Morningside Report and Summary Here - KiwiRail

1. Work with other agencies in the development of their long-term (5-10 year) transport
infrastructure plans to ensure that, over time, busy crossings are taken off grade with
over and under passes.
2. Ensure those over and under passes are effective alternatives for mobility users.
3. Liaise with manufactures of mobility vehicles to try and establish improvements to wheel
design to minimize risk at flange gaps. This could include wider wheels and or double
wheels.
Investigation Findings
The findings of the Investigation Report are as follows:
1. The combination of the uneven surface of the crossing on the day of the accident, the
width and depth of the flange gap, and the angle of the crossing (which was at 67
degrees to the railway line and runners) were major contributing factors to the accident.
2. A number of factors contributed to this situation existing at the time of the accident and
our findings in that regard are:
• At the highest level, the fact that at-grade pedestrian crossings (as opposed to the
use of under and overpasses) continue to be utilised in New Zealand on busy metro
networks meant that this accident was possible.
• No specific consideration was given to the appropriateness of the design of the
pedestrian crossing used at Morningside for special needs users such as wheelchair
bound pedestrians, push chair users and cyclists. Had such consideration been
made, it may have resulted in a choice of design which may have been less
susceptible to damage and/or once damaged, would have posed less of a potential
hazard to wheelchair users. However, had the Morningside crossing been
maintained as constructed, the crossing surface would likely not have posed a
potential hazard to wheelchair users.
• There was no specific recognition of potential hazards to special needs users such
as wheelchair bound pedestrians, push chair users and cyclists in the maintenance
inspection procedures for level crossings and when granting an exemption to the
inspection regime to permit inspections to be undertaken from the cabs of
locomotives, no specific consideration was given to level crossings.
• Once the Morningside crossing suffered the water damage, the track inspection
regime did not identify the deteriorated condition of the crossing, it was identified by a
Track Inspector while performing other duties who reported it as requiring work.
• Due to a number of failings within KiwiRail’s systems, the remedial work required to
repair the surface of the Morningside Crossing was recorded with a lower priority
than intended, the required remedial work was then not undertaken and it was also
then incorrectly recorded as having been completed.
Recommendations
The recommendations of the Investigation Report are as follows:
1. A review be undertaken of international practice in respect of the design,
construction, inspection and maintenance of rail pedestrian crossings. The review
should also include: