The Problem

y an “objective” inquirer mandates control of possible confounding factors, whether the
methods are qualitative or quantitative” (Guba and Lincoln 1994, 108). If an objective
reality were accepted in this case, then a straight-forward statistical analysis might be
performed to determine which stakeholders have the highest aggregate rating across a
few chosen metrics. Unfortunately (or fortunately), the political/social world within
which the public administrator operates will generally preclude the establishment of any
such specific metrics. Simply put, the question of methodological enquiry cannot simply
be addressed within a discussion about the “methods” to be used. Instead “methods must
be fitted to a predetermined methodology” -- a methodology predetermined by the
paradigm of enquiry chosen (108).
Accordingly, a case can be made that the ontological and epistemological viewpoints
expressed in the past decade or two in public administration have been heading from one
set (or paradigm) to another (or others). This shift brings with it certain responsibilities,
not the least of which is the responsibility to design new methodologies that support the
new set of ontological and epistemological assumptions. That is, while the modified
experimental method using falsification of hypotheses and highly quantitative methods fit
the positivist and post-positivist paradigms of enquiry, they do not necessarily fit the
newer critical theoretic and/or interpretive/constructivist paradigms of enquiry (White,
1994; Balfour and Mesaros, 1994; Dryzek, 1982). In the postpositivistic paradigm reality
is assumed to exist, as in its predecessor, positivism, but we as human inquirers can only
apprehend that reality imperfectly (unlike positivism) given our flawed human
intellectual abilities (the ontology has been defined as “critical realism” (Cook &
Campbell, 1979) because of the posture of proponents that claims about reality must be
subjected to the widest possible critical examination to facilitate apprehending reality as
closely as possible – but never perfectly). As stated by Guba and Lincoln, within this
epistemological stance “objectivity remains a “regulatory ideal”; special interest is placed
on “guardians” of objectivity such as critical traditions (Do the findings “fit” with preexisting
knowledge?) and the critical community (such as editors, referees, and
professional peers). Replicated findings are probably true (but always subject to
falsification)” (110).
9