India's Escalation-Resistant Nuclear Posture - The Stimson Center

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RAJESH M. BASRUR ⏐ 61
cost. There is a need – as yet unrecognized by officialdom – for a clearer
conception of minimum deterrence doctrine to prevent this from happening.
The third area where the necessity for improved capability is sensed is
command and control. The need for integrating command and control capability
more fully is a subject of some concern, and organizational matters are still
being sorted out. While precise information on this is not available, it appears
that technical requirements relating to more effective command and control,
such as permissive action links (PALs), are still to be obtained. Western thinking
is dominated by the fear that the attainment of such capability is likely to result
in active deployment, but that is very unlikely as there is a strong awareness of
the associated risks. Missile defense capability is also considered necessary to
protect major assets and has been sought persistently for some years. More
about this is discussed below.
The overall picture is that barring unexpected changes in the nature of
external threats, there is no likelihood of internally driven shifts in doctrine or
practice. Even at the height of tension with Pakistan, during both the 1999
Kargil conflict and the 2001-02 compound crisis, nuclear weapons never
seriously entered the picture other than verbally. Like Sherlock Holmes’s dog
that did not bark (in this case twice), this absence was significant. It reflected
well-entrenched Indian (and Pakistani) inhibitions about nuclear weapons based
on an acute awareness of the risks accompanying them. There seems to be a
sense that there is already second-strike stability vis-à-vis Pakistan, and that this
will be achieved relatively soon with respect to China. Above all, there is no
sign of significant civilian-military differences over nuclear matters. As
mentioned earlier, civilian control remains tight. Beyond that, while military
officers do seek greater inputs into policy, their perspective on major issues like
deployment and hardware is not very different from that of the civilian
leadership. Notably, there is no pressure from the armed forces for tactical or
“battlefield” weapons and “warfighting” capability, nor for testing to ensure
greater reliability of weapons systems. The possibility of small nuclear weapons
for use against military targets has been raised within the armed forces, but has
found no support from senior military officers, let alone the political leadership.
What does this imply for escalation control? There is a certain element of
instability in the existence of a hedging strategy that could drive rapid armament
in a more insecure environment. Similarly, the persistent interest in obtaining a
fully developed triad because it would allegedly make the Indian deterrent force
less vulnerable is not only of dubious merit, but also expansionary in its
implications. Arguments about vulnerability (recall the “bomber gap” and the
“missile gap”) were the prime propellants of the arms race during the Cold War.
The absence of a fully thought out doctrine of minimum deterrence leaves some
space – again more likely in a deteriorating environment – for expansionary
pressures on grounds such as “vulnerability” or “credibility.” For a truly
minimum deterrence posture, such gaps should not matter, nor should issues of
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