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Report No: 151, April 2013<br />

DEMOCRACY PROCESS AND PROBLEMS<br />

IN IRAQI KURDISTAN<br />

IRAK KÜRDİSTAN BÖLGESİ’NDE<br />

DEMOKRASİ SÜRECİ VE SORUNLARI<br />

CENTER FOR Ortadoğu MIDDLE Stratejik EASTERN Araştırmalar STRATEGIC Merkezi STUDIES<br />

ORTADOĞU STRATEJİK ARAŞTIRMALAR MERKEZİ<br />

Center for Mıddle Eastern Strategıc Studıes<br />

مركز الشرق األوسط للدراسات االستراتيجية<br />

ORSAM<br />

CENTER FOR MIDDLE EASTERN STRATEGIC STUDIES


DEMOCRACY PROCESS AND PROBLEMS<br />

IN IRAQI KURDISTAN<br />

IRAK KÜRDİSTAN BÖLGESİ’NDE<br />

DEMOKRASİ SÜRECİ VE SORUNLARI<br />

ORSAM Report No: 151<br />

April 2013<br />

ISBN: 978-605-4615-48-3<br />

Ankara - TURKEY ORSAM © 2013<br />

Content of this report is copyrighted to ORSAM. Except reasonable and partial quotation and exploitation under the Act No.<br />

5846, Law on Intellectual and Artistic Works, via proper citation, may not be used or re-published without prior permission by<br />

ORSAM. Assessments expressed in this report reflect only the opinions of its authors and do not represent the instiutional<br />

opinion of ORSAM.


ORSAM<br />

center for mıddle eastern strategıc studıes<br />

Strategıc Informatıon Management and<br />

Indepentdent Thought Productıon<br />

CENTER FOR MIDDLE EASTERN STRATEGIC STUDIES<br />

History<br />

In Turkey, the shortage of research on the Middle East grew more conspicuous than ever during<br />

the early 90’s. Center for Middle Eastern Strategic Studies (ORSAM) was established in January<br />

1, 2009 in order to provide relevant information to the general public and to the foreign<br />

policy community. The institute underwent an intensive structuring process, beginning to concentrate<br />

exclusively on Middle affairs.<br />

Outlook on the Middle Eastern World<br />

It is certain that the Middle East harbors a variety of interconnected problems. However, neither<br />

the Middle East nor its people ought to be stigmatized by images with negative connotations.<br />

Given the strength of their populations, Middle Eastern states possess the potential to<br />

activate their inner dynamics in order to begen peaceful mobilizations for development. Respect<br />

for people’s willingness to live together, respect for the sovereign right of states and respect<br />

for basic human rights and individual freedoms are the prerequisities for assuring peace and<br />

tranquility, both domesticalhly and internationally. In this con<strong>text</strong>, Turkey must continue to<br />

make constructive contributions to the establishment of regional stability and prosperity in its<br />

vicinity.<br />

ORSAM’s Think-Tank Research<br />

ORSAM, provides the general public and decision-making organizations with enlightening information<br />

about international politics in order to promote a healtier understanding of international<br />

policy issues and to help them to adopt appropriate positions. In order to present effective<br />

solutions, ORSAM supports high quality research by intellectuals and researchers that are competent<br />

in a variety of disciplines. ORSAM’s strong publishing capacity türansmits meticulous<br />

analyses of regional developments and trends to the interested parties. With its web site, its<br />

books, reports, and periodicals, ORSAM supports the development of Middle Eastern literature<br />

on a national and international scale. ORSAM supports the development of Middle Eastern<br />

literature on a national and international scala. ORSAM facilitates the sharing of knowledge<br />

and ideas with the Turkish and international communities by inviting statesmen, bureaucrats,<br />

academics, strategicts, businessmen, journalists, and NGO representatives to Turkey.<br />

www.<strong>orsam</strong>.org.tr


Yusuf Muhammad Sadiq<br />

He graduated from the department of Law and Political Sciences, Salahaddin University<br />

in Arbil in 2001. He did his masters degree in 2007 in the Faculty of Political Sciences at<br />

Nahrain University, in Baghdad. Nowadays, he continues his PhD on “Factors Affecting<br />

the Politics of the Future of Kurdistan” at University of Sulaymaniyah. Also, he works as<br />

a faculty member in the department of Political Sciences at University of Sulaymaniyah.<br />

Sadık, who is the founder of the chamber of political coordinatorship, worked as the<br />

coordinator of Board of Trustees of Kurdish Institute for Elections. He has been the<br />

member of board of trustees of the Center for Human Rights and Democracy Development<br />

since 2008, and the member of Coordination Committee of Opposition Parties<br />

since 2011. He still works as the Coordinator of Research Department of the Gorran<br />

Movement (Movement for Change).


PRESENTATION<br />

ORSAM attaches great importance to studies that are based on field search and observations on<br />

site as a part of its working principles. Therefore, in addition to the field search carried out by<br />

ORSAM specialists, ORSAM also gives weight to publications including the opinions of those<br />

who are specialists in their field in their own geographies.<br />

This report is an important study including observations, analyses, evaluation, and perspectives<br />

of specialists, who live abroad, on their own regions. This report entitled, “Democracy Process<br />

and Problems in Iraqi Kurdistan” contributes to Iraqi studies which is one of the major issues<br />

that ORSAM attaches importance to. The report puts forward the political process in Iraqi Kurdistan,<br />

which is of direct interest to Turkey, from past to present; and also it reflects the views<br />

of an academician who live in Iraqi Kurdistan in terms of its internal politics. In this respect, a<br />

detailed perspective is put forward on the past political process of Iraqi Kurdistan from inside.<br />

Furthermore, it is also extremely important in terms of setting forth the challenges and obstacles<br />

that Iraqi Kurdistan is facing today in democratization and political development process. Besides,<br />

the fact that it also includes solution offers to eliminate challenges and obstacles before the<br />

political process that Iraqi Kurdistan has been going through increases the value of the report.<br />

We hope that this study will be helpful for our readers who are interested in the subject.<br />

Hasan Kanbolat<br />

ORSAM Director<br />

4<br />

ORSAM<br />

Report No: 151, April 2013


Contents<br />

Presentation.............................................................................................................................................4<br />

Abstract.....................................................................................................................................................7<br />

1. POLITICAL SYSTEM IN KURDISTAN REGIONAL GOVERNMENT..............................9<br />

1.1. Administrative System in Iraqi Kurdistan............................................................................9<br />

1.2. Position of KDP and PUK in Political System of Iraqi Kurdistan....................................11<br />

2 CHALLENGES OF THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IN IRAQI KURDISTAN..................14<br />

2.1. Lack of Constitution..................................................................................................................15<br />

2.2. Deficiency of Rule of Law.........................................................................................................15<br />

2.3. Violation of Human Rights, Public Freedoms, and Freedom of Expression..................15<br />

2.4. Election Violations.....................................................................................................................16<br />

2.5. Multi-Party System and Peaceful Transfer of the Government.......................................17<br />

3. CONSEQUENCES AND SUGGESTIONS...................................................................................18<br />

ORSAM<br />

Report No: 151, April 2013 5


ORSAM Report No: 151, April 2013<br />

By<br />

: Yusuf Muhammet Sadık<br />

Translated by : Aytekin Enver,<br />

ORSAM Middle East Research Assistantı<br />

ORSAM<br />

ORSAM<br />

CENTER FOR MIDDLE EASTERN STRATEGIC STUDIES<br />

DEMOCRACY PROCESS AND<br />

PROBLEMS IN IRAQI KURDISTAN<br />

Abstract<br />

- Injustice, inequity, genocide, nationalism and disrespect to human rights by dictator regimes successively<br />

coming into power in Iraq led to 1991 March (Azar) uprising, objection of Kurdish populations to live under<br />

those regimes, and also led them to form democratic regime in the region.<br />

- The constitution project of the region was not accepted. However, the laws of the constitution project which<br />

regulate the articles especially on the relationship between executive and legislative organs and also which<br />

regulate the authorities of speaker and head of the region indicates that broad authorities were given to the<br />

head of the region by making concessions from the parliamentary regime.<br />

- In 1992 general elections, Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) were<br />

the only political parties in the region which received more than 7 per cent of the votes, and entered the<br />

parliament. This situation led these two political parties (KDP and PUK) to split the ministries 50-50 among<br />

themselves.<br />

- The lack of constitutional document, which clearly designates the relationship between citizens, political<br />

parties and the government as well as the relationship between legislative, executive and judicial powers, is<br />

one of the most important political problems of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).<br />

- The reports of civilian institutions which monitors judicial organs within KRG reveal a great number of<br />

judicial violations and deficiency of the rule of law. These reports point out the interventions of government,<br />

security forces, political parties, tribes and individuals to jurisdiction. This situation further increases political<br />

and social violence, as well as political and social conflicts in the region.<br />

- Although there are lots of political parties within KRG and the freedom to found political party exists, there<br />

is no such thing as party pluralism.<br />

- Civilian democratic system foundations should be laid in the region. Within this scope, the KRG Constitution<br />

Project should be revised and a balance should be established among executive, legislative and judicial<br />

organs to fix the violations within the parliamentary system in order to form a national consensus.<br />

- In order to prevent further civil wars, political armed violence and to create an environment that supports<br />

peaceful rivalry among all political parties in the region, it is required to reorganize armed, security and<br />

intelligence forces in the region in a professional way based on national foundations away from party and<br />

political affiliations.<br />

- It is necessary to develop effective, objective, independent mechanisms and judicial institutions which provide<br />

the rule of law. Those institutions and mechanisms should completely respect the judicial system, and the<br />

reliability should be provided.<br />

- In order to eliminate injustices, the use of administrative and judicial methods which respect administrative<br />

and judicial decisions of state mechanisms, administrative representatives and member of the public and<br />

which guarantee their rights should be based on parity.<br />

- It is necessary to guarantee fundamental rights of the citizens such to demonstrate, freedom of expression<br />

and freedom of press through law, and also it is required to amend laws that conflict with it.<br />

- The public force and state institutions should not be used against the opposition parties in political conflicts<br />

in order to reinforce the political pluralism in the region. Appropriation should be allocated for political parties<br />

within KRG based on transparency and equitable principles.<br />

ORSAM<br />

Report No: 151, April 2013 7


ORSAM<br />

CENTER FOR MIDDLE EASTERN STRATEGIC STUDIES<br />

Introduction<br />

The administrative experience of Iraqi Kurdistan<br />

started as a result of the fact that the<br />

people in the region no longer wanted to live<br />

under the rule of former Iraqi regime following<br />

the popular uprising that took place on<br />

March 1991. In the past, the people did not<br />

ask for such a thing. Because the aforesaid<br />

regimes had committed horrible murders<br />

against these people by encroaching their<br />

political, national and humanitarian rights in<br />

an environment of deprivation and tyranny.<br />

Such that, these murders had almost reached<br />

genocide level in the Halabja and Anfal operation.<br />

Therefore, the people in KRG surged<br />

into neighboring countries on late March and<br />

early April 1991, after the Iraqi troops returned<br />

to Kurdish regions. As a result of this, the<br />

international community intervened and decided<br />

to form safe zones in northern Iraq for<br />

Kurds. After the Iraqi regime took a decision<br />

for all political, military and civilian state institutions<br />

and organizations to withdraw from<br />

Sulaymaniya, Erbil and Duhok on October<br />

1991, “de facto” administrations emerged in<br />

the areas where Kurds seized control. Those<br />

steps encouraged Kurdish political parties to<br />

fill the authority gap and establish a democratic<br />

political regime based on the votes of<br />

electors in the areas under their own control.<br />

The first democratic election was held on<br />

May 1992 to elect the leader of National Assembly<br />

and Kurdish liberation movement for<br />

the administration of the areas where Kurds<br />

seize control. As a result of this election, the<br />

government was established and civilian and<br />

judicial institutions and organizations started<br />

to be created in the region. However, the civil<br />

war and conflicts between the two major<br />

parties; Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)<br />

and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) prevented<br />

further development of this young democratic<br />

experience. As a result, autonomous<br />

Iraqi Kurdistan was divided into two parts,<br />

each controlled by different political parties.<br />

At this point, analyzing the problems before<br />

the democratic process besides the political<br />

system in Iraqi Kurdistan, and solution to be<br />

offered to these problems becomes important.<br />

The Reason of the Research<br />

This research strives to shed light on the political<br />

system that emerged as a result of the<br />

transition that took place in early 1990s, set<br />

of this system in the following process, and<br />

the factors that ruined the democratic view<br />

here. To that end, a series of questions will be<br />

strived to be answered. Some of these questions<br />

might be listed as follows: What is the<br />

administrative structure of Iraqi Kurdistan? Is<br />

this a parliamentary system, or a presidential<br />

system? How does it affect the democratic<br />

process in the region? What is the impact of<br />

the relations among political parties, especially<br />

the relations between KDP and PUK<br />

which are two parties in power, on administrative<br />

institutions and organizations in the<br />

region? What are the most important reflections<br />

and setbacks of the democratic system<br />

in the region?<br />

Hypothesis of the Research<br />

Besides these main problems, some secondary<br />

questions will be strived to be answered<br />

through hypothesis: “The democratic process<br />

under the influence of relations between the<br />

two political parties in power within KRG<br />

is faced with a series of problems, and these<br />

problems lead to eviscerating the real content<br />

that would provide the public interest”.<br />

Research Method<br />

Descriptive method will be used to prove the<br />

main hypothesis of the research and to explain<br />

the most important characteristics of the<br />

8<br />

ORSAM<br />

Report No: 151, April 2013


DEMOCRACY PROCESS AND PROBLEMS IN IRAQI KURDISTAN<br />

ORSAM<br />

administrative system in the region. Similarly,<br />

to learn the primary inputs and outputs of the<br />

political process in KRG, systematic method<br />

will be used.<br />

Structure of the Research<br />

The research was divided in two parts. In the<br />

first part, the structure of political system in<br />

the region will be handled by putting forward<br />

the structure of the administrative system in<br />

the region, as well as the position of two parties<br />

in power and their impact on the political<br />

order and the institutions in the region. In the<br />

second part, on the other hand, the problems<br />

before the democratic process in the region<br />

will be addressed.<br />

1. POLITICAL SYSTEM IN KURDISTAN<br />

REGIONAL GOVERNMENT<br />

Political system is the whole constitutional<br />

principles, laws, political structure, institutions<br />

and mechanisms, which are used by<br />

the regime to put forward its will, and from<br />

which the state takes its presence and continuity<br />

1 . We are going to try to know the political<br />

system in KRG by dealing with the administrative<br />

system, political parties, their relationship,<br />

and the impact of these relations on<br />

the political regime in the region. Thus, it will<br />

be possible to address the most important<br />

problems that the democratic process in the<br />

region has been faced with in the following<br />

section of the study.<br />

1.1. Administrative System in Iraqi<br />

Kurdistan<br />

What is meant by the administrative system<br />

is the relationship between the administrative<br />

system and powers, especially legislative and<br />

executive powers, in KRG. In general, this<br />

relationship is regulated through constitutions<br />

which put forward how to shape the relationship<br />

among themselves by designating<br />

the authorities and responsibilities of both<br />

powers.<br />

The draft constitution of KRG has not yet<br />

been finalized. The Article 6 of the KRG constitution<br />

law dated 2008 and numbered 16 envisages<br />

to put the constitution to the vote of<br />

KRG citizens after being adopted by majority<br />

of the members of parliament.<br />

The draft constitution of the Kurdistan region<br />

was prepared by a special commission that<br />

had been created in accordance with the decision<br />

dated 8 September 2005 and numbered<br />

5 2 of the KRG Parliament. This commission<br />

was composed of academicians, jurists and<br />

members of the parliament. 3 When the draft<br />

constitution 4 was presented to KRG parliament<br />

on 24 June 2009, it was accepted with<br />

more than two thirds of the votes of members<br />

of the parliament. 5 However, the fact that the<br />

draft constitution was accepted when the second<br />

period was over poses problem in accordance<br />

with the Article 46 and Article 51 of the<br />

KRG Parliamentary Electoral Law. 6<br />

Besides all these, it is stated in the Article 1 of<br />

the aforesaid draft constitution that the political<br />

system in the region is a parliamentary,<br />

republican and a democratic system. 7 However,<br />

considering other articles of the draft,<br />

especially within the con<strong>text</strong> of the authorities<br />

of President of the region, it is seen that<br />

it was explicitly drifted apart from the parliamentary<br />

system. In some articles of the draft<br />

constitution, the President is envisaged to be<br />

elected through direct secret ballot by the<br />

people. 8 Within this con<strong>text</strong>, the President is<br />

given the authority to publish a decree or not<br />

in the following cases in addition to other authorities:<br />

9<br />

a– To form government after receiving the<br />

vote of confidence from the parliament,<br />

ORSAM<br />

Report No: 151, April 2013 9


ORSAM<br />

CENTER FOR MIDDLE EASTERN STRATEGIC STUDIES<br />

b– To discharge ministers from the office in<br />

case prime minister demands their resignation<br />

or the parliament removes the vote<br />

of confidence,<br />

c– To assign the members of the constitutional<br />

court after the parliament ratifies the<br />

candidates,<br />

d– To assign judges, head of the judicial supervisory<br />

council, members and head of<br />

the prosecution service after the ratification<br />

of candidates by the jurisdiction in the<br />

region.<br />

e– To assign presidents of independent council<br />

and high council after the ratification of<br />

candidates by the parliament.<br />

f– To establish the offices of KRG abroad in<br />

coordination with the respective commission<br />

within the federal government and<br />

with the proposal of the head of government,<br />

g– To assign those with special rank through<br />

nomination by respective minister and<br />

approval of the council of ministers.<br />

Similarly, in accordance with the draft constitution,<br />

the President shall issue a decree and<br />

shall have the power to declare a state of emergency,<br />

after consulting with the Speaker of the<br />

Parliament and the Prime Minister of Kurdistan,<br />

and obtaining their consent. 10 Thus,<br />

granting such broad authorities to the President<br />

of the Region leads to deviation from<br />

the parliamentary system. 11 Besides, this draft<br />

constitution gives the authority to intervene<br />

in administrative system of the region, parliament,<br />

government and judiciary power 12<br />

to the President of the Region. Furthermore,<br />

except for certain cases, it is not monitored<br />

by the parliament (except for perjury of the<br />

constitutional oath, serious violation of the<br />

Constitution, or high treason). It brings along<br />

severe implementations. In other words, they<br />

are impeached only by a vote of a majority of<br />

two-thirds of the members the Members of<br />

Parliament. 13 However, in accordance with<br />

the constitutional law, this situation conflicts<br />

with the basic principles of the parliamentary<br />

system. 14<br />

Deviation from the parliamentary system<br />

is explicitly seen in laws regulating judicial<br />

power and executive power, and which are<br />

recognized as constitutional laws in the absence<br />

of constitution. In accordance with the<br />

Article 56 dated 1992 and numbered 1 of the<br />

Electoral Law of KRG Parliament, by granting<br />

vote of confidence or no-confidence to<br />

the government, parliament shall monitor the<br />

government (This situation is a clear evidence<br />

for the parliamentary system). The KRG<br />

Presidential Law dated 2005 and numbered<br />

1 gives broad authorities to President of the<br />

Region, similar to the draft constitution of the<br />

Region. 15 However, there is no judicial power<br />

or parliamentary control to monitor the actions<br />

of the President. In addition, the President<br />

of the Region was also given the title of<br />

Head of the Regional Security Council in accordance<br />

with the KRG Security Council Law.<br />

This council has the authority to intervene in<br />

the following fields; economy, politics, diplomacy,<br />

security, intelligence, political parties,<br />

health, trade, communication, information<br />

systems. 16<br />

Deviation from the parliamentary system<br />

leads to monopolizing powers without any<br />

control or monitoring. This situation might<br />

lead to emergence of a dictatorial regime. 17<br />

Similarly, just like during the period of former<br />

President Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, the<br />

President might use his power and authorities<br />

in a way to serve the party’s and personal interests.<br />

18 This deviation again leads to elimination<br />

of mutual flexible balance and control<br />

10<br />

ORSAM<br />

Report No: 151, April 2013


DEMOCRACY PROCESS AND PROBLEMS IN IRAQI KURDISTAN<br />

ORSAM<br />

between legislative and executive powers. 19<br />

And this is considered as the most typical<br />

characteristics of the parliamentary system. 20<br />

Here, it is necessary to mention the political<br />

party experience in the region in order to show<br />

KRG’s administrative experience. Because it<br />

is quite hard to consider administrative institutions<br />

separately from the political parties in<br />

the region, because the aforesaid institutions<br />

were extremely affected by the relationship<br />

among political parties, especially by the relations<br />

between KDP and PUK. 21 As a matter of<br />

fact, the conflicts, wars and alliances between<br />

the aforesaid political parties directly affected<br />

the parliament and the regional government.<br />

1.2. Position of KDP and PUK in Political<br />

System of Iraqi Kurdistan<br />

The political parties in KRG started to appear<br />

in parallel with the increasing number of groups<br />

taking part in the armed struggle against<br />

the former regime. Those political parties,<br />

except for the Islamic Movement 22 , were gathered<br />

under the umbrella of the KRG front. 23<br />

However, the aforesaid parties’ role became<br />

weaker as they did not have seat within the<br />

KRG National Council and no other parties<br />

except for KDP and PUK could not enter the<br />

council due to the fact that other political parties<br />

could not pass the 7-percent threshold 24 .<br />

This situation led two major parties KDP and<br />

PUK to prevail in the political platform for a<br />

long time.<br />

On 22 May 1992, KDP and PUK agreed on<br />

sharing all authorities based on 50-50 sharing<br />

all authorities within the government and<br />

National Council as well as the seats within<br />

the National Council. However, five seats<br />

which had been allocated for Christians in<br />

the Assembly were excluded, and other parties<br />

which lost the elections were consoled 25<br />

with some ministries. 26 The first meeting of<br />

the Parliament of the Region was held in Erbil<br />

on 4 June 1992. In the aforesaid meeting,<br />

Jawhar Namiq Salim from KDP was elected<br />

as the president of the Kurdistan National Assembly,<br />

and Muhammad Tawfiq Rahim from<br />

PUK was elected as the vice-president of the<br />

Assembly. Also, Dr. Ruz Nouri Shavis from<br />

KDP was assigned as deputy prime minister<br />

when the first government in Kurdistan Region<br />

was formed by the leadership of Dr. Fuat<br />

Masum from PUK on 4 July 1992. 27 Meanwhile,<br />

the Assyrian Democratic Movement,<br />

Communist Party, Labour Party and Union<br />

Party gained a ministry each. 28 On the other<br />

hand, the Islamic Movement refused to enter<br />

in government and stayed out of the regional<br />

government and National Assembly. 29<br />

Formation of the regional government is considered<br />

as a historical step for Kurds in general,<br />

and for Iraqi Kurds in particular. Because<br />

Kurds had the opportunity to form a government<br />

only twice in history. The first one is the<br />

government that was formed by Sheikh Mahmoud<br />

in 1922, and subverted as a result of<br />

the British attack within less than a year. The<br />

second experience, on the other hand, took<br />

place in 1946 during the Kadi Muhammad<br />

period. However, this government could not<br />

last even a year either, and was subverted as<br />

a result of Iranian army’s attack on Mahabad<br />

which was the capital of the Kurdish Republic.<br />

30<br />

Thus, the Kurdistan Regional Government<br />

achieved to fill the political administrative<br />

and economic gap that emerged as result of<br />

the withdrawal of former political regime in<br />

Iraq from Kurdish regions. The government<br />

created an umbrella for volunteer schools, Seladdin<br />

University in Erbil, hospital and similar<br />

public institutions and organizations. Likewise,<br />

other governments that were formed following<br />

this government established political,<br />

financial and administrative institutions and<br />

organizations, and provided services.<br />

ORSAM<br />

Report No: 151, April 2013 11


ORSAM<br />

CENTER FOR MIDDLE EASTERN STRATEGIC STUDIES<br />

As mentioned above, KDP and PUK reached<br />

an agreement to 50-50 share the power in<br />

the region. This sharing spread into ministries<br />

and institutions. Because the government<br />

was double-headed which was composed of<br />

Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister. It<br />

was also the same for ministries. Deputy minister<br />

had the same administrative, financial<br />

and legal rights with minister. This situation<br />

paralyzed the decision-making mechanism<br />

within the government and ministries, and<br />

also led to a major administrative setback. 31<br />

The fifty-fifty sharing system led to a total<br />

split between the two parties in the con<strong>text</strong> of<br />

government and administration. This situation<br />

led to both a total split of the region, and<br />

also civil wars to be mentioned in the forthcoming<br />

part of the study.<br />

This was an unprecedented experience and<br />

led to the following consequences: 32<br />

a– While the setback of the formation of a<br />

united administration in the region led<br />

each ministries to split into two de facto<br />

ministries, it also led to a split among employees<br />

under two major parties.<br />

b– In addition to the planning for the future<br />

while the citizens encountered setbacks,<br />

there was also a setback in terms of the financial<br />

development.<br />

c– While this situation led to a rupture among<br />

the people and in the country, loyalty to<br />

country turned into loyalty to the party.<br />

d– As it had already been planned, some setbacks<br />

took place in holding elections.<br />

e–As a result, this experience led to a strong<br />

polarization in the region. And thus, the<br />

region was dragged into a civil war. 33<br />

In addition to financial conflicts 34 caused by<br />

double-headed government and administration,<br />

some other factors led Kurds in<br />

Iraq to be dragged into a civil war. Those<br />

reasons might be listed as follows:<br />

- Presence of militia forces affiliated to political<br />

parties 35 ,<br />

- Same old conflicts and disputes between<br />

KDP and the Leader of KDP Massoud Barzani,<br />

and PUK and Secretary General of<br />

PUK Jalal Talabani 36 ,<br />

- Destructive role of the former Iraqi regime<br />

37 ,<br />

- Deepening internal conflicts caused by<br />

direct of indirect interventions of neighboring<br />

countries, of Iran and Turkey 38 in<br />

particular.<br />

Those factors caused to the outbreak of war<br />

between KDP and PUK and the allies that are<br />

members of other Kurdish parties 39 . The first<br />

sparkle took place in Kaladize village on the<br />

borderline under the administration of Sulaymaniya.<br />

The dispute on property of various<br />

lands in this city led to the outbreak of conflict<br />

between supporters and members of the<br />

two parties (KDP and PUK) on 2 May 1994.<br />

The conflicts spread to Duhok, Sulaymaniya,<br />

Halabja and other areas before long. 40 The ongoing<br />

conflicts gave an opportunity for both<br />

the central Iraqi government in Baghdad and<br />

also neighboring countries to directly or indirectly<br />

intervene in the internal affairs of the<br />

region, and to help the warring factions. Such<br />

that, the conflict reached a point where Iraqi<br />

Republican Guards entered the territories<br />

of Erbil on 31 August 1996 at the request of<br />

KDP, and as a result, PUK was displaced from<br />

Erbil. 41 Afterwards, without loss of time, KDP<br />

relaunched National Assembly meetings of<br />

the Iraqi Kurdistan Region. Concordantly, the<br />

coalition government was formed under the<br />

leadership of Ruz Nuri Shawiz also with the<br />

participation of political parties such as; Iraqi<br />

Kurdistan Islamic Movement, Iraqi Kurdistan<br />

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Islamic Union, and Communist Party. PUK,<br />

on the other hand, did not take part in this<br />

government and formed a government with<br />

the participation of its allies such as Labour<br />

Party, Social Democratic Party under the leadership<br />

of Kosrat Resoul in the areas under<br />

its own control. 42<br />

The Iraqi Kurdistan Region, which had already<br />

been split into three regions as a result<br />

of internal conflicts, was further split in political<br />

and administrative terms. The region<br />

under the control of KDP included the majority<br />

of Duhok and Erbil. The region under<br />

the control of PUK, on the other hand, included<br />

eastern Arbil with Köysancak and the<br />

areas liberated from Kirkuk in addition to<br />

Sulaymaniya. The third region included Halabja<br />

and its neighborhood under the control<br />

of Kurdistan Islamic Movement. 43 Following<br />

this geographic, political and administrative<br />

split, judiciary split took place after PUK<br />

Secretary General Jalal Talabani was elected<br />

as the President of the Region in 1999 in the<br />

region under the control of PUK and court<br />

of appeal was created. 44 This profound split<br />

decreased the possibility of institutionalization<br />

of Kurds’ administrative experience. And<br />

this situation weakened the worries of neighboring<br />

countries. Thus, the countries in the<br />

region started not to attach much importance<br />

to developments on Kurds in Iraq. 45 However,<br />

at the end, the process of reunification of the<br />

region started as from the end of 2002 as a<br />

result of the Washington Peace Agreement 46<br />

that was signed between Jalal Talabani and<br />

Massoud Barzani in 1998 via the then-U.S.<br />

Secretary of State Madeleine Albright<br />

The first step was taken by reuniting KRG<br />

National Assembly which held its first joint<br />

session on 4 October 2002. However, 47 the<br />

regional government could be reunited on 7<br />

May 2006, only after 31 January 2005 when<br />

the second term election of the KRG National<br />

Assembly was held. 48 This delay on formation<br />

of the joint government stemmed from the<br />

dispute on how the authorities would be distributed<br />

in the region. By the way, there was<br />

also the issue of distributing shares in public<br />

authorities among Kurds in Baghdad. Finally,<br />

both parties reached an agreement. In accordance<br />

with the agreement, the government<br />

was united at high level (prime minister and<br />

deputy prime minister) and a double-headed<br />

government was formed. The government<br />

would be assigned by the parliament on the<br />

basis of partnership. The government would<br />

be formed by the President of the Region. Besides,<br />

parties also reached an agreement on<br />

gradual unification of ministries within the<br />

regional government also at high level. In accordance<br />

with the agreement, the authorities<br />

such as prime minister, deputy prime minister<br />

and ministries were split fifty-fifty between<br />

KDP and PUK as before. However, some<br />

authorities were given to political parties<br />

such as Kurdistan Islamic Union, Kurdistan<br />

Islamic Group, Kurdistan Communist Party,<br />

Social Democratic Party, and Labor Party<br />

which took part in the second term of the<br />

regional parliament. Prime Minister, Deputy<br />

Prime Minister and ministries were agreed to<br />

be elected every two years. Thus, a different<br />

formula was used to split the administration<br />

among the parties. This time, the government<br />

was equally shared; one under the presidency<br />

of the prime minister, and the other under<br />

the presidency of the deputy prime minister.<br />

While this agreement between KDP and<br />

PUK developed between the two parties, they<br />

signed a new strategic agreement on 27 July<br />

2007, and thus, they joined their views and<br />

efforts both in the region and in Baghdad and<br />

agreed for both electoral periods until 2013<br />

on how to share the administration at two levels.<br />

49 In this con<strong>text</strong>, Minister of Finance of<br />

the regional government gave a speech in the<br />

parliament on 21 December 2011, and said;<br />

“the regional government is double-headed.<br />

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CENTER FOR MIDDLE EASTERN STRATEGIC STUDIES<br />

