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Report No: 151, April 2013<br />
DEMOCRACY PROCESS AND PROBLEMS<br />
IN IRAQI KURDISTAN<br />
IRAK KÜRDİSTAN BÖLGESİ’NDE<br />
DEMOKRASİ SÜRECİ VE SORUNLARI<br />
CENTER FOR Ortadoğu MIDDLE Stratejik EASTERN Araştırmalar STRATEGIC Merkezi STUDIES<br />
ORTADOĞU STRATEJİK ARAŞTIRMALAR MERKEZİ<br />
Center for Mıddle Eastern Strategıc Studıes<br />
مركز الشرق األوسط للدراسات االستراتيجية<br />
ORSAM<br />
CENTER FOR MIDDLE EASTERN STRATEGIC STUDIES
DEMOCRACY PROCESS AND PROBLEMS<br />
IN IRAQI KURDISTAN<br />
IRAK KÜRDİSTAN BÖLGESİ’NDE<br />
DEMOKRASİ SÜRECİ VE SORUNLARI<br />
ORSAM Report No: 151<br />
April 2013<br />
ISBN: 978-605-4615-48-3<br />
Ankara - TURKEY ORSAM © 2013<br />
Content of this report is copyrighted to ORSAM. Except reasonable and partial quotation and exploitation under the Act No.<br />
5846, Law on Intellectual and Artistic Works, via proper citation, may not be used or re-published without prior permission by<br />
ORSAM. Assessments expressed in this report reflect only the opinions of its authors and do not represent the instiutional<br />
opinion of ORSAM.
ORSAM<br />
center for mıddle eastern strategıc studıes<br />
Strategıc Informatıon Management and<br />
Indepentdent Thought Productıon<br />
CENTER FOR MIDDLE EASTERN STRATEGIC STUDIES<br />
History<br />
In Turkey, the shortage of research on the Middle East grew more conspicuous than ever during<br />
the early 90’s. Center for Middle Eastern Strategic Studies (ORSAM) was established in January<br />
1, 2009 in order to provide relevant information to the general public and to the foreign<br />
policy community. The institute underwent an intensive structuring process, beginning to concentrate<br />
exclusively on Middle affairs.<br />
Outlook on the Middle Eastern World<br />
It is certain that the Middle East harbors a variety of interconnected problems. However, neither<br />
the Middle East nor its people ought to be stigmatized by images with negative connotations.<br />
Given the strength of their populations, Middle Eastern states possess the potential to<br />
activate their inner dynamics in order to begen peaceful mobilizations for development. Respect<br />
for people’s willingness to live together, respect for the sovereign right of states and respect<br />
for basic human rights and individual freedoms are the prerequisities for assuring peace and<br />
tranquility, both domesticalhly and internationally. In this con<strong>text</strong>, Turkey must continue to<br />
make constructive contributions to the establishment of regional stability and prosperity in its<br />
vicinity.<br />
ORSAM’s Think-Tank Research<br />
ORSAM, provides the general public and decision-making organizations with enlightening information<br />
about international politics in order to promote a healtier understanding of international<br />
policy issues and to help them to adopt appropriate positions. In order to present effective<br />
solutions, ORSAM supports high quality research by intellectuals and researchers that are competent<br />
in a variety of disciplines. ORSAM’s strong publishing capacity türansmits meticulous<br />
analyses of regional developments and trends to the interested parties. With its web site, its<br />
books, reports, and periodicals, ORSAM supports the development of Middle Eastern literature<br />
on a national and international scale. ORSAM supports the development of Middle Eastern<br />
literature on a national and international scala. ORSAM facilitates the sharing of knowledge<br />
and ideas with the Turkish and international communities by inviting statesmen, bureaucrats,<br />
academics, strategicts, businessmen, journalists, and NGO representatives to Turkey.<br />
www.<strong>orsam</strong>.org.tr
Yusuf Muhammad Sadiq<br />
He graduated from the department of Law and Political Sciences, Salahaddin University<br />
in Arbil in 2001. He did his masters degree in 2007 in the Faculty of Political Sciences at<br />
Nahrain University, in Baghdad. Nowadays, he continues his PhD on “Factors Affecting<br />
the Politics of the Future of Kurdistan” at University of Sulaymaniyah. Also, he works as<br />
a faculty member in the department of Political Sciences at University of Sulaymaniyah.<br />
Sadık, who is the founder of the chamber of political coordinatorship, worked as the<br />
coordinator of Board of Trustees of Kurdish Institute for Elections. He has been the<br />
member of board of trustees of the Center for Human Rights and Democracy Development<br />
since 2008, and the member of Coordination Committee of Opposition Parties<br />
since 2011. He still works as the Coordinator of Research Department of the Gorran<br />
Movement (Movement for Change).
PRESENTATION<br />
ORSAM attaches great importance to studies that are based on field search and observations on<br />
site as a part of its working principles. Therefore, in addition to the field search carried out by<br />
ORSAM specialists, ORSAM also gives weight to publications including the opinions of those<br />
who are specialists in their field in their own geographies.<br />
This report is an important study including observations, analyses, evaluation, and perspectives<br />
of specialists, who live abroad, on their own regions. This report entitled, “Democracy Process<br />
and Problems in Iraqi Kurdistan” contributes to Iraqi studies which is one of the major issues<br />
that ORSAM attaches importance to. The report puts forward the political process in Iraqi Kurdistan,<br />
which is of direct interest to Turkey, from past to present; and also it reflects the views<br />
of an academician who live in Iraqi Kurdistan in terms of its internal politics. In this respect, a<br />
detailed perspective is put forward on the past political process of Iraqi Kurdistan from inside.<br />
Furthermore, it is also extremely important in terms of setting forth the challenges and obstacles<br />
that Iraqi Kurdistan is facing today in democratization and political development process. Besides,<br />
the fact that it also includes solution offers to eliminate challenges and obstacles before the<br />
political process that Iraqi Kurdistan has been going through increases the value of the report.<br />
We hope that this study will be helpful for our readers who are interested in the subject.<br />
Hasan Kanbolat<br />
ORSAM Director<br />
4<br />
ORSAM<br />
Report No: 151, April 2013
Contents<br />
Presentation.............................................................................................................................................4<br />
Abstract.....................................................................................................................................................7<br />
1. POLITICAL SYSTEM IN KURDISTAN REGIONAL GOVERNMENT..............................9<br />
1.1. Administrative System in Iraqi Kurdistan............................................................................9<br />
1.2. Position of KDP and PUK in Political System of Iraqi Kurdistan....................................11<br />
2 CHALLENGES OF THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IN IRAQI KURDISTAN..................14<br />
2.1. Lack of Constitution..................................................................................................................15<br />
2.2. Deficiency of Rule of Law.........................................................................................................15<br />
2.3. Violation of Human Rights, Public Freedoms, and Freedom of Expression..................15<br />
2.4. Election Violations.....................................................................................................................16<br />
2.5. Multi-Party System and Peaceful Transfer of the Government.......................................17<br />
3. CONSEQUENCES AND SUGGESTIONS...................................................................................18<br />
ORSAM<br />
Report No: 151, April 2013 5
ORSAM Report No: 151, April 2013<br />
By<br />
: Yusuf Muhammet Sadık<br />
Translated by : Aytekin Enver,<br />
ORSAM Middle East Research Assistantı<br />
ORSAM<br />
ORSAM<br />
CENTER FOR MIDDLE EASTERN STRATEGIC STUDIES<br />
DEMOCRACY PROCESS AND<br />
PROBLEMS IN IRAQI KURDISTAN<br />
Abstract<br />
- Injustice, inequity, genocide, nationalism and disrespect to human rights by dictator regimes successively<br />
coming into power in Iraq led to 1991 March (Azar) uprising, objection of Kurdish populations to live under<br />
those regimes, and also led them to form democratic regime in the region.<br />
- The constitution project of the region was not accepted. However, the laws of the constitution project which<br />
regulate the articles especially on the relationship between executive and legislative organs and also which<br />
regulate the authorities of speaker and head of the region indicates that broad authorities were given to the<br />
head of the region by making concessions from the parliamentary regime.<br />
- In 1992 general elections, Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) were<br />
the only political parties in the region which received more than 7 per cent of the votes, and entered the<br />
parliament. This situation led these two political parties (KDP and PUK) to split the ministries 50-50 among<br />
themselves.<br />
- The lack of constitutional document, which clearly designates the relationship between citizens, political<br />
parties and the government as well as the relationship between legislative, executive and judicial powers, is<br />
one of the most important political problems of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).<br />
- The reports of civilian institutions which monitors judicial organs within KRG reveal a great number of<br />
judicial violations and deficiency of the rule of law. These reports point out the interventions of government,<br />
security forces, political parties, tribes and individuals to jurisdiction. This situation further increases political<br />
and social violence, as well as political and social conflicts in the region.<br />
- Although there are lots of political parties within KRG and the freedom to found political party exists, there<br />
is no such thing as party pluralism.<br />
- Civilian democratic system foundations should be laid in the region. Within this scope, the KRG Constitution<br />
Project should be revised and a balance should be established among executive, legislative and judicial<br />
organs to fix the violations within the parliamentary system in order to form a national consensus.<br />
- In order to prevent further civil wars, political armed violence and to create an environment that supports<br />
peaceful rivalry among all political parties in the region, it is required to reorganize armed, security and<br />
intelligence forces in the region in a professional way based on national foundations away from party and<br />
political affiliations.<br />
- It is necessary to develop effective, objective, independent mechanisms and judicial institutions which provide<br />
the rule of law. Those institutions and mechanisms should completely respect the judicial system, and the<br />
reliability should be provided.<br />
- In order to eliminate injustices, the use of administrative and judicial methods which respect administrative<br />
and judicial decisions of state mechanisms, administrative representatives and member of the public and<br />
which guarantee their rights should be based on parity.<br />
- It is necessary to guarantee fundamental rights of the citizens such to demonstrate, freedom of expression<br />
and freedom of press through law, and also it is required to amend laws that conflict with it.<br />
- The public force and state institutions should not be used against the opposition parties in political conflicts<br />
in order to reinforce the political pluralism in the region. Appropriation should be allocated for political parties<br />
within KRG based on transparency and equitable principles.<br />
ORSAM<br />
Report No: 151, April 2013 7
ORSAM<br />
CENTER FOR MIDDLE EASTERN STRATEGIC STUDIES<br />
Introduction<br />
The administrative experience of Iraqi Kurdistan<br />
started as a result of the fact that the<br />
people in the region no longer wanted to live<br />
under the rule of former Iraqi regime following<br />
the popular uprising that took place on<br />
March 1991. In the past, the people did not<br />
ask for such a thing. Because the aforesaid<br />
regimes had committed horrible murders<br />
against these people by encroaching their<br />
political, national and humanitarian rights in<br />
an environment of deprivation and tyranny.<br />
Such that, these murders had almost reached<br />
genocide level in the Halabja and Anfal operation.<br />
Therefore, the people in KRG surged<br />
into neighboring countries on late March and<br />
early April 1991, after the Iraqi troops returned<br />
to Kurdish regions. As a result of this, the<br />
international community intervened and decided<br />
to form safe zones in northern Iraq for<br />
Kurds. After the Iraqi regime took a decision<br />
for all political, military and civilian state institutions<br />
and organizations to withdraw from<br />
Sulaymaniya, Erbil and Duhok on October<br />
1991, “de facto” administrations emerged in<br />
the areas where Kurds seized control. Those<br />
steps encouraged Kurdish political parties to<br />
fill the authority gap and establish a democratic<br />
political regime based on the votes of<br />
electors in the areas under their own control.<br />
The first democratic election was held on<br />
May 1992 to elect the leader of National Assembly<br />
and Kurdish liberation movement for<br />
the administration of the areas where Kurds<br />
seize control. As a result of this election, the<br />
government was established and civilian and<br />
judicial institutions and organizations started<br />
to be created in the region. However, the civil<br />
war and conflicts between the two major<br />
parties; Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)<br />
and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) prevented<br />
further development of this young democratic<br />
experience. As a result, autonomous<br />
Iraqi Kurdistan was divided into two parts,<br />
each controlled by different political parties.<br />
At this point, analyzing the problems before<br />
the democratic process besides the political<br />
system in Iraqi Kurdistan, and solution to be<br />
offered to these problems becomes important.<br />
The Reason of the Research<br />
This research strives to shed light on the political<br />
system that emerged as a result of the<br />
transition that took place in early 1990s, set<br />
of this system in the following process, and<br />
the factors that ruined the democratic view<br />
here. To that end, a series of questions will be<br />
strived to be answered. Some of these questions<br />
might be listed as follows: What is the<br />
administrative structure of Iraqi Kurdistan? Is<br />
this a parliamentary system, or a presidential<br />
system? How does it affect the democratic<br />
process in the region? What is the impact of<br />
the relations among political parties, especially<br />
the relations between KDP and PUK<br />
which are two parties in power, on administrative<br />
institutions and organizations in the<br />
region? What are the most important reflections<br />
and setbacks of the democratic system<br />
in the region?<br />
Hypothesis of the Research<br />
Besides these main problems, some secondary<br />
questions will be strived to be answered<br />
through hypothesis: “The democratic process<br />
under the influence of relations between the<br />
two political parties in power within KRG<br />
is faced with a series of problems, and these<br />
problems lead to eviscerating the real content<br />
that would provide the public interest”.<br />
Research Method<br />
Descriptive method will be used to prove the<br />
main hypothesis of the research and to explain<br />
the most important characteristics of the<br />
8<br />
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Report No: 151, April 2013
DEMOCRACY PROCESS AND PROBLEMS IN IRAQI KURDISTAN<br />
ORSAM<br />
administrative system in the region. Similarly,<br />
to learn the primary inputs and outputs of the<br />
political process in KRG, systematic method<br />
will be used.<br />
Structure of the Research<br />
The research was divided in two parts. In the<br />
first part, the structure of political system in<br />
the region will be handled by putting forward<br />
the structure of the administrative system in<br />
the region, as well as the position of two parties<br />
in power and their impact on the political<br />
order and the institutions in the region. In the<br />
second part, on the other hand, the problems<br />
before the democratic process in the region<br />
will be addressed.<br />
1. POLITICAL SYSTEM IN KURDISTAN<br />
REGIONAL GOVERNMENT<br />
Political system is the whole constitutional<br />
principles, laws, political structure, institutions<br />
and mechanisms, which are used by<br />
the regime to put forward its will, and from<br />
which the state takes its presence and continuity<br />
1 . We are going to try to know the political<br />
system in KRG by dealing with the administrative<br />
system, political parties, their relationship,<br />
and the impact of these relations on<br />
the political regime in the region. Thus, it will<br />
be possible to address the most important<br />
problems that the democratic process in the<br />
region has been faced with in the following<br />
section of the study.<br />
1.1. Administrative System in Iraqi<br />
Kurdistan<br />
What is meant by the administrative system<br />
is the relationship between the administrative<br />
system and powers, especially legislative and<br />
executive powers, in KRG. In general, this<br />
relationship is regulated through constitutions<br />
which put forward how to shape the relationship<br />
among themselves by designating<br />
the authorities and responsibilities of both<br />
powers.<br />
The draft constitution of KRG has not yet<br />
been finalized. The Article 6 of the KRG constitution<br />
law dated 2008 and numbered 16 envisages<br />
to put the constitution to the vote of<br />
KRG citizens after being adopted by majority<br />
of the members of parliament.<br />
The draft constitution of the Kurdistan region<br />
was prepared by a special commission that<br />
had been created in accordance with the decision<br />
dated 8 September 2005 and numbered<br />
5 2 of the KRG Parliament. This commission<br />
was composed of academicians, jurists and<br />
members of the parliament. 3 When the draft<br />
constitution 4 was presented to KRG parliament<br />
on 24 June 2009, it was accepted with<br />
more than two thirds of the votes of members<br />
of the parliament. 5 However, the fact that the<br />
draft constitution was accepted when the second<br />
period was over poses problem in accordance<br />
with the Article 46 and Article 51 of the<br />
KRG Parliamentary Electoral Law. 6<br />
Besides all these, it is stated in the Article 1 of<br />
the aforesaid draft constitution that the political<br />
system in the region is a parliamentary,<br />
republican and a democratic system. 7 However,<br />
considering other articles of the draft,<br />
especially within the con<strong>text</strong> of the authorities<br />
of President of the region, it is seen that<br />
it was explicitly drifted apart from the parliamentary<br />
system. In some articles of the draft<br />
constitution, the President is envisaged to be<br />
elected through direct secret ballot by the<br />
people. 8 Within this con<strong>text</strong>, the President is<br />
given the authority to publish a decree or not<br />
in the following cases in addition to other authorities:<br />
9<br />
a– To form government after receiving the<br />
vote of confidence from the parliament,<br />
ORSAM<br />
Report No: 151, April 2013 9
ORSAM<br />
CENTER FOR MIDDLE EASTERN STRATEGIC STUDIES<br />
b– To discharge ministers from the office in<br />
case prime minister demands their resignation<br />
or the parliament removes the vote<br />
of confidence,<br />
c– To assign the members of the constitutional<br />
court after the parliament ratifies the<br />
candidates,<br />
d– To assign judges, head of the judicial supervisory<br />
council, members and head of<br />
the prosecution service after the ratification<br />
of candidates by the jurisdiction in the<br />
region.<br />
e– To assign presidents of independent council<br />
and high council after the ratification of<br />
candidates by the parliament.<br />
f– To establish the offices of KRG abroad in<br />
coordination with the respective commission<br />
within the federal government and<br />
with the proposal of the head of government,<br />
g– To assign those with special rank through<br />
nomination by respective minister and<br />
approval of the council of ministers.<br />
Similarly, in accordance with the draft constitution,<br />
the President shall issue a decree and<br />
shall have the power to declare a state of emergency,<br />
after consulting with the Speaker of the<br />
Parliament and the Prime Minister of Kurdistan,<br />
and obtaining their consent. 10 Thus,<br />
granting such broad authorities to the President<br />
of the Region leads to deviation from<br />
the parliamentary system. 11 Besides, this draft<br />
constitution gives the authority to intervene<br />
in administrative system of the region, parliament,<br />
government and judiciary power 12<br />
to the President of the Region. Furthermore,<br />
except for certain cases, it is not monitored<br />
by the parliament (except for perjury of the<br />
constitutional oath, serious violation of the<br />
Constitution, or high treason). It brings along<br />
severe implementations. In other words, they<br />
are impeached only by a vote of a majority of<br />
two-thirds of the members the Members of<br />
Parliament. 13 However, in accordance with<br />
the constitutional law, this situation conflicts<br />
with the basic principles of the parliamentary<br />
system. 14<br />
Deviation from the parliamentary system<br />
is explicitly seen in laws regulating judicial<br />
power and executive power, and which are<br />
recognized as constitutional laws in the absence<br />
of constitution. In accordance with the<br />
Article 56 dated 1992 and numbered 1 of the<br />
Electoral Law of KRG Parliament, by granting<br />
vote of confidence or no-confidence to<br />
the government, parliament shall monitor the<br />
government (This situation is a clear evidence<br />
for the parliamentary system). The KRG<br />
Presidential Law dated 2005 and numbered<br />
1 gives broad authorities to President of the<br />
Region, similar to the draft constitution of the<br />
Region. 15 However, there is no judicial power<br />
or parliamentary control to monitor the actions<br />
of the President. In addition, the President<br />
of the Region was also given the title of<br />
Head of the Regional Security Council in accordance<br />
with the KRG Security Council Law.<br />
This council has the authority to intervene in<br />
the following fields; economy, politics, diplomacy,<br />
security, intelligence, political parties,<br />
health, trade, communication, information<br />
systems. 16<br />
Deviation from the parliamentary system<br />
leads to monopolizing powers without any<br />
control or monitoring. This situation might<br />
lead to emergence of a dictatorial regime. 17<br />
Similarly, just like during the period of former<br />
President Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, the<br />
President might use his power and authorities<br />
in a way to serve the party’s and personal interests.<br />
18 This deviation again leads to elimination<br />
of mutual flexible balance and control<br />
10<br />
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Report No: 151, April 2013
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ORSAM<br />
between legislative and executive powers. 19<br />
And this is considered as the most typical<br />
characteristics of the parliamentary system. 20<br />
Here, it is necessary to mention the political<br />
party experience in the region in order to show<br />
KRG’s administrative experience. Because it<br />
is quite hard to consider administrative institutions<br />
separately from the political parties in<br />
the region, because the aforesaid institutions<br />
were extremely affected by the relationship<br />
among political parties, especially by the relations<br />
between KDP and PUK. 21 As a matter of<br />
fact, the conflicts, wars and alliances between<br />
the aforesaid political parties directly affected<br />
the parliament and the regional government.<br />
1.2. Position of KDP and PUK in Political<br />
System of Iraqi Kurdistan<br />
The political parties in KRG started to appear<br />
in parallel with the increasing number of groups<br />
taking part in the armed struggle against<br />
the former regime. Those political parties,<br />
except for the Islamic Movement 22 , were gathered<br />
under the umbrella of the KRG front. 23<br />
However, the aforesaid parties’ role became<br />
weaker as they did not have seat within the<br />
KRG National Council and no other parties<br />
except for KDP and PUK could not enter the<br />
council due to the fact that other political parties<br />
could not pass the 7-percent threshold 24 .<br />
This situation led two major parties KDP and<br />
PUK to prevail in the political platform for a<br />
long time.<br />
On 22 May 1992, KDP and PUK agreed on<br />
sharing all authorities based on 50-50 sharing<br />
all authorities within the government and<br />
National Council as well as the seats within<br />
the National Council. However, five seats<br />
which had been allocated for Christians in<br />
the Assembly were excluded, and other parties<br />
which lost the elections were consoled 25<br />
with some ministries. 26 The first meeting of<br />
the Parliament of the Region was held in Erbil<br />
on 4 June 1992. In the aforesaid meeting,<br />
Jawhar Namiq Salim from KDP was elected<br />
as the president of the Kurdistan National Assembly,<br />
and Muhammad Tawfiq Rahim from<br />
PUK was elected as the vice-president of the<br />
Assembly. Also, Dr. Ruz Nouri Shavis from<br />
KDP was assigned as deputy prime minister<br />
when the first government in Kurdistan Region<br />
was formed by the leadership of Dr. Fuat<br />
Masum from PUK on 4 July 1992. 27 Meanwhile,<br />
the Assyrian Democratic Movement,<br />
Communist Party, Labour Party and Union<br />
Party gained a ministry each. 28 On the other<br />
hand, the Islamic Movement refused to enter<br />
in government and stayed out of the regional<br />
government and National Assembly. 29<br />
Formation of the regional government is considered<br />
as a historical step for Kurds in general,<br />
and for Iraqi Kurds in particular. Because<br />
Kurds had the opportunity to form a government<br />
only twice in history. The first one is the<br />
government that was formed by Sheikh Mahmoud<br />
in 1922, and subverted as a result of<br />
the British attack within less than a year. The<br />
second experience, on the other hand, took<br />
place in 1946 during the Kadi Muhammad<br />
period. However, this government could not<br />
last even a year either, and was subverted as<br />
a result of Iranian army’s attack on Mahabad<br />
which was the capital of the Kurdish Republic.<br />
30<br />
Thus, the Kurdistan Regional Government<br />
achieved to fill the political administrative<br />
and economic gap that emerged as result of<br />
the withdrawal of former political regime in<br />
Iraq from Kurdish regions. The government<br />
created an umbrella for volunteer schools, Seladdin<br />
University in Erbil, hospital and similar<br />
public institutions and organizations. Likewise,<br />
other governments that were formed following<br />
this government established political,<br />
financial and administrative institutions and<br />
organizations, and provided services.<br />
ORSAM<br />
Report No: 151, April 2013 11
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CENTER FOR MIDDLE EASTERN STRATEGIC STUDIES<br />
As mentioned above, KDP and PUK reached<br />
an agreement to 50-50 share the power in<br />
the region. This sharing spread into ministries<br />
and institutions. Because the government<br />
was double-headed which was composed of<br />
Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister. It<br />
was also the same for ministries. Deputy minister<br />
had the same administrative, financial<br />
and legal rights with minister. This situation<br />
paralyzed the decision-making mechanism<br />
within the government and ministries, and<br />
also led to a major administrative setback. 31<br />
The fifty-fifty sharing system led to a total<br />
split between the two parties in the con<strong>text</strong> of<br />
government and administration. This situation<br />
led to both a total split of the region, and<br />
also civil wars to be mentioned in the forthcoming<br />
part of the study.<br />
This was an unprecedented experience and<br />
led to the following consequences: 32<br />
a– While the setback of the formation of a<br />
united administration in the region led<br />
each ministries to split into two de facto<br />
ministries, it also led to a split among employees<br />
under two major parties.<br />
b– In addition to the planning for the future<br />
while the citizens encountered setbacks,<br />
there was also a setback in terms of the financial<br />
development.<br />
c– While this situation led to a rupture among<br />
the people and in the country, loyalty to<br />
country turned into loyalty to the party.<br />
d– As it had already been planned, some setbacks<br />
took place in holding elections.<br />
e–As a result, this experience led to a strong<br />
polarization in the region. And thus, the<br />
region was dragged into a civil war. 33<br />
In addition to financial conflicts 34 caused by<br />
double-headed government and administration,<br />
some other factors led Kurds in<br />
Iraq to be dragged into a civil war. Those<br />
reasons might be listed as follows:<br />
- Presence of militia forces affiliated to political<br />
parties 35 ,<br />
- Same old conflicts and disputes between<br />
KDP and the Leader of KDP Massoud Barzani,<br />
and PUK and Secretary General of<br />
PUK Jalal Talabani 36 ,<br />
- Destructive role of the former Iraqi regime<br />
37 ,<br />
- Deepening internal conflicts caused by<br />
direct of indirect interventions of neighboring<br />
countries, of Iran and Turkey 38 in<br />
particular.<br />
Those factors caused to the outbreak of war<br />
between KDP and PUK and the allies that are<br />
members of other Kurdish parties 39 . The first<br />
sparkle took place in Kaladize village on the<br />
borderline under the administration of Sulaymaniya.<br />
The dispute on property of various<br />
lands in this city led to the outbreak of conflict<br />
between supporters and members of the<br />
two parties (KDP and PUK) on 2 May 1994.<br />
The conflicts spread to Duhok, Sulaymaniya,<br />
Halabja and other areas before long. 40 The ongoing<br />
conflicts gave an opportunity for both<br />
the central Iraqi government in Baghdad and<br />
also neighboring countries to directly or indirectly<br />
intervene in the internal affairs of the<br />
region, and to help the warring factions. Such<br />
that, the conflict reached a point where Iraqi<br />
Republican Guards entered the territories<br />
of Erbil on 31 August 1996 at the request of<br />
KDP, and as a result, PUK was displaced from<br />
Erbil. 41 Afterwards, without loss of time, KDP<br />
relaunched National Assembly meetings of<br />
the Iraqi Kurdistan Region. Concordantly, the<br />
coalition government was formed under the<br />
leadership of Ruz Nuri Shawiz also with the<br />
participation of political parties such as; Iraqi<br />
Kurdistan Islamic Movement, Iraqi Kurdistan<br />
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Islamic Union, and Communist Party. PUK,<br />
on the other hand, did not take part in this<br />
government and formed a government with<br />
the participation of its allies such as Labour<br />
Party, Social Democratic Party under the leadership<br />
of Kosrat Resoul in the areas under<br />
its own control. 42<br />
The Iraqi Kurdistan Region, which had already<br />
been split into three regions as a result<br />
of internal conflicts, was further split in political<br />
and administrative terms. The region<br />
under the control of KDP included the majority<br />
of Duhok and Erbil. The region under<br />
the control of PUK, on the other hand, included<br />
eastern Arbil with Köysancak and the<br />
areas liberated from Kirkuk in addition to<br />
Sulaymaniya. The third region included Halabja<br />
and its neighborhood under the control<br />
of Kurdistan Islamic Movement. 43 Following<br />
this geographic, political and administrative<br />
split, judiciary split took place after PUK<br />
Secretary General Jalal Talabani was elected<br />
as the President of the Region in 1999 in the<br />
region under the control of PUK and court<br />
of appeal was created. 44 This profound split<br />
decreased the possibility of institutionalization<br />
of Kurds’ administrative experience. And<br />
this situation weakened the worries of neighboring<br />
countries. Thus, the countries in the<br />
region started not to attach much importance<br />
to developments on Kurds in Iraq. 45 However,<br />
at the end, the process of reunification of the<br />
region started as from the end of 2002 as a<br />
result of the Washington Peace Agreement 46<br />
that was signed between Jalal Talabani and<br />
Massoud Barzani in 1998 via the then-U.S.<br />
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright<br />
The first step was taken by reuniting KRG<br />
National Assembly which held its first joint<br />
session on 4 October 2002. However, 47 the<br />
regional government could be reunited on 7<br />
May 2006, only after 31 January 2005 when<br />
the second term election of the KRG National<br />
