刑事檢控科各律師/高級律 - Department of Justice
刑事檢控科各律師/高級律 - Department of Justice
刑事檢控科各律師/高級律 - Department of Justice
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To : All Counsel/Senior Law Clerks/Prosecutions<br />
All Court Prosecutors/Magistracies<br />
致 : 刑 事 檢 控 科 各 律 師 / 高 級 律 政 書 記<br />
裁 判 法 院 各 法 庭 檢 控 主 任<br />
A Publication <strong>of</strong> the Prosecutions Division<br />
<strong>of</strong> the <strong>Department</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Justice</strong><br />
律 政 司 刑 事 檢 控 科 出 版 的 刊 物<br />
General Editor<br />
總 編 輯<br />
I Grenville Cross, SC<br />
江 樂 士 資 深 大 律 師<br />
CRIMINAL APPEALS BULLETIN<br />
刑 事 上 訴 案 判 例 簡 訊<br />
June Edition/2004<br />
2004 年 6 月 號<br />
Associate Editors<br />
副 編 輯<br />
D G Saw, SC<br />
邵 德 煒 資 深 大 律 師<br />
Patrick W S Cheung<br />
張 維 新<br />
Assistant Editors<br />
助 理 編 輯<br />
Denise F S Chan<br />
陳 鳳 珊<br />
Lily S L Wong<br />
王 詩 麗<br />
Vinci W S Lam<br />
林 穎 茜<br />
This Bulletin summarises recent judgments which the editors consider <strong>of</strong> significance.<br />
本 簡 訊 輯 錄 近 期 上 訴 案 件 中 各 編 輯 認 為 重 要 判 詞 的 摘 要 。<br />
( * Denotes Government Counsel<br />
( * 代 表 政 府 律 師<br />
# Denotes Appellant’s/Applicant’s/Respondent’s Counsel)<br />
# 代 表 上 訴 人 / 申 請 人 / 答 辯 人 的 律 師 )
2<br />
c.c.<br />
副 本 送 :<br />
e mail<br />
電 郵 送 :<br />
SJ<br />
律 政 司 司 長<br />
DDPPs<br />
各 副 刑 事 檢 控 專 員<br />
LOs<br />
各 律 政 專 員<br />
D <strong>of</strong> AD<br />
律 政 司 政 務 專 員<br />
DSG<br />
副 法 律 政 策 專 員<br />
Secretary, Law Reform Commission<br />
法 律 改 革 委 員 會 秘 書<br />
Editor/Hong Kong Law Reports & Digest<br />
《 香 港 法 律 匯 報 與 摘 錄 》 編 輯<br />
DLA<br />
法 律 援 助 署 署 長<br />
Bar Association (Attn : Administrative Secretary)<br />
香 港 大 律 師 公 會 行 政 秘 書<br />
Law Society (Attn : Secretary General)<br />
香 港 律 師 會 秘 書 長<br />
Editor/Hong Kong Cases<br />
Hong Kong Cases 編 輯<br />
Faculty <strong>of</strong> Law, HKU (Attn : Dean <strong>of</strong> Faculty)<br />
香 港 大 學 法 律 學 院 院 長<br />
Librarian (Law), City University<br />
香 港 城 市 大 學 高 級 助 理 圖 書 館 館 長 ( 法 律 組 )<br />
PHQ/HKPF (Attn : ACP/Crime)<br />
香 港 警 務 處 警 察 總 部 警 務 處 助 理 處 長 ( 刑 事 )<br />
ICAC (Attn : Head/Ops)<br />
廉 政 公 署 執 行 處 首 長<br />
PTS/HKPF (Attn : FTO(Exam))<br />
香 港 警 務 處 警 察 訓 練 學 校 警 察 訓 練 主 任 ( 考 試 )<br />
Administrator/Duty Lawyer Service<br />
當 值 律 師 服 務 總 幹 事<br />
C & E Training Development Group (Attn : Staff Officer)<br />
香 港 海 關 訓 練 發 展 課 參 事<br />
C & E Prosecution Group (Attn : Superintendent)<br />
香 港 海 關 檢 控 課 監 督<br />
LegCo Secretariat (Legal Service Division)<br />
立 法 會 秘 書 處 法 律 事 務 部<br />
D <strong>of</strong> Imm (Attn : AD(EL))<br />
入 境 事 務 處 助 理 處 長 ( 執 法 及 聯 絡 )<br />
Judiciary (PM/JISS Project)<br />
司 法 機 構 資 訊 系 統 策 略 計 劃 策 略 經 理<br />
Librarian/D <strong>of</strong> J<br />
律 政 司 圖 書 館 館 長<br />
Director <strong>of</strong> Advanced Legal Education<br />
法 律 專 業 進 修 總 監<br />
Hung On-to Memorial Library (HK Collection)/HKU<br />
香 港 大 學 孔 安 道 紀 念 圖 書 館 ( 特 藏 部 )<br />
<strong>Department</strong>al Prosecution Sections<br />
各 部 門 的 檢 控 組
3<br />
INDEX<br />
目 錄<br />
A p. 4 - p. 17<br />
第 4 至 17 頁<br />
B. p. 18 - p. 22<br />
第 18 至 22 頁<br />
C p. 23 - p. 29<br />
第 23 至 29 頁<br />
D. p. 30 - p. 38<br />
第 30 至 38 頁<br />
E. p. 39 - p. 43<br />
第 39 至 43 頁<br />
F. p. 44 - p. 45<br />
第 44 至 45 頁<br />
G. p. 46<br />
第 46 頁<br />
Appeal By Way <strong>of</strong> Case Stated<br />
以 案 件 呈 述 方 式 提 出 的 上 訴<br />
Criminal Appeals/Against Conviction<br />
刑 事 上 訴 案 件 / 針 對 定 罪<br />
Criminal Appeals/Against Sentence<br />
刑 事 上 訴 案 件 / 針 對 刑 罰<br />
Magistracy Appeals/Against Conviction<br />
裁 判 法 院 上 訴 案 件 / 針 對 定 罪<br />
Magistracy Appeals/Against Sentence<br />
裁 判 法 院 上 訴 案 件 / 針 對 刑 罰<br />
Costs in Criminal Cases<br />
刑 事 案 件 的 訟 費<br />
Practice and Procedure<br />
常 規 與 程 序
4<br />
Appeal No.<br />
(Date <strong>of</strong> Case Significance<br />
Judgment) Title<br />
A. APPEALS BY WAY OF CASE STATED<br />
以 案 件 呈 述 方 式 提 出 的 上 訴<br />
香 港 特 別 行 政 區 訴 古 思 堯 及 另 一 人<br />
HKSAR v KOO Sze-yiu and Another<br />
高 等 法 院 原 訟 法 庭 – 高 院 裁 判 法 院 上 訴 2003 年 第 1270 號<br />
* 張 維 新<br />
Cheung Waisun<br />
李 鏡 鏞<br />
Robert KY Lee<br />
# 答 辯 人 自 辯<br />
I/P<br />
高 等 法 院 原 訟 法 庭 法 官 湯 寶 臣<br />
聆 訊 日 期 : 二 零 零 四 年 五 月 十 八 日<br />
宣 判 日 期 : 二 零 零 四 年 六 月 二 十 八 日<br />
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF THE HIGH COURT<br />
MAGISTRACY APPEAL NO. 1270 OF 2003<br />
Date <strong>of</strong> Hearing: 18 May 2004<br />
Date <strong>of</strong> Judgment: 28 June 2004<br />
擾 亂 致 令 立 法 會 會 議 程 序 中 斷 – 香 港 法 例 第 382 章<br />
立 法 會 ( 權 力 及 特 權 ) 條 例 第 17(c) 條 – 適 用 對 象 –<br />
跟 隨 先 例 的 概 念 – 條 例 中 第 8 條 和 第 17(c) 條 的 最 高<br />
刑 罰 的 分 別<br />
兩 位 答 辯 人 共 同 被 控 一 項 控 罪 , 指 他 們 於 2003<br />
年 2 月 26 日 , 在 立 法 會 大 樓 內 , 正 當 立 法 會 舉 行 會<br />
議 時 , 引 起 擾 亂 , 致 令 立 法 會 的 會 議 程 序 中 斷 , 違<br />
反 香 港 法 例 第 382 章 ,《 立 法 會 ( 權 力 及 特 權 ) 條<br />
例 》 第 17(c) 條 。<br />
他 們 否 認 控 罪 。 在 審 訊 及 聽 取 過 陳 詞 後 , 裁 判<br />
官 裁 定 罪 名 不 成 立 , 並 將 控 罪 撤 銷 。 裁 判 官 在 判 詞<br />
中 指 出 合 適 的 控 罪 應 該 是 同 一 法 例 中 的 第 8 條 及 第<br />
20 條 而 不 是 第 17(c) 條 。 但 裁 判 官 拒 絕 引 用 香 港 法<br />
例 第 227 章 《 裁 判 官 條 例 》 第 27 條 所 賦 予 他 的 權 力<br />
去 將 控 罪 修 改 為 第 8 條 。 上 訴 人 不 服 這 個 裁 決 , 並<br />
依 據 《 裁 判 官 條 例 》 第 105 條 就 裁 決 所 涉 及 的 法 律
5<br />
問 題 以 「 案 件 呈 述 」 方 式 向 原 訟 法 庭 提 出 上 訴 。<br />