You all know this fact. We don’t need to hide<br />

it”. In the same speech, it was stated that “the<br />

budget coming from Baghdad was shared<br />

between Sulaymaniya and Germiyan administration<br />

(43 per cent) and Arbil and Duhok<br />

administration (57 per cent) until 21 December<br />

2010. 50<br />

Based on all these, we can suggest that the<br />

disagreement on sharing the administration<br />

and the problems stemming from the sharing<br />

system between parties paralyzed institutionalization<br />

of the political system in the<br />

region. Also, Kurdish parties led to a civil<br />

war especially between KDP and PUK. This<br />

situation led to a split among Kurdish political<br />

parties, especially between KDP and PUK<br />

in the con<strong>text</strong> of government, administration<br />

and jurisdiction. Also, the end of conflicts<br />

between the aforesaid political parties paved<br />

the way for the reunification of government<br />

at high level. However, party interests prevented<br />

the unification of two administrations<br />

in the region. Despite the fact that elections<br />

were held in the region for two periods and<br />

also three-period elections were held at federal<br />

level after the end of civil war between<br />

the aforesaid parties, both political parties do<br />

their best to maintain the current situation.<br />

Nevertheless, negative consequences of this<br />

equation in the con<strong>text</strong> of sharing the administration<br />

between the parties, as well as the<br />

widespread corruption and problems in democratic<br />

process led to a civilian tendency<br />

at public level to make a reform to improve<br />

the political system in the region in terms of<br />

its structure. It also made it possible for the<br />

Change (Gorran) Movement to appear in the<br />

region as a political opposition. 51<br />

2. CHALLENGES OF THE DEMOCRATIC<br />

PROCESS IN IRAQI KURDISTAN<br />

Democratic regimes have proved their success<br />

in the face of internal and foreign crises<br />

and risks throughout centuries. For instance,<br />

democratic regimes won the World War<br />

I and II in the West, and also during the Cold<br />

War, they achieved success against totalitarian-authoritarian<br />

regimes such as Monarchies,<br />

Nazism, Fascism and Communism. At the<br />

same time, those democratic regimes achieved<br />

dealing with internal political and economic<br />

challenges, solving crises. Thus, it made it<br />

possible to turn the developments that led to<br />

collapse of other regimes into an advantage.<br />

The collapse of Communist regimes in Eastern<br />

Europe and the split of the Soviet Union<br />

has been a big lesson in this terms.<br />

Mechanisms and primary elements of democratic<br />

regime such as freedom of expression,<br />

political pluralism, peaceful government<br />

change give opportunity to quickly see deficiencies<br />

and mistakes, as well as coming up<br />

with political programmes and successful<br />

solution of political and civilian parties, and<br />

also alternative programmes to the suggestions<br />

of other parties. So that, this process leads<br />

to elimination of deficiencies and mistakes,<br />

to development and renovation almost in<br />

each election period. Also, these mechanisms<br />

bring along political stability in the long term<br />

as they create an environment to solve and<br />

manage internal political conflicts through<br />

peaceful methods, and they give equal opportunities<br />

to those conflicting with one another<br />

to come into power by gaining public consent<br />

and pleasure.<br />

Establishing a real democratic regime in the<br />

region enables establishing political stability,<br />

and improving economic and social development.<br />

Besides, it also helps reinforcing political<br />

power in a way to use current international<br />

and regional opportunities in the future<br />

to reach the goals and to get rid of potential<br />

threats. But the democratic process encounters<br />

major challenges in the region. And this<br />

situation weakens its relations with the outside<br />

and also leads to internal instabilities.<br />

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Important challenges are mentioned below<br />

by pointing out the democratic factors in administrative<br />

experience in the region.<br />

2.1. Lack of Constitution<br />

In democratic regimes, constitution serves<br />

as a social contract between individuals and<br />

the state to establish the rules of democratic<br />

game, to limit the absolute power of administrators,<br />

to establish peaceful methods<br />

and mechanisms for the transfer of power,<br />

to protect and guarantee personal rights and<br />

freedoms. In other words, coming up with a<br />

constitution and to abide by the constitution<br />

paves the way for maintaining the other characteristics<br />

of democratic regime. 52<br />

The lack of constitutional document, which<br />

clearly designates the relationship between<br />

citizens, political parties and the government<br />

as well as the relationship between legislative,<br />

executive and judicial powers, is one of<br />

the most important political problems of the<br />

Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). This<br />

situation led to lack of administration experience<br />

in the region, ambiguous limits of the<br />

authorities of three powers, unequal power<br />

distribution among the three powers, stronger<br />

power of three political parties than the<br />

other three parties, deterioration of the government<br />

between those two parties in power,<br />

and to an armed conflict between the<br />

two parties.<br />

Also, there are many inequalities in the aforementioned<br />

constitution project. It appears<br />

that the authorities of the president of the region<br />

within the scope of this project was broadened<br />

to broaden the authorities of executive<br />

power at the cost of rights and freedoms<br />

of other authorities and citizens. As already<br />

mentioned before, this project gives brad authorities<br />

to the president of the region that<br />

would make it possible for him to meddle in<br />

government, parliament and jurisdiction. 53<br />

2.2 Deficiency of Rule of Law<br />

The rule of law is considered as one of the<br />

backbones and foundations of contemporary<br />

democracy. It is such a foundation that it is<br />

believed the democracy mechanism would<br />

not work without it. 54 Hence, it is important<br />

to find independent, objective and effective<br />

judicial institutions and control mechanisms<br />

to guarantee the rule of law. It is expected<br />

from those institutions and mechanisms to<br />

provide respect for law, to increase credibility<br />

of transactions, and to eliminate injustices. In<br />

order to eliminate injustices, the use of administrative<br />

and judicial methods which respect<br />

administrative and judicial decisions of state<br />

mechanisms, administrative representatives<br />

and members of the public and which guarantee<br />

their rights should be based on parity. 55<br />

The report of a non-governmental organization<br />

called the “American Society for Kurds”<br />

points out violation of the rule of law in KRG.<br />

Some of them can be listed as follows: that<br />

security forces and the police judge prisoners,<br />

acting slowly in concluding some cases,<br />

changing information in documents and files<br />

of certain issues that are not concluded, weak<br />

position of courts in the face of some issues<br />

related to two parties in power or tribes,<br />

physical and psychological torture against<br />

suspects, pressure and threat on judges, not<br />

performing the decision taken by judges in<br />

certain cases, delays in following the proceedings<br />

by judges of authorized courts, some<br />

judges’ adhering to the parties in power and<br />

giving verdicts in favor of the parties in power.<br />

56<br />

2.3. Violation of Human Rights, Public<br />

Freedoms, and Freedom of Expression<br />

Human rights is the cornerstone of democracy.<br />

57 In other words, it is unimaginable to<br />

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CENTER FOR MIDDLE EASTERN STRATEGIC STUDIES<br />

consider a democratic regime without a respect<br />

to fundamental rights of citizens. The<br />

strong bond between democracy and human<br />

rights is not recent. The Article 21 of the Universal<br />

Declaration of Human Rights suggests<br />

that; “The will of the people shall be the basis<br />

of the authority of government”. 58 What is<br />

meant by this statement based on the bilateral<br />

relationship between the state and individual<br />

is that protecting human rights, reaching democracy<br />

and a democratic regime is a part of<br />

the fundamental rights of the people.<br />

On the other hand, democracy presumes that<br />

there is a freedom of opinion and expression<br />

including the absence of an obstacle or influence<br />

in accepting an idea, and the right to<br />

publish an idea or thought without changing<br />

it or limiting ideas with obstacles. 59<br />

Also, media organs are considered as an important<br />

means to express criticisms about<br />

the deficiencies in government agencies in<br />

democratic regimes. In addition to this, it<br />

might be asserted that is an important means<br />

to raise awareness among citizens, to form<br />

free platforms for political disputes, to create<br />

public opinion and exert pressure to eliminate<br />

problems and deficiencies. 60<br />

The fundamental rights of citizens such as<br />

to stage demonstration are violated in KRG.<br />

Although this right is found within the Iraqi<br />

constitution 61 , in accordance with the relevant<br />

law of KRG, to stage demonstration depends<br />

on the approval of executive and administrative<br />

organs. Thus, the right to stage demonstration<br />

was limited. 62 The international<br />

reports point out violation of various human<br />

rights such as; torture, illegal arbitrary detentions,<br />

forcing citizens to become members<br />

of the two parties in power, security forces’<br />

killing and injuring civilians who staged demonstrations.<br />

63<br />

As for the freedom of expression and press,<br />

many independent and semi-independent<br />

journals, magazines, radio and TV channels<br />

have emerged since 2000. Although press law<br />

was introduced by the Regional Parliament,<br />

there are many violations in this field as well.<br />

The Metro Center to defend the rights of journalists,<br />

prepared the most critical report<br />

on the press rights in 2011 since the establishment<br />

of KRG. In 2011, the Center recorded<br />

359 cases of violations in different forms;<br />

four of which were injuries by gun fire, 8 cases<br />

of setting fire to media offices and channels,<br />

85 cases of physical abuse, 57 cases of verbal<br />

threats. 64<br />

2.4. Election Violations<br />

One of the most important elements of democracy<br />

is free and just elections held regularly<br />

where the people would show their own<br />

will. Each elector should be able to vote for<br />

the one that would represent himself/herself<br />

under the principles of transparency, freedom<br />

and equality. To that end, elections should<br />

be based on general, just and secret ballot<br />

basis. 65 But the elections are not the only part<br />

of democracy. Elections are just a component<br />

of democracy, but to make it a real one,<br />

the elections must be based on democratic<br />

foundations. And this should be done in accordance<br />

with equal opportunities, potential<br />

and means. Democracy which aims for the<br />

people to elect the person to rule themselves<br />

does not come to mean that the same group<br />

will always rule the other group. Accordingly,<br />

elections mean to elect, to participate in the<br />

elections, to be provided with opportunities<br />

and options to choose from. 66<br />

In order for the elections not to lose its meaning,<br />

goal and to provide democracy, some<br />

conditions considered essential are required<br />

to be provided. Those principles might be listed<br />

as follows: 67<br />

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- The peoples shall be provided with rights<br />

to elect, to be a candidate and to participate<br />

in the elections. This comes to mean<br />

that all citizens have the right to elect and<br />

to take part in public affairs.<br />

- Election procedures shall provide freedom<br />

to elect in terms of the majority of votes,<br />

equality among the people, secret balloting<br />

and right polling.<br />

- Elections shall be held on a regular and<br />

continuous basis for citizens to be able to<br />

elect their representatives, to take part in<br />

the political process, and to have a say in<br />

political decisions. 68<br />

- Elections shall be carried out with respect<br />

to fundamental rights of citizens.<br />

- For a truer and more comprehensive reflection<br />

of electoral will on elections results,<br />

electoral organizations shall be designated<br />

on an equitable basis.<br />

- In order to guarantee fair elections, the<br />

election process shall be controlled by an<br />

independent electoral commission, not by<br />

the state institutions. The decisions taken<br />

shall be open to objection in judicial authorities.<br />

- Elections shall be held based on fair competition.<br />

- Freedom shall be provided in electoral<br />

campaigns.<br />

Many violations and problems are witnessed<br />

in electoral field in KRG. For instance, none<br />

of the general elections have been held in<br />

time in accordance with electoral laws. The<br />

regional parliamentary elections were held in<br />

three electoral periods in 1992, 2005, 2009.<br />

The third period elections were held a couple<br />

of months later than the date assigned. A<br />

similar case also took place in provincial council<br />

elections that had been held only once<br />

until 2005.<br />

Aside from these, many other violations were<br />

made in the elections held in the region. Those<br />

violations especially took place in KRG<br />

Parliamentary elections held on 25 July 2009.<br />

Lots of violations and gerrymanders took place<br />

on the election day and during the electoral<br />

campaigns. Citizens were systematically<br />

oppressed due to their political affiliations. 69<br />

For example, many civil servants had to quit<br />

their jobs. 70 Those including deans and heads<br />

of department were discharged from their<br />

positions, 71 and many people from various<br />

departments were threatened 72 . Moreover,<br />

especially both in Arbil and Duhok, a largescale<br />

gerrymander took place on the election<br />

day. 73 There’s no doubt that it was aimed to<br />

change the will of electors as well as the election<br />

results by doing all these, and thus this<br />

situation prevented the reflection of true tendencies<br />

of electors on the results.<br />

2.5. Multi-Party System and Peaceful<br />

Transfer of the Government<br />

Political pluralism comes to mean that there<br />

are multiple political powers in a state, and<br />

that there is a peaceful rivalry 74 among those<br />

powers with equal opportunities. Within<br />

this con<strong>text</strong>, the success of a political party in<br />

a democratic regime depends on how much<br />

the people support its programme. It is required<br />

for all political parties and power to have<br />

equal opportunities to win the gratitude of<br />

electors. For instance, using the resources of<br />

government agencies for electoral campaigns,<br />

and spending public budget to win the votes<br />

of electors leads to a situation where some<br />

political parties can use state resources while<br />

other cannot. Equal opportunities among<br />

political parties cause political, economic and<br />

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social programmes in favor of electors to be<br />

the primary variable to come into power. This<br />

would lead the general interest to be put ahead<br />

of personal interests and the interests of<br />

political party.<br />

Although there are many political parties in<br />

the region and the formation of parties are regulated<br />

by law 75 , there is not exactly a multiparty<br />

system in the region. Because in parallel<br />

with the aforementioned reports, KDP and<br />

PUK which are the parties in power use the<br />

public budget and the resources of government<br />

agencies in the region in their election<br />

campaigns. 76<br />

Also, those two parties exert pressure on other<br />

parties. Sometimes, without cutting off<br />

financial aid, headquarters of other political<br />

parties are assaulted and set on fire. 77 Especially,<br />

these attacks take place especially in the<br />

region under the control of KDP. That’s why,<br />

almost a single-party system is seen in the regions<br />

where KDP and PUK are in control in<br />

KRG.<br />

Implementing peaceful democracy requires<br />

having constitutional, judicial, and political<br />

opportunities to peacefully transfer the power<br />

among the conflicting political parties.<br />

Because peacefully coming into power leads<br />

to an open political competition with broad,<br />

free popular participation without any discrimination.<br />

78<br />

The message sent to the party not voted aims<br />

to revise program and projects of the party.<br />

In this case, the party which loses the power<br />

and/or elections has to revise its program and<br />

projects. In addition to this, the party also<br />

has to reorganize its structure and to change<br />

some symbols. Hence, more active and new<br />

projects will be prepared for the next elections.<br />

From this point of view, this would lead<br />

to reorganization and restructuring of political<br />

parties in democratic regime.<br />

Also another message is sent to the party<br />

which wins the elections in peaceful transfer<br />

of the power: According to this message, the<br />

authorities given by the electors are not the<br />

absolute authorities. The message says that<br />

they will end up like the other party which<br />

loses, in case the promises given to electors<br />

are not kept and the public interest is not met.<br />

Based on this, peaceful transfer of the power<br />

leads to a dynamic and continuous renewal of<br />

the political process. Also it does not conflict<br />

with the public interest and puts it ahead of<br />

personal interests and the narrow interests of<br />

political party.<br />

Although the democratic system experience<br />

in KRG has been going on for more than two<br />

periods, its peaceful transfer of power has not<br />

yet been completed. Despite the change of<br />

position between KDP and PUK, neither of<br />

them has made a complete power transfer to<br />

the other one. Equal opportunities have not<br />

been provided for other parties and groups<br />

competing for the power, and they could not<br />

come into power despite winning the elections.<br />

Hence, as Molla Bahtiyar said in the political<br />

bureau elections of KDP, the most important<br />

question is; “Will KDP and PUK accept<br />

the electoral victory of any political party<br />

in the future, and voluntarily give the power<br />

to them? 79<br />

In conclusion, despite the existence of some<br />

elements of democracy such as elections, free<br />

media, presence of political parties etc., deficiencies<br />

and violations would prevent the democratic<br />

process in KRG from being completed.<br />

3. CONSEQUENCES AND<br />

SUGGESTIONS<br />

1. Consequences<br />

1. Injustice, inequity, genocide, nationalism<br />

and disrespect to human rights by dictator re-<br />

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gimes successively coming into power in Iraq<br />

led to 1991 March (Azar) uprising, objection<br />

of Kurdish populations to live under those regimes,<br />

and also led them to form democratic<br />

regime in the region. This situation helped<br />

the former regime withdraw all of its political,<br />

administrative and military institutions<br />

from Sulaymaniya, Arbil and Duhok. And<br />

this led to the first parliamentary elections of<br />

the regional government on May 1992 which<br />

is considered one of the most fair and democratic<br />

election in the Middle East despite some<br />

deficiencies and violations.<br />

2. The constitution project of KRG was not<br />

accepted. However, the laws of the constitution<br />

project which regulate the articles especially<br />

on the relationship between executive and<br />

legislative organs and also which regulate the<br />

authorities of speaker and head of the region<br />

indicates that broad authorities were given to<br />

the head of the region by making concessions<br />

from the parliamentary regime. This might<br />

lead a person to have all the authorities without<br />

any control of monitoring. This situation<br />

leads to emergence of dictatorial regimes<br />

in societies which are in the process of transition<br />

from totalitarian regime into a democratic<br />

regime. This might create an imbalance<br />

and loss of mutual control between legislative<br />

and executive organs that are considered as<br />

the most determinant characteristics of the<br />

parliamentary system.<br />

3. In 1992 general elections, Kurdistan Democratic<br />

Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of<br />

Kurdistan (PUK) were the only political parties<br />

in the region which received more than 7<br />

per cent of the votes, and entered the parliament.<br />

Some deputies and ministers of KDP<br />

and PUK within the regional parliament gave<br />

their seats to other small parties. But this situation<br />

led these two political parties (KDP<br />

and PUK) to split the ministries 50-50 among<br />

themselves. This equal split spread to ministries<br />

and directorates. This situation paralyzed<br />

the decision-making process withing the government<br />

and ministries. Deepening internal<br />

split between the two political parties, financial<br />

conflicts, presence of partisan militia<br />

forces, the hostility between KDP and PUK<br />

dating back to history, destructive role of the<br />

Saddam regime, civil wars triggered by direct<br />

and indirect regional interventions of neighboring<br />

countries such as Iran and Turkey led<br />

to political, legislative, geographic, military<br />

split in the region.<br />

4. Internal disputes and conflicts still continue<br />

despite sharing administration including<br />

the authorities in central government between<br />

KDP and PUK.<br />

5. It is important to assess future international<br />

and regional investments to reach the<br />

goals, establish political stability, bring economic<br />

and social development to a desired<br />

level in order to create a real democratic regime.<br />

However, the democratic process in KRG<br />

encounters major challenges threatening its<br />

internal stability and weakening its relations<br />

with the outside world.<br />

6. The lack of constitutional document, which<br />

clearly designates the relationship between<br />

citizens, political parties and the government<br />

as well as the relationship between legislative,<br />

executive and judicial powers, is one of<br />

the most important political problems of the<br />

Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). This<br />

situation led to the lack of administrative experience,<br />

and also ambiguous limits of the<br />

authorities of three powers as well as unequal<br />

distribution of powers. There are also many<br />

mistakes in KRG constitutional project. This<br />

project was as if prepared to broaden the authorities<br />

of executive power and especially of<br />

the President of the Region against the rights<br />

and freedoms of citizens.<br />

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CENTER FOR MIDDLE EASTERN STRATEGIC STUDIES<br />

7. The reports of civilian institutions which<br />

monitors judicial organs within KRG reveal a<br />

great number of judicial violations and deficiency<br />

of the rule of law. These reports point<br />

out the interventions of government, security<br />

forces, political parties, tribes and individuals<br />

to jurisdiction. Besides, it is also stated in the<br />

report that detainees and prisoners are tortured,<br />

the executive organs do not perform judicial<br />

decisions, that everybody is not treated<br />

equally before the law, and that other infractions<br />

which shake the confidence of citizens<br />

and political powers are implemented. This<br />

situation further increases political and social<br />

violence, as well as political and social conflicts<br />

in the region.<br />

8. Human rights violations such as; torture,<br />

illegal arbitrary detentions, forcing citizens to<br />

become members of one of the two parties in<br />

power, security forces’ killing and injuring civilians<br />

who stage demonstrations take place.<br />

As for the freedom of expression and press,<br />

despite the fact that many independent and<br />

semi-independent journals, magazines, radio<br />

and TV channels have emerged since 2000<br />

and the press law was introduced by the Regional<br />

Parliament, still many violations pointed<br />

out by the reports published by nongovernmental<br />

organizations take place in this<br />

field.<br />

9. Despite the fact that many local and general<br />

elections were held in the region, deficiencies<br />

and violations which cause to lack of will<br />

of electors take place in electoral processes.<br />

However, these infractions are observed to<br />

decrease with each passing elections.<br />

Although there are lots of political parties<br />

within KRG and the freedom to found political<br />

party exists, there is no such thing as party<br />

pluralism. According to independent reports<br />

in this field, KDP and PUK which are in power<br />

use public property and government agencies<br />

in electoral campaigns. Also those two parties<br />

exert pressure on other parties through different<br />

methods. Thus, we can suggest that the<br />

party system in KRG is similar to the singleparty<br />

system based on KDP and PUK in power.<br />

Besides, it has never been seen in KRG<br />

that the power has ever been transferred peacefully.<br />

Despite the position change between<br />

KDP and PUK, neither of them could ever<br />

completely take over the power. Furthermore,<br />

other parties and groups have not been provided<br />

with equal opportunities to compete for<br />

power, and they have never come into power<br />

in case of winning the elections.<br />

2. Suggestions<br />

1. Civilian democratic system foundations<br />

should be laid in the region. Within this scope,<br />

the KRG Constitution Project should be<br />

revised and a balance should be established<br />

among executive, legislative and judicial organs<br />

to fix the violations within the parliamentary<br />

system in order to form a national<br />

consensus.<br />

2. In order to prevent further civil wars, political<br />

armed violence and to create an environment<br />

that supports peaceful rivalry among all<br />

political parties in the region, it is required to<br />

reorganize armed, security and intelligence<br />

forces in the region in a professional way based<br />

on national foundations away from party<br />

and political affiliations. The tendencies to<br />

become a party among those powers should<br />

be eliminated and their being used in internal<br />

political conflicts should be prevented.<br />

3. It is necessary to develop effective, objective,<br />

independent mechanisms and judicial institutions<br />

which provide the rule of law. Those<br />

institutions and mechanisms should completely<br />

respect the judicial system, and the reliability<br />

should be provided. In order to elimi-<br />

20<br />

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nate injustices, the use of administrative and<br />

judicial methods which respect administrative<br />

and judicial decisions of state mechanisms,<br />

administrative representatives and member<br />

of the public and which guarantee their rights<br />

should be based on parity.<br />

4. It is necessary to guarantee fundamental<br />

rights of the citizens such to demonstrate,<br />

freedom of expression and freedom of press<br />

through law, and also it is required to amend<br />

laws that conflict with it. What is required<br />

should be done to prevent constant attacks<br />

on journalists.<br />

5. The Independent High Electoral Commission<br />

should be professionally reorganized by<br />

specialists who are known for their honesty<br />

who are not affiliated to any sect or political<br />

party for the elections in Iraq. Similarly,<br />

an electoral commission should be formed<br />

in KRG, those who commit fraud should be<br />

strongly fought against, and also public properties,<br />

government agencies, armed forces<br />

and security forces should be forbidden to be<br />

used in electoral campaigns.<br />

6. The public force and state institutions should<br />

not be used against the opposition parties<br />

in political conflicts in order to reinforce the<br />

political pluralism in the region. Appropriation<br />

should be allocated for political parties<br />

within KRG based on transparency and equitable<br />

principles.<br />

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CENTER FOR MIDDLE EASTERN STRATEGIC STUDIES<br />

ENDNOTOS<br />

1 Dr. Hafız Olwan Aldlimi, Batı Avrupa ve Amerika’daki siyasi sistemler, Dar Wail, Amman, 2001,<br />

p.7<br />

2 See Article 1 of the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Goverment Constitution law dated 2008 and numbered<br />

(16).<br />

3 It appears that this commission is not tranparent and work within the knowledge of all its members,<br />

because of some important meetings were held without the knowledge of one thirds<br />

of the members, and approximately 22 articles of the draft project were amended. See Bihadin<br />

Youssef, dimanah Latalah, Dr. Nuri Talabani on http://sbeiy.com/ku/Inter_Report_Detail.<br />

aspx?id=138&cat=2<br />

4 A series of criticisms were directed to this project; especially on reorganizing the relationship<br />

between legislative nad executive powers, and on administrative decentralization. As an exam-<br />

ثيَداضوونةوةيةك بؤ ثرِؤذةى دةستووري ple: see. Dr. Latif Mustafa - Yusuf Mehemed Sadik - Server Ali Cafer<br />

هةريَ‏ ي كوردستان،‏ ضاثخانةى زةرطةتة،‏ سليَماني،‏ 2009<br />

ثةرلةماني كوردستان،‏ ثرِؤذةى دةستوري هةريَ‏ ي كوردستان see. 5 To see the <strong>text</strong> adopted by the Kurdistan Parliament<br />

– عيَراق،‏ ناوةندي ضاث نية،‏ أربيل،‏ 2009<br />

6 The researcher mentioned this in a statement he had given. To access the document of this<br />

statement راي طشتي لة رؤذنامةي رؤذنامة،‏ ذمارة ،2009 /4 /15 ،2 ال see. 2 ‏.ثاشكؤي To see the answers the judiciary<br />

commission of the parliament of the region had given to the opinions on the aforementioned<br />

statement see. لة ليذنةى ياسايي ثةرلةماني كوردستانةوة،‏ لة سايتي ‏:روونكردنةوةيةك http://perleman.org/<br />

default.aspx?page=articles&c=News-Committees&id=5098) However, the researcher also<br />

mentioned his opinion in an explanatory interview with judge dr. Latif Mustafa. This interview<br />

was published راي طشتي لة رؤذنامةي رؤذنامة،‏ ذمارة ،2009 /5 /13 ،3 ال on 2 ‏.ثاشكؤي Similarly, many intellectuals<br />

and academicians like former head of the parliament of the region late Jawhar Namiq<br />

Salim confirmed the opinion of the researcher. Salim, who wrote an article on Hawlati Journal,<br />

expressed his opinion on the legitimacy of the parliament of the region in the second period<br />

after January 2009. After citing various articles of the electoral law of the Kurdistan Parliament as<br />

evidence, he says he heard about the dispute between Mr. Yusuf Muhammad and the judiciary<br />

commission of the Kurdistan Parliament from the Habat Journal dated 22/4/2009. After examining<br />

the articles of the electoral law of the parliament of the Region, I saw that Yusuf Muhammad<br />

جةوهةر نامق سالم،‏ See. was right and the response of the commission was doubtful, he adds.<br />

دواساتةكاني ئةم خولةى ثةرلةماني هةريَ‏ و ثرِؤذةى دةستووري كوردستان،‏ رِؤنامةي هاوآلتي،‏ ذمارة (532)، ضوارشةممة 2009، 6/ 10/ ال<br />

http://hawlati.info/NewsDetailN.aspx?id=9202&LinkID=67 :4. يان هةمان بابةت لة سايتي<br />

7 Article 1 of the draft constitution: The Iraqi Kurdistan Region is a region within the Federal State<br />

of Iraq. It is a democratic republic with a parliamentary political system that is based on political<br />

pluralism, the principle of separation of powers, and the peaceful transfer of power through di-<br />

ثةرلةماني كوردستان،‏ سةرضاوةى ثيَشوو،‏ See. rect, general, and periodic elections that use a secret ballot.<br />

ال 65<br />

هةمان سةرضاوة،‏ ال constitution, 89 8 See. Article 61 of the draft<br />

9 See. Paragraph six, fiftee, sixteen, seventeen, eighteen, nineteen, twenty, twenty-one, twenty-<br />

هةمان سةرضاوة،‏ ال ال – 90 93 constitution, two of Article 65 of the draft<br />

هةمان سةرضاوة،‏ ال ال See.– 90 10 See. Paragraph eight and nine of Article 65 of the draft constitution,<br />

91<br />

ثيَشوو،‏ ال ال – 91 92 11 See. Dr. Latif Mustafa – Yusuf Mehemed Sadik – Server Ali Cafer<br />

12 For details See.Yargıç dr. Latif Mustafa Emin, relations between the head of state and prime minister<br />

in parliamentary system, dar serdom l’it-tibaa ve’n-neşr, Sulaymaniya, 2009, p. 367 – 374<br />

‏.ثةرلةماني كوردستان،‏ سةرضاوةى ثيَشوو،‏ ال constitution, 89 13 See. Article 65 of the draft<br />

‏:لة سيستمي ثةرلةماني لة ثرِؤذةى دستووري هةريَ‏ دا،‏ لة سايتي (İnhiraf) 14 See. Hakin Şeyh Latif, Ladan<br />

http://sbeiy.com/ku/article_detail.aspx?ArticleID=830&AuthorID=203<br />

رؤذنامةى وةقائعي كوردستان،‏ ذمارة ،(55) سالَي ثيَنجةم،‏ : Region, 15 See. Article ten of the presidency law of the<br />

2005 /7 /10.<br />

16 See. Security council law of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region, no. 4 year 2011, Vakai Kurdistan jounal,<br />

no. 127, 5.6.2011.<br />

‏:لة ضاوةرِواني دةستوردا!‏ ضةند سةرجنيَك سةبارةت بة ثرِؤذةى دةستووري هةريَ‏ ي كوردستان،‏ لة سايتي Menemi, 17 See. Zana Rauf<br />

http://sbeiy.com/ku/Dosya_Rozhnama_detail.aspx?ArticleID=170&CatID=13&Cat=dosya<br />

22<br />

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18 That was really the case. President of the Kurdistan Regional Government Massoud Barzani<br />

used his authority and influence to prevent the ministries from being given to the Change Movement<br />

in the Iraqi government after the second term elections of the Iraqi house of representatives<br />

in 2010. The President of the Region explicitly stated that he demanded Iraqi Prime Minister<br />

Nouri Al-Maliki not to give any ministry to any Kurdish movement without his approval, not<br />

ثيَشةوا تةوفيق:‏ سةرؤكي هةريَ‏ ثشتراستي كردةوة كة ئةو نةيهيَشتووة.‏See even to assign a single police officer.<br />

http://sbeiy.com/ku/newsdetail.aspx?id=32906&cat=1 Again ‏:طؤرِان لة بةغدا وةزارةت وةربطريَت.‏ لة سايتي<br />

See حةمة نةجيب،‏ ثارلةمانتاريَكي يةكيَتي:‏ بارزاني ثيَي وتني ثؤست بؤ طؤرِان نية،‏ لة سايتي.‏ ‏:محةمةد http://www.destur.<br />

سؤران حسنيَ‏ ، مالكي بة طؤرِاني وتوة ملم لة ذيَر.‏See net/bzharay-hefte/4275-barzani-nawshirwan.html Again<br />

http://www.kurdiu.org/hawal/?pageid=60279 ‏:ضةقؤي بةرزاني و هاوثةيانيي كوردستان دا بووة،‏ لة سايتي<br />

‏.سةرضاوةى ثيَشوو Menmi, 19 Zana Rauf<br />

20 - Again See.Hani Ali et-Tavahirî, Political system and constitution law, Darus-sakafa li’n-Naşr<br />

ve’t-Tevzi, Amman, 2008, p. 258 – 261. Similarly, Dr. Numan Ahmed el Hatib, kısaca siyasi<br />

sistemler, Darus-sakafa li’n-Naşr ve’t-Tevzi, Amman, 1999, p. 380.<br />

21 Hereinafter PUK and KDP will be used for those two political parties.<br />

22 An Islamic jihad movement which was split from the Muslim Brotherhood in Iraqi Kurdistan<br />

in 1987. It fought along with other kurdish movements against the former Iraqi regime. Many<br />

groups have split from this movement so far. Kurdistan Islamic Union is among them. For detailed<br />

information. See Al Jazeera, Kurdistan Islamic Movement, website: http://www.aljazeera.<br />

net/NR/exeres/8D1C10BA-5216-40D4-BCD8-01B2E0BC7CA4.htm<br />

23 It is a front that was established on 12.6.1988 in order to coordiante Kurdish parties after the<br />

massacre and chemical attack of the Iraqi regime against Kurds and Kurdistan following the<br />

end of war between Iran and Iraq. Therefore, 8 political parties joined this front leading the<br />

popular uprising on March 1991. Those parties can be listed as follows: Kurdistan Democratic<br />

Party, Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, Iraqi Communist Party, Kurdistan Regional Movement, Kurdistan<br />

Democratic People’s Party, Kurdistan Democratic Socialist Party – Pasok, Kurdistan Labor<br />

Party Assyrian Democratic Movement. The front controlled the zones liberated from the former<br />

regime until the regional government was established on June 1991. Similarly, the general elec-<br />

نةوشيروان مستةفا،‏ مفاوةزاتي بةرةي كوردستاني – بةعس (1991)، كتيَبخانةى.‏See tions were held on .19/05/1992<br />

http://telskuf.com/ Yine See.Evrak Thomas 38, website: ‏.جمالي عةلي باثير،‏ سليَماني،‏ ،2009 ال ال -111 112<br />

articles.asp?article_id=10711<br />

24 For a detailed information about the aforesaid elections and results See.Reşid Ammare Yas –<br />

Yusuf Muhammed Sadık, Irak - Kürdistan Bölgesinde Siyasi Muhalefet, Başlangıç ve gelecek,<br />

Arap siyasi Araştırma ve İnceleme Merkezi, Doha, 2012, p. 4 – 5<br />

25 Nechirvan Mustafa: و حوكم ئةزموني هةريَ‏ ي كردستان،‏ لة سايتي ‏:حيزب http://sbeiy.com/ku/ArticleParts.aspx?<br />

PartID=25&ArticleID=485&AuthorID=36<br />

26 There were also other articles of the agreement which were not implemented afterwards: Both<br />

parties reached an agreement on reelction of the national council on 5/10/1992. Because the<br />

first election had been rigged. As one of the candidated could not receive the majority of votes,<br />

the president was supposed to be reelected two months later. For a detailed information on the<br />

حامد طةوهةري،‏ باشووري كوردستان لة نيَوان دوو هةلَبذاردندا – 1992 2005، ستؤكهؤلَم،‏ 2004، ال ال See.-27 agreement,<br />

28.<br />

27 This government resigned on April 1993, and a government similar to the former government<br />

was formed under the leadership of Kosrat Resul Ali. For a detailed information on formation<br />

طةراس ئارِ.‏ ظي.‏ ستانسفيلَد،‏ كوردستانى عيَراق ثةرةسةندني سياسي و ثشكوتنى ديوكراسي،‏ وة:.‏See of the government,<br />

‏.ثرِؤفيسؤر.‏ ى.‏ د.‏ ياسني سةردةشتي،‏ ضاثخانةى سيما،‏ سليَماني،‏ 2010، ال ال - 337 339<br />

28 For a detailed information about the names, and political tendencies of the ministers and deputy<br />

‏.هةمان سةرضاوة،‏ ال ال - 331 See.332 ministers that took office in the first government of the region,<br />

29 The Islamic Movement and Islamic List, composed of independent Islamists, and especially<br />

Iraki Kurdistan Muslim Brotherhood ranked third in the elections held on 19 May 1992, and<br />

received 5 percent of the votes. After refusing to join the government, it became an opposition<br />

movement out of the national council. As the aforesaid movement had a militant tendency, and<br />

also was an armed movement, it fought against both major parties, especially against PUK, for<br />

several times between 1993 and 1999. See.Dr Reşit Ammara ve Yusuf Muhammed Sadık, ibid.<br />

s. 6 – 7<br />

30 See.Neşirvan Mustafa, مستةفا،‏ حيزب و دةسةآلتي تةنفيزي،‏ لة سايتي ‏:نةوشيروان http://sbeiy.com/ku/ArticleParts.aspx?PartID=25&ArticleID=485&AuthorID=36<br />