Assembly was held. 48 This delay on formation<br />
of the joint government stemmed from the<br />
dispute on how the authorities would be distributed<br />
in the region. By the way, there was<br />
also the issue of distributing shares in public<br />
authorities among Kurds in Baghdad. Finally,<br />
both parties reached an agreement. In accordance<br />
with the agreement, the government<br />
was united at high level (prime minister and<br />
deputy prime minister) and a double-headed<br />
government was formed. The government<br />
would be assigned by the parliament on the<br />
basis of partnership. The government would<br />
be formed by the President of the Region. Besides,<br />
parties also reached an agreement on<br />
gradual unification of ministries within the<br />
regional government also at high level. In accordance<br />
with the agreement, the authorities<br />
such as prime minister, deputy prime minister<br />
and ministries were split fifty-fifty between<br />
KDP and PUK as before. However, some<br />
authorities were given to political parties<br />
such as Kurdistan Islamic Union, Kurdistan<br />
Islamic Group, Kurdistan Communist Party,<br />
Social Democratic Party, and Labor Party<br />
which took part in the second term of the<br />
regional parliament. Prime Minister, Deputy<br />
Prime Minister and ministries were agreed to<br />
be elected every two years. Thus, a different<br />
formula was used to split the administration<br />
among the parties. This time, the government<br />
was equally shared; one under the presidency<br />
of the prime minister, and the other under<br />
the presidency of the deputy prime minister.<br />
While this agreement between KDP and<br />
PUK developed between the two parties, they<br />
signed a new strategic agreement on 27 July<br />
2007, and thus, they joined their views and<br />
efforts both in the region and in Baghdad and<br />
agreed for both electoral periods until 2013<br />
on how to share the administration at two levels.<br />
49 In this con<strong>text</strong>, Minister of Finance of<br />
the regional government gave a speech in the<br />
parliament on 21 December 2011, and said;<br />
“the regional government is double-headed.<br />
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You all know this fact. We don’t need to hide<br />
it”. In the same speech, it was stated that “the<br />
budget coming from Baghdad was shared<br />
between Sulaymaniya and Germiyan administration<br />
(43 per cent) and Arbil and Duhok<br />
administration (57 per cent) until 21 December<br />
2010. 50<br />
Based on all these, we can suggest that the<br />
disagreement on sharing the administration<br />
and the problems stemming from the sharing<br />
system between parties paralyzed institutionalization<br />
of the political system in the<br />
region. Also, Kurdish parties led to a civil<br />
war especially between KDP and PUK. This<br />
situation led to a split among Kurdish political<br />
parties, especially between KDP and PUK<br />
in the con<strong>text</strong> of government, administration<br />
and jurisdiction. Also, the end of conflicts<br />
between the aforesaid political parties paved<br />
the way for the reunification of government<br />
at high level. However, party interests prevented<br />
the unification of two administrations<br />
in the region. Despite the fact that elections<br />
were held in the region for two periods and<br />
also three-period elections were held at federal<br />
level after the end of civil war between<br />
the aforesaid parties, both political parties do<br />
their best to maintain the current situation.<br />
Nevertheless, negative consequences of this<br />
equation in the con<strong>text</strong> of sharing the administration<br />
between the parties, as well as the<br />
widespread corruption and problems in democratic<br />
process led to a civilian tendency<br />
at public level to make a reform to improve<br />
the political system in the region in terms of<br />
its structure. It also made it possible for the<br />
Change (Gorran) Movement to appear in the<br />
region as a political opposition. 51<br />
2. CHALLENGES OF THE DEMOCRATIC<br />
PROCESS IN IRAQI KURDISTAN<br />
Democratic regimes have proved their success<br />
in the face of internal and foreign crises<br />
and risks throughout centuries. For instance,<br />
democratic regimes won the World War<br />
I and II in the West, and also during the Cold<br />
War, they achieved success against totalitarian-authoritarian<br />
regimes such as Monarchies,<br />
Nazism, Fascism and Communism. At the<br />
same time, those democratic regimes achieved<br />
dealing with internal political and economic<br />
challenges, solving crises. Thus, it made it<br />
possible to turn the developments that led to<br />
collapse of other regimes into an advantage.<br />
The collapse of Communist regimes in Eastern<br />
Europe and the split of the Soviet Union<br />
has been a big lesson in this terms.<br />
Mechanisms and primary elements of democratic<br />
regime such as freedom of expression,<br />
political pluralism, peaceful government<br />
change give opportunity to quickly see deficiencies<br />
and mistakes, as well as coming up<br />
with political programmes and successful<br />
solution of political and civilian parties, and<br />
also alternative programmes to the suggestions<br />
of other parties. So that, this process leads<br />
to elimination of deficiencies and mistakes,<br />
to development and renovation almost in<br />
each election period. Also, these mechanisms<br />
bring along political stability in the long term<br />
as they create an environment to solve and<br />
manage internal political conflicts through<br />
peaceful methods, and they give equal opportunities<br />
to those conflicting with one another<br />
to come into power by gaining public consent<br />
and pleasure.<br />
Establishing a real democratic regime in the<br />
region enables establishing political stability,<br />
and improving economic and social development.<br />
Besides, it also helps reinforcing political<br />
power in a way to use current international<br />
and regional opportunities in the future<br />
to reach the goals and to get rid of potential<br />
threats. But the democratic process encounters<br />
major challenges in the region. And this<br />
situation weakens its relations with the outside<br />
and also leads to internal instabilities.<br />
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Important challenges are mentioned below<br />
by pointing out the democratic factors in administrative<br />
experience in the region.<br />
2.1. Lack of Constitution<br />
In democratic regimes, constitution serves<br />
as a social contract between individuals and<br />
the state to establish the rules of democratic<br />
game, to limit the absolute power of administrators,<br />
to establish peaceful methods<br />
and mechanisms for the transfer of power,<br />
to protect and guarantee personal rights and<br />
freedoms. In other words, coming up with a<br />
constitution and to abide by the constitution<br />
paves the way for maintaining the other characteristics<br />
of democratic regime. 52<br />
The lack of constitutional document, which<br />
clearly designates the relationship between<br />
citizens, political parties and the government<br />
as well as the relationship between legislative,<br />
executive and judicial powers, is one of<br />
the most important political problems of the<br />
Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). This<br />
situation led to lack of administration experience<br />
in the region, ambiguous limits of the<br />
authorities of three powers, unequal power<br />
distribution among the three powers, stronger<br />
power of three political parties than the<br />
other three parties, deterioration of the government<br />
between those two parties in power,<br />
and to an armed conflict between the<br />
two parties.<br />
Also, there are many inequalities in the aforementioned<br />
constitution project. It appears<br />
that the authorities of the president of the region<br />
within the scope of this project was broadened<br />
to broaden the authorities of executive<br />
power at the cost of rights and freedoms<br />
of other authorities and citizens. As already<br />
mentioned before, this project gives brad authorities<br />
to the president of the region that<br />
would make it possible for him to meddle in<br />
government, parliament and jurisdiction. 53<br />
2.2 Deficiency of Rule of Law<br />
The rule of law is considered as one of the<br />
backbones and foundations of contemporary<br />
democracy. It is such a foundation that it is<br />
believed the democracy mechanism would<br />
not work without it. 54 Hence, it is important<br />
to find independent, objective and effective<br />
judicial institutions and control mechanisms<br />
to guarantee the rule of law. It is expected<br />
from those institutions and mechanisms to<br />
provide respect for law, to increase credibility<br />
of transactions, and to eliminate injustices. In<br />
order to eliminate injustices, the use of administrative<br />
and judicial methods which respect<br />
administrative and judicial decisions of state<br />
mechanisms, administrative representatives<br />
and members of the public and which guarantee<br />
their rights should be based on parity. 55<br />
The report of a non-governmental organization<br />
called the “American Society for Kurds”<br />
points out violation of the rule of law in KRG.<br />
Some of them can be listed as follows: that<br />
security forces and the police judge prisoners,<br />
acting slowly in concluding some cases,<br />
changing information in documents and files<br />
of certain issues that are not concluded, weak<br />
position of courts in the face of some issues<br />
related to two parties in power or tribes,<br />
physical and psychological torture against<br />
suspects, pressure and threat on judges, not<br />
performing the decision taken by judges in<br />
certain cases, delays in following the proceedings<br />
by judges of authorized courts, some<br />
judges’ adhering to the parties in power and<br />
giving verdicts in favor of the parties in power.<br />
56<br />
2.3. Violation of Human Rights, Public<br />
Freedoms, and Freedom of Expression<br />
Human rights is the cornerstone of democracy.<br />
57 In other words, it is unimaginable to<br />
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consider a democratic regime without a respect<br />
to fundamental rights of citizens. The<br />
strong bond between democracy and human<br />
rights is not recent. The Article 21 of the Universal<br />
Declaration of Human Rights suggests<br />
that; “The will of the people shall be the basis<br />
of the authority of government”. 58 What is<br />
meant by this statement based on the bilateral<br />
relationship between the state and individual<br />
is that protecting human rights, reaching democracy<br />
and a democratic regime is a part of<br />
the fundamental rights of the people.<br />
On the other hand, democracy presumes that<br />
there is a freedom of opinion and expression<br />
including the absence of an obstacle or influence<br />
in accepting an idea, and the right to<br />
publish an idea or thought without changing<br />
it or limiting ideas with obstacles. 59<br />
Also, media organs are considered as an important<br />
means to express criticisms about<br />
the deficiencies in government agencies in<br />
democratic regimes. In addition to this, it<br />
might be asserted that is an important means<br />
to raise awareness among citizens, to form<br />
free platforms for political disputes, to create<br />
public opinion and exert pressure to eliminate<br />
problems and deficiencies. 60<br />
The fundamental rights of citizens such as<br />
to stage demonstration are violated in KRG.<br />
Although this right is found within the Iraqi<br />
constitution 61 , in accordance with the relevant<br />
law of KRG, to stage demonstration depends<br />
on the approval of executive and administrative<br />
organs. Thus, the right to stage demonstration<br />
was limited. 62 The international<br />
reports point out violation of various human<br />
rights such as; torture, illegal arbitrary detentions,<br />
forcing citizens to become members<br />
of the two parties in power, security forces’<br />
killing and injuring civilians who staged demonstrations.<br />
63<br />
As for the freedom of expression and press,<br />
many independent and semi-independent<br />
journals, magazines, radio and TV channels<br />
have emerged since 2000. Although press law<br />
was introduced by the Regional Parliament,<br />
there are many violations in this field as well.<br />
The Metro Center to defend the rights of journalists,<br />
prepared the most critical report<br />
on the press rights in 2011 since the establishment<br />
of KRG. In 2011, the Center recorded<br />
359 cases of violations in different forms;<br />
four of which were injuries by gun fire, 8 cases<br />
of setting fire to media offices and channels,<br />
85 cases of physical abuse, 57 cases of verbal<br />
threats. 64<br />
2.4. Election Violations<br />
One of the most important elements of democracy<br />
is free and just elections held regularly<br />
where the people would show their own<br />
will. Each elector should be able to vote for<br />
the one that would represent himself/herself<br />
under the principles of transparency, freedom<br />
and equality. To that end, elections should<br />
be based on general, just and secret ballot<br />
basis. 65 But the elections are not the only part<br />
of democracy. Elections are just a component<br />
of democracy, but to make it a real one,<br />
the elections must be based on democratic<br />
foundations. And this should be done in accordance<br />
with equal opportunities, potential<br />
and means. Democracy which aims for the<br />
people to elect the person to rule themselves<br />
does not come to mean that the same group<br />
will always rule the other group. Accordingly,<br />
elections mean to elect, to participate in the<br />
elections, to be provided with opportunities<br />
and options to choose from. 66<br />
In order for the elections not to lose its meaning,<br />
goal and to provide democracy, some<br />
conditions considered essential are required<br />
to be provided. Those principles might be listed<br />
as follows: 67<br />
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- The peoples shall be provided with rights<br />
to elect, to be a candidate and to participate<br />
in the elections. This comes to mean<br />
that all citizens have the right to elect and<br />
to take part in public affairs.<br />
- Election procedures shall provide freedom<br />
to elect in terms of the majority of votes,<br />
equality among the people, secret balloting<br />
and right polling.<br />
- Elections shall be held on a regular and<br />
continuous basis for citizens to be able to<br />
elect their representatives, to take part in<br />
the political process, and to have a say in<br />
political decisions. 68<br />
- Elections shall be carried out with respect<br />
to fundamental rights of citizens.<br />
- For a truer and more comprehensive reflection<br />
of electoral will on elections results,<br />
electoral organizations shall be designated<br />
on an equitable basis.<br />
- In order to guarantee fair elections, the<br />
election process shall be controlled by an<br />
independent electoral commission, not by<br />
the state institutions. The decisions taken<br />
shall be open to objection in judicial authorities.<br />
- Elections shall be held based on fair competition.<br />
- Freedom shall be provided in electoral<br />
campaigns.<br />
Many violations and problems are witnessed<br />
in electoral field in KRG. For instance, none<br />
of the general elections have been held in<br />
time in accordance with electoral laws. The<br />
regional parliamentary elections were held in<br />
three electoral periods in 1992, 2005, 2009.<br />
The third period elections were held a couple<br />
of months later than the date assigned. A<br />
similar case also took place in provincial council<br />
elections that had been held only once<br />
until 2005.<br />
Aside from these, many other violations were<br />
made in the elections held in the region. Those<br />
violations especially took place in KRG<br />
Parliamentary elections held on 25 July 2009.<br />
Lots of violations and gerrymanders took place<br />
on the election day and during the electoral<br />
campaigns. Citizens were systematically<br />
oppressed due to their political affiliations. 69<br />
For example, many civil servants had to quit<br />
their jobs. 70 Those including deans and heads<br />
of department were discharged from their<br />
positions, 71 and many people from various<br />
departments were threatened 72 . Moreover,<br />
especially both in Arbil and Duhok, a largescale<br />
gerrymander took place on the election<br />
day. 73 There’s no doubt that it was aimed to<br />
change the will of electors as well as the election<br />
results by doing all these, and thus this<br />