控 辯 雙 方 在 證 據 方 面 無 太 大 爭 議 。 裁 判 官 裁 定<br />
上 訴 人 已 證 明 了 下 列 的 基 本 事 實 :<br />
(1) 在 2003 年 2 月 26 日 下 午 約 5 時 30 分 , 立<br />
法 會 在 中 環 昃 臣 道 8 號 的 立 法 會 大 樓 內<br />
正 進 行 《 國 家 安 全 ( 立 法 條 文 ) 條 例 草<br />
案 》 的 首 讀 和 二 讀 程 序 。 當 前 保 安 局<br />
局 長 ( 葉 劉 淑 儀 女 士 ) 準 備 就 上 述 條 例<br />
草 案 動 議 二 讀 發 言 時 , 一 批 立 法 會 議<br />
員 站 立 抗 議 並 離 場 。 這 時 候 有 人 從 立<br />
法 會 大 樓 內 的 2 號 公 眾 席 上 把 紙 碎 拋 下<br />
會 議 廳 。 第 一 和 第 二 答 辯 人 亦 從 2 號 公<br />
眾 席 的 座 位 站 起 來 高 叫 口 號 ( 反 對 23 條<br />
立 法 和 收 回 藍 紙 草 案 )。 第 二 答 辯 人 亦<br />
試 圖 張 開 一 幅 黑 布 橫 額 ;<br />
(2) 立 法 會 保 安 人 員 隨 即 上 前 阻 止 兩 位 答<br />
辯 人 , 並 勸 喻 兩 人 肅 靜 及 返 回 座 位 。<br />
但 兩 位 答 辯 人 仍 然 不 斷 大 叫 口 號 及 手<br />
握 欄 杆 , 保 安 員 於 是 強 行 把 兩 人 帶 離<br />
公 眾 席 。 期 間 兩 人 與 保 安 人 員 發 生 糾<br />
纏 。 立 法 會 的 會 議 因 此 被 中 斷 近 兩 分<br />
鐘 。 在 兩 人 被 帶 走 後 , 立 法 會 的 會 議<br />
才 可 繼 續 進 行 。<br />
裁 判 官 認 為 第 17(c) 條 祇 是 規 範 被 立 法 會 或 任<br />
何 委 員 會 命 令 到 立 法 會 作 證 的 人 士 , 其 他 出 現 在 會<br />
議 廳 的 公 眾 人 士 之 行 為 則 祇 是 由 第 8 條 及 相 關 的 附<br />
例 所 規 管 。 裁 判 官 指 出 答 辯 人 既 然 不 是 被 傳 召 的 人<br />
士 , 所 以 他 們 的 行 為 祇 受 第 8 條 及 有 關 行 政 指 令 規<br />
限 , 裁 判 官 認 為 控 方 是 選 錯 控 罪 。<br />
裁 判 官 有 留 意 到 胡 國 興 法 官 曾 處 理 一 宗 同 類 型<br />
的 案 件 , 即 香 港 特 別 行 政 區 訴 梁 國 雄 (HCMA<br />
561/1999)。 而 在 該 案 中 , 胡 法 官 裁 定 第 17(c) 條 是<br />
恰 當 的 控 罪 。 雖 然 有 此 先 例 , 裁 判 官 以 以 下 的 理 據<br />
拒 絕 跟 隨 :
6<br />
… 儘 管 該 案 的 案 情 與 本 案 有 相 似 之 處 , 但<br />
本 席 發 覺 在 上 訴 的 過 程 中 , 法 庭 從 沒 有 提<br />
及 第 8 條 及 其 附 例 。 本 席 認 為 可 能 由 於 控<br />
辯 雙 方 在 討 論 過 程 中 , 都 忽 略 了 第 8 條 及<br />
其 附 例 的 存 在 和 適 用 性 , 因 而 法 庭 亦 被 誤<br />
導 及 忽 略 了 第 8 條 及 其 附 例 的 存 在 , 所 以<br />
該 案 例 對 於 第 17 條 (c) 款 是 否 才 是 合 適 的<br />
控 罪 這 一 點 , 不 能 視 作 權 威 性 的 案 例 。<br />
有 關 修 改 控 罪 方 面 , 裁 判 官 認 為 鑑 於 第 17(c)<br />
條 和 第 8 條 無 論 在 性 質 和 規 管 範 圍 都 完 全 不 同 , 其<br />
差 異 屬 關 鍵 性 , 如 果 到 了 裁 決 階 段 才 去 修 改 控 罪 是<br />
對 答 辯 人 不 公 平 , 因 此 裁 判 官 決 定 直 接 宣 判 罪 名 不<br />
成 立 及 撤 銷 控 罪 。<br />
裁 判 官 指 出 , 這 個 無 罪 的 裁 定 引 起 三 點 法 律 問<br />
題 , 但 最 主 要 的 是 第 一 點 :<br />
(1) 本 席 裁 定 第 382 章 《 立 法 會 ( 權 力 及 特<br />
權 ) 條 例 》 第 17 條 (c) 款 , 是 規 範 只 被<br />
立 法 會 或 委 員 會 命 令 到 立 法 會 或 委 員<br />
會 作 證 的 人 士 的 行 為 , 而 非 任 何 其 他<br />
在 會 議 廳 的 公 眾 人 士 的 行 為 , 這 法 律<br />
觀 點 是 否 有 錯 誤 ?<br />
(2) 如 果 沒 有 錯 誤 , 本 席 不 對 控 罪 作 出 修<br />
改 是 否 有 錯 誤 ?<br />
(3) 本 席 裁 定 第 一 及 第 二 答 辯 人 罪 名 不 成<br />
立 , 在 法 律 上 是 否 有 錯 誤 ?<br />
上 訴 人 指 裁 判 官 犯 了 原 則 上 的 錯 誤 , 單 就 字 眼<br />
來 看 , 第 17(c) 條 的 適 用 對 象 已 十 分 清 楚 , 它 是 適<br />
用 於 ` 任 何 人 ' 而 並 非 祇 是 被 傳 召 到 立 法 會 作 證 人<br />
士 。` 任 何 人 ' 就 會 包 括 答 辯 人 及 任 何 出 現 在 會 議<br />
廳 的 公 眾 人 士 。<br />
至 於 香 港 特 別 行 政 區 訴 梁 國 雄 一 案 , 上 訴 人 認<br />
為 雖 然 胡 法 官 沒 有 在 他 的 判 詞 中 提 過 第 8 條 及 其 附<br />
例 , 但 這 不 代 表 胡 法 官 是 被 誤 導 或 忽 略 了 第 8 條 的
7<br />
存 在 。 簡 單 來 說 , 胡 法 官 祇 需 根 據 提 出 的 控 罪 來 判<br />
案 , 他 不 需 要 對 所 有 有 關 的 條 例 都 去 討 論 研 究 。<br />
上 訴 人 根 據 法 例 第 221 章 ,《 刑 事 訴 訟 程 序 條<br />
例 》 第 101D 條 指 出 , 本 案 案 情 屬 於 構 成 兩 項 或 多<br />
項 控 罪 的 行 為 , 所 以 第 8 條 及 第 17 條 其 實 都 適 用 ,<br />
但 因 為 答 辯 人 的 擾 亂 行 為 涉 及 ‘ 令 會 議 程 序 中 斷 ’ 的<br />
特 別 元 素 , 所 以 第 17(c) 條 比 較 第 8 條 更 為 恰 當 。<br />
上 訴 人 最 後 提 出 就 算 裁 判 官 對 第 17(c) 條 的 詮<br />
釋 是 正 確 的 話 , 他 也 應 該 依 據 《 裁 判 官 條 例 》 第 27<br />
條 的 條 文 去 修 改 控 罪 , 引 用 他 認 為 是 恰 當 的 第 8 條<br />
來 處 理 案 件 而 不 是 直 接 撤 銷 控 罪 了 事 。 上 訴 人 強 調<br />
第 27 條 的 要 求 是 強 制 性 的 , 如 果 告 發 欠 妥 , 而 情 況<br />
又 符 合 第 27(2) 條 所 列 舉 的 條 件 的 話 , 那 麼 裁 判 官<br />
就 必 須 啓 動 修 改 控 罪 的 程 序 。<br />
第 8 條 及 第 17(c) 條 的 條 款 分 別 如 下 :<br />
對 進 入 會 議 廳 範 圍 的 規 限<br />
(1) 除 本 條 另 有 規 定 外 , 立 法 會 會 議 須 公<br />
開 舉 行 ;<br />
(2) 除 議 員 或 立 法 會 人 員 外 , 任 何 人 進 入<br />
或 逗 留 在 會 議 廳 範 圍 內 的 權 利 , 須 受<br />
議 事 規 則 或 立 法 會 所 通 過 用 以 限 制 或<br />
禁 止 享 有 此 項 權 利 的 決 議 所 規 限 ;<br />
(3) 為 維 持 會 議 廳 範 圍 的 保 安 、 確 保 在 其<br />
內 的 人 舉 止 行 為 恰 當 、 以 及 為 其 他 行<br />
政 上 的 目 的 , 主 席 可 不 時 發 出 他 認 為<br />
必 要 或 適 宜 的 行 政 指 令 , 以 規 限 非 議<br />
員 或 非 立 法 會 人 員 的 人 進 入 會 議 廳 及<br />
會 議 廳 範 圍 內 , 並 規 限 上 述 的 人 在 其<br />
內 的 行 為 ;<br />
(4) 主 席 根 據 第 (3) 款 發 出 的 行 政 指 令 , 其<br />
副 本 須 由 秘 書 妥 為 認 證 , 並 在 會 議 廳<br />
範 圍 內 顯 眼 處 予 以 展 示 ; 凡 如 此 認 證<br />
和 展 示 該 等 副 本 , 即 當 作 為 已 給 予 所<br />
有 受 該 行 政 指 令 影 響 的 人 充 分 通 知 。
8<br />
藐 視 罪<br />
凡 任 何 人 –<br />
(a) 不 服 從 立 法 會 或 任 何 委 員 會 所 作 出 的 合 法<br />
命 令 , 而 該 命 令 是 要 求 他 到 立 法 會 或 該 委<br />
員 會 列 席 , 或 要 求 他 到 立 法 會 或 該 委 員 會<br />
席 前 出 示 任 何 文 據 、 簿 冊 、 文 件 或 紀 錄<br />
的 , 除 非 該 人 已 根 據 第 13 條 獲 免 列 席 或 出<br />
示 ; 或<br />
(b) 在 訊 問 過 程 中 , 拒 絕 接 受 立 法 會 或 任 何 委<br />
員 會 訊 間 , 或 拒 絕 回 答 由 立 法 會 或 任 何 委<br />
員 會 所 提 出 的 任 何 合 法 及 有 關 的 問 題 , 除<br />
非 該 人 已 根 據 第 13 條 獲 免 回 答 ; 或<br />
(c) 在 立 法 會 或 任 何 委 員 舉 行 會 議 時 , 引 起 或<br />
參 加 任 何 擾 亂 , 致 令 立 法 會 或 該 委 員 的 會<br />
議 程 序 中 斷 或 相 當 可 能 中 斷 , 即 屬 犯 罪 ,<br />
可 處 罰 款 $10,000 及 監 禁 12 個 月 , 如 持 續<br />
犯 罪 , 則 在 持 續 犯 罪 期 間 , 另 加 每 日 罰 款<br />
$2,000。<br />
裁 決 :<br />
(1) 從 不 同 角 度 來 看 , 裁 判 官 對 第 17(c) 條 的 分 析<br />
都 是 錯 誤 的 ;<br />
(2) 裁 判 官 的 結 論 主 要 建 基 於 他 對 整 個 《 立 法 會<br />
( 權 力 及 特 權 ) 條 例 》 中 各 項 條 款 之 編 排 及 最 高 懲 罰<br />
之 比 較 而 成 。 他 指 出 上 述 法 例 第 二 部 份 列 出 議 員 的<br />
特 權 及 豁 免 權 , 這 部 份 亦 列 出 對 進 入 會 議 廳 範 圍 的<br />
人 士 的 行 為 規 限 , 即 包 括 第 8 條 ; 第 三 部 份 列 出 立<br />
法 會 傳 召 證 人 的 權 力 及 有 關 證 人 的 特 權 ; 第 四 部 份<br />
則 列 舉 了 違 反 第 二 及 第 三 部 份 涉 及 之 控 罪 的 罰 則 。<br />
裁 判 官 提 到 第 四 部 份 裏 的 第 17 條 的 (a) 及 (b) 兩 款 規<br />
定 都 是 有 關 於 被 命 令 到 立 法 會 作 證 的 人 士 , 所 以 第<br />
17 條 就 是 規 範 被 立 法 會 或 任 何 委 員 會 命 令 出 席 作 證<br />
人 士 的 行 為 , 而 其 他 在 會 議 廳 的 人 士 之 行 為 則 由 第<br />
8 條 所 監 管 。 法 庭 認 為 裁 判 官 的 分 析 稍 欠 全 面 。 第