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CENTER FOR MIDDLE EASTERN STRATEGIC STUDIES<br />

‏.طةراس ئار ظى ستانسفيلَد،‏ سةرضاوةى ثيَشوو،‏ ال 31 333<br />

‏.نةوشيروان مستةفا،‏ حيزب و دةسةآلتي تةنفيزي،‏ سةرضاوةى ثيَشوو Mustafa, 32 See.Neşirvan<br />

33 For a detailed information about the development process of this polarization, and the role it<br />

طةراس ئار ظى ستانسفيلَد،‏ سةرضاوةى ثيَشوو،.‏See played in internal conflicts that took place in the region,<br />

‏.ال ال – 339 343<br />

34 The customs gates, especially incomes earned from the Ibrahim Halil customs gate, was one<br />

of the bone of contention between the two parties. Ibrahim Halil gate became one of the most<br />

important trade gates both for the region and for Iraq because of the sanctions of the Security<br />

Council on Iraq. Because the former Iraqi government and influential people within this government<br />

used this gate to smuggle oil abroad. Also vital needs of the citizens were imported<br />

through this gate. See.Dr. Hamid Mahmud İsa, Irak’ta Kürt Sorunu, İngiliz İşgalinden Amerikan<br />

İşgali’ne Kadar incomes of the region were shared as follows: 35& to KDP, 35 % to PUK, 15 % to<br />

هاورِآ باخةوان،‏ هاورِيَنامة بؤ ميَذووي كوردستان و كورد،‏ دةزطاي.‏See other parties, 5 % to the regional government…<br />

‏.ضاث و ثةخشي سةردةم،‏ 1999، ال 365<br />

But both parties tried to seize the control of the Ibrahim Halil customs gate which was the main<br />

‏.طةراس ئار ظى ستانسفيلَد،‏ سةرضاوةى ثيَشوو،‏ ال ال 335 و See.342 source of income of the region.<br />

35 Despite the formation of Peshmarga Ministry and 29000 warriors under their control since the<br />

very first government that was formed in the region, those troops were under the direct control<br />

of KDP ad PUK. Similarly, the security forces in the region were not in a different position. See.<br />

طةراس ئار ظى ستانسفيلَد،‏ سةرضاوةى ثيَشوو،‏ ال 345. و كذلك:‏ نةوشيروان مستةفا،‏ كيَشةى ثارتي و يةكيَتي،‏ سةرضاوةى ثيَشوو،‏ ال ال<br />

91– 92. و أيضاً:‏ رةجائي فايد،‏ كوردةكاني عيًراق هيوا و ئاوات لة نيَوان بةديهاتن و بةدينةهاتن،‏ وة:‏ على ميرزا عارف هةورامي،‏ بةرِيَوةبةريَتيي<br />

‏.خانةى وةرطيَرِان،‏ سليَماني،‏ 2010، ال 310<br />

36 The conflict between the two parties dates back to decades ago, or even way before the period<br />

when PUK was established. Back then, there were disagreements between the KDP leader<br />

Mustafa Barzani and Ibrahim Ahmad, who was the head of the political bureau of the party, and<br />

Jalal Talabani since 1964. The focal point of the conflict was on the leadership and how the de-<br />

رةجائي.‏See cisions would be taken within KDP. There were also ideologic and cultural conflicts.<br />

Those conflicts broke out in seventies and late eighties once فايد،‏ سةرضاوةى ثيَشوو،‏ ال ال – 302 304<br />

again. As a result, internal conflicts took place both between the two parties and among other<br />

نةوشيروان مستةفا،‏ ثةجنةكان يةكتر.‏See Yine ‏.طةراس ئار ظى ستانسفيلَد،‏ سةرضاوةى ثيَشوو،‏ ال ال – 205 See.212 parties.<br />

. برلني postfach،1997 ئةشكيًنن ديوي ناوةوةى رووداوةكاني كوردستاني عيَراق - 1979 1983، ناوةندي بآلوكردنةوةى<br />

37 The Weekly Hawlati journal oublished a series of confidential documents about the former Iraqi<br />

regime in 2003. One of these documents was the that was published on 10 September 2003<br />

with no 140. The document was the letter had been sent by a person named Abu Jihad who<br />

worked in Sulaimaniyah office of the Ba’ath Party that was closed. In the document he explains<br />

the fact that head of the office (Abu Kays) assigned him with a task to create trouble between<br />

KDP and PUK, and he himself (Abu Jihad) used the company commander in KDP troops and<br />

also a relative (Kadir Hasan). Kadir really killed Mam Cotyar, one of the PUK executives, by<br />

opening fire on KDP headquarter in Kaleduzi on 2/5/1994. This event was the first spark of the<br />

civil war. هاوآلتي،‏ ضاثخانةى رةجن،‏ ذمارة ،140 ضوارشةممة ،2003 /9 /10 ال ال See.2 -1 ‏.رؤذنامةى According to the<br />

document, some sources asserts that Kadir Hasan took part in the Kaleduzi event and he was<br />

‏.حاميد طةوهةري،‏ باشوري كوردستان لة نيَوان دوو هةلَبذاردندا،‏ سةرضاوةى ثيَشوو،‏ ال See.74 killed during the conflict.<br />

38 They tried to ignite the internal conflicts among the Kurdish parties, and supported one against<br />

طةراس ئار ظى ستانسفيلَد،.‏See the other. Those parties were poliarized through alliances and unions.<br />

‏.سةرضاوةى ثيَشوو،‏ ال ال 342 و 346<br />

39 The conflicts between KDP and PUK alsted for more than four months. While six conflicts took<br />

place during that period, internal and external efforts to establish peace in the region served as<br />

truce for a while. Until the peace agreement between the two parties in Washington on 17 Sep-<br />

حاميد طةوهةري،‏ باشوري كوردستان لة نيَوان دوو هةلَبذاردندا،‏ سةرضاوةى ثيَشوو،‏ ال ال 66- 280. و كذلك:.‏See tember .1998<br />

http://sbeiy. ‏:نةوشيروان مستةفا،‏ خةون يان مؤتةكة ديوي ناوةوةى رووداوةكاني كوردستاني عيَراق (1992- 2002)، لة سايتي<br />

com/ku/article_detail.aspx?ArticleID=1539&AuthorID=36<br />

‏.رةجائي فايد،‏ سةرضاوةى ثيَشوو،‏ ال See.310 Yine هةمان سةرضاوة.‏See 40<br />

لظني،‏ وردةكارييةكاني ‎31‎ي ئاب لة بةلَطةنامةكاندا،‏ طؤظاري لظني،‏ ذمارة ‎1‎ي 74، ئةيلول.‏See 41 For a detailed information<br />

،2008. Again See.Dr. Hamid Mahmud İsa ibid, p. 440 – 444. KDP asked for aid from ال – 31 35<br />

the Saddam regime on the grounds that PUK received aid from the Iranian regime. Nechirvan<br />

Mustafa says that both parties had good relationship with Iran, but one of the parties went out of<br />

24<br />

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Report No: 151, April 2013


DEMOCRACY PROCESS AND PROBLEMS IN IRAQI KURDISTAN<br />

ORSAM<br />

control from time to time, and when this was the case they wanted to take it under control again;<br />

and that it was the most typical characteristics of the Iranian politics, that it did not allow one of<br />

the parties have a control over the other one. From Dr. Reşit Ammara Yas and Yusuf Muhammad<br />

Sadiq , ibid, p. 7.<br />

42 See. ibid, p. 7 – 8.<br />

43 ‏.حيزب و حوكم ئةزموني كوردستان،‏ سةرضاوةى ثيَشوو Mustafa, See.Nechirvan<br />

44 لة نيوان من و مام جالل ئازاري – 1999 شوباتي 2001، ضاثخانةى رةجن،‏ سليَماني،‏ 2009، ال 96. يان Mustafa, See.Nechirvan<br />

http://sbeiy.com/ku/ArticleParts.aspx?PartID=39&ArticleID=2426&AuthorID=3 ‏:لةسةر سايتي سبةى<br />

6.<br />

45 At this stage, the mutual meetings between Iran, Turkey and Syria on the situation of Kurds in<br />

North Iraq was suspended. As it is known, those meetings started to held again after the collapse<br />

of the former regime in Iraq in 2003 when Kurdish parties became prominents in Iraq in<br />

‏.طةراس ئار ظى ستانسفيلَد،‏ سةرضاوةى ثيَشوو،‏ ال See.348 geenral, and in the region in particular.<br />

46 عايدة علي سري الدين،‏ See. For the full <strong>text</strong> of the Washington agreement between KDP and PUK,<br />

حةميد طةوهةري،.‏See Again ‏.املسألة الكردية في ملف السياسة الدولية،‏ دار اآلفاق اجلديدة،‏ بيروت،‏ 2000، ص ص‎380‎ – 384<br />

‏.باشوري كوردستان لة نيَوان دوو هةلَبذاردندا،‏ سةرضاوةى ثيَشوو،‏ ال ال 279- 286<br />

47 See. The first period of elections in 1992, Kurdistan Parliament website: http://www.kurdistanparliament.org/default.aspx?page=sitecontents&c=Parliament-History1992<br />

48 ‏.ئؤثؤزسيؤني سياسي،‏ ضاثخانةي رِةجن،‏ سليَماني،‏ 2009، ال Salih, 330 See.Yasin<br />

49 This agreement remained secret until 5 July 2010. On this date, some parts of the<br />

agreement was published on the following website: http://standardkurd.net/direje.<br />

aspx?Cor=Hewal&Jimare=3420. The split of the region between KDP and PUK continued until<br />

this date.<br />

50<br />

http://www.kurdiu.org/hawal/index. ‏:كورديو،‏ بايز تالَةباني:‏ حكومةتي هةريَ‏ تا ئيَستا هةردوو ثارضةية...،‏ لة سايتي لظني ثريَس،‏ بايز تالَةباني:‏ تا ئيَستا سآ جار داواكراوة وةزارةتي دارايي يةكبخريَتةوة بةآلم.‏See php?pageid=92730 Again<br />

http://lvinpress.com/K_Direje.aspx?Jimare=6614&Besh=Hewal&Cor=1 ‏:نةكراوة،‏ لة سايتي<br />

51 For a detailed information See. Dr. Reşid Ammara Yas ve Yusuf Muhammed Sadık, ibid, p. 14 –<br />

28.<br />

52 ‏،ديَظيد بيَتهام و كوين بؤيأل،‏ ديوكراسي ضية؟ ئاشنابوون بة ديوكراسي،‏ وةرطيَرِاني شؤرِش جوانرِؤيي،‏ خانةى وةرطيَرِان،‏ سليَماني،‏ 2003<br />

‏.ال 33<br />

53 See. The Article 65 of the draft constitution of the Region.<br />

54 Dr. Mazin Muvaffak Haşim, Demokrasinin Dayanaklarını Konuşalım, website: http://www.alrashad.org/issues/17/17-Hashem.htm<br />

55 The International Institute of Human Rights, Depaul University Faculty of Law, Democracy and<br />

Freedoms, 2005, p. 39.<br />

56 Amerika Kürtleri Cemiyeti ASK, Irak Kürdistanı Bölgesi Yargı Sistemi İzleme projesi, Erbil, İnternet<br />

sitesi: http://www.askurds.org/judiciarymonitoring1.pdf<br />

Some of those violations are pointed out in the report of the Amnesty International. See. Uluslararası<br />

Af örgütü, Beş Yıl Sonra Irak, Katliamlar ve Karamsarlıklar Arasında, Uluslararası Af örgütü<br />

yayınları, Londra, belge No. 2008 / 001 / AI Index No: MDE Mart 2008, birinci baskı, p. 20<br />

57 David Betham, Democracy and Human Rights, translated by Muhammed Taki Dilfruz, İntişarart-i<br />

Tarh-i Nov, Tahran, 1383 H. Ş. p. 151.<br />

58 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G. A. Res. 217 A, UN GAOR, üçüncü dönem, Supp.<br />

No. 1 BM Belgesi No A / 810, 1948<br />

59 Uluslararası İnsan Hakları Enstitüsü, Depaul Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi, ibid, p. 40.<br />

60 ‏.سةرضاوةى ثيَشوو،‏ ال Boilla(?)28 David Betham and Kevin<br />

61 See. Article 38 of Iraqi constitution.<br />

62 - See. The first paragraph of the Article 3 of the law dated 2010 and numbered 11 that regulates<br />

the demonstrations in Iraqi Kurdistan shows that the aforesaid law turned into an effective<br />

instrument under the control fo the authorities in power to prevent the demonstrations in the<br />

كورديو:‏ گروپى ‎400‎له چوارچێوه ى یاساى خۆپیشانداندا داواى مۆڵه ت بۆ خۆپیشاندان ده كه ن و.‏See region. As an example,<br />

http://www.kurdiu.org/hawal/index.php?pageid=59350 ‏:پارێزگاريسلێمانى مۆڵه تیان پێ نادات،‏ لة سايتي<br />

63 See. 2010 report of the Amnesty International, Human Rights in the Republic of Iraq, website:<br />

http://amnesty.org/ar/region/iraq/report-2010 Again, Amnesty International, Beş Yıl Sonra Irak,<br />

Katliamlar ve Karamsarlıklar Arasında, ibid, p. 20. Again See.U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,<br />

2010 Human Rights Report: Iraq, April 8, 2011, In site: http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/<br />

ORSAM<br />

Report No: 151, April 2013 25


ORSAM<br />

CENTER FOR MIDDLE EASTERN STRATEGIC STUDIES<br />

nea/154462.htm Again, Amnesty International, Human Rights in the Middle East and North<br />

Africa, January – April 2011, Uluslararası Af Örgütü Yayınları, London, Belge No. Index: POL<br />

10/ 012/ 2011 Arabic, May 2011, First Edition, p. 19. You can also reach the report on the website:<br />

http://amnesty.org/ar/library/asset/POL10/012/2011/ar/f797ad21-8843-474f-b376-1686-<br />

f8c67960/pol100122011ara.pdf<br />

64 See. The annual report of the METRO Center journalists on the violations in Kurdistan Region<br />

in 2011. Sulaymaniyah, 2012, again See.HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Yol Ayırımında Irak’ta<br />

ABD öncülüğündeki sekiz yıllık işgalin ardından İnsan Hakları, website: http://www.hrw.org/ar/<br />

reports/2011/01/20,<br />

65 The International Institute of Human Rights, Depaul University Faculty of Law, ibid, p. 38.<br />

66 Dr. Muhammed Abid el Cabiri, Democracy and Human Rights, The Arab League Research Center,<br />

Beirut, Third Edition, 2004, p. 16 – 17.<br />

67 Revab Cemal, Seçim Sistemleri, p. 1 – 2websitesi (31/1/2012 tarihinde): http://www.scribd.com/doc<br />

/77534331/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B8%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%8<br />

6%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A<br />

8-%D8%AC%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84<br />

ريَكخراوي دياكؤنياي سويدي،‏ ديوكراتي سياسةت،‏ ئامادة و وةرطيَرِاني:‏ فرسةت ئةحمةد – موئةيةد تةيب – تيَلي ئةمني،‏ ضاثخانةى 68<br />

‏،خةبات<br />

دهؤك،‏ ض 2699 3، ك،‏ ال ال – 25 26<br />

69 What is meant by saying this is a planned process is that PUK had decided to exert pressure<br />

on otehr lists, especially on the change list, by discharging their offices in government agencies<br />

or by displacing them. In this con<strong>text</strong>, in his statement on Awene Journal, Molla Bahtiyar says:<br />

“as long as the police officersi security and peshmargas or high-ranking officials are nominated<br />

by PUK, PUK has the right to change their office and withdraw their support.” For the full <strong>text</strong> of<br />

the document, مه ال به ختیار:‏ مانگانه یه كێتی و پارتی له سی ملیۆن دۆالر كه متر له حكومه ت وه رناگرن.‏See ‏،ئاويَنة،‏ website:<br />

http://awene.com/Direje.aspx?Babet=Babet&Cor=Chawpekewtin&jimare=715<br />

فةالح نةجم،‏ به پێچه وانه ی یاسای هه ڵبژاردنه وه یه كێتی به رده وامه له ده ركردنی فه رمانبه ره حكومییه كان.‏See 70 As an example,<br />