situation prevented the reflection of true tendencies<br />
of electors on the results.<br />
2.5. Multi-Party System and Peaceful<br />
Transfer of the Government<br />
Political pluralism comes to mean that there<br />
are multiple political powers in a state, and<br />
that there is a peaceful rivalry 74 among those<br />
powers with equal opportunities. Within<br />
this con<strong>text</strong>, the success of a political party in<br />
a democratic regime depends on how much<br />
the people support its programme. It is required<br />
for all political parties and power to have<br />
equal opportunities to win the gratitude of<br />
electors. For instance, using the resources of<br />
government agencies for electoral campaigns,<br />
and spending public budget to win the votes<br />
of electors leads to a situation where some<br />
political parties can use state resources while<br />
other cannot. Equal opportunities among<br />
political parties cause political, economic and<br />
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social programmes in favor of electors to be<br />
the primary variable to come into power. This<br />
would lead the general interest to be put ahead<br />
of personal interests and the interests of<br />
political party.<br />
Although there are many political parties in<br />
the region and the formation of parties are regulated<br />
by law 75 , there is not exactly a multiparty<br />
system in the region. Because in parallel<br />
with the aforementioned reports, KDP and<br />
PUK which are the parties in power use the<br />
public budget and the resources of government<br />
agencies in the region in their election<br />
campaigns. 76<br />
Also, those two parties exert pressure on other<br />
parties. Sometimes, without cutting off<br />
financial aid, headquarters of other political<br />
parties are assaulted and set on fire. 77 Especially,<br />
these attacks take place especially in the<br />
region under the control of KDP. That’s why,<br />
almost a single-party system is seen in the regions<br />
where KDP and PUK are in control in<br />
KRG.<br />
Implementing peaceful democracy requires<br />
having constitutional, judicial, and political<br />
opportunities to peacefully transfer the power<br />
among the conflicting political parties.<br />
Because peacefully coming into power leads<br />
to an open political competition with broad,<br />
free popular participation without any discrimination.<br />
78<br />
The message sent to the party not voted aims<br />
to revise program and projects of the party.<br />
In this case, the party which loses the power<br />
and/or elections has to revise its program and<br />
projects. In addition to this, the party also<br />
has to reorganize its structure and to change<br />
some symbols. Hence, more active and new<br />
projects will be prepared for the next elections.<br />
From this point of view, this would lead<br />
to reorganization and restructuring of political<br />
parties in democratic regime.<br />
Also another message is sent to the party<br />
which wins the elections in peaceful transfer<br />
of the power: According to this message, the<br />
authorities given by the electors are not the<br />
absolute authorities. The message says that<br />
they will end up like the other party which<br />
loses, in case the promises given to electors<br />
are not kept and the public interest is not met.<br />
Based on this, peaceful transfer of the power<br />
leads to a dynamic and continuous renewal of<br />
the political process. Also it does not conflict<br />
with the public interest and puts it ahead of<br />
personal interests and the narrow interests of<br />
political party.<br />
Although the democratic system experience<br />
in KRG has been going on for more than two<br />
periods, its peaceful transfer of power has not<br />
yet been completed. Despite the change of<br />
position between KDP and PUK, neither of<br />
them has made a complete power transfer to<br />
the other one. Equal opportunities have not<br />
been provided for other parties and groups<br />
competing for the power, and they could not<br />
come into power despite winning the elections.<br />
Hence, as Molla Bahtiyar said in the political<br />
bureau elections of KDP, the most important<br />
question is; “Will KDP and PUK accept<br />
the electoral victory of any political party<br />
in the future, and voluntarily give the power<br />
to them? 79<br />
In conclusion, despite the existence of some<br />
elements of democracy such as elections, free<br />
media, presence of political parties etc., deficiencies<br />
and violations would prevent the democratic<br />
process in KRG from being completed.<br />
3. CONSEQUENCES AND<br />
SUGGESTIONS<br />
1. Consequences<br />
1. Injustice, inequity, genocide, nationalism<br />
and disrespect to human rights by dictator re-<br />
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gimes successively coming into power in Iraq<br />
led to 1991 March (Azar) uprising, objection<br />
of Kurdish populations to live under those regimes,<br />
and also led them to form democratic<br />
regime in the region. This situation helped<br />
the former regime withdraw all of its political,<br />
administrative and military institutions<br />
from Sulaymaniya, Arbil and Duhok. And<br />
this led to the first parliamentary elections of<br />
the regional government on May 1992 which<br />
is considered one of the most fair and democratic<br />
election in the Middle East despite some<br />
deficiencies and violations.<br />
2. The constitution project of KRG was not<br />
accepted. However, the laws of the constitution<br />
project which regulate the articles especially<br />
on the relationship between executive and<br />
legislative organs and also which regulate the<br />
authorities of speaker and head of the region<br />
indicates that broad authorities were given to<br />
the head of the region by making concessions<br />
from the parliamentary regime. This might<br />
lead a person to have all the authorities without<br />
any control of monitoring. This situation<br />
leads to emergence of dictatorial regimes<br />
in societies which are in the process of transition<br />
from totalitarian regime into a democratic<br />
regime. This might create an imbalance<br />
and loss of mutual control between legislative<br />
and executive organs that are considered as<br />
the most determinant characteristics of the<br />
parliamentary system.<br />
3. In 1992 general elections, Kurdistan Democratic<br />
Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of<br />
Kurdistan (PUK) were the only political parties<br />
in the region which received more than 7<br />
per cent of the votes, and entered the parliament.<br />
Some deputies and ministers of KDP<br />
and PUK within the regional parliament gave<br />
their seats to other small parties. But this situation<br />
led these two political parties (KDP<br />
and PUK) to split the ministries 50-50 among<br />
themselves. This equal split spread to ministries<br />
and directorates. This situation paralyzed<br />
the decision-making process withing the government<br />
and ministries. Deepening internal<br />
split between the two political parties, financial<br />
conflicts, presence of partisan militia<br />
forces, the hostility between KDP and PUK<br />
dating back to history, destructive role of the<br />
Saddam regime, civil wars triggered by direct<br />
and indirect regional interventions of neighboring<br />
countries such as Iran and Turkey led<br />
to political, legislative, geographic, military<br />
split in the region.<br />
4. Internal disputes and conflicts still continue<br />
despite sharing administration including<br />
the authorities in central government between<br />
KDP and PUK.<br />
5. It is important to assess future international<br />
and regional investments to reach the<br />
goals, establish political stability, bring economic<br />
and social development to a desired<br />
level in order to create a real democratic regime.<br />
However, the democratic process in KRG<br />
encounters major challenges threatening its<br />
internal stability and weakening its relations<br />
with the outside world.<br />
6. The lack of constitutional document, which<br />
clearly designates the relationship between<br />
citizens, political parties and the government<br />
as well as the relationship between legislative,<br />
executive and judicial powers, is one of<br />
the most important political problems of the<br />
Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). This<br />
situation led to the lack of administrative experience,<br />
and also ambiguous limits of the<br />
authorities of three powers as well as unequal<br />
distribution of powers. There are also many<br />
mistakes in KRG constitutional project. This<br />
project was as if prepared to broaden the authorities<br />
of executive power and especially of<br />
the President of the Region against the rights<br />
and freedoms of citizens.<br />
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CENTER FOR MIDDLE EASTERN STRATEGIC STUDIES<br />
7. The reports of civilian institutions which<br />
monitors judicial organs within KRG reveal a<br />
great number of judicial violations and deficiency<br />
of the rule of law. These reports point<br />
out the interventions of government, security<br />
forces, political parties, tribes and individuals<br />
to jurisdiction. Besides, it is also stated in the<br />
report that detainees and prisoners are tortured,<br />
the executive organs do not perform judicial<br />
decisions, that everybody is not treated<br />
equally before the law, and that other infractions<br />
which shake the confidence of citizens<br />
and political powers are implemented. This<br />
situation further increases political and social<br />
violence, as well as political and social conflicts<br />
in the region.<br />
8. Human rights violations such as; torture,<br />
illegal arbitrary detentions, forcing citizens to<br />
become members of one of the two parties in<br />
power, security forces’ killing and injuring civilians<br />
who stage demonstrations take place.<br />
As for the freedom of expression and press,<br />
despite the fact that many independent and<br />
semi-independent journals, magazines, radio<br />
and TV channels have emerged since 2000<br />
and the press law was introduced by the Regional<br />
Parliament, still many violations pointed<br />
out by the reports published by nongovernmental<br />
organizations take place in this<br />
field.<br />
9. Despite the fact that many local and general<br />
elections were held in the region, deficiencies<br />
and violations which cause to lack of will<br />
of electors take place in electoral processes.<br />
However, these infractions are observed to<br />
decrease with each passing elections.<br />
Although there are lots of political parties<br />
within KRG and the freedom to found political<br />
party exists, there is no such thing as party<br />
pluralism. According to independent reports<br />
in this field, KDP and PUK which are in power<br />
use public property and government agencies<br />
in electoral campaigns. Also those two parties<br />
exert pressure on other parties through different<br />
methods. Thus, we can suggest that the<br />
party system in KRG is similar to the singleparty<br />
system based on KDP and PUK in power.<br />
Besides, it has never been seen in KRG<br />
that the power has ever been transferred peacefully.<br />
Despite the position change between<br />
KDP and PUK, neither of them could ever<br />
completely take over the power. Furthermore,<br />
other parties and groups have not been provided<br />
with equal opportunities to compete for<br />
power, and they have never come into power<br />
in case of winning the elections.<br />
2. Suggestions<br />
1. Civilian democratic system foundations<br />
should be laid in the region. Within this scope,<br />
the KRG Constitution Project should be<br />
revised and a balance should be established<br />
among executive, legislative and judicial organs<br />
to fix the violations within the parliamentary<br />
system in order to form a national<br />
consensus.<br />
2. In order to prevent further civil wars, political<br />
armed violence and to create an environment<br />
that supports peaceful rivalry among all<br />
political parties in the region, it is required to<br />
reorganize armed, security and intelligence<br />
forces in the region in a professional way based<br />
on national foundations away from party<br />
and political affiliations. The tendencies to<br />
become a party among those powers should<br />
be eliminated and their being used in internal<br />
political conflicts should be prevented.<br />
3. It is necessary to develop effective, objective,<br />
independent mechanisms and judicial institutions<br />
which provide the rule of law. Those<br />
institutions and mechanisms should completely<br />
respect the judicial system, and the reliability<br />
should be provided. In order to elimi-<br />
20<br />
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nate injustices, the use of administrative and<br />
judicial methods which respect administrative<br />
and judicial decisions of state mechanisms,<br />
administrative representatives and member<br />
of the public and which guarantee their rights<br />
should be based on parity.<br />
4. It is necessary to guarantee fundamental<br />
rights of the citizens such to demonstrate,<br />
freedom of expression and freedom of press<br />
through law, and also it is required to amend<br />
laws that conflict with it. What is required<br />
should be done to prevent constant attacks<br />
on journalists.<br />
5. The Independent High Electoral Commission<br />
should be professionally reorganized by<br />
specialists who are known for their honesty<br />
who are not affiliated to any sect or political<br />
party for the elections in Iraq. Similarly,<br />
an electoral commission should be formed<br />
in KRG, those who commit fraud should be<br />
strongly fought against, and also public properties,<br />
government agencies, armed forces<br />
and security forces should be forbidden to be<br />
used in electoral campaigns.<br />
6. The public force and state institutions should<br />
not be used against the opposition parties<br />
in political conflicts in order to reinforce the<br />
political pluralism in the region. Appropriation<br />
should be allocated for political parties<br />
within KRG based on transparency and equitable<br />
principles.<br />
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Report No: 151, April 2013 21
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ENDNOTOS<br />
1 Dr. Hafız Olwan Aldlimi, Batı Avrupa ve Amerika’daki siyasi sistemler, Dar Wail, Amman, 2001,<br />
p.7<br />
2 See Article 1 of the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Goverment Constitution law dated 2008 and numbered<br />
(16).<br />
3 It appears that this commission is not tranparent and work within the knowledge of all its members,<br />
because of some important meetings were held without the knowledge of one thirds<br />
of the members, and approximately 22 articles of the draft project were amended. See Bihadin<br />
Youssef, dimanah Latalah, Dr. Nuri Talabani on http://sbeiy.com/ku/Inter_Report_Detail.<br />
aspx?id=138&cat=2<br />
4 A series of criticisms were directed to this project; especially on reorganizing the relationship<br />
between legislative nad executive powers, and on administrative decentralization. As an exam-<br />
ثيَداضوونةوةيةك بؤ ثرِؤذةى دةستووري ple: see. Dr. Latif Mustafa - Yusuf Mehemed Sadik - Server Ali Cafer<br />
هةريَ ي كوردستان، ضاثخانةى زةرطةتة، سليَماني، 2009<br />
ثةرلةماني كوردستان، ثرِؤذةى دةستوري هةريَ ي كوردستان see. 5 To see the <strong>text</strong> adopted by the Kurdistan Parliament<br />
– عيَراق، ناوةندي ضاث نية، أربيل، 2009<br />
6 The researcher mentioned this in a statement he had given. To access the document of this<br />
statement راي طشتي لة رؤذنامةي رؤذنامة، ذمارة ،2009 /4 /15 ،2 ال see. 2 .ثاشكؤي To see the answers the judiciary<br />
commission of the parliament of the region had given to the opinions on the aforementioned<br />
statement see. لة ليذنةى ياسايي ثةرلةماني كوردستانةوة، لة سايتي :روونكردنةوةيةك http://perleman.org/<br />
default.aspx?page=articles&c=News-Committees&id=5098) However, the researcher also<br />
mentioned his opinion in an explanatory interview with judge dr. Latif Mustafa. This interview<br />
was published راي طشتي لة رؤذنامةي رؤذنامة، ذمارة ،2009 /5 /13 ،3 ال on 2 .ثاشكؤي Similarly, many intellectuals<br />
and academicians like former head of the parliament of the region late Jawhar Namiq<br />
Salim confirmed the opinion of the researcher. Salim, who wrote an article on Hawlati Journal,<br />
expressed his opinion on the legitimacy of the parliament of the region in the second period<br />
after January 2009. After citing various articles of the electoral law of the Kurdistan Parliament as<br />
evidence, he says he heard about the dispute between Mr. Yusuf Muhammad and the judiciary<br />
