20130412164339753295_book_an-introduction-to-political-communication

POLITICAL COMMUNICATION IN A GLOBALISED WORLD
This in turn led the government, and Margaret Thatcher in particular, to
mount a campaign of political pressure on the BBC, targeted against its
‘impartiality’ in coverage of the conflict. As the Glasgow University Media
Group showed in their study of war reporting, the impartiality of television
news was debatable (1985). Coverage in general was normally deferential to,
and supportive of, dubious official claims of military success. The war was
sanitised for television viewers, and the non-military possibilities of a resolution
to the conflict marginalised. Criticism of the government’s policy, as in
the infamous Panorama special of 11 May 1982, was rare. 5 For the government,
however, all this amounted to a kind of subversion, as if the BBC should
have accepted that on this issue the government’s interests and views were
synonymous with those of ‘the nation’.
Throughout the Falklands conflict there was a fundamental tension in
official information policy. Ministry of Defence advice issued to journalists
on the task force included the recognition that ‘the essence of successful
warfare is secrecy. The essence of successful journalism is publicity’ (quoted
in Harris, 1983, p. 16). This is not strictly true, however. Publicity, as we
noted above, is now viewed as an instrument of war, particularly by the
politicians who must take responsibility for its execution in a democracy.
Thus, while the military authorities and the Defence Ministry pursued a
policy of non-cooperation with the media, the government as a whole
required media publicity for its symbolic campaign.
Mercer et al. note that ‘from the outset the Prime Minister sought to rally
party, national and international opinion’ (1987, p. 18) through such
displays as the departure of the task force. In the words of a serving admiral
at the time, ‘it was very important to give tangible evidence of military power
to back up the diplomatic effort. It was very much a PR show – to show the
Fleet leaving, both for British opinion, to rally them behind the ships and as
an expression of power for world opinion and, of course, the enemy’ (ibid.,
p. 19).
For the reporting of good news, then, the media were most welcome and
were treated accordingly. Beyond this role as transmitters of symbolic
demonstrations of military power, the media were also used to confuse and
‘disinform’ the enemy. When, for example, landings on the Falklands were
being prepared, misleading information was leaked to the media, thence to
the public and, of course, the Argentinians.
Whether or not one agrees with the ‘justness’ of the Falklands War and
the government’s information policy during it, there is no doubt, as Robert
Harris concludes, ‘that in many respects the British people were not given
the facts during the Falklands War. Information was leaked out slowly and
often reluctantly by the Ministry of Defence; rumours were allowed to
circulate unchecked; and the British authorities frequently used the media as
an instrument with which to confuse the enemy’ (1983, p. 92). Such tactics
may or may not have contributed to British military success in the Falklands,
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