- website: http://sbeiy.com/ku/newsdetail.aspx?id=17525&cat=1<br />

71 As an example, سبةى،‏ له سه ر لیستی ‏(گۆڕان)،‏ دوو مامۆستا ده ركران.‏See -website: http://awene.com/Direje.<br />

راگری كۆلێژی زانسته مرۆڤایه تییه كانی Abdulhalik, aspx?Babet=Hewal&Jimare=3810 Again See.Delir<br />

http://sbeiy.com/ku/newsdetail.aspx?id=17397&cat=1 - website: ‏،زانكۆی كۆیه له سه ر كار الده درێت<br />

سبةي،‏ له سكاڵایه كدا بۆ رای گشتی سه رۆكی لیستی بزوتنه وه ی چاكسازی كردستان:‏ ماوه یه كه See. 72 As an example<br />

sbeiy.com/ku/newsdetail. - website: ‏،له هه ولێرو دهۆك فشارده خرێته سه ر ئه و كه سانه ی هاوكاریمان ده كه ن<br />

هةلَويَست عوسمان و بةرهةم لةتييف،‏ ديداريَك لةطةأل د.‏ عبداملصور بارزاني،‏ طؤظاري.‏See aspx?id=17459&cat=1 Again<br />

ئاآل لةتيف،‏ كاندیدێكی بزووتنه وه ی چاكسازی كردستان ده ستگیركرا.‏See Again ‏.رِيَطا،‏ ذمارة ‎20‎ي 13، حوزةيراني ، 2009 ال 17- 19<br />

هاوآلتي،‏ لیستی See. - website: http://hawlati.info/NewsDetailN.aspx?id=8954&LinkID=63 Again<br />

http://hawlati.info/NewsDetailN. website: ‏,پێشكه وتن:‏ ئاسایشی پارتی هه ڕه شه ی كوشنت له ئه ندامامنان ده كات<br />

aspx?id=9555&LinkID=63<br />

73 In the reports of electoral monitoring reports, there is a consensus regarding that these elections<br />

were rigged to a large extent. Here, we are going to point out a part of these reports which<br />

includes some parts of the local and international journals:<br />

(A Berzan Ali Heme, ڵبژاردن له هه ولێر و دهۆك هه رێمی كوردستان ده خاته لیستی ڕه شه وه ‏،هه - website: http://chawyxelk.com/NewsDetailN.aspx?id=1873&LinkID=63&Detail=1<br />

(B again سبةى،‏ چاودێرێكی گروپی نه زاهه : ته نیا له و وێستگه یه ی منی تێدابوم 120 بۆ 130 ده نگ به ساخته دراوه - website:<br />

http://sbeiy.com/ku/newsdetail.aspx?id=19195&cat=1<br />

C) The Economist print edition, The times they are a-Changing: on site: http://www.economist.com/world/mideast-africa/displaystory.cfm?story_id=14140770<br />

(D again ئاويَنة،‏ ئینستیۆتی مافه كانی مرۆڤ:‏ ساخته كاریی به رفراوان كراوه – website: http://awene.com/Direje.<br />

aspx?Babet=Hewal&Jimare=4517<br />

E) Again, Electoral Monitoring Final Report of the Head of Parliament of the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional<br />

Government, website: http://www.tammuz.net/news/arabic/03-09-009a.pdf<br />

(F again نوێنه ری سێ رێكخراوي نێوده وڵه تی:‏ پێشێلكاری زۆر له الیه ن حیزبی ده سه ڵاتداره وه ئه جنامدراوه - website:<br />

http://hawlati.info/NewsDetailN.aspx?id=10224&LinkID=63<br />

(G again ئاويَنة،‏ تؤرِي شةمس:‏ ژماره یه كی زۆر له هێزه كانی پێشمه رگه دووجار ده نگیان داوه.‏See - website: http://awene.<br />

com/Direje.aspx?Babet=Hewal&Jimare=447<br />

H) again See. The letter sent by the French Consul to former Reform and Service List Leader<br />

Seladdin Bhaddin - website http://www.kurdiu.org/fileup3/3278french.pdf<br />

26<br />

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DEMOCRACY PROCESS AND PROBLEMS IN IRAQI KURDISTAN<br />

ORSAM<br />

I) It is also stated that some officials resorted to rig in the bulletin, which is asserted to be the<br />

internal bulletin of KDP, and that this situation negatively affected the prestige of KDP. For a<br />

هاوآلتي،‏ پارتی دان به وه داده نێت له هه ڵبژاردنه كانی ‎25/7‎دا.‏See detailed information on the aforesaid bulletin,<br />

http://hawlati.info/NewsDetailN.aspx?id=12191&LinkID=63 - website: ساخته كاری ئه جنامداوه<br />

İ) Again, independent journal of Levin published a report of the organizational bureau of KDP.<br />

In the report, the rate of rigs in Arbil and Duhok in terms of the KDP votes is: Arbil (20 percent),<br />

لظني دةطاتة مةكتةبة هةستيارةكةى ثارتي و زانيارييةكاني بآلو Kurdi, Duhok 26) percent). See. Mehmud Yasin<br />

‏.دةكاتةوة،‏ بةشي دووةم،‏ ذمارة 2012، 1/ 1/ 184، ال ال 6- 9<br />

‏.لة ثيَناو كوردستانيَكي نويَدا،‏ ضاثخانةى منارة،‏ هةوليَر،‏ 2007، ال Kadir, 39 74 Rezdar Muhammed<br />

75 See. Iraqi Kurdistan Regio no. 17 date 1993 political party law. Article 3. Kurdistan Regional<br />

Government National Assembly, Law and Regulations – no. 2 date 1993, p. 94.<br />

76 It is stated in the first paragraph of the Article 14 of the political party law numbered 17 and<br />

dated 1993 of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region that: “Allocation apprpriated for political parties from<br />

the regional budget is distributed in accordance with certain rules to be accpeted by the Iraqi<br />

Kurdistan Assembly.” However, he aforementioned rules have not been regulated yet. Hence,<br />

the aforesaid allocations depend on the decisions of two political parties in power. For instance,<br />

it is cut when the attitude of the change movement and the opposition in general is on the increase.<br />

It should also be noted that PUK and KDP use 4,720,000,000 dinar (four billion seven<br />

ضاوثيَكةوتن Muhammed, hundred twenty million) each month from the regional budget. See.Diyar<br />

Of course, in addition to ‏.لةطةأل رةشيد تاهير بريكاري وةزيري داريي،‏ طؤظاري لظني،‏ ذمارة 187، شوباتي 2012، ال 18<br />

salaries of the party personnel and press members, expenses of media channels also add to<br />

this amount. However, the parliamentary groups are almost equal to the change movement in<br />

terms of the size. On the other hand, the share that the change movement receives from these<br />

allocations is 500,000 (five hundred thousand) dollars per month. In other words 600,000,000<br />

(six hundred milllion) dinar. Of course, in case it is given. See.Dr. Reşid Ammara Yas ve Yusuf<br />

Muhammed Sadık, ibid, p. 37.<br />

77 See. AFP, In Iraqi Kurdistan, some “violations” take place within the opposition - website: http://<br />

www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5h1spHvJf7n_SVojslg7EfpnmCAyw<br />

78 The International Institute of Human Rights, Depaul University, Faculty of Law, ibid, p. 37.<br />

79 Molla Bahtiyar, ثةياميَكي رؤذنامةواني بؤ نيَضيرظان بةرزاني - website: http://www.cawder.org/yeke.php?besh<br />

=Nusraw&perrge=nusraw&nujimare=22975,<br />

ORSAM<br />

Report No: 151, April 2013 27


ORSAM<br />

CENTER FOR MIDDLE EASTERN STRATEGIC STUDIES<br />

ORSAM REPORTS<br />

ORSAM Report No: 1<br />

March 2009<br />

The Struggle Against Piracy:<br />

The Somalia Case and Turkey’s<br />

Position<br />

(Tr - Eng)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 2<br />

April 2009<br />

60 Years of Alliance: NATO and<br />

Turkey<br />

(Tr - Eng)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 3<br />

May 2009<br />

Iraq’s Pivotal Point: Talafar<br />

(Tr - Eng)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 4<br />

July 2009<br />

2009 Lübnan Seçimleri: Kazananlar,<br />

Kaybedenler ve Türkiye<br />

(Tr)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 5<br />

August 2009<br />

Turkey-Lebanon Relations:<br />

Perceptions of Turkey Among the<br />

Religious and Sectarian Factions<br />

in Lebanon<br />

(Tr - Eng)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 6<br />

November 2009<br />

The Tuzhurmatu Turkmens: A<br />

Success Story<br />

(Tr - Eng - Ar)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 7<br />

November 2009<br />

The Forgotten Turkmen Land:<br />

Diyala<br />

(Tr - Eng - Ar)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 8<br />

BLACK SEA INTERNATIONAL<br />

Report No: 1<br />

December 2009<br />

Abkhazia for the Integration of the<br />

Black Sea<br />

(Tr - Eng)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 9<br />

January 2010<br />

The Yemen Issue: A Step Toward<br />

Regional War?<br />

(Tr - Eng)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 10<br />

January 2010<br />

Civil War in Yemen: The Power<br />

Struggle, Regional Influences and<br />

Relations With Turkey<br />

(Tr - Eng)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 11<br />

February 2010<br />

The Forgotten Turks: Turkmens<br />

of Lebanon<br />

(Tr – Eng – Ar)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 12<br />

BLACK SEA INTERNATIONAL<br />

Report No: 2<br />

February 2010<br />

Russian Perspective: The Influence<br />

of the Factor of Iraq on<br />

Turkey’s Middle East Policies<br />

(1990-2008)<br />

(Tr - Rus)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 13<br />

February 2010<br />

7 March 2010 Irak Seçimleri<br />

Öncesi Şii Kökenli Parti ve Seçmenlerin<br />

Politik Davranışlarının<br />

Analizi<br />

(Tr)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 14<br />

February 2010<br />

Seçim Öncesi Irak’ta Siyasal Durum<br />

ve Seçime İlişkin Beklentiler<br />

(Tr)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 15<br />

March 2010<br />

Orsam Heyetinin 7 March 2010<br />

Irak Seçimlerine İlişkin Gözlem<br />

Raporu<br />

(Tr)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 16<br />

April 2010<br />

Sultanate of Oman: An Arab State<br />

Between Tradition and Modernity<br />

in the Arabian Peninsula<br />

(Tr)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 17<br />

April 2010<br />

Evaluation of Iraqi Parliamentary<br />

Elections of March 7, 2010 and<br />

the New Political Equation<br />

(Tr)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 18<br />

BLACK SEA INTERNATIONAL<br />

Report No: 3<br />

May 2010<br />

Turkish-Russian Relations: From<br />

Neighborhood to Strategic Cooperation<br />

(Tr - Rus)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 19<br />

September 2010<br />

Turkmens’ Migration Towards<br />

Turkey and Turkmen Population<br />

in Turkey<br />

(Tr)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 20<br />

BLACK SEA INTERNATIONAL<br />

Report No: 4<br />

October 2010<br />

Current Situation in Kyrgzstan,<br />

the Reasons of Change in<br />

Government and Short Term<br />

Foresights<br />

(Tr)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 21<br />

November 2010<br />

Away From Iraq: Post 2003 Iraqi<br />

Migration to Neighboring Countries<br />

and to Turkey<br />

(Tr – Eng)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 22<br />

January 2011<br />

Turkey-Yemen Relations and the<br />

Perception of Turkey in Yemen<br />

(Tr – Eng – Ar)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 23<br />

January 2011<br />

Is the Qatar-Iraq-Turkey-Europe<br />

Natural Gas Pipeline Project<br />

Feasible?<br />

(Tr - Eng)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 24<br />

January 2011<br />

The State of Kuwait: Relations<br />

with Turkey, War and Peace and<br />

the Al-Sabah<br />

Government in Between<br />

(Tr)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 25<br />

January 2011<br />

Embargo on Iran by the Security<br />

Council in Legal and Political<br />

Aspects<br />

(Tr)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 26<br />

BLACK SEA INTERNATIONAL<br />

Report No: 5<br />

February 2011<br />

The Recent Developments in<br />

Kyrgyzstan:<br />

Past, Present and Future<br />

(Tr - Rus)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 27<br />

February 2011<br />

The Steps of the Egyptian Revolution:<br />

Is That the End of an Era?<br />

(Tr)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 28<br />

BLACK SEA INTERNATIONAL<br />

Report No: 6<br />

February 2011<br />

The Limits of Power in Distraining<br />

on Ships by a Coast State<br />

on the<br />

International Law of the Sea<br />

-Georgia’s Distraining on the<br />

Ships Navigating Around the<br />

Black Sea-<br />

(Tr)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 29<br />

February 2011<br />

Tunisia, Popular Revolution and<br />

Turkey’s Exprience<br />

(Tr)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 30<br />

February 2011<br />

Property Disagreements in<br />

Kirkuk: A Study Based on the<br />

Field Search<br />

(Tr)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 31<br />

BLACK SEA INTERNATIONAL<br />

Report No: 7<br />

March 2011<br />

The Developments in Afghanistan<br />

and Pakistan and Their Effects on<br />

International Security<br />

(Tr)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 32<br />

March 2011<br />

Shiite Opposition Question in<br />

Saudi Arabia and Its Impacts<br />

(Tr)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 33<br />

March 2011<br />

Turkmen Existence in Iraq<br />

(Tr)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 34<br />

March 2011<br />

Turkmen Press in Iraq<br />

(Tr – Ar)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 35<br />

March 2011<br />

Current Situation and Important<br />

Political Developments in Iraq<br />

(Tr)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 36<br />

ORSAM Water Research Programme<br />

Report No: 1<br />

March 2011<br />

Eu’s Water Framework Directive<br />

Implementation in Turkey: The<br />

Draft National Implementation<br />

Plan<br />

(Eng)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 37<br />

March 2011<br />

Popular Revolt in Tunisia and Its<br />

Aftermath<br />

(Tr)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 38<br />

March 2011<br />

Libyan War, International Intervention<br />

and Turkey<br />

(Tr)<br />

28<br />

ORSAM<br />

Report No: 151, April 2013


DEMOCRACY PROCESS AND PROBLEMS IN IRAQI KURDISTAN<br />

ORSAM<br />

ORSAM Report No: 39<br />

March 2011<br />

From Past to Present Libya<br />

(Tr)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 40<br />

ORSAM Water Research Programme<br />

Report No: 2<br />

March 2011<br />

Climate Change From a Security<br />

Perspective and Its Effects on<br />

Middle East<br />

(Tr)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 41<br />

March 2011<br />

Understanding Iraq Through<br />

Cartoons - 1<br />

(Tr)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 42<br />

ORSAM Water Research Programme<br />

Report No: 3<br />

April 2011<br />

Hydropolitical History of Nile<br />

River Basin and Recent Developments<br />

(Tr)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 43<br />

April 2011<br />

Social-Political Structure of<br />

the Northern Iraq and Kurdish<br />

Regional<br />

Goverment’s Relations with<br />

Turkey<br />

(Tr)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 44<br />

ORSAM Water Research Programme<br />

Report No: 4<br />

April 2011<br />

The Obligation of “International<br />

Cooperation” in Meriç (Maritza-<br />

Evros)<br />

Basin Water Management<br />

(Tr)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 45<br />

April 2011<br />

Syria Towards Democracy or<br />

Civil War?: Social and Political<br />

Structure, Prospects<br />

For Change and Its Impacts on<br />

Turkey<br />

(Tr)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 46<br />

May 2011<br />

Power Struggle in Syria, Reaction<br />

of the International Community<br />

and Turkey’s Position<br />

(Tr)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 47<br />

ORSAM Water Research Programme<br />

Report No: 5<br />

May 2011<br />

Turkey-Syria Relations: Asi<br />

(Orontes) Friendship Dam As An<br />

Example Of Cooperation<br />

In Transboundary Waters<br />

(Tr)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 48<br />

May 2011<br />

Orsam Interviews - 1<br />

Iraqi Arabs, Minorities & Academics<br />

- 1<br />

(Tr)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 49<br />

May 2011<br />

Orsam Interviews - 2<br />

Iraqi Turkmens - 1<br />

(Tr)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 50<br />

May 2011<br />

ORSAM Interviews - 3<br />

Iraqi Kurdish Officials, Academics<br />

& Journalists - 1<br />

(Tr)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 51<br />

BLACK SEA INTERNATIONAL<br />

Report No: 8<br />

May 2011<br />

The 75th Anniversary of Montreaux<br />

Convention Regarding the<br />

Regime of Turkish Straits<br />

(In the Framework of the Changing<br />

Geopolitics of the Black Sea)<br />

(Tr)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 52<br />

BLACK SEA INTERNATIONAL<br />

Report No: 9<br />

May 2011<br />

Afghanistan and Regional Security<br />

(Middle East, Central and South<br />

Asia, Russian Federation)<br />

(Tr - Rus)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 53<br />

May 2011<br />

Madagascar: Gains, Missing<br />

Opportunities, and Relations<br />

with Turkey in the 50th Year of<br />

Independence<br />

(Tr)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 54<br />

May 2011<br />

Iraqi Groups’ Approach Towards<br />

Main Political Problems and Relations<br />

With Turkey: A Study Based<br />

On Field Research<br />

(Tr)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 55<br />

June 2011<br />

Antalya Conference of Syrian<br />

Opposition: Results, Outlook on<br />

Basic Problems and Expectations<br />

from Turkey<br />

(Tr)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 56<br />

June 2011<br />

Elections and Experience of Justice<br />

and Development Party<br />

(Tr – Ar)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 57<br />

June 2011<br />

Reflections Of 12 June 2011 Turkey<br />

Parliamentary Elections in the<br />

Middle Eastern Countries<br />

(Tr - Eng)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 58<br />

July 2011<br />

Reflections of 12 June 2011 Turkey<br />

Parliamentary Elections in the<br />

Middle East Through Cartoons<br />

(Tr)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 59<br />

July 2011<br />

Understanding Iraq Through<br />

Cartoons - 2<br />

(Tr)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 60<br />

ORSAM Water Research Programme<br />

Report No: 6<br />

July 2011<br />

Cooperation and Conflict on the<br />

Mekong River Waters<br />

(Tr-Eng)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 61<br />

July 2011<br />

The Complete Decipher of the<br />

“Chance in Syria Conference”,<br />

Carried Out in Antalya Between<br />

June 1-2 2011<br />

(Tr - Eng)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 62<br />

August 2011<br />

Understanding Iraq Through<br />

Cartoons - 3<br />

(Tr)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 63<br />

ORSAM Water Research Programme<br />

Report No: 7<br />

August 2011<br />

The Invisible Strategic Resource:<br />

Transboundary Ground Waters<br />

(Tr)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 64<br />

August 2011<br />

Victory of Justice and Development<br />

Party in 12 June 2011<br />

Turkey’s General Elections<br />

(Tr – Ar)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 65<br />

August 2011<br />

Arab Spring Through Cartoons<br />

– 1<br />

(Tr)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 66<br />

August 2011<br />

Civil War in Libya and International<br />

Intervention Through<br />

Cartoons - 1<br />

(Tr)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 67<br />

August 2011<br />

Somalia: A Nation’s Peril and<br />

Turkey’s Humanitarian Aid<br />

(Tr)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 68<br />

September 2011<br />

The Operaton Against Osama<br />

Bin Laden and Its Reflections in<br />

Cartoons<br />

(Tr)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 69<br />

September 2011<br />

Understanding Iraq Through<br />

Cartoons - 4<br />

(Tr)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 70<br />

BLACK SEA INTERNATIONAL<br />

Report No: 10<br />

September 2011<br />

Russia’s and Turkey’s Iran Policies<br />

in the XXI. Century<br />

(Tr - Rus)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 71<br />

September 2011<br />

Gaza Problem: Israel’s Blocade,<br />

International Law, Palmer Report<br />

and Turkey’s Approach<br />

(Tr)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 72<br />

September 2011<br />

Statistics of the Middle Eastern<br />

Countries<br />

(Tr)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 73<br />

BLACK SEA INTERNATIONAL<br />

Report No: 11<br />

October 2011<br />

Anatolian Sphere of Influence<br />

(Tr-Eng)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 74<br />

BLACK SEA INTERNATIONAL<br />

Report No: 12<br />

October 2011<br />

Ukraine in Regress: The Tymoshenko<br />

Trial<br />

(Eng)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 75<br />

BLACK SEA INTERNATIONAL<br />

Report No: 13<br />

October 2011<br />

Kazaks and Kazakistanis<br />

(Tr - Rus)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 76<br />

BLACK SEA INTERNATIONAL<br />

Report No: 14<br />

October 2011<br />

The Forgotten Turks in Italy:<br />

Moena Turks<br />

(Tr - It)<br />

ORSAM<br />

Report No: 151, April 2013 29


ORSAM<br />

CENTER FOR MIDDLE EASTERN STRATEGIC STUDIES<br />

ORSAM Report No: 77<br />

October 2011<br />

The Regional and Global Effects<br />

of the Us Post-Withdrawal Policy<br />

Towards Iraq and Its Reflections<br />

on Turkey<br />

(Tr)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 78<br />

ORSAM Water Research Programme<br />

Report No: 8<br />

October 2011<br />

Constructed Wetlands and Re-<br />

Use of Waste Water for the Irrigation<br />

in Turkey and Israel<br />

(Tr)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 79<br />

October 2011<br />

The Political Balance in Pre-<br />

Election Period in Tunisia<br />

(Tr)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 80<br />

October 2011<br />

Understanding Iraq Through<br />

Cartoons - 5<br />

(Tr)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 81<br />

BLACK SEA INTERNATIONAL<br />

Report No: 15<br />

October 2011<br />

Great Power Politics on Afghanistan<br />

(Tr-Eng)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 82<br />

BLACK SEA INTERNATIONAL<br />

Report No: 16<br />

October 2011<br />

Afghanistan in the Perspective of<br />

Neighboring Countries<br />

(Tr-Eng)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 83<br />

November 2011<br />

The Community Brought up to<br />

Agenda upon the Transition in<br />

Syria: The Turkmens of Syria<br />

(Tr)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 84<br />

ORSAM Water Research Programme<br />

Report No: 9<br />

November 2011<br />

Somalia’s Catastrophic Famine:<br />

Political Drought or Natural One?<br />

(Tr-Eng)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 85<br />

November 2011<br />

Historical Pragmatism in Syrian<br />

Political Culture, Syrian Foreign<br />

Policy Under Bashar Al-Assad<br />

and Turkish-Syrian Relations<br />

(Tr)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 86<br />

November 2011<br />

From Past to Present: The Iraqi<br />

Turkmen Front’s Structure and<br />

Administration<br />

(Tr)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 87<br />

November 2011<br />

Turkmen in Iraq and Their Flight:<br />

A Demographic Question?<br />

(Eng)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 88<br />

November 2011<br />

Bektashism in Iraq (Turkmens –<br />

Shabaks – Kakais)<br />

(Tr)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 89<br />

November 2011<br />

Morocco Monarchy in Transformation<br />

Process: Evolution or<br />

Revolution?<br />

(Tr)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 90<br />

November 2011<br />

The Efforts of Democratization in<br />

the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan<br />

Within the Con<strong>text</strong> of Local<br />

Actors and Regional Challenges<br />

(Tr-Eng)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 91<br />

December 2011<br />

The Arab League’s and Turkey’s<br />

Decisions to Impose Sanction<br />

Against Syria, and Possible Consequences<br />

(Tr)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 92<br />

December 2011<br />

Current Situation of Disputed<br />

Areas in Iraq<br />

(Tr)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 93<br />

ORSAM Water Research Programme<br />

Report: 10<br />

December 2011<br />

Turkey and Wfd Harmonization: A<br />

Silent, But Significant Process<br />

(Eng)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 94<br />

December 2011<br />

The Role of Perception in Turkey-<br />

France Crisis: French Perception<br />

on Turkey<br />

(Tr)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 95<br />

December 2012<br />

Arab Spring Through Cartoons<br />

– 2<br />

(Tr)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 96<br />

December 2011<br />

Understanding Iraq Through<br />

Cartoons – 6<br />

(Tr)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 97<br />

January 2012<br />

Understanding Iraq Through<br />

Cartoons – 7<br />

(Tr)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 98<br />

BLACK SEA INTERNATIONAL<br />

Report No: 17<br />

January 2012<br />

Presidential Election in Kyrgyzstan<br />

and Its Effects on Kyrgyzstan-Turkey<br />

Relations<br />

(Tr)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 99<br />

January 2012<br />

Turkish Political Parties’ Statements<br />

on Syrian Refugees in Hatay,<br />

and Approaches of Political<br />

Party Representatives and Movements<br />

in Hatay Towards Syrian<br />

Developments (March-December<br />

2011)<br />

(Tr)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 100<br />

January 2012<br />

Statistics of Iraq<br />

(Tr)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 101<br />

ORSAM Water Research Programme<br />

Report No: 11<br />

January 2012<br />

Right to Safe Drinking Water and<br />

Sanitation<br />

(Tr)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 102<br />

January 2012<br />

How and Under What Circumstances<br />

Could Iraq Be Split Up?<br />

Being Ready for the Worst<br />

(Tr – Eng)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 103<br />

January 2012<br />

The Struggle for Oil in Iraq: An<br />

Analysis in the Light of Multi-<br />

National Companies,<br />

International Contracts and Constitutional<br />

Debates<br />

(Tr)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 104<br />

ORSAM Water Research Programme<br />

Report No: 12<br />

February 2012<br />

An Evaluation on the Draft Articles<br />

on the Law of Transboundary<br />

Aquifers<br />

(Tr – Eng)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 105<br />

February 2012<br />

Political Rights of Minorities in<br />

Iraqi Legislation<br />

(Tr)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 106<br />

February 2012<br />

Social Rights of Minorities in Iraqi<br />

Legislation<br />

(Tr)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 107<br />

February 2012<br />

Human Rights of Minorities in<br />

Terms of International Law And<br />

Iraqi Constitution<br />

(Tr)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 108<br />

February 2012<br />

The Future of the Economic Cooperation<br />

Organization (ECO)<br />

(Tr - Eng)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 109<br />

February 2012<br />

The Missing Letter: The Rise of<br />

Turkey and the “Bric” Area<br />

(It)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 110<br />

ORSAM Water Research Programme<br />

Report No: 13<br />

March 2012<br />

Water Resources and Management<br />

in Iran<br />

(Tr)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 111<br />

March 2012<br />

A Critical Look at the Syrian<br />

Kurdish Opposition<br />

(Tr)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 112<br />

March 2012<br />

Constitutional System and Political<br />

Parties in Islamic Republic<br />

of Iran<br />

(Tr)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 113<br />

BLACK SEA INTERNATIONAL<br />

Report No: 18<br />

April 2012<br />

Mongolia: A Developing Democracy<br />

and a Magnet for Mining<br />

(Eng)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 114<br />

April 2012<br />

Understanding the Syrian Problem<br />

Through Comics - 8<br />

(Tr)<br />

30<br />

ORSAM<br />

Report No: 151, April 2013


DEMOCRACY PROCESS AND PROBLEMS IN IRAQI KURDISTAN<br />

ORSAM<br />

ORSAM Report No: 115<br />

April 2012<br />

Arguments on Safe Havens in<br />

Syria: Risks, Opportunities and<br />

Scenarios for Turkey<br />

(Tr - Eng)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 116<br />

ORSAM Water Research Programme<br />

Report No: 14<br />

April 2012<br />

The Concept of “Benefit-Sharing”,<br />

Its Theoretical Background<br />

and Practical Reflections<br />

(Tr - Eng)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 117<br />

April 2012<br />

Invest to Mosul Invest to Future<br />

(Tr - Eng)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 118<br />

BLACK SEA INTERNATIONAL<br />

Report No: 19<br />

May 2012<br />

The Analysis of Trade-Economic<br />

Relations<br />

Between Ukraine and Turkey<br />

(Tr - Rus)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 119<br />

BLACK SEA INTERNATIONAL<br />

Report No: 20<br />

May 2012<br />

Geopolitical Dynamics as an<br />

Instrument of Investigation of<br />

Trends and Scenariouse of Regional<br />

Development<br />

(Tr - Rus)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 120<br />

BLACK SEA INTERNATIONAL<br />

Report No: 21<br />

May 2012<br />

Development of Political System<br />

in Kazakhstan: 2012 Parliamentary<br />

Elections<br />

(Tr)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 121<br />

May 2012<br />

New Dynamics in Local and Iraqi<br />

Politics in Mosul (Field Study)<br />

(Tr - Eng - Ger)<br />

ORSAM Bericht Nr. 121<br />

Mai 2012<br />

Kommunalpolitik in Mosul und<br />

Neue Dynamiken in Der Irakischen<br />

Politik (Feldarbeit)<br />

(Ger)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 122<br />

ORSAM Water Research Programme<br />

Report No: 15<br />

May 2012<br />

Water Resources Management<br />

in Iraq<br />

(Tr - Eng)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 123<br />

BLACK SEA INTERNATIONAL<br />

Report No: 22<br />

June 2012<br />

Global Migration and Development<br />

of Migration Policies<br />

of Turkey and European Union<br />

(Tr)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 124<br />

July 2012<br />

Turkey in Africa: The Implementation<br />

of the Action Plan and an<br />

Evaluation<br />

After Fifteen Years<br />

(Tr - Eng - Fr)<br />

ORSAM Rapport No 124<br />

Juillet 2012<br />

La Turquie en Afrique: Un Bilan<br />

de la Mise en Oeuvre du Plan<br />

D’action<br />

Quinze Ans Apres<br />

(Tr - Eng - Fr)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 125<br />

BLACK SEA INTERNATIONAL<br />

Report No: 23<br />

July 2012<br />

Middle East Policy of Russia<br />

(Tr - Eng)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 126<br />

ORSAM Water Research Programme<br />

Report No: 16<br />

July 2012<br />

Towards the New Water Framework<br />

Directive: Notes on Water<br />

Draft Law<br />

(Tr)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 127<br />

August 2012<br />

Kurdish Movements in Syria<br />

(Tr - Eng)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 128<br />

BLACK SEA INTERNATIONAL<br />

Report No: 24<br />

September 2012<br />

The Development of Belarus -<br />

Turkey Economic Cooperation in<br />

Modern Conditions<br />

(Tr - Rus - Eng)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 129<br />

BLACK SEA INTERNATIONAL<br />

Report No: 25<br />

September 2012<br />

Belarus-Turkey: Positive Dynamics<br />

of Intergovernmental<br />

Cooperation<br />

(Tr - Rus - Eng)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 130<br />

November 2012<br />

Syrian Circassians<br />

(Tr - Eng)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 131<br />

BLACK SEA INTERNATIONAL<br />

Report No: 26<br />

November 2012<br />

“The Third Wave”: Geopolitics of<br />

Postmodernism<br />

(Tur - Eng)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 132<br />

November 2012<br />

Foreign Minister Ahmet<br />

Davutoğlu’s Visit to Kirkuk<br />

(Tr - Eng)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 133<br />

November 2012<br />

The Rise and Future of Opposition<br />

in Iraqi Kurdistan Region<br />

(Tr)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 134<br />

November 2012<br />

Iraqi Circassians<br />

(Tr - Eng)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 135<br />

BLACK SEA INTERNATIONAL<br />

Report No: 27<br />

November 2012<br />

The Peculiarities of Turkey’s<br />

Foreign Policy towards the Post-<br />

Soviet States<br />

(Tur – Eng - Rus)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 136<br />

BLACK SEA INTERNATIONAL<br />

Report No: 28<br />

November 2012<br />

Turkish-Crimean Relationship as<br />

an Integration<br />

Factor in Turkish-Ukranian Relations<br />

(Tur – Rus)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 137<br />

BLACK SEA INTERNATIONAL<br />

Report No: 29<br />

December 2012<br />

Energy Policy of Belarus and the<br />

Cooperation Belarus Developed<br />

With Russia and the EU on Energy<br />

(1991-2011)<br />

(Tur – Rus)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 138<br />

December 2012<br />

“Unity or Pyd Power Play? Syrian<br />

Kurdish Dynamics After the Erbil<br />

Agreement”<br />

(Tr)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 139<br />

December 2012<br />

Balances among Kurds in Syria,<br />

Regime Opponents and Turkey:<br />

Relations Pattern at the Crossroads<br />

of Conflict-Stability<br />

(Tr - Eng)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 140<br />

December 2012<br />

Internal Political Balances in<br />

North Iraq and Future of the Strategic<br />

Alliance<br />

(Tr - Eng)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 141<br />

December 2012<br />

The State of Turkmen Education<br />

in Iraq<br />

(Tr - Eng)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 142<br />

January 2013<br />

President Obama’s Second Term:<br />

Domestic and Foreign Challenges<br />

(Eng)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 143<br />

January 2013<br />

2012 Iraq Assessment and Iraq<br />

Chronology<br />

(Tr)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 144<br />

ORSAM Water Research Programme<br />

Report No: 17<br />

January 2013<br />

Orsam Water Interviews 2011<br />

(Tr - Eng)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 145<br />

ORSAM Water Research Programme<br />

Report No: 18<br />

January 2013<br />

Orsam Water Interviews 2012<br />

(Tr - Eng)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 146<br />

BLACK SEA INTERNATIONAL<br />

Report No: 30<br />

January 2013<br />

Eurasi in 2013:<br />

Political and Economic<br />

Analysis<br />

(Eng)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 147<br />

BLACK SEA INTERNATIONAL<br />

Report No: 31<br />

January 2013<br />

Cultural Dialogue: Newcomers<br />

from the Ural-Volga Region –<br />

Belarusian-Lithuanian Tartars in<br />

Grand Duchy of Lithuania<br />

(Tur – Rus)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 148<br />

January 2013<br />

Internatonal Politics and Civilizations<br />

(Clash of Civilizations and<br />

Dialogue)<br />

(Tr - Eng)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 149<br />

February 2013<br />

David cameron and the Eu:<br />

Crossing the Rubicon<br />

(Eng)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 150<br />

March 2013<br />

Syrian Turkmens: Political Movements<br />

and Military Structure<br />

(Tr - Eng)<br />

ORSAM Report No: 151<br />

March 2013<br />

Democracy Process and Problems<br />

in Iraqi Kurdistan<br />

(Tr - Eng)<br />

ORSAM<br />

Report No: 151, April 2013 31


ORSAM<br />

CENTER FOR MIDDLE EASTERN STRATEGIC STUDIES<br />

ACADEMIC STAFF<br />

Hasan Kanbolat<br />

ORSAM Director<br />

Prof. Dr. Meliha Benli Altunışık<br />

ORSAM Advisor,Middle East, METU Director of Institute of Social Sciences<br />

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Hasan Ali Karasar ORSAM Advisor, ORSAM Eurasian Strategies Coordinator - Bilkent University<br />