commission of the Kurdistan Parliament from the Habat Journal dated 22/4/2009. After examining<br />
the articles of the electoral law of the parliament of the Region, I saw that Yusuf Muhammad<br />
جةوهةر نامق سالم، See. was right and the response of the commission was doubtful, he adds.<br />
دواساتةكاني ئةم خولةى ثةرلةماني هةريَ و ثرِؤذةى دةستووري كوردستان، رِؤنامةي هاوآلتي، ذمارة (532)، ضوارشةممة 2009، 6/ 10/ ال<br />
http://hawlati.info/NewsDetailN.aspx?id=9202&LinkID=67 :4. يان هةمان بابةت لة سايتي<br />
7 Article 1 of the draft constitution: The Iraqi Kurdistan Region is a region within the Federal State<br />
of Iraq. It is a democratic republic with a parliamentary political system that is based on political<br />
pluralism, the principle of separation of powers, and the peaceful transfer of power through di-<br />
ثةرلةماني كوردستان، سةرضاوةى ثيَشوو، See. rect, general, and periodic elections that use a secret ballot.<br />
ال 65<br />
هةمان سةرضاوة، ال constitution, 89 8 See. Article 61 of the draft<br />
9 See. Paragraph six, fiftee, sixteen, seventeen, eighteen, nineteen, twenty, twenty-one, twenty-<br />
هةمان سةرضاوة، ال ال – 90 93 constitution, two of Article 65 of the draft<br />
هةمان سةرضاوة، ال ال See.– 90 10 See. Paragraph eight and nine of Article 65 of the draft constitution,<br />
91<br />
ثيَشوو، ال ال – 91 92 11 See. Dr. Latif Mustafa – Yusuf Mehemed Sadik – Server Ali Cafer<br />
12 For details See.Yargıç dr. Latif Mustafa Emin, relations between the head of state and prime minister<br />
in parliamentary system, dar serdom l’it-tibaa ve’n-neşr, Sulaymaniya, 2009, p. 367 – 374<br />
.ثةرلةماني كوردستان، سةرضاوةى ثيَشوو، ال constitution, 89 13 See. Article 65 of the draft<br />
:لة سيستمي ثةرلةماني لة ثرِؤذةى دستووري هةريَ دا، لة سايتي (İnhiraf) 14 See. Hakin Şeyh Latif, Ladan<br />
http://sbeiy.com/ku/article_detail.aspx?ArticleID=830&AuthorID=203<br />
رؤذنامةى وةقائعي كوردستان، ذمارة ،(55) سالَي ثيَنجةم، : Region, 15 See. Article ten of the presidency law of the<br />
2005 /7 /10.<br />
16 See. Security council law of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region, no. 4 year 2011, Vakai Kurdistan jounal,<br />
no. 127, 5.6.2011.<br />
:لة ضاوةرِواني دةستوردا! ضةند سةرجنيَك سةبارةت بة ثرِؤذةى دةستووري هةريَ ي كوردستان، لة سايتي Menemi, 17 See. Zana Rauf<br />
http://sbeiy.com/ku/Dosya_Rozhnama_detail.aspx?ArticleID=170&CatID=13&Cat=dosya<br />
22<br />
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18 That was really the case. President of the Kurdistan Regional Government Massoud Barzani<br />
used his authority and influence to prevent the ministries from being given to the Change Movement<br />
in the Iraqi government after the second term elections of the Iraqi house of representatives<br />
in 2010. The President of the Region explicitly stated that he demanded Iraqi Prime Minister<br />
Nouri Al-Maliki not to give any ministry to any Kurdish movement without his approval, not<br />
ثيَشةوا تةوفيق: سةرؤكي هةريَ ثشتراستي كردةوة كة ئةو نةيهيَشتووة.See even to assign a single police officer.<br />
http://sbeiy.com/ku/newsdetail.aspx?id=32906&cat=1 Again :طؤرِان لة بةغدا وةزارةت وةربطريَت. لة سايتي<br />
See حةمة نةجيب، ثارلةمانتاريَكي يةكيَتي: بارزاني ثيَي وتني ثؤست بؤ طؤرِان نية، لة سايتي. :محةمةد http://www.destur.<br />
سؤران حسنيَ ، مالكي بة طؤرِاني وتوة ملم لة ذيَر.See net/bzharay-hefte/4275-barzani-nawshirwan.html Again<br />
http://www.kurdiu.org/hawal/?pageid=60279 :ضةقؤي بةرزاني و هاوثةيانيي كوردستان دا بووة، لة سايتي<br />
.سةرضاوةى ثيَشوو Menmi, 19 Zana Rauf<br />
20 - Again See.Hani Ali et-Tavahirî, Political system and constitution law, Darus-sakafa li’n-Naşr<br />
ve’t-Tevzi, Amman, 2008, p. 258 – 261. Similarly, Dr. Numan Ahmed el Hatib, kısaca siyasi<br />
sistemler, Darus-sakafa li’n-Naşr ve’t-Tevzi, Amman, 1999, p. 380.<br />
21 Hereinafter PUK and KDP will be used for those two political parties.<br />
22 An Islamic jihad movement which was split from the Muslim Brotherhood in Iraqi Kurdistan<br />
in 1987. It fought along with other kurdish movements against the former Iraqi regime. Many<br />
groups have split from this movement so far. Kurdistan Islamic Union is among them. For detailed<br />
information. See Al Jazeera, Kurdistan Islamic Movement, website: http://www.aljazeera.<br />
net/NR/exeres/8D1C10BA-5216-40D4-BCD8-01B2E0BC7CA4.htm<br />
23 It is a front that was established on 12.6.1988 in order to coordiante Kurdish parties after the<br />
massacre and chemical attack of the Iraqi regime against Kurds and Kurdistan following the<br />
end of war between Iran and Iraq. Therefore, 8 political parties joined this front leading the<br />
popular uprising on March 1991. Those parties can be listed as follows: Kurdistan Democratic<br />
Party, Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, Iraqi Communist Party, Kurdistan Regional Movement, Kurdistan<br />
Democratic People’s Party, Kurdistan Democratic Socialist Party – Pasok, Kurdistan Labor<br />
Party Assyrian Democratic Movement. The front controlled the zones liberated from the former<br />
regime until the regional government was established on June 1991. Similarly, the general elec-<br />
نةوشيروان مستةفا، مفاوةزاتي بةرةي كوردستاني – بةعس (1991)، كتيَبخانةى.See tions were held on .19/05/1992<br />
http://telskuf.com/ Yine See.Evrak Thomas 38, website: .جمالي عةلي باثير، سليَماني، ،2009 ال ال -111 112<br />
articles.asp?article_id=10711<br />
24 For a detailed information about the aforesaid elections and results See.Reşid Ammare Yas –<br />
Yusuf Muhammed Sadık, Irak - Kürdistan Bölgesinde Siyasi Muhalefet, Başlangıç ve gelecek,<br />
Arap siyasi Araştırma ve İnceleme Merkezi, Doha, 2012, p. 4 – 5<br />
25 Nechirvan Mustafa: و حوكم ئةزموني هةريَ ي كردستان، لة سايتي :حيزب http://sbeiy.com/ku/ArticleParts.aspx?<br />
PartID=25&ArticleID=485&AuthorID=36<br />
26 There were also other articles of the agreement which were not implemented afterwards: Both<br />
parties reached an agreement on reelction of the national council on 5/10/1992. Because the<br />
first election had been rigged. As one of the candidated could not receive the majority of votes,<br />
the president was supposed to be reelected two months later. For a detailed information on the<br />
حامد طةوهةري، باشووري كوردستان لة نيَوان دوو هةلَبذاردندا – 1992 2005، ستؤكهؤلَم، 2004، ال ال See.-27 agreement,<br />
28.<br />
27 This government resigned on April 1993, and a government similar to the former government<br />
was formed under the leadership of Kosrat Resul Ali. For a detailed information on formation<br />
طةراس ئارِ. ظي. ستانسفيلَد، كوردستانى عيَراق ثةرةسةندني سياسي و ثشكوتنى ديوكراسي، وة:.See of the government,<br />
.ثرِؤفيسؤر. ى. د. ياسني سةردةشتي، ضاثخانةى سيما، سليَماني، 2010، ال ال - 337 339<br />
28 For a detailed information about the names, and political tendencies of the ministers and deputy<br />
.هةمان سةرضاوة، ال ال - 331 See.332 ministers that took office in the first government of the region,<br />
29 The Islamic Movement and Islamic List, composed of independent Islamists, and especially<br />
Iraki Kurdistan Muslim Brotherhood ranked third in the elections held on 19 May 1992, and<br />
received 5 percent of the votes. After refusing to join the government, it became an opposition<br />
movement out of the national council. As the aforesaid movement had a militant tendency, and<br />
also was an armed movement, it fought against both major parties, especially against PUK, for<br />
several times between 1993 and 1999. See.Dr Reşit Ammara ve Yusuf Muhammed Sadık, ibid.<br />
s. 6 – 7<br />
30 See.Neşirvan Mustafa, مستةفا، حيزب و دةسةآلتي تةنفيزي، لة سايتي :نةوشيروان http://sbeiy.com/ku/ArticleParts.aspx?PartID=25&ArticleID=485&AuthorID=36<br />
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.طةراس ئار ظى ستانسفيلَد، سةرضاوةى ثيَشوو، ال 31 333<br />
.نةوشيروان مستةفا، حيزب و دةسةآلتي تةنفيزي، سةرضاوةى ثيَشوو Mustafa, 32 See.Neşirvan<br />
33 For a detailed information about the development process of this polarization, and the role it<br />
طةراس ئار ظى ستانسفيلَد، سةرضاوةى ثيَشوو،.See played in internal conflicts that took place in the region,<br />
.ال ال – 339 343<br />
34 The customs gates, especially incomes earned from the Ibrahim Halil customs gate, was one<br />
of the bone of contention between the two parties. Ibrahim Halil gate became one of the most<br />
important trade gates both for the region and for Iraq because of the sanctions of the Security<br />
Council on Iraq. Because the former Iraqi government and influential people within this government<br />
used this gate to smuggle oil abroad. Also vital needs of the citizens were imported<br />
through this gate. See.Dr. Hamid Mahmud İsa, Irak’ta Kürt Sorunu, İngiliz İşgalinden Amerikan<br />
İşgali’ne Kadar incomes of the region were shared as follows: 35& to KDP, 35 % to PUK, 15 % to<br />
هاورِآ باخةوان، هاورِيَنامة بؤ ميَذووي كوردستان و كورد، دةزطاي.See other parties, 5 % to the regional government…<br />
.ضاث و ثةخشي سةردةم، 1999، ال 365<br />
But both parties tried to seize the control of the Ibrahim Halil customs gate which was the main<br />
.طةراس ئار ظى ستانسفيلَد، سةرضاوةى ثيَشوو، ال ال 335 و See.342 source of income of the region.<br />
35 Despite the formation of Peshmarga Ministry and 29000 warriors under their control since the<br />
very first government that was formed in the region, those troops were under the direct control<br />
of KDP ad PUK. Similarly, the security forces in the region were not in a different position. See.<br />
طةراس ئار ظى ستانسفيلَد، سةرضاوةى ثيَشوو، ال 345. و كذلك: نةوشيروان مستةفا، كيَشةى ثارتي و يةكيَتي، سةرضاوةى ثيَشوو، ال ال<br />
91– 92. و أيضاً: رةجائي فايد، كوردةكاني عيًراق هيوا و ئاوات لة نيَوان بةديهاتن و بةدينةهاتن، وة: على ميرزا عارف هةورامي، بةرِيَوةبةريَتيي<br />
.خانةى وةرطيَرِان، سليَماني، 2010، ال 310<br />
36 The conflict between the two parties dates back to decades ago, or even way before the period<br />
when PUK was established. Back then, there were disagreements between the KDP leader<br />
Mustafa Barzani and Ibrahim Ahmad, who was the head of the political bureau of the party, and<br />
Jalal Talabani since 1964. The focal point of the conflict was on the leadership and how the de-<br />
رةجائي.See cisions would be taken within KDP. There were also ideologic and cultural conflicts.<br />
Those conflicts broke out in seventies and late eighties once فايد، سةرضاوةى ثيَشوو، ال ال – 302 304<br />
again. As a result, internal conflicts took place both between the two parties and among other<br />
نةوشيروان مستةفا، ثةجنةكان يةكتر.See Yine .طةراس ئار ظى ستانسفيلَد، سةرضاوةى ثيَشوو، ال ال – 205 See.212 parties.<br />
. برلني postfach،1997 ئةشكيًنن ديوي ناوةوةى رووداوةكاني كوردستاني عيَراق - 1979 1983، ناوةندي بآلوكردنةوةى<br />
37 The Weekly Hawlati journal oublished a series of confidential documents about the former Iraqi<br />
regime in 2003. One of these documents was the that was published on 10 September 2003<br />
with no 140. The document was the letter had been sent by a person named Abu Jihad who<br />
worked in Sulaimaniyah office of the Ba’ath Party that was closed. In the document he explains<br />
the fact that head of the office (Abu Kays) assigned him with a task to create trouble between<br />
KDP and PUK, and he himself (Abu Jihad) used the company commander in KDP troops and<br />
also a relative (Kadir Hasan). Kadir really killed Mam Cotyar, one of the PUK executives, by<br />
opening fire on KDP headquarter in Kaleduzi on 2/5/1994. This event was the first spark of the<br />
civil war. هاوآلتي، ضاثخانةى رةجن، ذمارة ،140 ضوارشةممة ،2003 /9 /10 ال ال See.2 -1 .رؤذنامةى According to the<br />
document, some sources asserts that Kadir Hasan took part in the Kaleduzi event and he was<br />
.حاميد طةوهةري، باشوري كوردستان لة نيَوان دوو هةلَبذاردندا، سةرضاوةى ثيَشوو، ال See.74 killed during the conflict.<br />
38 They tried to ignite the internal conflicts among the Kurdish parties, and supported one against<br />
طةراس ئار ظى ستانسفيلَد،.See the other. Those parties were poliarized through alliances and unions.<br />
.سةرضاوةى ثيَشوو، ال ال 342 و 346<br />
39 The conflicts between KDP and PUK alsted for more than four months. While six conflicts took<br />
place during that period, internal and external efforts to establish peace in the region served as<br />
truce for a while. Until the peace agreement between the two parties in Washington on 17 Sep-<br />
حاميد طةوهةري، باشوري كوردستان لة نيَوان دوو هةلَبذاردندا، سةرضاوةى ثيَشوو، ال ال 66- 280. و كذلك:.See tember .1998<br />
http://sbeiy. :نةوشيروان مستةفا، خةون يان مؤتةكة ديوي ناوةوةى رووداوةكاني كوردستاني عيَراق (1992- 2002)، لة سايتي<br />
com/ku/article_detail.aspx?ArticleID=1539&AuthorID=36<br />
.رةجائي فايد، سةرضاوةى ثيَشوو، ال See.310 Yine هةمان سةرضاوة.See 40<br />
لظني، وردةكارييةكاني 31ي ئاب لة بةلَطةنامةكاندا، طؤظاري لظني، ذمارة 1ي 74، ئةيلول.See 41 For a detailed information<br />
،2008. Again See.Dr. Hamid Mahmud İsa ibid, p. 440 – 444. KDP asked for aid from ال – 31 35<br />
the Saddam regime on the grounds that PUK received aid from the Iranian regime. Nechirvan<br />
Mustafa says that both parties had good relationship with Iran, but one of the parties went out of<br />
24<br />
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control from time to time, and when this was the case they wanted to take it under control again;<br />
and that it was the most typical characteristics of the Iranian politics, that it did not allow one of<br />
the parties have a control over the other one. From Dr. Reşit Ammara Yas and Yusuf Muhammad<br />
Sadiq , ibid, p. 7.<br />
42 See. ibid, p. 7 – 8.<br />
43 .حيزب و حوكم ئةزموني كوردستان، سةرضاوةى ثيَشوو Mustafa, See.Nechirvan<br />
44 لة نيوان من و مام جالل ئازاري – 1999 شوباتي 2001، ضاثخانةى رةجن، سليَماني، 2009، ال 96. يان Mustafa, See.Nechirvan<br />
http://sbeiy.com/ku/ArticleParts.aspx?PartID=39&ArticleID=2426&AuthorID=3 :لةسةر سايتي سبةى<br />
6.<br />
45 At this stage, the mutual meetings between Iran, Turkey and Syria on the situation of Kurds in<br />
North Iraq was suspended. As it is known, those meetings started to held again after the collapse<br />
of the former regime in Iraq in 2003 when Kurdish parties became prominents in Iraq in<br />
.طةراس ئار ظى ستانسفيلَد، سةرضاوةى ثيَشوو، ال See.348 geenral, and in the region in particular.<br />
46 عايدة علي سري الدين، See. For the full <strong>text</strong> of the Washington agreement between KDP and PUK,<br />
حةميد طةوهةري،.See Again .املسألة الكردية في ملف السياسة الدولية، دار اآلفاق اجلديدة، بيروت، 2000، ص ص380 – 384<br />
.باشوري كوردستان لة نيَوان دوو هةلَبذاردندا، سةرضاوةى ثيَشوو، ال ال 279- 286<br />
47 See. The first period of elections in 1992, Kurdistan Parliament website: http://www.kurdistanparliament.org/default.aspx?page=sitecontents&c=Parliament-History1992<br />
48 .ئؤثؤزسيؤني سياسي، ضاثخانةي رِةجن، سليَماني، 2009، ال Salih, 330 See.Yasin<br />
49 This agreement remained secret until 5 July 2010. On this date, some parts of the<br />
agreement was published on the following website: http://standardkurd.net/direje.<br />
aspx?Cor=Hewal&Jimare=3420. The split of the region between KDP and PUK continued until<br />
this date.<br />
50<br />
http://www.kurdiu.org/hawal/index. :كورديو، بايز تالَةباني: حكومةتي هةريَ تا ئيَستا هةردوو ثارضةية...، لة سايتي لظني ثريَس، بايز تالَةباني: تا ئيَستا سآ جار داواكراوة وةزارةتي دارايي يةكبخريَتةوة بةآلم.See php?pageid=92730 Again<br />
http://lvinpress.com/K_Direje.aspx?Jimare=6614&Besh=Hewal&Cor=1 :نةكراوة، لة سايتي<br />
51 For a detailed information See. Dr. Reşid Ammara Yas ve Yusuf Muhammed Sadık, ibid, p. 14 –<br />
28.<br />
52 ،ديَظيد بيَتهام و كوين بؤيأل، ديوكراسي ضية؟ ئاشنابوون بة ديوكراسي، وةرطيَرِاني شؤرِش جوانرِؤيي، خانةى وةرطيَرِان، سليَماني، 2003<br />
.ال 33<br />
53 See. The Article 65 of the draft constitution of the Region.<br />
54 Dr. Mazin Muvaffak Haşim, Demokrasinin Dayanaklarını Konuşalım, website: http://www.alrashad.org/issues/17/17-Hashem.htm<br />
55 The International Institute of Human Rights, Depaul University Faculty of Law, Democracy and<br />
Freedoms, 2005, p. 39.<br />
56 Amerika Kürtleri Cemiyeti ASK, Irak Kürdistanı Bölgesi Yargı Sistemi İzleme projesi, Erbil, İnternet<br />
sitesi: http://www.askurds.org/judiciarymonitoring1.pdf<br />
Some of those violations are pointed out in the report of the Amnesty International. See. Uluslararası<br />
Af örgütü, Beş Yıl Sonra Irak, Katliamlar ve Karamsarlıklar Arasında, Uluslararası Af örgütü<br />
yayınları, Londra, belge No. 2008 / 001 / AI Index No: MDE Mart 2008, birinci baskı, p. 20<br />
57 David Betham, Democracy and Human Rights, translated by Muhammed Taki Dilfruz, İntişarart-i<br />
Tarh-i Nov, Tahran, 1383 H. Ş. p. 151.<br />
58 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G. A. Res. 217 A, UN GAOR, üçüncü dönem, Supp.<br />
No. 1 BM Belgesi No A / 810, 1948<br />
59 Uluslararası İnsan Hakları Enstitüsü, Depaul Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi, ibid, p. 40.<br />
60 .سةرضاوةى ثيَشوو، ال Boilla(?)28 David Betham and Kevin<br />
61 See. Article 38 of Iraqi constitution.<br />
62 - See. The first paragraph of the Article 3 of the law dated 2010 and numbered 11 that regulates<br />
the demonstrations in Iraqi Kurdistan shows that the aforesaid law turned into an effective<br />
