20130412164339753295_book_an-introduction-to-political-communication

PRESSURE-GROUP POLITICS
ignoring the role of management and other factors for which the unions had
no responsibility was part of the pattern of bias referred to earlier (1976,
1980). Be that as it may, by 1977 the company was in deep crisis, and the then
Labour government appointed South African industrialist Michael Edwardes
to rescue it on behalf of the taxpayer.
Edwardes pioneered, in the British context, a variety of media management
and communication techniques which had the effect of circumventing
established management–union channels, weakening the authority of the
union leadership and the solidarity of the workforce. Edwardes and his
management adopted a strategy of ‘going over the heads’ of union negotiators,
communicating directly with the workforce and seeking to persuade
them of the correctness of management’s policies. Edwardes also applied
public relations techniques, pursued through the media, to mobilise public
support.
For example, announcements of important management decisions would
be timed to accommodate main news programmes, particularly the popular
early evening bulletins with the largest audiences (basic public relations, of
course, but innovative in the context of industrial disputes). News reports
would be closely monitored by British Leyland’s PR staff, and any perceived
mistakes or inaccuracies in coverage were immediately relayed to the media
organisation concerned, for correction at the next available opportunity.
Edwardes insisted on going ‘live’ when he appeared in broadcast interviews,
thus preventing the possibility of his views being edited to his disadvantage.
To protect his authority and status, he never appeared in debates with union
leaders on television.
BL under Edwardes pioneered the practice of producing company newspapers
which were delivered free of charge to the workforce. This allowed
management to bypass the leadership of the union by disseminating its
message directly into workers’ homes. Management offers on pay, conditions
or other points of dispute could be made ‘unmediated’ by union leaders’
objections and counter arguments. BL management also introduced the
practice of carrying out surveys of workers’ opinions, the findings of which
would then be incorporated into negotiating tactics. By the use of such
methods Edwardes secured from the BL workforce a vote of 7 to 1 in favour
of his recovery plan, despite the vociferous objections of the union.
Where British Leyland had led, other managements followed, compelling
union negotiators to accept that they, too, would have to embrace communication
techniques which involved co-operation with, rather than huffy
dismissal of, the ‘capitalist media’. This would require an appreciation of the
media’s demands and news-values, and attention to the presentation as well
as the substance of a negotiating position.
During the rail strike of 1982 the National Union of Railway-workers did
precisely this, making the dispute, in Jones’s view, the first in which ‘a
substantial attempt at negotiating through the news media was made’ (1986,
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