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Evaluation of the Australian Wage Subsidy Special Youth ...

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8<br />

(1) applying to all <strong>of</strong> a firm’s employees, also called a wage bill subsidy<br />

(Haveman (1982));<br />

(2) applicable only to net changes in <strong>the</strong> firm’s employment, also termed a marginal stock<br />

subsidy (Haveman (1982));<br />

(3) for new hirings by a firm, which Haveman (1982) labels a recruitment subsidy.<br />

The first <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se is not treated here. Most commonly, wage subsidies are introduced with<br />

<strong>the</strong> aim <strong>of</strong> being <strong>of</strong> a marginal stock subsidy, but usually it is only practicably possible to<br />

ensure a subsidy is a recruitment subsidy. In <strong>the</strong> later analysis <strong>of</strong> SYETP, it will be<br />

noticeable that it is a targeted recruitment subsidy.<br />

Kaldor (1936) gave <strong>the</strong> early introduction <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> use <strong>of</strong> wage subsidies as a remedy for<br />

‘chronic’ unemployment by reducing <strong>the</strong> cost <strong>of</strong> labour. Micro-economic <strong>the</strong>ory provides<br />

a framework for <strong>the</strong> expected effects <strong>of</strong> wage subsidies on <strong>the</strong> level and structure <strong>of</strong><br />

unemployment, with partial equilibrium analysis. In general, <strong>the</strong> labour market is<br />

assumed to be inefficient in operation, and <strong>the</strong> subsidy acts against this inefficient<br />

outcome.<br />

A wage subsidy paid to <strong>the</strong> employer is expected to act by stimulating demand for <strong>the</strong>se<br />

workers, and so raise employment. The wage subsidy is anticipated to act by reducing <strong>the</strong><br />

cost <strong>of</strong> labour relative to o<strong>the</strong>r inputs. In a traditional model, <strong>the</strong> labour and capital are<br />

balanced to pr<strong>of</strong>it maximise, and <strong>the</strong> reduction in <strong>the</strong> cost <strong>of</strong> labour leads to an incentive<br />

for a pr<strong>of</strong>it-maximising firm to substitute labour for capital. There is <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> possibility<br />

<strong>of</strong> an additional scale effect, where lower costs increase demand via reduced prices that<br />

stimulate an expansion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> firm’s scale <strong>of</strong> production, and in turn employment levels.<br />

A net employment effect <strong>the</strong>n results from <strong>the</strong> interaction <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> substitution and scale<br />

effects.<br />

Where <strong>the</strong> wage subsidy is targeted at a specific group <strong>of</strong> workers, <strong>the</strong>n labour is split<br />

between subsidised and unsubsidised workers, and <strong>the</strong> substitution effect may work only<br />

so that subsidised workers replace unsubsidised workers. In this case, any net

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