9<br />
17 條 開 宗 明 義 地 說 ` 凡 任 何 人 ’ , 而 這 個 ` 任 何<br />
人 ' 究 竟 指 誰 , 那 就 要 考 慮 到 各 條 款 的 個 別 內<br />
容 。 ` 任 何 人 ' 在 (a) 及 (b) 款 的 對 象 , 當 然 是 針 對<br />
那 些 被 傳 召 作 證 的 人 , 但 (c) 款 所 指 的 ` 任 何 人 '<br />
必 然 會 是 任 何 那 些 ` 在 立 法 會 或 任 何 委 員 舉 行 會 議<br />
時 , 引 起 或 參 加 任 何 擾 亂 , 致 令 立 法 會 或 該 委 員 會<br />
的 會 議 程 序 中 斷 或 相 當 可 能 中 斷 ' 的 人 士 。(c) 款 本<br />
身 的 用 語 非 常 清 楚 , 裁 判 官 沒 有 必 要 用 其 他 條 款 去<br />
引 證 (c) 款 的 意 義 ;<br />
(3) 就 算 裁 判 官 應 該 參 考 其 他 條 款 的 話 , 那 他 也 應<br />
該 將 第 四 部 份 的 第 19 條 一 併 考 慮 。 第 19 條 是 有 關 於<br />
` 任 何 人 ' 干 預 議 員 , 立 法 會 人 員 或 證 人 的 條 文 。<br />
這 包 括 襲 擊 、 妨 礙 或 騷 擾 議 員 及 將 會 或 已 經 作 供 的<br />
證 人 。 這 就 顯 示 第 四 部 份 的 範 圍 較 寬 而 其 對 象 就 並<br />
非 單 是 證 人 。 第 四 部 份 裏 的 條 款 除 了 定 下 證 人 的 責<br />
任 , 也 規 定 了 ` 任 何 人 ' 不 可 對 議 員 及 證 人 進 行 干<br />
擾 , 更 不 容 許 ` 任 何 人 ' 去 擾 亂 會 議 程 序 ;<br />
(4) 就 算 第 19 條 沒 有 參 考 價 值 , 單 憑 17(c) 條 本 身<br />
的 內 容 來 分 析 , 裁 判 官 的 看 法 也 欠 妥 當 。 第 17(c)<br />
條 的 整 個 內 容 是 ` 任 何 人 ' 在 立 法 會 或 任 何 委 員 舉<br />
行 會 議 時 , 引 起 或 參 加 任 何 擾 亂 , 致 令 立 法 會 或 該<br />
委 員 的 會 議 程 序 中 斷 或 相 信 可 能 中 斷 即 屬 犯 罪 。 這<br />
個 ` 引 起 或 參 加 任 何 擾 亂 ' 的 對 象 , 不 可 能 祇 適 用<br />
於 證 人 , 因 為 它 包 含 了 幾 個 人 一 起 犯 案 的 可 能 。 但<br />
基 於 裁 判 官 的 分 析 , 如 果 有 人 在 公 眾 席 引 起 擾 亂 ,<br />
而 被 傳 召 的 證 人 參 加 擾 亂 的 話 , 但 兩 人 就 不 可 以 共<br />
同 被 告 第 17(c) 條 而 要 分 開 處 理 。 這 與 第 17(c) 條 的<br />
內 容 並 不 相 符 。 裁 判 官 之 分 析 似 乎 是 祇 著 重 於 第<br />
17(a) 及 (b) 款 的 含 意 並 以 此 來 作 推 論 但 就 迴 避 了 (c)<br />
款 本 身 的 內 容 ;<br />
(5) 雖 然 胡 法 官 在 香 港 特 別 行 政 區 訴 梁 國 雄 的 判 詞<br />
中 沒 有 提 過 第 8 條 , 但 法 庭 同 意 胡 法 官 不 需 要 在 上<br />
述 案 件 中 逐 一 去 討 論 其 他 條 例 。 該 案 與 本 案 的 基 本<br />
案 情 並 無 有 意 義 之 區 別 , 法 理 上 裁 判 官 應 該 跟 從 。<br />
裁 判 官 的 做 法 反 而 是 忽 略 了 普 通 法 的 一 個 基 本 原
10<br />
則 , 即 是 跟 隨 先 例 的 概 念 。 該 案 例 對 裁 判 官 具 有 約<br />
束 力 ;<br />
(6) 第 8 條 及 第 17(c) 條 都 可 以 適 用 於 答 辯 人 的 行<br />
為 , 而 兩 項 控 罪 並 非 是 互 相 排 斥 的 。 控 方 明 顯 是 基<br />
於 答 辯 人 的 行 為 所 造 成 之 後 果 而 選 擇 以 第 17(c) 條<br />
提 出 起 訴 。 控 方 在 法 律 上 沒 有 犯 錯 。 行 為 的 結 果 這<br />
一 點 是 兩 項 控 罪 的 主 要 分 別 , 也 解 釋 了 最 高 刑 罰 有<br />
很 大 差 別 的 原 因 ;<br />
(7) 就 算 第 17(c) 條 在 編 排 上 或 字 眼 上 真 有 不 明 確<br />
的 地 方 , 但 裁 判 官 都 不 應 以 採 取 這 狹 窄 的 角 度 去 詮<br />
釋 及 引 用 有 關 條 例 。 這 些 條 例 之 目 的 是 保 障 立 法 會<br />
工 作 環 境 的 尊 嚴 及 效 率 。 這 不 是 說 不 准 其 他 人 表 達<br />
意 見 , 但 表 達 意 見 的 方 式 及 手 法 如 果 造 成 擾 亂 的 結<br />
果 , 控 方 就 可 以 用 較 嚴 重 的 第 17(c) 條 提 出 起 訴 ;<br />
(8) 基 於 以 上 的 原 因 , 法 庭 對 第 一 條 問 題 之 回 應 是<br />
` 是 ', 裁 判 官 的 法 律 觀 點 有 錯 誤 ;<br />
(9) 本 案 所 涉 及 的 法 律 問 題 其 實 很 清 楚 , 祇 是 裁 判<br />
官 錯 誤 理 解 法 例 。 如 果 再 將 案 件 交 還 裁 判 官 處 理 ,<br />
似 乎 對 答 辯 人 做 成 不 公 。 既 然 問 題 已 得 到 澄 清 , 案<br />
件 無 須 發 還 裁 判 官 處 理 或 重 審 。 但 這 並 不 代 表 答 辯<br />
人 當 時 的 行 為 得 到 認 同 ; 立 法 會 的 尊 嚴 應 該 受 到 尊<br />
重 和 保 障 。<br />
結 果 .. 上 訴 得 直 但 不 發 還 裁 判 官 或 重 審 。<br />
附 帶 意 見 : 就 算 裁 判 官 對 第 17(c) 條 的 理 解 是 正 確<br />
的 話 , 在 本 案 的 情 況 下 , 他 應 該 引 用<br />
《 裁 判 官 條 例 》 第 27 條 去 修 改 控 罪 。<br />
但 法 庭 不 認 為 Poon Chau-cheong v<br />
Secretary for <strong>Justice</strong> [2002] 2<br />
HKLRD 636 能 夠 支 持 上 訴 人 在 陳 詞 中<br />
的 一 個 論 點 , 即 是 說 , 裁 判 官 應 該 一 直<br />
修 改 控 罪 直 至 可 以 判 罪 為 止 。 第 27 條<br />
的 原 意 並 非 如 此 。
11<br />
[English digest<br />
<strong>of</strong> MA 1270 <strong>of</strong><br />
2003, above]<br />
Tong J<br />
(28.6.2004)<br />
*Cheung Waisun<br />
& Robert K Y Lee<br />
#I/P<br />
(1) KOO<br />
Sze-yiu<br />
(2) LEUNG<br />
Kwokhung<br />
Disturbance which interrupted the proceedings <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Legislative Council/s 17(c) <strong>of</strong> the Legislative Council (Powers<br />
and Privileges) Ordinance, Cap 382/Applicability/Notion <strong>of</strong><br />
stare decisis/Difference in maximum penalties under s 8 and<br />
s 17(c), Cap 382<br />
The Respondents were jointly charged with the <strong>of</strong>fence <strong>of</strong><br />
creating a disturbance in the Legislative Council Building on 26<br />
February 2003, which interrupted the proceedings <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Legislative Council while the Council was sitting, contrary to s<br />
17(c) <strong>of</strong> the Legislative Council (Powers and Privileges)<br />
Ordinance, Cap 382.<br />
Both Respondents pleaded not guilty. Having heard the<br />
submissions, the magistrate acquitted them after trial and<br />
dismissed the charge. In his verdict, the magistrate ruled that the<br />
charge should have been one under s 8 and s 20 <strong>of</strong> the same<br />
Ordinance instead <strong>of</strong> under s 17(c). The magistrate, however,<br />
refused to exercise the power vested in him by s 27 <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Magistrates Ordinance, Cap 227, to amend the charge to one under<br />
s 8. The Appellant appealed against the magistrate’s<br />
determination by way <strong>of</strong> case stated, pursuant to s 105 <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Magistrates Ordinance, Cap 227.<br />
There was little in dispute regarding the evidence. The<br />
magistrate ruled that the Appellant had established the following<br />
basic facts :<br />
(1) About 5:30 pm on 26 February 2003, the<br />
Legislative Council was conducting the First and<br />
Second Reading <strong>of</strong> the National Security<br />
(Legislative Provisions) Bill at the Legislative<br />
Council Building at 8 Jackson Road, Central.<br />
