India's Escalation-Resistant Nuclear Posture - The Stimson Center

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⎦ ⎣ RAJESH M. BASRUR ⏐ 73 and those that are deployed in the field. This is likely to remain a tacit understanding partly because India will not want to make a commitment that does not include China, and because, the current situation, is, in any case, working well. On the global front, the Indian approach is ambivalent. The NPT-based nonproliferation regime is a major stumbling block, since it keeps India outside the charmed circle of recognized nuclear weapons states. India is unlikely to enter into any formal multilateral agreements (other than universal ones that do not discriminate between nuclear haves and have-nots) without some sort of implicit acceptance into the nuclear club, for instance by its inclusion in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) or the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Hence its reluctance to join the US-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), and its qualified support for the April 2004 Security Council resolution requiring states not to support proliferation to non-state actors, both of which are basically in accord with its interests. At the same time, Indian interest in the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty and, in a more acceptable form, of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) remains alive. On the latter, which was much debated in the media, the main Indian complaint was not against the basic provisions of the Treaty itself as much as against its evident intent to close the Indian nuclear option. After the 1998 tests, the Indian government explicitly accepted the idea of a CTBT so long as it was not discriminatory. In terms of practical politics, there is little doubt that some sort of indirect legitimization of India’s de facto status as a nuclear weapon power will suffice to obtain a change in India’s position, as did in fact happen with respect to the Antarctic Treaty in the early 1980s, when India dropped its criticisms and became a party to what it had long held to be a discriminatory treaty. CONCLUSION Barring a serious negative turn in relationships with Pakistan and China, or the emergence of an unanticipated threat, the pace of India’s nuclear evolution is likely to remain glacial, picking up some moraine by way of incremental additions to hardware, but not deviating significantly from its doctrine of minimum deterrence. In this projection, Indian forces will remain in a nondeployed state, intermediate-range missiles targeting China will be inducted in due course, a sea-based deterrent will be pursued without any sense of urgency, and steady improvements will be made in command and control. In the main, the trend will constrain the scope for escalation of nuclear tensions with both Pakistan and China, though some hiccups may occur with Pakistan over missile defense. However, a significant deterioration in its security environment is likely to invite changes in India’s nuclear thinking and practice. The kinds of change that may occur are: a shift to deployment in response to a Pakistani initiative to ⎤ ⎡
⎦ ⎣ 74 ⏐ INDIA’S ESCALATION-RESISTANT NUCLEAR POSTURE deploy (an unlikely event); an imminent threat apprehended during a crisis, either with China (again unlikely) or with Pakistan; and an accelerated program to expand capabilities, both in quantity and quality, in response to a sharp rise in the general threat level from either or both its nuclear adversaries. The likelihood of a threat emanating from China appears low for the foreseeable future. Though reasons for optimism about the Indo-Pakistan relationship have been outlined above, its prospects still remain somewhat uncertain. The revival of tensions, followed by nuclear altercations and crises, would bring great risks, even the possibility of war, though it could also induce the kind of extensive arms control that has been absent so far. But a more steady and prudent course of stabilization is surely to be preferred. Fortunately, there appears to be a process of learning from previous failures on the part of both leaderships. But one more area of learning is still needed, and this is with respect to doctrine, on which nuclear posture rests. Even if external conditions deteriorate, an effective deterrence posture does not require the augmentation of capabilities. A more thorough understanding of the fundamentals of minimum deterrence – that a little is enough to create unacceptable risks for the enemy, and hence to deter it – will go a long way to constrain inflationary tendencies built on Cold War type arguments about credibility and vulnerability. One inescapable reality is that of strategic interdependence, especially when a relationship is hostile, since that sharply raises the cost of failure for both sides. Overall, there is a strong possibility that India’s predilection for nuclear and strategic stability through confidence building and risk-reduction measures will remain undiminished. Contrary to widespread characterizations about the influence of nuclear hawks, there is virtually no constituency for a truly hardline, expansive nuclear program in India. While there does not appear to be a great deal of creative thinking at present on arms control, the Indian commitment to nuclear risk reduction and escalation control is unquestionably durable. ⎤ ⎡
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India's Escalation-Resistant Nuclear Posture - The Stimson Center

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