Prof. Dr. Tarık Oğuzlu<br />

ORSAM Advisor,Middle East-Antalya International University<br />

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Harun Öztürkler ORSAM Advisor, Middle East Economies - Afyon Kocatepe University, Department of Economics<br />

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Mehmet Şahin<br />

ORSAM Advisor, Middle East - Gazi University, Department of IR<br />

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Özlem Tür<br />

ORSAM Advisor, Middle East - METU, Department of IR<br />

Habib Hürmüzlü<br />

ORSAM Advisor, Middle East<br />

Asst. Prof. Dr. Serhat Erkmen<br />

ORSAM Advisor, Middle East -Ahi Evran University, Department of IR<br />

Asst. Prof. Dr. Canat Mominkulov ORSAM Researcher, Eurasia, Al Farabi Kazakh National University<br />

Elmira Cheremisova<br />

ORSAM Advisor, Middle East - St. Petersburg University<br />

Assoc.Prof.Dr. Didem Danış<br />

ORSAM Advisor, Middle East - Galatasaray University, Department of Sociology<br />

Dr. Jale Nur Ece<br />

ORSAM Advisor, Maritime Safety and Security<br />

Assoc. Prof. Dr. İlyas Kemaloğlu (Kamalov) ORSAM Advisor, Eurasia<br />

Assoc.Prof.Dr. Yaşar Sarı<br />

ORSAM Advisor, Eurasia - Kyrgyzstan-Turkey Manas University<br />

Asst. Prof. Dr. Bayram Sinkaya<br />

ORSAM Advisor, Middle East - Yıldırım Beyazıt University Department of International Relations<br />

Dr. Süreyya Yiğit<br />

ORSAM Advisor, Eurasia<br />

Att. Aslıhan Erbaş Açıkel<br />

ORSAM Advisor, Energy-Maritime Law<br />

Pınar Arıkan Sinkaya<br />

ORSAM Advisor, Middle East - METU Department of International Relations<br />

Volkan Çakır<br />

ORSAM Advisor, Africa - ORSAM Antananarivo (Madagascar) Representative<br />

Bilgay Duman<br />

ORSAM Researcher, Middle East<br />

Tamer Koparan<br />

ORSAM Managing Editor<br />

Noyan Gürel<br />

ORSAM İzmir Represatative<br />

Oytun Orhan<br />

ORSAM Researcher, Middle East<br />

Sercan Doğan<br />

ORSAM Research Assistant, Middle East<br />

Nebahat Tanriverdi<br />

ORSAM Research Assistant, Middle East<br />

Seval Kök<br />

ORSAM Research Assistant, Middle East<br />

Uğur Çil<br />

ORSAM, Middle East<br />

Göknil Erbaş<br />

ORSAM, Black Sea<br />

Shalaw Fatah<br />

ORSAM Research Assistant, Middle East<br />

Tuğçe Kayıtmaz<br />

Interpreter<br />

ORSAM Water Research Programme<br />

Dr. Tuğba Evrim Maden<br />

ORSAM Water Research Programme Hydropolitics Researcher<br />

Dr. Seyfi Kılıç<br />

ORSAM Water Research Programme Hydropolitics Researcher<br />

ORSAM ADVISORY BOARD<br />

Dr. Ismet Abdulmecid<br />

Prof. Dr. Ramazan Daurov<br />

Prof. Dr. Vitaly Naumkin<br />

Hasan Alsancak<br />

Prof. Dr. Meliha Benli Altunışık<br />

Prof. Dr. Ahat Andican<br />

Prof. Dorayd A. Noori<br />

Prof. Dr. Tayyar Arı<br />

Prof. Dr. Ali Arslan<br />

Dr. Farhan Ahmad Nizami<br />

Başar Ay<br />

Prof. Aftab Kamal Pasha<br />

Prof. Dr. Mustafa Aydın<br />

Ambassador Shaban Murati<br />

Dr. Ersel Aydınlı<br />

Safarov Sayfullo Sadullaevich<br />

Mohamed Noureddine<br />

Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Bağcı<br />

Itır Bağdadi<br />

Prof. Dr. İdris Bal<br />

Assist. Prof. Dr. Ersan Başar<br />

Kemal Beyatlı<br />

Yaşar Yakış<br />

Barbaros Binicioğlu<br />

Prof. Dr. Ali Birinci<br />

Patrick Seale<br />

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Mustafa Budak<br />

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Hasan Canpolat<br />

Ret. (Air) Gen. Ergin Celasin<br />

Dr. Sami Al Taqi<br />

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Mitat Çelikpala<br />

Çetiner Çetin<br />

Prof. Dr. Gökhan Çetinsaya<br />

Former President of Iraqi Council of State<br />

Assistant Director, Russian Academy of Sciences Institute of Oriental Studies<br />

Director, Russian Academy of Sciences Institute of Oriental Studies<br />

İhlas Holding CEO<br />

ORSAM Advisor Middle East, METU Director of Institute of Social Sciences<br />

Former Minister & Istanbul University<br />

Vice-Undersecretary in Iraq’s Embassy in Ankara<br />

Uludağ University, Head of Department of International Relations<br />

Istanbul University, Department of History<br />

The Director of Centre for İslamic Studies at Oxford University<br />

General Secretary, Turkish Textile Employers’ Association<br />

The Director of The Centre for West Asian Studies in India<br />

President of Kadir Has University<br />

Albanian Institute for International Studies<br />

Vice-President of Bilkent University, Fulbright Executive Director<br />

Strategic Research Center Under The President of Tajikistan<br />

Specialist in Turkish Affairs, Prof. at Lebanese University - History<br />

METU, Head of Department of International Relations<br />

İzmir Economy University, Department of International Relations and European Union<br />

Member of Parliament in the 24th Legislative Term of Grand National Assembly of Turkey<br />

Karadeniz Techinical University, Maritime Transportation and Management Engineering<br />

Head of Iraqi Turkman Press Council<br />

Ambassador, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs<br />

ORSAM Advisor, Middle Eastern Economies<br />

Polis Akademisi<br />

Well-Known Middle East and Syria Specialist<br />

Deputy Director General in Prime Ministerial State Archives<br />

Turkish Ministry of Defense Advisor<br />

23rd Commander of Air Forces<br />

General Manager of Orient Research Center<br />

Kadir Has University, Head of Deparment of International Relations<br />

Journalist, Iraq<br />

President of The Council of Higher Education<br />

32<br />

ORSAM<br />

Report No: 151, April 2013


DEMOCRACY PROCESS AND PROBLEMS IN IRAQI KURDISTAN<br />

ORSAM<br />

Assoc. Prof. Dr Didem Danış<br />

ORSAM Advisor, Immigration Studies & Iraqi Refugees, Galatasary University, Department of Sociology<br />

Prof. Dr. Volkan Ediger<br />

İzmir Economy University, Department of Economics<br />

Prof. Dr. Cezmi Eraslan<br />

President of Atatürk Research Center, Istanbul University, Department of History<br />

Prof. Dr. Çağrı Erhan<br />

Ankara University, Faculty of Political Science, Department of IR & Director ATAUM<br />

Asst. Prof. Dr. Serhat Erkmen<br />

ORSAM Middle East Advisor, Ahi Evran University, Head of the Department of International Relations<br />

Dr. Amer Hasan Fayyadh<br />

Baghdad University, Dean of Political Sciences Faculty (Iraq)<br />

Att. Aslıhan Erbaş Açıkel<br />

ORSAM Advisor, Energy-Maritime Law<br />

Cevat Gök<br />

Manager of Iraq El FIRAT TV - Turkey<br />

Mete Göknel<br />

Former Director of Petroleum Pipeline Corporation (BOTAŞ)<br />

Osman Göksel<br />

BTC & NABUCCO Coordinator<br />

Timur Göksel<br />

Beirut American University (Lebanon)<br />

Prof. Muhamad Al Hamdani<br />

Cultural Undersecretary in Iraq’s Embassy in Ankara<br />

Numan Hazar<br />

Retired Ambassador<br />

Habib Hürmüzlü<br />

ORSAM Middle East Advisor<br />

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Pınar İpek<br />

Bilkent University, Department of International Relations<br />

Dr. Tuğrul İsmail<br />

TOBB University of Economics & Technology, Department of International Relations<br />

Assoc. Prof. Dr. İlyas Kemaloğlu (Kamalov) ORSAM Eurasia Advisor<br />

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Hasan Ali Karasar Bilkent University, Department of International Relations<br />

Assoc.Prof.Dr. Şenol Kantarcı<br />

Kırıkkale University, Department of International Relations<br />

Selçuk Karaçay<br />

Deputy Director, Vodafone (Turkey)<br />

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Nilüfer Karacasulu Dokuz Eylül University, Department of International Relations<br />

Prof. Dr. M. Lütfullah Karaman<br />

Istanbul Medeniyet University, Department of International Relations<br />

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Şaban Kardaş<br />

TOBB Economy and Technology University, Department of International Relations<br />

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Elif Hatun Kılıçbeyli Çukurova University, Head of the Department of International Relations<br />

Prof. Dr. Aleksandr Knyazev<br />

Kyrgyz Slavic University (Bishkek)<br />

Prof. Dr. Erol Kurubaş<br />

Kırıkkale University, Head of the Department of International Relations<br />

Prof. Dr. Talip Küçükcan<br />

Director of Marmara University, Institute of Middle East Studies<br />

Arslan Kaya<br />

KPMG, Sworn-in Certified Financial Accountant<br />

Dr. Hicran Kazancı<br />

Iraqi Turkman Front Turkey Representative<br />

İlhan Tanır<br />

ORSAM Middle East Advisor, Journalist<br />

İzzettin Kerküklü<br />

President of Kirkuk Foundation<br />

Prof. Dr. Mustafa Kibaroğlu<br />

Okan University, Head of Department of International Relations<br />

Prof. Dr. Alexandr Koleşnikov<br />

Diplomat<br />

Dr. Max Georg Meier<br />

Hanns Seidel Foundation, Projects Director (Bishkek)<br />

Prof.Dr. Mosa Aziz Al-Mosawa<br />

President of Baghdad University (Iraq)<br />

Prof. Dr. Mahir Nakip<br />

Erciyes University, Faculty of Economic and Administrative Sciences<br />

Assoc.Prof.Dr. Tarık Oğuzlu<br />

ORSAM Advisor,Middle East-Antalya International University<br />

Hediye levent<br />

Journalist, Syria<br />

Prof.Dr. Çınar Özen<br />

Ankara University, Faculty of Political Science, Department of International Relations<br />

Murat Özçelik<br />

Ambassador<br />

Assoc. Prof. Harun Öztürkler<br />

ORSAM Middle East Economies Advisor, Afyon Kocatepe University, Department of Economics<br />

Dr. Bahadır Pehlivantürk<br />

TOBB Economy and Technology University, Department of International Relations<br />

Prof. Dr. Victor Panin<br />

Pyatigorsk University (Pyatigorsk, Russian Federation)<br />

Assoc.Prof.Dr. Fırat Purtaş<br />

Gazi University Department of International Relations, Deputy Secretary General of TÜRKSOY<br />

Prof. Suphi Saatçi<br />

Secretary-General of Kirkuk Foundation<br />

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Yaşar Sarı<br />

ORSAM Advisor, Eurasia - Kyrgyzstan-Turkey Manas University<br />

Ersan Sarıkaya<br />

Türkmeneli TV (Kirkuk, Iraq)<br />

Dr. Bayram Sinkaya<br />

ORSAM Middle East Advisor, Atatürk University<br />

Assoc.Prof.Dr. İbrahim Sirkeci<br />

Reader in Demography and Marketing Regent’s College, (London, UK)<br />

Dr. Aleksandr Sotnichenko<br />

St. Petersburg University (Russian Federation)<br />

Semir Yorulmaz<br />

Journalist, Egypt<br />

Zaher Sultan<br />

President of Lebanon Turkish Association<br />

Dr. Irina Svistunova<br />

Russia Strategic Research Center, Turkey-Middle East Studies Expert (Russian Federation)<br />

Asst. Prof. Dr. Mehmet Şahin<br />

ORSAM Advisor, Middle East, Gazi University, Department of International Relations<br />

Prof. Dr. Türel Yılmaz Şahin<br />

Gazi University, Department of International Relations<br />

Mehmet Şüküroğlu<br />

Energy Expert<br />

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Oktay Tanrısever METU, Department of International Relations<br />

Prof. Erol Taymaz<br />

Vice President of the METU North Cyprus Campus (TRNC)<br />

Prof. Sabri Tekir<br />

Dean of İzmir University, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences<br />

Dr. Gönül Tol<br />

Director of Middle East Institute Turkish Studies (USA)<br />

Advt. Niyazi Güney<br />

Prens Group, Vice Chairman<br />

Asst. Prof. Dr. Özlem Tür<br />

ORSAM Advisor, Middle East, METU, Department of International Relations<br />

M. Ragıp Vural General Coordinator of 2023 (Magazine)<br />

Dr. Ermanno Visintainer<br />

Director of Vox Populi (Rome,Italy)<br />

Dr. Umut Uzer<br />

Istanbul Technical University, Humanities and Social Sciences<br />

Prof. Dr. Vatanyar Yagya<br />

St. Petersburg City Council Member, St. Petersburg University (Russian Federation)<br />

Dr. Süreyya Yiğit<br />

ORSAM Eurasia Advisor Prof. Dr. Gökhan Çetinsaya President of The Council of Higher Education<br />

Assoc. Prof. Dr Didem Danış<br />

ORSAM Advisor, Immigration Studies & Iraqi Refugees, Galatasary University, Department of Sociology<br />

EDITORIAL BOARD OF MIDDLE EAST STUDIES<br />

Meliha Altunışık<br />

Bülent Aras<br />

Tayyar Arı<br />

Middle East Technical University (Turkey)<br />

Ministry of Turkish Foreign Affairs, Head of Center for Strategic Strategic Research<br />

Uludağ University (Turkey)<br />

ORSAM<br />

Report No: 151, April 2013 33


ORSAM<br />

CENTER FOR MIDDLE EASTERN STRATEGIC STUDIES<br />

İlker Aytürk<br />

Bilkent University (Turkey)<br />

Recep Boztemur<br />

Middle East Technical University (Turkey)<br />

Katerina Dalacoura<br />

London School of Economics (UK)<br />

F. Gregory Gause Vermont University (USA)<br />

Fawaz Gerges<br />

London School of Economics (UK)<br />

Ahmet K. Han<br />

Kadir Has University (Turkey)<br />

Raymond Hinnebusch<br />

St. Andrews University (UK)<br />

Rosemary Holiis<br />

City University (UK)<br />

Bahgat Korany<br />

Durham University (UK)<br />

Peter Mandaville<br />

George Mason University (USA)<br />

Emma Murphy<br />

Durham University (UK)<br />

MIDDLE EAST ANALYSIS EDITORIAL BOARD<br />

Prof. Dr. Meliha Altunışık<br />

Hasan Kanbolat<br />

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Hasan Ali Karasar<br />

Asst. Prof. Dr. Serhat Erkmen<br />

Middle East Technical University , Director of Institute of Social Sciences<br />

ORSAM Director<br />

Bilkent University, Department of International Relations<br />

ORSAM Middle East Advisor, Ahi Evran University, Head of Department of International Relations<br />

34<br />

ORSAM<br />

Report No: 151, April 2013


ORSAM<br />

Mithatpaşa Caddesi 46/6 Kızılay-ANKARA<br />

Tel: 0 (312) 430 26 09 Fax: 0 (312) 430 39 48<br />

www.<strong>orsam</strong>.org.tr, <strong>orsam</strong>@<strong>orsam</strong>.org.tr

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