When the former Secretary for Security (Mrs<br />
Regina Ip) was about to make her motion speech<br />
on the Second Reading <strong>of</strong> the Bill, a group <strong>of</strong><br />
Legislative Councillors stood up to protest and<br />
walked out <strong>of</strong> the Council Chamber. At this<br />
juncture, some person(s) threw pieces <strong>of</strong> paper<br />
from the No. 2 public gallery down to the Council<br />
Chamber. The first and second Respondents also<br />
stood up from their seats in the No. 2 public<br />
gallery and shouted slogans (protesting against<br />
Article 23 and demanding retraction <strong>of</strong> the blue<br />
Bill). The second Respondent also tried to display<br />
a black fabric banner;<br />
(2) LegCo security <strong>of</strong>ficers came up to stop the two<br />
Respondents, told them to keep quiet and to return
12<br />
to their seats. The two Respondents kept on<br />
shouting slogans and held onto the railings. They<br />
were eventually removed from the public gallery<br />
by force, in the course <strong>of</strong> which the Respondents<br />
scuffled with the security <strong>of</strong>ficers. As a result, the<br />
LegCo meeting was interrupted for about 2<br />
minutes and it resumed after the Respondents had<br />
been taken away.<br />
The magistrate was <strong>of</strong> the view that s 17(c) regulated only<br />
the conduct <strong>of</strong> persons who were ordered by the Council or a<br />
committee to attend the Council to be examined. The conduct <strong>of</strong><br />
other members <strong>of</strong> the public inside the Council Chamber fell<br />
within the ambit <strong>of</strong> s 8 and its subsidiary legislation. He pointed<br />
out that since the Respondents were not summoned to attend the<br />
Council, their conduct should only be regulated by s 8 and the<br />
relevant administrative instructions. He took the view that the<br />
prosecution had chosen the wrong provision for the charge.<br />
The magistrate noted that Mr <strong>Justice</strong> Woo had handled a<br />
similar case HKSAR v Leung Kwok-hung (HCMA 561/1999), in<br />
which he ruled that s 17(c) was appropriate. The magistrate<br />
nevertheless chose not to follow the precedent for the following<br />
reason :<br />
…… Albeit the facts <strong>of</strong> these 2 cases are similar, I note<br />
that in the course <strong>of</strong> appeal (<strong>of</strong> the previous case), there<br />
was no mention by the appellate court <strong>of</strong> s 8 and its<br />
subsidiary regulations. It may well be that both the<br />
prosecution and the appellant overlooked s 8 and its<br />
subsidiary regulations and the question <strong>of</strong> their<br />
applicability, thus resulting in the appellate court<br />
having been misled and also failed to note the existence<br />
<strong>of</strong> s 8 and its subsidiary regulations. For this reason, I<br />
am <strong>of</strong> the view that on the issue <strong>of</strong> whether s 17(c) is the<br />
appropriate charge, that case cannot be regarded as<br />
binding authority.<br />
On the question <strong>of</strong> amending the charge, the magistrate<br />
stated that since s 17(c) and s 8 were totally different in their<br />
nature and ambit <strong>of</strong> regulation, the variance was material and any<br />
amendment at the verdict stage would cause injustice to the<br />
Respondents. He therefore decided not to amend the charge but<br />
simply dismiss it.<br />
The magistrate certified three questions <strong>of</strong> law, the first one<br />
being the most crucial:<br />
(1) In determining that s 17(c) <strong>of</strong> the Legislative<br />
Council (Powers and Privileges) Ordinance, Cap<br />
382 regulated only the conduct <strong>of</strong> persons who
13<br />
were ordered by the Council or a committee to<br />
attend the Council or the committee to be examined<br />
but not the conduct <strong>of</strong> other members <strong>of</strong> the public<br />
inside the Council Chamber, did I err in point <strong>of</strong><br />
law?<br />
(2) If the determination was not erroneous, was I<br />
wrong not to amend the charge?<br />
(3) Was my acquittal <strong>of</strong> the two Respondents<br />
erroneous in point <strong>of</strong> law?<br />
The Appellant submitted that the magistrate was wrong in<br />
principle. It was clear from the wording alone that s 17(c) applied<br />
to ‘any person’ and not only to persons ordered to attend the<br />
Council to be examined. ‘Any person’ would include the<br />
Respondents and any members <strong>of</strong> the public inside the Council<br />
Chamber.<br />
As for HKSAR v Leung Kwok-hung, the Appellant<br />
considered that although Mr <strong>Justice</strong> Woo made no mention <strong>of</strong> s 8<br />
and its subsidiary regulations in his judgment, that did not mean<br />
that he had been misled or had overlooked the section. After all,<br />
Mr <strong>Justice</strong> Woo needed only to decide the case as charged and<br />
needed not to discuss or study all relevant legislation.<br />
The Appellant pointed out that the facts <strong>of</strong> the present case<br />
were acts constituting two or more <strong>of</strong>fences under s 101D <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Criminal Procedure Ordinance, Cap 221. Hence both s 8 and s<br />
