The Western Condition - St Antony's College - University of Oxford

The Western Condition: Turkey, the US and the EU in the New Middle East
2009 in part reflected these dynamics. In January of that year, Erdoğan stormed out of the World
Economic Forum in Davos after strongly rebuking Israel’s president, Shimon Peres, for the Israeli
military’s brutal three-week operation on the Gaza Strip. At the time Erdoğan was personally
involved in conducting indirect negotiations between Syria and Israel, and Turkish officials claim
they were on the brink of a major breakthrough on the eve of the Israeli offensive, which took
them by surprise and prompted the AKP government to suspend its mediation efforts. 75
The Turkish premier’s outburst, which turned him into an instant hero at home as well across
many Middle Eastern countries, was not premeditated and heralded a new arrangement whereby
time and again the foreign ministry would have to react and reshape policy on the basis of
Erdoğan’s unpredictable actions, with varying outcomes. In the case of Israel, the ‘Davos
moment’ boosted the AKP’s standing in Turkey, in the region and possibly further afield,
reflecting the widespread frustration with the western and ‘moderate’ regional governments’
subdued response in the face of what was widely perceived as a devastating assault on an already
besieged population. In Baku, Erdoğan personally conceded to Azeri demands to make
normalisation of Turkey’s ties with Armenia conditional on the resolution of the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict, thus effectively spelling the end of the AKP’s Armenian opening.
In this context, it is of little surprise that the Islamic bias in Turkish foreign policy, a dimension
already present in Davutoğlu’s worldview albeit usually wrapped in relatively subtle references to
culture and history, became more pronounced. In some cases, this could bolster Turkey’s ‘soft
power’ and ability to operate in terrains where western actors lacked the necessary means, ties or
intentions to be as effective, as demonstrated in the well-organised and high profile campaign to
extend humanitarian assistance to draught and conflict-ridden Somalia in 2011. 76 At other times,
however, Turkish credibility could be seriously affected. Such was the case when Prime Minister
Erdoğan labelled the plight of China’s Uighur Turks under Beijing’s assimilationist policies as
‘genocide’, or supported Sudan’s President Omar al-Bashar, on grounds that “Muslims cannot
commit genocide”. The critical point was not that such positions might offend the West and its
modes of labelling and ascriptions, but that they brought under critical light Turkey’s own
limitations in dealing with its past crimes against the Armenians, Kurds and other minorities and
its deteriorating human rights record.
Perceptions of a religious bias also limited the international appeal and the impact of the AKP’s
criticism of Israeli policies against Palestinians. Nevertheless, Turkey’s ties with Israel further
75 Carsten Wieland, ‘The Syria-Israel talks: old themes, new setting’, OpenDemocracy, 29 May 2008, Nicholas Kimbrell,
‘Turkey shelves mediation between Syria, Israel over Gaza’, The Daily Stary (Lebanon), 1 January 2009; and Mustafa
Kibaroğlu, ‘Will the smoke of Gaza cloud Turkish – Israeli relations?’, Bitterlemons International, 3(7), 22 January 2009.
76 Pinar Akpınar, ‘Turkish aid to Somalia: A new pulse in Africa’, Al Jazeera English (online), 2 September 2011;
‘World nations praise Turkey for Somalia aid’, Today’s Zaman, 24 February 2012; Richard Laughreuters, ‘Somalia:
Where western aid fails, Turkey succeeds’, The Vancouver Sun, 2 June 2012.
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