India's Escalation-Resistant Nuclear Posture - The Stimson Center

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⎦ ⎣ RAJESH M. BASRUR ⏐ 59 reluctance on the part of the ruling political elite to permit them to play a major part in determining security policy. Both these aspects of nuclear policy are civilian-driven, dominated by the NSA. However, it appears that the civilian bodies which have a nuts-and-bolts understanding of nuclear strategy, the NSAB and the NSCN, play a relatively limited role in formulating India’s nuclear stance today. 6 Though time will tell, there is some expectation that the UPA government will review and revamp the NSC and give it a more prominent role in policy making than before. 7 The nuclear-scientific community is often credited with a significant role in policy making. In practice, while it is true that nuclear scientists have generally been strong advocates of the bomb, there is no evidence of their being able to determine the agenda of even relatively weak political leaders. Nuclear decisions have always been political decisions. 8 However, nuclear scientists associated with the development of missiles do push for expanding capabilities and will continue to do so. If the threat environment deteriorates, they are likely to find a sympathetic ear in the policymaking community. This brief overview provides the basis for an assessment of official thinking today, which is fundamentally minimalist and hence both stable and escalationresistant. Because the military does not have a significant say, operational pressures relating to issues such as deployment and force expansion are very limited. Have the requirements for minimum deterrence been met? In the main, official circles do not feel that they have. In particular, there is a widely felt need for three components of a minimal deterrence capability. The first is a capacity to deter China effectively, for which the 3,000 km-range Agni III intermediaterange missile, still under development, is seen as a necessity. China is not currently seen as a threat, but there are significant concerns about its intent in aiding Pakistan’s missile and nuclear programs. Some feel there is a need to target Beijing specifically, while others do not see this as a necessary requirement. After all, as the respected thinker K. Subrahmanyam, has noted, “Will the Chinese risk Kunming and Chengdu at present and even Shanghai and Guangzu later…for any conceivable political, military and strategic objective?” 9 But the push for a China-specific deterrent is not characterized by a sense of urgency, which is not surprising considering the positive trend in Sino-Indian relations. The Agni III is slated for testing in 2004. So far, China has not taken India’s nuclearization seriously but that will almost certainly change. Once the Agni III is inducted into the Indian arsenal, there is likely to be a new dynamic in Sino-Indian relations. Chinese threat 6 The first NSAB, which put together the Draft Nuclear Doctrine of August 1999, was more influential, but its successors have not enjoyed a similar stature. 7 Siddharth Varadarajan, “Revamp of National Security Council on Cards,” Times of India, May 31, 2004. 8 Basrur, “Nuclear Weapons and Indian Strategic Culture,” pp. 189-190. 9 K. Subrahmanyam, “Not A Numbers Game: Minimum Cost of N-Deterrence,” Times of India, December 7, 1998. ⎤ ⎡
⎦ ⎣ 60 ⏐ INDIA’S ESCALATION-RESISTANT NUCLEAR POSTURE perceptions and targeting policies are bound to be reassessed and changes therein will inevitably call for a response from the Indian side. However, barring an unforeseen downturn in Sino-Indian relations, not much change may be expected. It is unlikely that technical dynamics will drive nuclear strategy toward major changes in either country. Their relationship now rests on a political foundation that envisages setting difficult issues like their boundary dispute aside and focusing on areas of mutual benefit such as trade and investment. New Delhi does not express an interest in catching up with China, and India is unlikely to seek more than a minimal deterrence capacity against that country. The possibility of an escalation in tensions driven by nucleartechnological competition is remote. It should be noted that there is no serious perception in India of a need to develop intercontinental-missiles in the foreseeable future because no threat requiring this capability is anticipated. A second felt need is for a triad. It is not quite clear as to why this is considered necessary. The usual argument, based on thinking drawn from western assured destruction literature, is that submarine-based warheads are least vulnerable to a first strike. This is by no means deducible from a specifically minimum deterrence standpoint in which deterrence rests on the risk faced by the adversary rather than on one’s own invulnerability. 10 In practice, organizational interests and perceptions do seem to play an unacknowledged role in bolstering such arguments. The scientific community is certainly interested in the development of a sea-based platform, while the politics of interservice rivalry ensures that all three arms of the military get a piece of the cake. More generally, there is no clearly enunciated basis for the requirements of minimum deterrence as yet. While Indian strategic culture acts as a restraining factor, the lack of a well thought out and consistent doctrine allows considerable open-endedness in Indian nuclear thinking and practice. The question “how much is enough?” is not yet being asked in policymaking circles. In part, this reflects an awareness that to make any quantifiable commitment is to render oneself vulnerable to pressures from the international “nonproliferation lobby,” which is viewed with much contempt but also a degree of apprehension. In part, it is also the result of an unarticulated perception that nuclear weapons are not really a problem area because India has enough to deter Pakistan and because China is not a major worry for the foreseeable future. The result is that future uncertainties are the basis of a hedging strategy that is open-ended but not driven by a desire to get anywhere quickly. As things stand, this is not worrisome. But if India’s strategic relationships with China or Pakistan were to deteriorate, there would be scope for an expansionary, arms-racing process of the Cold War type, though within the constraints posed by strategic culture and 10 The obvious criticism is how can an adversary be certain that one will not be able to retaliate with even one weapon from a single leg? Minimum deterrence, after all, is based on the contention that “one bomb on one city is unacceptable.” K. Subrahmanyam, “A Credible Deterrent: Logic of the Nuclear Doctrine,” Times of India, October 4, 1999. ⎤ ⎡
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India's Escalation-Resistant Nuclear Posture - The Stimson Center

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