17(c) were applicable. Nevertheless, s 17(c) was more appropriate<br />
than s 8 because the Respondents had created a disturbance which<br />
resulted in ‘interruption <strong>of</strong> the proceedings’, a special element <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>of</strong>fence.<br />
The Appellant finally submitted that even if the magistrate’s<br />
interpretation <strong>of</strong> s 17(c) was correct, he should have amended the<br />
charge, pursuant to s 27 <strong>of</strong> the Magistrates Ordinance, to one<br />
under s 8 which he deemed more appropriate, instead <strong>of</strong> simply<br />
dismissing the case. The Appellant emphasised that s 27 was<br />
mandatory. Where the information was defective and the criteria<br />
laid down in s 27(2) were met, the magistrate was obliged to<br />
initiate the amendment process.<br />
Sections 8 and 17(c) read respectively as follows:<br />
Regulation <strong>of</strong> admittance to precincts <strong>of</strong> the Chamber<br />
(1) Subject to this section, sittings <strong>of</strong> the Council shall<br />
be open to the public.<br />
(2) The right <strong>of</strong> persons other than members or <strong>of</strong>ficers
14<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Council to enter or remain within the<br />
precincts <strong>of</strong> the Chamber shall be subject to the<br />
Rules <strong>of</strong> Procedure or any resolution <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Council limiting or prohibiting the enjoyment <strong>of</strong><br />
such right.<br />
(3) The President may from time to time, for the<br />
purpose <strong>of</strong> maintaining the security <strong>of</strong> the precincts<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Chamber, ensuring the proper behaviour and<br />
decorum <strong>of</strong> persons therein and for other<br />
administrative purposes, issue such administrative<br />
instructions as he may deem necessary or<br />
expedient for regulating the admittance <strong>of</strong> persons<br />
(other than members or <strong>of</strong>ficers <strong>of</strong> the Council) to,<br />
and the conduct <strong>of</strong> such persons within, the<br />
Chamber and the precincts <strong>of</strong> the Chamber.<br />
(4) Copies <strong>of</strong> administrative instructions issued by the<br />
President under subsection (3) shall be duly<br />
authenticated by the Clerk and exhibited in a<br />
conspicuous position in the precincts <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Chamber; and such copies when so authenticated<br />
and exhibited shall be deemed to be sufficient<br />
notice to all persons affected thereby.<br />
Contempts<br />
Any person who-<br />
(a) disobeys any lawful order made by the Council or a<br />
committee requiring him to attend or produce any<br />
papers, books, documents or records before the<br />
Council or committee, unless such attendance or<br />
production is excused under section 13; or<br />
(b) refuses to be examined before, or to answer any<br />
lawful and relevant question put by, the Council or<br />
a committee during the course <strong>of</strong> any examination,<br />
unless such refusal is excused under section 13; or<br />
(c) creates or joins in any disturbance which interrupts<br />
or is likely to interrupt the proceedings <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Council or a committee while the Council or such<br />
committee is sitting,<br />
commits an <strong>of</strong>fence and is liable to a fine <strong>of</strong> $10000 and<br />
to imprisonment for 12 months, and in the case <strong>of</strong> a<br />
continuing <strong>of</strong>fence to a further fine <strong>of</strong> $2000 for each<br />
day on which the <strong>of</strong>fence continues.<br />
Held :
15<br />
(1) The magistrate’s analysis <strong>of</strong> s 17(c) was flawed from<br />
different perspectives;<br />
(2) The magistrate’s conclusion was based mainly on his<br />
analysis <strong>of</strong> the structure <strong>of</strong> the Legislative Council (Powers and<br />
Privileges) Ordinance, Cap 382 and a comparison <strong>of</strong> the maximum<br />
penalties. As pointed out by him, Part II (which covered s 8)<br />
outlined the privileges and immunities <strong>of</strong> Councillors, and<br />
provided for regulation <strong>of</strong> admittance to the precincts <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Chamber. Part III provided for the power <strong>of</strong> the Legislative<br />
Council to order attendance <strong>of</strong> witnesses and privileges <strong>of</strong><br />
witnesses. Part IV provided for the penalty for contravention <strong>of</strong><br />
the relevant <strong>of</strong>fences under Parts II and III. The magistrate<br />
observed that since subsections (a) and (b) <strong>of</strong> s 17 in Part IV dealt<br />
with persons who were ordered to attend the Council for<br />
examination, it followed that s 17 was for regulating conduct <strong>of</strong><br />
persons who were ordered by the Council or a committee to attend<br />
the Council to be examined, whilst conduct <strong>of</strong> other persons inside<br />
the Council Chamber fell within the ambit <strong>of</strong> s 8. The court was<br />
