The Western Condition - St Antony's College - University of Oxford

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The Western Condition: Turkey, the US and the EU in the New Middle East also why a number of secular commentators now insinuate that they would rather not have him solve the Kurdish ‘problem’, as they see a Turkish-Kurdish, pious-Sunni Muslim coalition then taking over of what little they still possess today. But this is only one possible scenario. What alternatives can we think of? One could argue that a resolution by the AKP of the Kurdish conflict would in part, albeit implicitly, be inspired by the inclusive and flexible domestic geometries of the US and Europe (including federalism, decentralisation, localism, multiculturalism and minority rights) even though the politics of tolerance and inclusiveness are still clearly wanting on both side of the Atlantic. Such a new configuration would open the way for an invigorated ‘western’ Turkey, at least as far as the West’s perception of itself is concerned. Only that the referent here would not be the authoritarian, hegemonic and colonial Europe of the 1920s on which the Kemalist Republic was founded and rests still today, but the post-nationalist, potentially post-hegemonic West that is much less sure about itself, its history or its model, and that needs to position itself in an increasingly multi-polar world. There can be no doubt that such a context of shifting global power cannot provide the certainties of the Cold War era, and still many in Turkey, Europe and the US would like to ignore this fact. But beyond those suffocating certainties lies the promise of a new global deal that is truly post-colonial and post-Eurocentric. The triangle between Turkey, the EU and the US might be one of its most intriguing laboratories. 75
Conclusion: Beyond the impossible triangle Conclusion: Beyond the impossible triangle The western condition is not about whether Turkey will choose or abandon ‘the West’, but rather about how the structure-agency dynamic plays out in its foreign policy or how the actors involved manage to use the structural relationship between Turkey and the West to reinvigorate the potentials for peace and prosperity in the region. This depends in turn on which face of the West Turkey will see and eventually enact: the dominating and patronizing or the supportive and empowering version? The security-focused zero-sum face or the reconciliatory face? Will it be able to regain credibility alongside the EU in emphasising democracy, rule of law, human rights, civil liberties and social justice? The European Union was in a unique position in the early 2000s to help steer Turkey in this direction, and for all its socio-economic woes, we think it can still do so today. The United States could help, if geostrategic considerations converge with a democratisation agenda. Turkey’s increasingly interwoven future with Europe is not only a structural and unavoidable fact regardless of the fate of its accession process into the EU. It is a choice that needs to be made and made again on all sides. In the political turbulence of the region, a democratic and stable Turkey and a democratic and stable European Union can work together to thwart the danger of a further polarisation of the Middle East along sectarian axes and to inspire the peoples of the Mediterranean and their own struggles for social justice and political accountability. And yet again, such a ‘democratic alliance’ would require the commitment of the United States and the Obama administration to steer away from a predominantly geostrategic logic in the Middle East shaped by the security needs of Israel towards a renewed strategy of engagement. So we are left with the sense that a revived Turkey – EU partnership is necessary, not as if nothing had happened in the intervening period since the mid-2000s, but rather integrating the ‘reality on the ground’ created by the two other foreign policy logics observed in the following years, namely ‘autonomisation’ and ‘Americanisation’. This is not an ‘impossibility triangle’. The factors that led to these two impulses are still with us and they are to stay. Turkey will continue to pursue ‘zero problems’ in the longer run, especially in the socio-economic field. It would do well to tone down its self-promotion as a model, and there are signs that this message is being received at least in the Foreign Ministry if not by the Prime Minister. Instead Turkey could opt for cooperation and conversation at a time when so many states in the region are engaged in fierce internal battles to redefine a political version of Islam as social forces awake and demand participation. At the same time, its proactive engagement as part of a US-led Sunni axis reflects a reality that needs to be contended with in the region, namely that this increasingly relevant sectarian divide runs not only among but also within most countries in the region, providing 76
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The Western Condition - St Antony's College - University of Oxford

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