Perestroika and Change in Soviet Weapons ... - The Black Vault

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SUMURYK
Soviet weapons acquisition has been an effective enterprise since the
1930s. This effectiveness arises from four principal sources: (1) the
allocation of sufficient resources, (2) implementation priority ensuring
that the allocational choices are actually carried out, (3) a buyer's
market in which the Defense Ministry has been panted the privilege of
not accepting inferior products, and (4) an R&D approach that has
dealt with the shortcomings of the Soviet economic system. Soviet
political choices since mid-1987 have radically altered the political
structure of defense, reducing the resources going to new weapons and
diluting the priority of defense production. A second major change is
the role of weapons technology and complexity in reducing the power
of the buyer's market and the capabilities of the Soviet weapons R&D
style.
For 25 years, Soviet leaders have attempted to transfer features of
defense industry-mainly managers and methods-to the civilian sector
to improve productivity and output. On assuming leadership, Mikhail
Gorbachev followed this same approach in what turned out to be a first
phase of his effort of enlisting the defense sector in the aid of the
economy. However, something new is now being added to past policies:
Two key elements allowing Soviet defense industry to be effective at
developing and producing military systems--allocational priority and
implementation priority-are now being transferred to civilian production.
This reallocation of resources and partial reassignment of priority
mark the second phase of an evolving policy toward defense industrythe
conversion of defense industry capacity to civilian purposes.
Since the beginning of 1988, the direct consequences for weapons
development and procurement of defense industry conversion to civil-
Jan output have all been negative.
tV
* The transfer of enterprises from the dissolved ministry of light
and food industry to the defense complex absorbed defense
managers' attention, diverted defense production capacity, and
redirected new investment to food processing equipment.
SImplementation of plans for the defense industry to make
further contributions to the production of consumer goods and
ligt industry equipment drew on additional management and
production caaite and required more diversion of investmnet.
Defense procurement reductions arising from Gorbachev's policy
announced in December 1988 immediately began to influence