<strong>of</strong> the view that the magistrate’s analysis was not comprehensive<br />
enough. Section 17 began with ‘Any person who…’. What ‘any<br />
person’ meant depended on the individual provisions. In<br />
subsections (a) and (b), ‘any person’ clearly referred to those who<br />
were ordered to attend the Council, but in subsection (c), ‘any<br />
person’ must be anyone who ‘creates or joins in any disturbance<br />
which interrupts or is likely to interrupt the proceedings <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Council or a committee while the Council or such committee is<br />
sitting’. The wording <strong>of</strong> subsection (c) was so clear that there was<br />
no need for the magistrate to have cited other provisions to clarify<br />
its meaning;<br />
(3) Even if it was necessary for the magistrate to refer to other<br />
provisions, he should have taken into consideration s 19 <strong>of</strong> Part<br />
IV. Section 19 was a provision against the interference with<br />
members, <strong>of</strong>ficers or witnesses by ‘any person’. It dealt with<br />
people who assaulted, obstructed or molested members and<br />
witnesses who would be giving or had given evidence. It was<br />
evident that Part IV covered a much wider area and not just<br />
witnesses. Apart from setting out the duties <strong>of</strong> witnesses, this part<br />
also prohibited ‘any person’ from interfering with members and<br />
witnesses, and disallowed ‘any person’ from disturbing Council<br />
proceedings;<br />
(4) Even if s 19 were <strong>of</strong> no reference value, the analysis <strong>of</strong> the<br />
content <strong>of</strong> s 17(c) itself sufficed to show that the magistrate’s<br />
view was flawed. The entire s 17(c) made it an <strong>of</strong>fence for ‘any<br />
person’ to create or join in any disturbance which interrupted or<br />
was likely to interrupt the proceedings <strong>of</strong> the Council or a<br />
committee. Persons who ‘created or joined in any disturbance’
16<br />
could not be taken to refer only to witnesses. It was possible that a<br />
number <strong>of</strong> persons committed the <strong>of</strong>fence together. According to<br />
the magistrate’s line <strong>of</strong> reasoning, if a person created a disturbance<br />
in the public gallery and a witness joined in, these two persons<br />
could not be jointly charged under s 17(c) but would have to be<br />
dealt with separately. This was inconsistent with the provisions <strong>of</strong><br />
s 17(c). It seemed that the magistrate’s analysis focused only on<br />
subsections (a) and (b) from which inferences were drawn but<br />
ignored subsection (c) per se;<br />
(5) Although Mr <strong>Justice</strong> Woo made no mention <strong>of</strong> s 8 in the<br />
judgment <strong>of</strong> HKSAR v Leung Kwok-hung, the court agreed that<br />
there was no need for the judge to discuss the other provisions one<br />
by one. As there was no significant difference between the basic<br />
facts <strong>of</strong> the two cases, the magistrate should have followed the<br />
precedent as a matter <strong>of</strong> legal practice. The magistrate’s handling<br />
<strong>of</strong> this case deviated from the basic common law principle <strong>of</strong> stare<br />
decisis. The previous case was binding upon the magistrate;<br />
(6) Both s 8 and s 17(c) were applicable to the conduct <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Respondents and the two charges were not mutually exclusive.<br />
The prosecution’s choice <strong>of</strong> s 17(c) was obviously based on the<br />
consequence brought about by the Respondents’ conduct. The<br />
prosecution did not err in law. The major difference between the<br />
two charges lay in difference between the consequences <strong>of</strong><br />
conduct, which also explained the substantial difference in<br />
maximum penalties;<br />
(7) Even if s 17(c) was unclear in its structure or wording, the<br />
magistrate should not have interpreted and applied the provisions<br />
in such a narrow sense. The provisions were intended to safeguard<br />
the dignity and efficiency <strong>of</strong> the working environment in the<br />
Legislative Council. That was not to say that other people were<br />
not allowed to express their views, but if the ways and means <strong>of</strong><br />
their expression caused interruptions, the prosecution could<br />
institute a charge under the more severe s 17(c);<br />
(8) For the above reasons, the court’s answer to the first<br />
question was ‘yes’ - the magistrate erred on a point <strong>of</strong> law;<br />
(9) The questions <strong>of</strong> law involved in the present case were in<br />
fact rather straightforward but the magistrate had misinterpreted<br />
the law. If the case was remitted to the magistrate, it might cause<br />
injustice to the Respondents. Since the questions had been<br />
clarified, it would not be necessary to remit the case to the<br />
magistrate or to order a retrial. This, however, should not be taken<br />
to mean that the Respondents’ conduct on that occasion was to be<br />
condoned. The dignity <strong>of</strong> the Legislative Council should be<br />
upheld and safeguarded.