instrument under the control fo the authorities in power to prevent the demonstrations in the<br />
كورديو: گروپى 400له چوارچێوه ى یاساى خۆپیشانداندا داواى مۆڵه ت بۆ خۆپیشاندان ده كه ن و.See region. As an example,<br />
http://www.kurdiu.org/hawal/index.php?pageid=59350 :پارێزگاريسلێمانى مۆڵه تیان پێ نادات، لة سايتي<br />
63 See. 2010 report of the Amnesty International, Human Rights in the Republic of Iraq, website:<br />
http://amnesty.org/ar/region/iraq/report-2010 Again, Amnesty International, Beş Yıl Sonra Irak,<br />
Katliamlar ve Karamsarlıklar Arasında, ibid, p. 20. Again See.U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,<br />
2010 Human Rights Report: Iraq, April 8, 2011, In site: http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/<br />
ORSAM<br />
Report No: 151, April 2013 25
ORSAM<br />
CENTER FOR MIDDLE EASTERN STRATEGIC STUDIES<br />
nea/154462.htm Again, Amnesty International, Human Rights in the Middle East and North<br />
Africa, January – April 2011, Uluslararası Af Örgütü Yayınları, London, Belge No. Index: POL<br />
10/ 012/ 2011 Arabic, May 2011, First Edition, p. 19. You can also reach the report on the website:<br />
http://amnesty.org/ar/library/asset/POL10/012/2011/ar/f797ad21-8843-474f-b376-1686-<br />
f8c67960/pol100122011ara.pdf<br />
64 See. The annual report of the METRO Center journalists on the violations in Kurdistan Region<br />
in 2011. Sulaymaniyah, 2012, again See.HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Yol Ayırımında Irak’ta<br />
ABD öncülüğündeki sekiz yıllık işgalin ardından İnsan Hakları, website: http://www.hrw.org/ar/<br />
reports/2011/01/20,<br />
65 The International Institute of Human Rights, Depaul University Faculty of Law, ibid, p. 38.<br />
66 Dr. Muhammed Abid el Cabiri, Democracy and Human Rights, The Arab League Research Center,<br />
Beirut, Third Edition, 2004, p. 16 – 17.<br />
67 Revab Cemal, Seçim Sistemleri, p. 1 – 2websitesi (31/1/2012 tarihinde): http://www.scribd.com/doc<br />
/77534331/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B8%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%8<br />
6%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A<br />
8-%D8%AC%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84<br />
ريَكخراوي دياكؤنياي سويدي، ديوكراتي سياسةت، ئامادة و وةرطيَرِاني: فرسةت ئةحمةد – موئةيةد تةيب – تيَلي ئةمني، ضاثخانةى 68<br />
،خةبات<br />
دهؤك، ض 2699 3، ك، ال ال – 25 26<br />
69 What is meant by saying this is a planned process is that PUK had decided to exert pressure<br />
on otehr lists, especially on the change list, by discharging their offices in government agencies<br />
or by displacing them. In this con<strong>text</strong>, in his statement on Awene Journal, Molla Bahtiyar says:<br />
“as long as the police officersi security and peshmargas or high-ranking officials are nominated<br />
by PUK, PUK has the right to change their office and withdraw their support.” For the full <strong>text</strong> of<br />
the document, مه ال به ختیار: مانگانه یه كێتی و پارتی له سی ملیۆن دۆالر كه متر له حكومه ت وه رناگرن.See ،ئاويَنة، website:<br />
http://awene.com/Direje.aspx?Babet=Babet&Cor=Chawpekewtin&jimare=715<br />
فةالح نةجم، به پێچه وانه ی یاسای هه ڵبژاردنه وه یه كێتی به رده وامه له ده ركردنی فه رمانبه ره حكومییه كان.See 70 As an example,<br />
- website: http://sbeiy.com/ku/newsdetail.aspx?id=17525&cat=1<br />
71 As an example, سبةى، له سه ر لیستی (گۆڕان)، دوو مامۆستا ده ركران.See -website: http://awene.com/Direje.<br />
راگری كۆلێژی زانسته مرۆڤایه تییه كانی Abdulhalik, aspx?Babet=Hewal&Jimare=3810 Again See.Delir<br />
http://sbeiy.com/ku/newsdetail.aspx?id=17397&cat=1 - website: ،زانكۆی كۆیه له سه ر كار الده درێت<br />
سبةي، له سكاڵایه كدا بۆ رای گشتی سه رۆكی لیستی بزوتنه وه ی چاكسازی كردستان: ماوه یه كه See. 72 As an example<br />
sbeiy.com/ku/newsdetail. - website: ،له هه ولێرو دهۆك فشارده خرێته سه ر ئه و كه سانه ی هاوكاریمان ده كه ن<br />
هةلَويَست عوسمان و بةرهةم لةتييف، ديداريَك لةطةأل د. عبداملصور بارزاني، طؤظاري.See aspx?id=17459&cat=1 Again<br />
ئاآل لةتيف، كاندیدێكی بزووتنه وه ی چاكسازی كردستان ده ستگیركرا.See Again .رِيَطا، ذمارة 20ي 13، حوزةيراني ، 2009 ال 17- 19<br />
هاوآلتي، لیستی See. - website: http://hawlati.info/NewsDetailN.aspx?id=8954&LinkID=63 Again<br />
http://hawlati.info/NewsDetailN. website: ,پێشكه وتن: ئاسایشی پارتی هه ڕه شه ی كوشنت له ئه ندامامنان ده كات<br />
aspx?id=9555&LinkID=63<br />
73 In the reports of electoral monitoring reports, there is a consensus regarding that these elections<br />
were rigged to a large extent. Here, we are going to point out a part of these reports which<br />
includes some parts of the local and international journals:<br />
(A Berzan Ali Heme, ڵبژاردن له هه ولێر و دهۆك هه رێمی كوردستان ده خاته لیستی ڕه شه وه ،هه - website: http://chawyxelk.com/NewsDetailN.aspx?id=1873&LinkID=63&Detail=1<br />
(B again سبةى، چاودێرێكی گروپی نه زاهه : ته نیا له و وێستگه یه ی منی تێدابوم 120 بۆ 130 ده نگ به ساخته دراوه - website:<br />
http://sbeiy.com/ku/newsdetail.aspx?id=19195&cat=1<br />
C) The Economist print edition, The times they are a-Changing: on site: http://www.economist.com/world/mideast-africa/displaystory.cfm?story_id=14140770<br />
(D again ئاويَنة، ئینستیۆتی مافه كانی مرۆڤ: ساخته كاریی به رفراوان كراوه – website: http://awene.com/Direje.<br />
aspx?Babet=Hewal&Jimare=4517<br />
E) Again, Electoral Monitoring Final Report of the Head of Parliament of the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional<br />
Government, website: http://www.tammuz.net/news/arabic/03-09-009a.pdf<br />
(F again نوێنه ری سێ رێكخراوي نێوده وڵه تی: پێشێلكاری زۆر له الیه ن حیزبی ده سه ڵاتداره وه ئه جنامدراوه - website:<br />
http://hawlati.info/NewsDetailN.aspx?id=10224&LinkID=63<br />
(G again ئاويَنة، تؤرِي شةمس: ژماره یه كی زۆر له هێزه كانی پێشمه رگه دووجار ده نگیان داوه.See - website: http://awene.<br />
com/Direje.aspx?Babet=Hewal&Jimare=447<br />
H) again See. The letter sent by the French Consul to former Reform and Service List Leader<br />
Seladdin Bhaddin - website http://www.kurdiu.org/fileup3/3278french.pdf<br />
26<br />
ORSAM<br />
Report No: 151, April 2013
DEMOCRACY PROCESS AND PROBLEMS IN IRAQI KURDISTAN<br />
ORSAM<br />
I) It is also stated that some officials resorted to rig in the bulletin, which is asserted to be the<br />
internal bulletin of KDP, and that this situation negatively affected the prestige of KDP. For a<br />
هاوآلتي، پارتی دان به وه داده نێت له هه ڵبژاردنه كانی 25/7دا.See detailed information on the aforesaid bulletin,<br />
http://hawlati.info/NewsDetailN.aspx?id=12191&LinkID=63 - website: ساخته كاری ئه جنامداوه<br />
İ) Again, independent journal of Levin published a report of the organizational bureau of KDP.<br />
In the report, the rate of rigs in Arbil and Duhok in terms of the KDP votes is: Arbil (20 percent),<br />
لظني دةطاتة مةكتةبة هةستيارةكةى ثارتي و زانيارييةكاني بآلو Kurdi, Duhok 26) percent). See. Mehmud Yasin<br />
.دةكاتةوة، بةشي دووةم، ذمارة 2012، 1/ 1/ 184، ال ال 6- 9<br />
.لة ثيَناو كوردستانيَكي نويَدا، ضاثخانةى منارة، هةوليَر، 2007، ال Kadir, 39 74 Rezdar Muhammed<br />
75 See. Iraqi Kurdistan Regio no. 17 date 1993 political party law. Article 3. Kurdistan Regional<br />
Government National Assembly, Law and Regulations – no. 2 date 1993, p. 94.<br />
76 It is stated in the first paragraph of the Article 14 of the political party law numbered 17 and<br />
dated 1993 of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region that: “Allocation apprpriated for political parties from<br />
the regional budget is distributed in accordance with certain rules to be accpeted by the Iraqi<br />
Kurdistan Assembly.” However, he aforementioned rules have not been regulated yet. Hence,<br />
the aforesaid allocations depend on the decisions of two political parties in power. For instance,<br />
it is cut when the attitude of the change movement and the opposition in general is on the increase.<br />
It should also be noted that PUK and KDP use 4,720,000,000 dinar (four billion seven<br />
ضاوثيَكةوتن Muhammed, hundred twenty million) each month from the regional budget. See.Diyar<br />
Of course, in addition to .لةطةأل رةشيد تاهير بريكاري وةزيري داريي، طؤظاري لظني، ذمارة 187، شوباتي 2012، ال 18<br />
salaries of the party personnel and press members, expenses of media channels also add to<br />
this amount. However, the parliamentary groups are almost equal to the change movement in<br />
terms of the size. On the other hand, the share that the change movement receives from these<br />
allocations is 500,000 (five hundred thousand) dollars per month. In other words 600,000,000<br />
(six hundred milllion) dinar. Of course, in case it is given. See.Dr. Reşid Ammara Yas ve Yusuf<br />
Muhammed Sadık, ibid, p. 37.<br />
77 See. AFP, In Iraqi Kurdistan, some “violations” take place within the opposition - website: http://<br />
www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5h1spHvJf7n_SVojslg7EfpnmCAyw<br />
78 The International Institute of Human Rights, Depaul University, Faculty of Law, ibid, p. 37.<br />
79 Molla Bahtiyar, ثةياميَكي رؤذنامةواني بؤ نيَضيرظان بةرزاني - website: http://www.cawder.org/yeke.php?besh<br />
=Nusraw&perrge=nusraw&nujimare=22975,<br />
ORSAM<br />
Report No: 151, April 2013 27
ORSAM<br />
CENTER FOR MIDDLE EASTERN STRATEGIC STUDIES<br />
ORSAM REPORTS<br />
ORSAM Report No: 1<br />
March 2009<br />
The Struggle Against Piracy:<br />
The Somalia Case and Turkey’s<br />
Position<br />
(Tr - Eng)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 2<br />
April 2009<br />
60 Years of Alliance: NATO and<br />
Turkey<br />
(Tr - Eng)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 3<br />
May 2009<br />
Iraq’s Pivotal Point: Talafar<br />
(Tr - Eng)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 4<br />
July 2009<br />
2009 Lübnan Seçimleri: Kazananlar,<br />
Kaybedenler ve Türkiye<br />
(Tr)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 5<br />
August 2009<br />
Turkey-Lebanon Relations:<br />
Perceptions of Turkey Among the<br />
Religious and Sectarian Factions<br />
in Lebanon<br />
(Tr - Eng)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 6<br />
November 2009<br />
The Tuzhurmatu Turkmens: A<br />
Success Story<br />
(Tr - Eng - Ar)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 7<br />
November 2009<br />
The Forgotten Turkmen Land:<br />
Diyala<br />
(Tr - Eng - Ar)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 8<br />
BLACK SEA INTERNATIONAL<br />
Report No: 1<br />
December 2009<br />
Abkhazia for the Integration of the<br />
Black Sea<br />
(Tr - Eng)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 9<br />
January 2010<br />
The Yemen Issue: A Step Toward<br />
Regional War?<br />
(Tr - Eng)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 10<br />
January 2010<br />
Civil War in Yemen: The Power<br />
Struggle, Regional Influences and<br />
Relations With Turkey<br />
(Tr - Eng)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 11<br />
February 2010<br />
The Forgotten Turks: Turkmens<br />
of Lebanon<br />
(Tr – Eng – Ar)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 12<br />
BLACK SEA INTERNATIONAL<br />
Report No: 2<br />
February 2010<br />
Russian Perspective: The Influence<br />
of the Factor of Iraq on<br />
Turkey’s Middle East Policies<br />
(1990-2008)<br />
(Tr - Rus)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 13<br />
February 2010<br />
7 March 2010 Irak Seçimleri<br />
Öncesi Şii Kökenli Parti ve Seçmenlerin<br />
Politik Davranışlarının<br />
Analizi<br />
(Tr)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 14<br />
February 2010<br />
Seçim Öncesi Irak’ta Siyasal Durum<br />
ve Seçime İlişkin Beklentiler<br />
(Tr)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 15<br />
March 2010<br />
Orsam Heyetinin 7 March 2010<br />
Irak Seçimlerine İlişkin Gözlem<br />
Raporu<br />
(Tr)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 16<br />
April 2010<br />
Sultanate of Oman: An Arab State<br />
Between Tradition and Modernity<br />
in the Arabian Peninsula<br />
(Tr)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 17<br />
April 2010<br />
Evaluation of Iraqi Parliamentary<br />
Elections of March 7, 2010 and<br />
the New Political Equation<br />
(Tr)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 18<br />
BLACK SEA INTERNATIONAL<br />
Report No: 3<br />
May 2010<br />
Turkish-Russian Relations: From<br />
Neighborhood to Strategic Cooperation<br />
(Tr - Rus)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 19<br />
September 2010<br />
Turkmens’ Migration Towards<br />
Turkey and Turkmen Population<br />
in Turkey<br />
(Tr)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 20<br />
BLACK SEA INTERNATIONAL<br />
Report No: 4<br />
October 2010<br />
Current Situation in Kyrgzstan,<br />
the Reasons of Change in<br />
Government and Short Term<br />
Foresights<br />
(Tr)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 21<br />
November 2010<br />
Away From Iraq: Post 2003 Iraqi<br />
Migration to Neighboring Countries<br />
and to Turkey<br />
(Tr – Eng)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 22<br />
January 2011<br />
Turkey-Yemen Relations and the<br />
Perception of Turkey in Yemen<br />
(Tr – Eng – Ar)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 23<br />
January 2011<br />
Is the Qatar-Iraq-Turkey-Europe<br />
Natural Gas Pipeline Project<br />
Feasible?<br />
(Tr - Eng)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 24<br />
January 2011<br />
The State of Kuwait: Relations<br />
with Turkey, War and Peace and<br />
the Al-Sabah<br />
Government in Between<br />
(Tr)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 25<br />
January 2011<br />
Embargo on Iran by the Security<br />
Council in Legal and Political<br />
Aspects<br />
(Tr)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 26<br />
BLACK SEA INTERNATIONAL<br />
Report No: 5<br />
February 2011<br />
The Recent Developments in<br />
Kyrgyzstan:<br />
Past, Present and Future<br />
(Tr - Rus)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 27<br />
February 2011<br />
The Steps of the Egyptian Revolution:<br />
Is That the End of an Era?<br />
(Tr)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 28<br />
BLACK SEA INTERNATIONAL<br />
Report No: 6<br />
February 2011<br />
The Limits of Power in Distraining<br />
on Ships by a Coast State<br />
on the<br />
International Law of the Sea<br />
-Georgia’s Distraining on the<br />
Ships Navigating Around the<br />
Black Sea-<br />
(Tr)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 29<br />
February 2011<br />
Tunisia, Popular Revolution and<br />
Turkey’s Exprience<br />
(Tr)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 30<br />
February 2011<br />
Property Disagreements in<br />
Kirkuk: A Study Based on the<br />
Field Search<br />
(Tr)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 31<br />
BLACK SEA INTERNATIONAL<br />
Report No: 7<br />
March 2011<br />
The Developments in Afghanistan<br />
and Pakistan and Their Effects on<br />
International Security<br />
(Tr)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 32<br />
March 2011<br />
Shiite Opposition Question in<br />
Saudi Arabia and Its Impacts<br />
(Tr)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 33<br />
March 2011<br />
Turkmen Existence in Iraq<br />
(Tr)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 34<br />
March 2011<br />
Turkmen Press in Iraq<br />
(Tr – Ar)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 35<br />
March 2011<br />
Current Situation and Important<br />
Political Developments in Iraq<br />
(Tr)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 36<br />
ORSAM Water Research Programme<br />
Report No: 1<br />
March 2011<br />
Eu’s Water Framework Directive<br />
Implementation in Turkey: The<br />
Draft National Implementation<br />
Plan<br />
(Eng)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 37<br />
March 2011<br />
Popular Revolt in Tunisia and Its<br />
Aftermath<br />
(Tr)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 38<br />
March 2011<br />
Libyan War, International Intervention<br />
and Turkey<br />
(Tr)<br />
28<br />
ORSAM<br />
Report No: 151, April 2013
DEMOCRACY PROCESS AND PROBLEMS IN IRAQI KURDISTAN<br />
ORSAM<br />
ORSAM Report No: 39<br />
March 2011<br />
From Past to Present Libya<br />
(Tr)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 40<br />
ORSAM Water Research Programme<br />
Report No: 2<br />
March 2011<br />
Climate Change From a Security<br />
Perspective and Its Effects on<br />
Middle East<br />
(Tr)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 41<br />
March 2011<br />
Understanding Iraq Through<br />
Cartoons - 1<br />
(Tr)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 42<br />
ORSAM Water Research Programme<br />
Report No: 3<br />
April 2011<br />
Hydropolitical History of Nile<br />
River Basin and Recent Developments<br />
(Tr)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 43<br />
April 2011<br />
Social-Political Structure of<br />
the Northern Iraq and Kurdish<br />
Regional<br />
Goverment’s Relations with<br />
Turkey<br />
(Tr)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 44<br />
ORSAM Water Research Programme<br />
Report No: 4<br />
April 2011<br />
The Obligation of “International<br />
