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The Western Condition - St Antony's College - University of Oxford

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<strong>The</strong> <strong>Western</strong> <strong>Condition</strong>: Turkey, the US and the EU in the New Middle East<br />

Accompanying the government’s initiatives during this period was the remarkable atmosphere <strong>of</strong><br />

societal openness, pluralism and introspection that these few years <strong>of</strong> political and economic<br />

reform had ushered in. For the first time, the most traumatic chapters <strong>of</strong> the country’s modern<br />

history and its hitherto untouchable socio-political taboos – from the founding myths <strong>of</strong> the<br />

Kemalist nation-building process to the systematic annihilation <strong>of</strong> Anatolia’s non-Muslim<br />

communities and their heritage; from the existence <strong>of</strong> the Turkish ‘deep state’ 33 to the causes and<br />

consequences <strong>of</strong> military coups, and the plight <strong>of</strong> every group suppressed by the state or<br />

marginalised in society, including the Kurds, Alevis, women, pious Muslims, religious minorities,<br />

atheists and LGBT communities – became the subject <strong>of</strong> open and candid public discussion,<br />

through books, newspaper articles, television debates, academic research and conferences. 34<br />

During this brief ‘liberal moment’ that lasted until the mid-2000s, Turkey did not only attempt to<br />

fix its broken economy and restructure its political institutions, but also to heal its deep running<br />

social and historical fault lines. We should note that these attempts also triggered a wave <strong>of</strong> angry<br />

and at times violent nationalist reaction from within the state and society. For example, in 2005 a<br />

conference on Ottoman Armenians, the first to openly challenge <strong>of</strong>ficial accounts <strong>of</strong> history, was<br />

postponed when a court ruled it could not be held at the grounds <strong>of</strong> a public university. When<br />

finally reorganised at a private university, its participants were pelted with eggs by protestors. 35<br />

Much more alarming were the murders <strong>of</strong> a Roman Catholic priest and three Protestant<br />

missionaries in 2006 and well-known Armenian-Turkish journalist Hrant Dink in 2007, all <strong>of</strong><br />

which have been subsequently linked to the Turkish ‘deep state’, though none <strong>of</strong> the resulting<br />

court cases have so far been able to name the real culprits. 36<br />

At crucial moments, the first AKP government did not yield to such pressures or attempt to obstruct<br />

this process <strong>of</strong> societal introspection. Even if it did not so much lead the process, the ruling party<br />

<strong>of</strong>ten facilitated it by striking a reconciliatory rather than confrontational tone in domestic politics<br />

and carefully managing the frequently clashing expectations <strong>of</strong> its diverse socio-political constituents.<br />

33 <strong>The</strong> ‘deep state’ refers to a secret and extra-legal network <strong>of</strong> security sector actors, judiciary, civilian politicians and<br />

organised crime groups united by a chauvinist view <strong>of</strong> the state and society, which continues to pose a major<br />

obstacle to the consolidation <strong>of</strong> democracy and the rule <strong>of</strong> law in Turkey today. <strong>The</strong> roots <strong>of</strong> this ‘state within a<br />

state’ date back to the final decade <strong>of</strong> the Ottoman Empire, when a semi-secret organisation, known as Teşkilat-ı<br />

Mahsusa (the Special Organisation), was set up under the Committee <strong>of</strong> Union and Progress government. Founded<br />

on a vaguely defined pan-Turkist and pan-Islamist ideology, the organisation carried out political assassinations and<br />

played a key role in the Armenian genocide <strong>of</strong> 1915-16. See Taner Akcam, A Shameful Act: <strong>The</strong> Armenian Genocide and<br />

the Question <strong>of</strong> Turkish Responsibility, (London: Constable, 2007).<br />

34 This atmosphere <strong>of</strong> relative openness and the sense <strong>of</strong> liberation from decades <strong>of</strong> self-imposed ignorance is<br />

captured in Kerem Öktem’s Angry Nation: Turkey since 1989, (London: Zed Books, 2011)<br />

35 Titled ‘Ottoman Era Armenians During the Collapse <strong>of</strong> the Empire: Intellectual Responsibility and Democratic<br />

Problems’, the conference was first planned to take place at the Bosphorus <strong>University</strong> between May 25-27, but was<br />

delayed due to public and political pressures and the last minute judicial intervention. It was finally held at Bilgi<br />

<strong>University</strong> on 24 September 2005.<br />

36 <strong>The</strong>re is overwhelming evidence to implicate an underground network <strong>of</strong> ultra-nationalist security sector actors<br />

and their civilian accomplices in organising and carrying out these murders. In 2011, one <strong>of</strong> these cases, the murder<br />

<strong>of</strong> Protestant missionaries in Malatya (also known as Zirve Publishing House massacre), was merged with a major<br />

investigation and court case, known as ‘Ergenekon’, into allegations <strong>of</strong> coup plotting against the AKP government.<br />

23

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