17<br />
Result - Appeal allowed. No consequential orders.<br />
Obiter - Even if the magistrate’s interpretation <strong>of</strong> s 17(c) were<br />
correct, he should, under the circumstances <strong>of</strong> the case,<br />
have invoked s 27 <strong>of</strong> the Magistrates Ordinance to amend<br />
the charge. The court did not think Poon Chau-cheong v<br />
Secretary for <strong>Justice</strong> [2002] 2 HKLRD 636, lent support<br />
to the Appellant’s submission that the magistrate should<br />
have kept on amending the charge until he could convict.<br />
Such was not the intent <strong>of</strong> s 27.
18<br />
B. CRIMINAL APPEALS/<br />
AGAINST CONVICTION<br />
刑 事 上 訴 案 件 / 針 對 定 罪<br />
CA 582/2002<br />
Stuart-Moore VP<br />
Yeung JA<br />
Beeson J<br />
(21.5.2004)<br />
*DG Saw SC<br />
& Fung Mei-ki<br />
#Annie Lai<br />
YIU<br />
Chi-wang<br />
Rape/Directions on burden <strong>of</strong> pro<strong>of</strong>/Judge inviting jury to<br />
consider whether complainant or defendant telling the truth/If<br />
defendant disbelieved prosecution still required to prove<br />
charge<br />
強 姦 – 就 舉 證 責 任 作 出 的 指 引 – 法 官 請 陪 審 團 考<br />
慮 究 竟 是 事 主 還 是 被 告 人 說 出 事 實 真 相 – 被 告 人<br />
不 獲 相 信 - 控 方 仍 須 證 明 控 罪<br />
The Applicant was convicted after trial <strong>of</strong> rape.<br />
The <strong>of</strong>fence was alleged to have occurred at the Applicant’s<br />
home on 5 May 2002. The complainant and the Applicant were<br />
known to each other. The complainant, aged 20, stated that at<br />
about 9:30 am she awoke to find herself in premises she had never<br />
seen before. She was naked and the Applicant was in the process<br />
<strong>of</strong> having sexual intercourse with her. Evidence was given by<br />
other witnesses for the prosecution and defence about the<br />
complainant’s behaviour prior to the alleged rape which revealed<br />
that she had become very drunk in the early hours <strong>of</strong> that morning.<br />
She had also, without being aware <strong>of</strong> it, consumed a drug known<br />
as Clobozam, the side effects <strong>of</strong> which included drowsiness,<br />
confusion, light-headedness, and amnesia. If taken with alcohol,<br />
increased effects would result therefrom.<br />
On 5 May 2002, the complainant was at the C Club in Lan<br />
Kwai Fong, and admitted she was ‘very drunk ’ . She remembered<br />
wanting to dance and being hungry but also feeling bad and<br />
vomiting. She remembered being supported by a friend, but had<br />
no recollection until she later awoke in the same bed as the<br />
Applicant. The complainant had no specific memory <strong>of</strong> anything<br />
which occurred between herself and the Applicant in the early<br />
hours <strong>of</strong> the morning, either at the C Club or at a restaurant which<br />
the evidence revealed she had visited. She had no recollection <strong>of</strong><br />
meeting the Applicant. She was unable to remember anything<br />
from the time <strong>of</strong> leaving the C Club until she woke up the next<br />
morning.<br />
The Applicant testified that sexual intercourse had taken<br />
place, but that the complainant was a willing and enthusiastic<br />
participant and was in control <strong>of</strong> herself. She had willingly<br />
removed all <strong>of</strong> her clothing at his home and they had slept<br />
together.<br />
Although the defence case had not raised such a defence, the
19<br />
judge left for the jury’s consideration the issue <strong>of</strong> genuine but<br />
mistaken belief in consent.<br />
On appeal, it was submitted, inter alia, that the judge had<br />
erred in his directions to the jury on the burden <strong>of</strong> pro<strong>of</strong>. This<br />
argument focused on directions where the judge invited the jury to<br />
consider whether it was the complainant or the Applicant who had<br />
been telling them the truth, and where the jury was asked to<br />
consider whether or not a CCTV film provided any support for<br />
either <strong>of</strong> the versions they had heard.<br />
Held :<br />
(1) The problem with which the jury was confronted was not<br />
infrequently encountered in cases involving allegations <strong>of</strong> sexual<br />
assault where the prime conflict, as to what occurred just before<br />
and at the time <strong>of</strong> the alleged <strong>of</strong>fence, was to be determined solely<br />
on the testimony given by the complainant and the defendant.<br />
This was considered in Liberato & Ors v R [1985] 159 CLR 507,<br />
515, where Brennan J said:<br />
When a case turns on a conflict between the evidence<br />
<strong>of</strong> a prosecution witness and the evidence <strong>of</strong> a defence<br />
witness, it is common place for a judge to invite a jury<br />
to consider the question: who is to be believed? But it<br />
is essential to ensure, by suitable direction, that the<br />
answer to that question (which the jury would<br />
doubtless ask themselves in any event) if adverse to the<br />
defence, is not taken as concluding the issue whether<br />
the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt<br />
the issues which it bears the onus <strong>of</strong> proving. The jury<br />
must be told that, even if they prefer the evidence for<br />
the prosecution, they should not convict unless they<br />
are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt <strong>of</strong> the truth <strong>of</strong><br />
that evidence. The jury must be told that, even if they<br />
do not positively believe the evidence for the defence,<br />
they cannot find an issue against the accused contrary<br />
to that evidence if that evidence gives rise to a<br />
reasonable doubt as to that issue.<br />
(2) The jury were given directions in the clearest terms as to the<br />
burden and standard <strong>of</strong> pro<strong>of</strong>. They were told that even if they did<br />
not believe what the Applicant had said in his testimony, it was<br />
still for the prosecution to prove the charge by the evidence they<br />
had called.<br />
Result - Application dismissed.<br />
Obiter - There were dangers in a judge opening up a topic <strong>of</strong> law<br />
for which there had been no evidential foundation. This
20<br />
could only lead to speculation.<br />
CA 520/2003<br />
MA CJHC<br />
Stuart-Moore VP<br />
Lunn J<br />
(11.6.2004)<br />
*Kevin Zervos SC<br />
& Marco Li<br />
#N Sarony SC<br />
Johannes Chan<br />
Angela Gwilt &<br />
Kennis Tai<br />