Cooperation” in Meriç (Maritza-<br />
Evros)<br />
Basin Water Management<br />
(Tr)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 45<br />
April 2011<br />
Syria Towards Democracy or<br />
Civil War?: Social and Political<br />
Structure, Prospects<br />
For Change and Its Impacts on<br />
Turkey<br />
(Tr)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 46<br />
May 2011<br />
Power Struggle in Syria, Reaction<br />
of the International Community<br />
and Turkey’s Position<br />
(Tr)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 47<br />
ORSAM Water Research Programme<br />
Report No: 5<br />
May 2011<br />
Turkey-Syria Relations: Asi<br />
(Orontes) Friendship Dam As An<br />
Example Of Cooperation<br />
In Transboundary Waters<br />
(Tr)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 48<br />
May 2011<br />
Orsam Interviews - 1<br />
Iraqi Arabs, Minorities & Academics<br />
- 1<br />
(Tr)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 49<br />
May 2011<br />
Orsam Interviews - 2<br />
Iraqi Turkmens - 1<br />
(Tr)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 50<br />
May 2011<br />
ORSAM Interviews - 3<br />
Iraqi Kurdish Officials, Academics<br />
& Journalists - 1<br />
(Tr)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 51<br />
BLACK SEA INTERNATIONAL<br />
Report No: 8<br />
May 2011<br />
The 75th Anniversary of Montreaux<br />
Convention Regarding the<br />
Regime of Turkish Straits<br />
(In the Framework of the Changing<br />
Geopolitics of the Black Sea)<br />
(Tr)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 52<br />
BLACK SEA INTERNATIONAL<br />
Report No: 9<br />
May 2011<br />
Afghanistan and Regional Security<br />
(Middle East, Central and South<br />
Asia, Russian Federation)<br />
(Tr - Rus)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 53<br />
May 2011<br />
Madagascar: Gains, Missing<br />
Opportunities, and Relations<br />
with Turkey in the 50th Year of<br />
Independence<br />
(Tr)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 54<br />
May 2011<br />
Iraqi Groups’ Approach Towards<br />
Main Political Problems and Relations<br />
With Turkey: A Study Based<br />
On Field Research<br />
(Tr)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 55<br />
June 2011<br />
Antalya Conference of Syrian<br />
Opposition: Results, Outlook on<br />
Basic Problems and Expectations<br />
from Turkey<br />
(Tr)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 56<br />
June 2011<br />
Elections and Experience of Justice<br />
and Development Party<br />
(Tr – Ar)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 57<br />
June 2011<br />
Reflections Of 12 June 2011 Turkey<br />
Parliamentary Elections in the<br />
Middle Eastern Countries<br />
(Tr - Eng)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 58<br />
July 2011<br />
Reflections of 12 June 2011 Turkey<br />
Parliamentary Elections in the<br />
Middle East Through Cartoons<br />
(Tr)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 59<br />
July 2011<br />
Understanding Iraq Through<br />
Cartoons - 2<br />
(Tr)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 60<br />
ORSAM Water Research Programme<br />
Report No: 6<br />
July 2011<br />
Cooperation and Conflict on the<br />
Mekong River Waters<br />
(Tr-Eng)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 61<br />
July 2011<br />
The Complete Decipher of the<br />
“Chance in Syria Conference”,<br />
Carried Out in Antalya Between<br />
June 1-2 2011<br />
(Tr - Eng)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 62<br />
August 2011<br />
Understanding Iraq Through<br />
Cartoons - 3<br />
(Tr)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 63<br />
ORSAM Water Research Programme<br />
Report No: 7<br />
August 2011<br />
The Invisible Strategic Resource:<br />
Transboundary Ground Waters<br />
(Tr)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 64<br />
August 2011<br />
Victory of Justice and Development<br />
Party in 12 June 2011<br />
Turkey’s General Elections<br />
(Tr – Ar)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 65<br />
August 2011<br />
Arab Spring Through Cartoons<br />
– 1<br />
(Tr)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 66<br />
August 2011<br />
Civil War in Libya and International<br />
Intervention Through<br />
Cartoons - 1<br />
(Tr)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 67<br />
August 2011<br />
Somalia: A Nation’s Peril and<br />
Turkey’s Humanitarian Aid<br />
(Tr)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 68<br />
September 2011<br />
The Operaton Against Osama<br />
Bin Laden and Its Reflections in<br />
Cartoons<br />
(Tr)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 69<br />
September 2011<br />
Understanding Iraq Through<br />
Cartoons - 4<br />
(Tr)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 70<br />
BLACK SEA INTERNATIONAL<br />
Report No: 10<br />
September 2011<br />
Russia’s and Turkey’s Iran Policies<br />
in the XXI. Century<br />
(Tr - Rus)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 71<br />
September 2011<br />
Gaza Problem: Israel’s Blocade,<br />
International Law, Palmer Report<br />
and Turkey’s Approach<br />
(Tr)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 72<br />
September 2011<br />
Statistics of the Middle Eastern<br />
Countries<br />
(Tr)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 73<br />
BLACK SEA INTERNATIONAL<br />
Report No: 11<br />
October 2011<br />
Anatolian Sphere of Influence<br />
(Tr-Eng)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 74<br />
BLACK SEA INTERNATIONAL<br />
Report No: 12<br />
October 2011<br />
Ukraine in Regress: The Tymoshenko<br />
Trial<br />
(Eng)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 75<br />
BLACK SEA INTERNATIONAL<br />
Report No: 13<br />
October 2011<br />
Kazaks and Kazakistanis<br />
(Tr - Rus)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 76<br />
BLACK SEA INTERNATIONAL<br />
Report No: 14<br />
October 2011<br />
The Forgotten Turks in Italy:<br />
Moena Turks<br />
(Tr - It)<br />
ORSAM<br />
Report No: 151, April 2013 29
ORSAM<br />
CENTER FOR MIDDLE EASTERN STRATEGIC STUDIES<br />
ORSAM Report No: 77<br />
October 2011<br />
The Regional and Global Effects<br />
of the Us Post-Withdrawal Policy<br />
Towards Iraq and Its Reflections<br />
on Turkey<br />
(Tr)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 78<br />
ORSAM Water Research Programme<br />
Report No: 8<br />
October 2011<br />
Constructed Wetlands and Re-<br />
Use of Waste Water for the Irrigation<br />
in Turkey and Israel<br />
(Tr)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 79<br />
October 2011<br />
The Political Balance in Pre-<br />
Election Period in Tunisia<br />
(Tr)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 80<br />
October 2011<br />
Understanding Iraq Through<br />
Cartoons - 5<br />
(Tr)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 81<br />
BLACK SEA INTERNATIONAL<br />
Report No: 15<br />
October 2011<br />
Great Power Politics on Afghanistan<br />
(Tr-Eng)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 82<br />
BLACK SEA INTERNATIONAL<br />
Report No: 16<br />
October 2011<br />
Afghanistan in the Perspective of<br />
Neighboring Countries<br />
(Tr-Eng)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 83<br />
November 2011<br />
The Community Brought up to<br />
Agenda upon the Transition in<br />
Syria: The Turkmens of Syria<br />
(Tr)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 84<br />
ORSAM Water Research Programme<br />
Report No: 9<br />
November 2011<br />
Somalia’s Catastrophic Famine:<br />
Political Drought or Natural One?<br />
(Tr-Eng)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 85<br />
November 2011<br />
Historical Pragmatism in Syrian<br />
Political Culture, Syrian Foreign<br />
Policy Under Bashar Al-Assad<br />
and Turkish-Syrian Relations<br />
(Tr)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 86<br />
November 2011<br />
From Past to Present: The Iraqi<br />
Turkmen Front’s Structure and<br />
Administration<br />
(Tr)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 87<br />
November 2011<br />
Turkmen in Iraq and Their Flight:<br />
A Demographic Question?<br />
(Eng)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 88<br />
November 2011<br />
Bektashism in Iraq (Turkmens –<br />
Shabaks – Kakais)<br />
(Tr)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 89<br />
November 2011<br />
Morocco Monarchy in Transformation<br />
Process: Evolution or<br />
Revolution?<br />
(Tr)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 90<br />
November 2011<br />
The Efforts of Democratization in<br />
the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan<br />
Within the Con<strong>text</strong> of Local<br />
Actors and Regional Challenges<br />
(Tr-Eng)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 91<br />
December 2011<br />
The Arab League’s and Turkey’s<br />
Decisions to Impose Sanction<br />
Against Syria, and Possible Consequences<br />
(Tr)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 92<br />
December 2011<br />
Current Situation of Disputed<br />
Areas in Iraq<br />
(Tr)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 93<br />
ORSAM Water Research Programme<br />
Report: 10<br />
December 2011<br />
Turkey and Wfd Harmonization: A<br />
Silent, But Significant Process<br />
(Eng)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 94<br />
December 2011<br />
The Role of Perception in Turkey-<br />
France Crisis: French Perception<br />
on Turkey<br />
(Tr)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 95<br />
December 2012<br />
Arab Spring Through Cartoons<br />
– 2<br />
(Tr)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 96<br />
December 2011<br />
Understanding Iraq Through<br />
Cartoons – 6<br />
(Tr)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 97<br />
January 2012<br />
Understanding Iraq Through<br />
Cartoons – 7<br />
(Tr)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 98<br />
BLACK SEA INTERNATIONAL<br />
Report No: 17<br />
January 2012<br />
Presidential Election in Kyrgyzstan<br />
and Its Effects on Kyrgyzstan-Turkey<br />
Relations<br />
(Tr)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 99<br />
January 2012<br />
Turkish Political Parties’ Statements<br />
on Syrian Refugees in Hatay,<br />
and Approaches of Political<br />
Party Representatives and Movements<br />
in Hatay Towards Syrian<br />
Developments (March-December<br />
2011)<br />
(Tr)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 100<br />
January 2012<br />
Statistics of Iraq<br />
(Tr)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 101<br />
ORSAM Water Research Programme<br />
Report No: 11<br />
January 2012<br />
Right to Safe Drinking Water and<br />
Sanitation<br />
(Tr)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 102<br />
January 2012<br />
How and Under What Circumstances<br />
Could Iraq Be Split Up?<br />
Being Ready for the Worst<br />
(Tr – Eng)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 103<br />
January 2012<br />
The Struggle for Oil in Iraq: An<br />
Analysis in the Light of Multi-<br />
National Companies,<br />
International Contracts and Constitutional<br />
Debates<br />
(Tr)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 104<br />
ORSAM Water Research Programme<br />
Report No: 12<br />
February 2012<br />
An Evaluation on the Draft Articles<br />
on the Law of Transboundary<br />
Aquifers<br />
(Tr – Eng)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 105<br />
February 2012<br />
Political Rights of Minorities in<br />
Iraqi Legislation<br />
(Tr)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 106<br />
February 2012<br />
Social Rights of Minorities in Iraqi<br />
Legislation<br />
(Tr)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 107<br />
February 2012<br />
Human Rights of Minorities in<br />
Terms of International Law And<br />
Iraqi Constitution<br />
(Tr)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 108<br />
February 2012<br />
The Future of the Economic Cooperation<br />
Organization (ECO)<br />
(Tr - Eng)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 109<br />
February 2012<br />
The Missing Letter: The Rise of<br />
Turkey and the “Bric” Area<br />
(It)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 110<br />
ORSAM Water Research Programme<br />
Report No: 13<br />
March 2012<br />
Water Resources and Management<br />
in Iran<br />
(Tr)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 111<br />
March 2012<br />
A Critical Look at the Syrian<br />
Kurdish Opposition<br />
(Tr)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 112<br />
March 2012<br />
Constitutional System and Political<br />
Parties in Islamic Republic<br />
of Iran<br />
(Tr)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 113<br />
BLACK SEA INTERNATIONAL<br />
Report No: 18<br />
April 2012<br />
Mongolia: A Developing Democracy<br />
and a Magnet for Mining<br />
(Eng)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 114<br />
April 2012<br />
Understanding the Syrian Problem<br />
Through Comics - 8<br />
(Tr)<br />
30<br />
ORSAM<br />
Report No: 151, April 2013
DEMOCRACY PROCESS AND PROBLEMS IN IRAQI KURDISTAN<br />
ORSAM<br />
ORSAM Report No: 115<br />
April 2012<br />
Arguments on Safe Havens in<br />
Syria: Risks, Opportunities and<br />
Scenarios for Turkey<br />
(Tr - Eng)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 116<br />
ORSAM Water Research Programme<br />
Report No: 14<br />
April 2012<br />
The Concept of “Benefit-Sharing”,<br />
Its Theoretical Background<br />
and Practical Reflections<br />
(Tr - Eng)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 117<br />
April 2012<br />
Invest to Mosul Invest to Future<br />
(Tr - Eng)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 118<br />
BLACK SEA INTERNATIONAL<br />
Report No: 19<br />
May 2012<br />
The Analysis of Trade-Economic<br />
Relations<br />
Between Ukraine and Turkey<br />
(Tr - Rus)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 119<br />
BLACK SEA INTERNATIONAL<br />
Report No: 20<br />
May 2012<br />
Geopolitical Dynamics as an<br />
Instrument of Investigation of<br />
Trends and Scenariouse of Regional<br />
Development<br />
(Tr - Rus)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 120<br />
BLACK SEA INTERNATIONAL<br />
Report No: 21<br />
May 2012<br />
Development of Political System<br />
in Kazakhstan: 2012 Parliamentary<br />
Elections<br />
(Tr)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 121<br />
May 2012<br />
New Dynamics in Local and Iraqi<br />
Politics in Mosul (Field Study)<br />
(Tr - Eng - Ger)<br />
ORSAM Bericht Nr. 121<br />
Mai 2012<br />
Kommunalpolitik in Mosul und<br />
Neue Dynamiken in Der Irakischen<br />
Politik (Feldarbeit)<br />
(Ger)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 122<br />
ORSAM Water Research Programme<br />
Report No: 15<br />
May 2012<br />
Water Resources Management<br />
in Iraq<br />
(Tr - Eng)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 123<br />
BLACK SEA INTERNATIONAL<br />
Report No: 22<br />
June 2012<br />
Global Migration and Development<br />
of Migration Policies<br />
of Turkey and European Union<br />
(Tr)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 124<br />
July 2012<br />
Turkey in Africa: The Implementation<br />
of the Action Plan and an<br />
Evaluation<br />
After Fifteen Years<br />
(Tr - Eng - Fr)<br />
ORSAM Rapport No 124<br />
Juillet 2012<br />
La Turquie en Afrique: Un Bilan<br />
de la Mise en Oeuvre du Plan<br />
D’action<br />
Quinze Ans Apres<br />
(Tr - Eng - Fr)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 125<br />
BLACK SEA INTERNATIONAL<br />
Report No: 23<br />
July 2012<br />
Middle East Policy of Russia<br />
(Tr - Eng)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 126<br />
ORSAM Water Research Programme<br />
Report No: 16<br />
July 2012<br />
Towards the New Water Framework<br />
Directive: Notes on Water<br />
Draft Law<br />
(Tr)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 127<br />
August 2012<br />
Kurdish Movements in Syria<br />
(Tr - Eng)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 128<br />
BLACK SEA INTERNATIONAL<br />
Report No: 24<br />
September 2012<br />
The Development of Belarus -<br />
Turkey Economic Cooperation in<br />
Modern Conditions<br />
(Tr - Rus - Eng)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 129<br />
BLACK SEA INTERNATIONAL<br />
Report No: 25<br />
September 2012<br />
Belarus-Turkey: Positive Dynamics<br />
of Intergovernmental<br />
Cooperation<br />
(Tr - Rus - Eng)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 130<br />
November 2012<br />
Syrian Circassians<br />
(Tr - Eng)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 131<br />
BLACK SEA INTERNATIONAL<br />
Report No: 26<br />
November 2012<br />
“The Third Wave”: Geopolitics of<br />
Postmodernism<br />
(Tur - Eng)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 132<br />
November 2012<br />
Foreign Minister Ahmet<br />
Davutoğlu’s Visit to Kirkuk<br />
(Tr - Eng)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 133<br />
November 2012<br />
The Rise and Future of Opposition<br />
in Iraqi Kurdistan Region<br />
(Tr)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 134<br />
November 2012<br />
Iraqi Circassians<br />
(Tr - Eng)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 135<br />
BLACK SEA INTERNATIONAL<br />
Report No: 27<br />
November 2012<br />
The Peculiarities of Turkey’s<br />
Foreign Policy towards the Post-<br />
Soviet States<br />
(Tur – Eng - Rus)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 136<br />
BLACK SEA INTERNATIONAL<br />
Report No: 28<br />
November 2012<br />
Turkish-Crimean Relationship as<br />
an Integration<br />
Factor in Turkish-Ukranian Relations<br />
(Tur – Rus)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 137<br />
BLACK SEA INTERNATIONAL<br />
Report No: 29<br />
December 2012<br />
Energy Policy of Belarus and the<br />
Cooperation Belarus Developed<br />
With Russia and the EU on Energy<br />
(1991-2011)<br />
(Tur – Rus)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 138<br />
December 2012<br />
“Unity or Pyd Power Play? Syrian<br />
Kurdish Dynamics After the Erbil<br />
Agreement”<br />
(Tr)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 139<br />
December 2012<br />
Balances among Kurds in Syria,<br />
Regime Opponents and Turkey:<br />
Relations Pattern at the Crossroads<br />
of Conflict-Stability<br />
(Tr - Eng)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 140<br />
December 2012<br />
Internal Political Balances in<br />
North Iraq and Future of the Strategic<br />
Alliance<br />
(Tr - Eng)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 141<br />
December 2012<br />
The State of Turkmen Education<br />
in Iraq<br />
(Tr - Eng)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 142<br />
January 2013<br />
President Obama’s Second Term:<br />
Domestic and Foreign Challenges<br />
(Eng)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 143<br />
January 2013<br />
2012 Iraq Assessment and Iraq<br />
Chronology<br />
(Tr)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 144<br />
ORSAM Water Research Programme<br />
Report No: 17<br />
January 2013<br />
Orsam Water Interviews 2011<br />
(Tr - Eng)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 145<br />
ORSAM Water Research Programme<br />
Report No: 18<br />
January 2013<br />
Orsam Water Interviews 2012<br />
(Tr - Eng)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 146<br />
BLACK SEA INTERNATIONAL<br />
Report No: 30<br />
January 2013<br />
Eurasi in 2013:<br />
Political and Economic<br />
Analysis<br />
(Eng)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 147<br />
BLACK SEA INTERNATIONAL<br />
Report No: 31<br />
January 2013<br />
Cultural Dialogue: Newcomers<br />
from the Ural-Volga Region –<br />
Belarusian-Lithuanian Tartars in<br />
Grand Duchy of Lithuania<br />
(Tur – Rus)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 148<br />
January 2013<br />
Internatonal Politics and Civilizations<br />
(Clash of Civilizations and<br />
Dialogue)<br />
(Tr - Eng)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 149<br />
February 2013<br />
David cameron and the Eu:<br />
Crossing the Rubicon<br />
(Eng)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 150<br />
March 2013<br />
Syrian Turkmens: Political Movements<br />
and Military Structure<br />
(Tr - Eng)<br />
ORSAM Report No: 151<br />
March 2013<br />
Democracy Process and Problems<br />
in Iraqi Kurdistan<br />
(Tr - Eng)<br />
ORSAM<br />
Report No: 151, April 2013 31
ORSAM<br />
CENTER FOR MIDDLE EASTERN STRATEGIC STUDIES<br />
ACADEMIC STAFF<br />
Hasan Kanbolat<br />
ORSAM Director<br />
Prof. Dr. Meliha Benli Altunışık<br />
ORSAM Advisor,Middle East, METU Director of Institute of Social Sciences<br />
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Hasan Ali Karasar ORSAM Advisor, ORSAM Eurasian Strategies Coordinator - Bilkent University<br />
Prof. Dr. Tarık Oğuzlu<br />
ORSAM Advisor,Middle East-Antalya International University<br />
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Harun Öztürkler ORSAM Advisor, Middle East Economies - Afyon Kocatepe University, Department of Economics<br />
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Mehmet Şahin<br />
ORSAM Advisor, Middle East - Gazi University, Department of IR<br />
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Özlem Tür<br />
ORSAM Advisor, Middle East - METU, Department of IR<br />
Habib Hürmüzlü<br />
ORSAM Advisor, Middle East<br />
Asst. Prof. Dr. Serhat Erkmen<br />
ORSAM Advisor, Middle East -Ahi Evran University, Department of IR<br />
Asst. Prof. Dr. Canat Mominkulov ORSAM Researcher, Eurasia, Al Farabi Kazakh National University<br />
Elmira Cheremisova<br />
ORSAM Advisor, Middle East - St. Petersburg University<br />
Assoc.Prof.Dr. Didem Danış<br />
ORSAM Advisor, Middle East - Galatasaray University, Department of Sociology<br />
Dr. Jale Nur Ece<br />
ORSAM Advisor, Maritime Safety and Security<br />
Assoc. Prof. Dr. İlyas Kemaloğlu (Kamalov) ORSAM Advisor, Eurasia<br />
Assoc.Prof.Dr. Yaşar Sarı<br />
ORSAM Advisor, Eurasia - Kyrgyzstan-Turkey Manas University<br />
Asst. Prof. Dr. Bayram Sinkaya<br />
ORSAM Advisor, Middle East - Yıldırım Beyazıt University Department of International Relations<br />
Dr. Süreyya Yiğit<br />
ORSAM Advisor, Eurasia<br />
Att. Aslıhan Erbaş Açıkel<br />
ORSAM Advisor, Energy-Maritime Law<br />
Pınar Arıkan Sinkaya<br />
ORSAM Advisor, Middle East - METU Department of International Relations<br />
Volkan Çakır<br />
ORSAM Advisor, Africa - ORSAM Antananarivo (Madagascar) Representative<br />
Bilgay Duman<br />
ORSAM Researcher, Middle East<br />
Tamer Koparan<br />
ORSAM Managing Editor<br />
Noyan Gürel<br />
ORSAM İzmir Represatative<br />
Oytun Orhan<br />
ORSAM Researcher, Middle East<br />
Sercan Doğan<br />
ORSAM Research Assistant, Middle East<br />
Nebahat Tanriverdi<br />
ORSAM Research Assistant, Middle East<br />
Seval Kök<br />
ORSAM Research Assistant, Middle East<br />
Uğur Çil<br />
ORSAM, Middle East<br />
Göknil Erbaş<br />
ORSAM, Black Sea<br />
Shalaw Fatah<br />
ORSAM Research Assistant, Middle East<br />
Tuğçe Kayıtmaz<br />
Interpreter<br />
ORSAM Water Research Programme<br />
Dr. Tuğba Evrim Maden<br />
ORSAM Water Research Programme Hydropolitics Researcher<br />
Dr. Seyfi Kılıç<br />
ORSAM Water Research Programme Hydropolitics Researcher<br />
ORSAM ADVISORY BOARD<br />
Dr. Ismet Abdulmecid<br />
Prof. Dr. Ramazan Daurov<br />
Prof. Dr. Vitaly Naumkin<br />
Hasan Alsancak<br />
Prof. Dr. Meliha Benli Altunışık<br />
Prof. Dr. Ahat Andican<br />
Prof. Dorayd A. Noori<br />
Prof. Dr. Tayyar Arı<br />
Prof. Dr. Ali Arslan<br />
Dr. Farhan Ahmad Nizami<br />
Başar Ay<br />
Prof. Aftab Kamal Pasha<br />
Prof. Dr. Mustafa Aydın<br />
Ambassador Shaban Murati<br />
Dr. Ersel Aydınlı<br />
Safarov Sayfullo Sadullaevich<br />
Mohamed Noureddine<br />
Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Bağcı<br />
Itır Bağdadi<br />
Prof. Dr. İdris Bal<br />
Assist. Prof. Dr. Ersan Başar<br />
Kemal Beyatlı<br />
Yaşar Yakış<br />
Barbaros Binicioğlu<br />
Prof. Dr. Ali Birinci<br />
Patrick Seale<br />
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Mustafa Budak<br />
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Hasan Canpolat<br />
Ret. (Air) Gen. Ergin Celasin<br />
Dr. Sami Al Taqi<br />
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Mitat Çelikpala<br />
Çetiner Çetin<br />
Prof. Dr. Gökhan Çetinsaya<br />
Former President of Iraqi Council of State<br />
Assistant Director, Russian Academy of Sciences Institute of Oriental Studies<br />
Director, Russian Academy of Sciences Institute of Oriental Studies<br />
İhlas Holding CEO<br />
ORSAM Advisor Middle East, METU Director of Institute of Social Sciences<br />
Former Minister & Istanbul University<br />
Vice-Undersecretary in Iraq’s Embassy in Ankara<br />
Uludağ University, Head of Department of International Relations<br />
Istanbul University, Department of History<br />
The Director of Centre for İslamic Studies at Oxford University<br />
General Secretary, Turkish Textile Employers’ Association<br />
The Director of The Centre for West Asian Studies in India<br />
President of Kadir Has University<br />
Albanian Institute for International Studies<br />
Vice-President of Bilkent University, Fulbright Executive Director<br />
Strategic Research Center Under The President of Tajikistan<br />
Specialist in Turkish Affairs, Prof. at Lebanese University - History<br />
METU, Head of Department of International Relations<br />
İzmir Economy University, Department of International Relations and European Union<br />
Member of Parliament in the 24th Legislative Term of Grand National Assembly of Turkey<br />
Karadeniz Techinical University, Maritime Transportation and Management Engineering<br />
Head of Iraqi Turkman Press Council<br />
Ambassador, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs<br />
ORSAM Advisor, Middle Eastern Economies<br />
Polis Akademisi<br />
Well-Known Middle East and Syria Specialist<br />
Deputy Director General in Prime Ministerial State Archives<br />
Turkish Ministry of Defense Advisor<br />
23rd Commander of Air Forces<br />
General Manager of Orient Research Center<br />
Kadir Has University, Head of Deparment of International Relations<br />
Journalist, Iraq<br />
President of The Council of Higher Education<br />
32<br />
ORSAM<br />
Report No: 151, April 2013
DEMOCRACY PROCESS AND PROBLEMS IN IRAQI KURDISTAN<br />
ORSAM<br />
Assoc. Prof. Dr Didem Danış<br />
ORSAM Advisor, Immigration Studies & Iraqi Refugees, Galatasary University, Department of Sociology<br />
Prof. Dr. Volkan Ediger<br />
İzmir Economy University, Department of Economics<br />
Prof. Dr. Cezmi Eraslan<br />
President of Atatürk Research Center, Istanbul University, Department of History<br />
Prof. Dr. Çağrı Erhan<br />
Ankara University, Faculty of Political Science, Department of IR & Director ATAUM<br />
Asst. Prof. Dr. Serhat Erkmen<br />
ORSAM Middle East Advisor, Ahi Evran University, Head of the Department of International Relations<br />
Dr. Amer Hasan Fayyadh<br />
Baghdad University, Dean of Political Sciences Faculty (Iraq)<br />
Att. Aslıhan Erbaş Açıkel<br />
ORSAM Advisor, Energy-Maritime Law<br />
Cevat Gök<br />
Manager of Iraq El FIRAT TV - Turkey<br />
Mete Göknel<br />
Former Director of Petroleum Pipeline Corporation (BOTAŞ)<br />
Osman Göksel<br />
BTC & NABUCCO Coordinator<br />
Timur Göksel<br />
Beirut American University (Lebanon)<br />
Prof. Muhamad Al Hamdani<br />
Cultural Undersecretary in Iraq’s Embassy in Ankara<br />
Numan Hazar<br />
Retired Ambassador<br />
Habib Hürmüzlü<br />
ORSAM Middle East Advisor<br />
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Pınar İpek<br />
Bilkent University, Department of International Relations<br />
Dr. Tuğrul İsmail<br />
TOBB University of Economics & Technology, Department of International Relations<br />
Assoc. Prof. Dr. İlyas Kemaloğlu (Kamalov) ORSAM Eurasia Advisor<br />
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Hasan Ali Karasar Bilkent University, Department of International Relations<br />
Assoc.Prof.Dr. Şenol Kantarcı<br />
Kırıkkale University, Department of International Relations<br />
Selçuk Karaçay<br />
Deputy Director, Vodafone (Turkey)<br />
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Nilüfer Karacasulu Dokuz Eylül University, Department of International Relations<br />
Prof. Dr. M. Lütfullah Karaman<br />
Istanbul Medeniyet University, Department of International Relations<br />
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Şaban Kardaş<br />
TOBB Economy and Technology University, Department of International Relations<br />
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Elif Hatun Kılıçbeyli Çukurova University, Head of the Department of International Relations<br />
Prof. Dr. Aleksandr Knyazev<br />
Kyrgyz Slavic University (Bishkek)<br />
Prof. Dr. Erol Kurubaş<br />
Kırıkkale University, Head of the Department of International Relations<br />
Prof. Dr. Talip Küçükcan<br />
Director of Marmara University, Institute of Middle East Studies<br />
Arslan Kaya<br />
KPMG, Sworn-in Certified Financial Accountant<br />
Dr. Hicran Kazancı<br />
Iraqi Turkman Front Turkey Representative<br />
İlhan Tanır<br />
ORSAM Middle East Advisor, Journalist<br />
İzzettin Kerküklü<br />
President of Kirkuk Foundation<br />
Prof. Dr. Mustafa Kibaroğlu<br />
Okan University, Head of Department of International Relations<br />
Prof. Dr. Alexandr Koleşnikov<br />
Diplomat<br />
Dr. Max Georg Meier<br />
Hanns Seidel Foundation, Projects Director (Bishkek)<br />
Prof.Dr. Mosa Aziz Al-Mosawa<br />
President of Baghdad University (Iraq)<br />
Prof. Dr. Mahir Nakip<br />
Erciyes University, Faculty of Economic and Administrative Sciences<br />
Assoc.Prof.Dr. Tarık Oğuzlu<br />
ORSAM Advisor,Middle East-Antalya International University<br />
Hediye levent<br />
Journalist, Syria<br />
Prof.Dr. Çınar Özen<br />
Ankara University, Faculty of Political Science, Department of International Relations<br />
Murat Özçelik<br />
Ambassador<br />
Assoc. Prof. Harun Öztürkler<br />
ORSAM Middle East Economies Advisor, Afyon Kocatepe University, Department of Economics<br />
Dr. Bahadır Pehlivantürk<br />
TOBB Economy and Technology University, Department of International Relations<br />
Prof. Dr. Victor Panin<br />
Pyatigorsk University (Pyatigorsk, Russian Federation)<br />
Assoc.Prof.Dr. Fırat Purtaş<br />
Gazi University Department of International Relations, Deputy Secretary General of TÜRKSOY<br />
Prof. Suphi Saatçi<br />
Secretary-General of Kirkuk Foundation<br />
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Yaşar Sarı<br />
ORSAM Advisor, Eurasia - Kyrgyzstan-Turkey Manas University<br />
Ersan Sarıkaya<br />
Türkmeneli TV (Kirkuk, Iraq)<br />
Dr. Bayram Sinkaya<br />
ORSAM Middle East Advisor, Atatürk University<br />
Assoc.Prof.Dr. İbrahim Sirkeci<br />
Reader in Demography and Marketing Regent’s College, (London, UK)<br />
Dr. Aleksandr Sotnichenko<br />
St. Petersburg University (Russian Federation)<br />
Semir Yorulmaz<br />
Journalist, Egypt<br />
Zaher Sultan<br />
President of Lebanon Turkish Association<br />
Dr. Irina Svistunova<br />
Russia Strategic Research Center, Turkey-Middle East Studies Expert (Russian Federation)<br />
Asst. Prof. Dr. Mehmet Şahin<br />
ORSAM Advisor, Middle East, Gazi University, Department of International Relations<br />
Prof. Dr. Türel Yılmaz Şahin<br />
Gazi University, Department of International Relations<br />
Mehmet Şüküroğlu<br />
Energy Expert<br />
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Oktay Tanrısever METU, Department of International Relations<br />
Prof. Erol Taymaz<br />
Vice President of the METU North Cyprus Campus (TRNC)<br />
Prof. Sabri Tekir<br />
Dean of İzmir University, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences<br />
Dr. Gönül Tol<br />
Director of Middle East Institute Turkish Studies (USA)<br />
Advt. Niyazi Güney<br />
Prens Group, Vice Chairman<br />
Asst. Prof. Dr. Özlem Tür<br />
ORSAM Advisor, Middle East, METU, Department of International Relations<br />
M. Ragıp Vural General Coordinator of 2023 (Magazine)<br />
Dr. Ermanno Visintainer<br />
Director of Vox Populi (Rome,Italy)<br />
Dr. Umut Uzer<br />
Istanbul Technical University, Humanities and Social Sciences<br />
Prof. Dr. Vatanyar Yagya<br />
St. Petersburg City Council Member, St. Petersburg University (Russian Federation)<br />
Dr. Süreyya Yiğit<br />
ORSAM Eurasia Advisor Prof. Dr. Gökhan Çetinsaya President of The Council of Higher Education<br />
Assoc. Prof. Dr Didem Danış<br />
ORSAM Advisor, Immigration Studies & Iraqi Refugees, Galatasary University, Department of Sociology<br />
EDITORIAL BOARD OF MIDDLE EAST STUDIES<br />
Meliha Altunışık<br />
Bülent Aras<br />
Tayyar Arı<br />
Middle East Technical University (Turkey)<br />
Ministry of Turkish Foreign Affairs, Head of Center for Strategic Strategic Research<br />
Uludağ University (Turkey)<br />
ORSAM<br />
Report No: 151, April 2013 33
ORSAM<br />
CENTER FOR MIDDLE EASTERN STRATEGIC STUDIES<br />
İlker Aytürk<br />
Bilkent University (Turkey)<br />
Recep Boztemur<br />
Middle East Technical University (Turkey)<br />
Katerina Dalacoura<br />
London School of Economics (UK)<br />
F. Gregory Gause Vermont University (USA)<br />
Fawaz Gerges<br />
London School of Economics (UK)<br />
Ahmet K. Han<br />
Kadir Has University (Turkey)<br />
Raymond Hinnebusch<br />
St. Andrews University (UK)<br />
Rosemary Holiis<br />
City University (UK)<br />
Bahgat Korany<br />
Durham University (UK)<br />
Peter Mandaville<br />
George Mason University (USA)<br />
Emma Murphy<br />
Durham University (UK)<br />
MIDDLE EAST ANALYSIS EDITORIAL BOARD<br />
Prof. Dr. Meliha Altunışık<br />
Hasan Kanbolat<br />
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Hasan Ali Karasar<br />
Asst. Prof. Dr. Serhat Erkmen<br />
Middle East Technical University , Director of Institute of Social Sciences<br />
ORSAM Director<br />
Bilkent University, Department of International Relations<br />
ORSAM Middle East Advisor, Ahi Evran University, Head of Department of International Relations<br />
34<br />
ORSAM<br />
Report No: 151, April 2013
ORSAM<br />
Mithatpaşa Caddesi 46/6 Kızılay-ANKARA<br />
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