(1) SIN<br />
Kam-wah<br />
(2) LAM<br />
Chuen-ip<br />
Misconduct in public <strong>of</strong>fice/Senior police <strong>of</strong>ficer accepting free<br />
sexual favours from night club owner/No real distinction<br />
between acceptance <strong>of</strong> sex and acceptance <strong>of</strong> money/Police<br />
<strong>of</strong>ficer deemed to be on duty when circumstances so required<br />
藉 公 職 作 出 的 不 當 行 為 – 高 級 警 務 人 員 接 受 夜 總<br />
會 東 主 免 費 提 供 的 性 優 待 – 接 受 性 優 待 和 接 受 金<br />
錢 實 際 上 並 無 分 別 – 警 務 人 員 在 情 況 需 要 時 當 作<br />
為 在 當 值 中<br />
A1 was convicted after trial <strong>of</strong> three charges <strong>of</strong> misconduct<br />
in public <strong>of</strong>fice. A2 was convicted <strong>of</strong> three charges <strong>of</strong> exercising<br />
control, direction or influence over other persons for the purposes<br />
<strong>of</strong> or with a view to their prostitution, and three charges <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>of</strong>fering an advantage to a public <strong>of</strong>ficer. All three sets <strong>of</strong> charges<br />
were inter-linked and related to three separate occasions on<br />
various dates between March 2001 and May 2002. They were<br />
reciprocal charges.<br />
A1 at the material time was a Senior Superintendent <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Hong Kong Police Force. Between April 1998 and March 2001,<br />
he was attached to the Organized Crime and Triad Bureau.<br />
Between April 2002 and May 2002, he was attached to the<br />
Narcotics Bureau.<br />
A2, the wife <strong>of</strong> a police <strong>of</strong>ficer, had a beneficial interest in<br />
four clubs in Tsim Sha Tsui. The judge at trial found that these<br />
had the primary function <strong>of</strong> providing to their customers sexual<br />
services in the form <strong>of</strong> hostesses. The hostesses were, in reality,<br />
prostitutes.<br />
The evidence showed that A1 accepted sexual favours<br />
bestowed on him by A2. He accepted free sexual services from<br />
the hostesses she arranged for him. The judge concluded that<br />
these favours were provided to and accepted by him in relation to<br />
his <strong>of</strong>fice. He was a Senior Superintendent and the favours<br />
provided were well beyond normal hospitality. The money paid to<br />
the hostesses by A2 was substantial. The inference was that these<br />
forms <strong>of</strong> entertainment were provided to A1 as some sort <strong>of</strong><br />
‘sweetener’ to him. A2 had interests in establishments which were<br />
extremely dubious from a legal point <strong>of</strong> view.<br />
On appeal, A1 submitted that all A1 did was to accept<br />
hospitality from a friend. A2 was the wife <strong>of</strong> a police <strong>of</strong>ficer. It<br />
was, therefore, pure conjecture that there was any corrupt motive
21<br />
involved. This was reinforced by the fact that although the<br />
establishments with which A2 was linked did have dealings with<br />
the police, these dealings were with a different department within<br />
the Police Force to that to which A1 belonged.<br />
A1 further submitted that a police <strong>of</strong>ficer could only be<br />
deemed to be on duty when he was required (in the sense <strong>of</strong> being<br />
actually instructed by a superior) to be on duty; alternatively, if he<br />
was always to be on duty, this was somehow in breach <strong>of</strong> the antidiscrimination<br />
provisions <strong>of</strong> the Bill <strong>of</strong> Rights (Articles 1 and 22)<br />
as he, unlike others in society, would never really have a day <strong>of</strong>f.<br />
Held :<br />
Section 21 <strong>of</strong> the Police Force Ordinance, Cap 232, read:<br />
Every police <strong>of</strong>ficer shall for the purposes <strong>of</strong> this<br />
Ordinance be deemed to be always on duty when<br />
required to act as such and shall perform the duties<br />
and exercise the powers granted to him under this<br />
Ordinance or any other law at any time and every<br />
place in Hong Kong where he may be doing duty.<br />
(1) For A1 to put himself in the position <strong>of</strong> accepting favours <strong>of</strong><br />
this nature (especially given his <strong>of</strong>fice) from a person who<br />
indulged in highly questionable activities and whose<br />
establishments would have frequent contacts with the police was<br />
very serious misconduct indeed. There was no material before the<br />
judge that suggested that what was provided to A1 was mere<br />
hospitality between friends. There was no material to suggest that<br />
A1 and A2 were even friends. Even if they were, the provision <strong>of</strong><br />
sexual favours was hardly the normal form <strong>of</strong> hospitality between<br />
friends, even close friends. The whole idea here was far fetched;<br />
(2) A1 was a very senior police <strong>of</strong>ficer and to be kept ‘sweet ’<br />
by a person like A2 was significant. Purely as a matter <strong>of</strong><br />
common sense, it was difficult to see any explanation for A1’s<br />
acceptance and A2’s provision <strong>of</strong> the sexual favours other than<br />
sinister ones. It was accepted by the Applicants that had money<br />
changed hands, this would have been very much more sinister.<br />
There was little or no difference in this case between the payment<br />
<strong>of</strong> money and the provision, at no cost to A1, <strong>of</strong> sexual favours;<br />
(3) In analyzing the facts <strong>of</strong> any given case to see whether the<br />
ingredients <strong>of</strong> the <strong>of</strong>fence had been proven to exist, the central<br />
theme <strong>of</strong> the <strong>of</strong>fence <strong>of</strong> misconduct had to be borne in mind: the<br />
concept <strong>of</strong> the intentional abuse <strong>of</strong> an <strong>of</strong>ficial position. In this<br />
case, the necessary ingredients <strong>of</strong> the <strong>of</strong>fence existed and A1 had<br />
intentionally abused his <strong>of</strong>ficial position;
22<br />
(4) Section 21 <strong>of</strong> the Police Force Ordinance was a deeming<br />
provision. If the deemed state <strong>of</strong> affairs (namely, a police <strong>of</strong>ficer<br />
being on duty) could only exist when the police <strong>of</strong>ficer was<br />
actually ordered to be on duty, there would be no need for a<br />
deeming provision at all: the police <strong>of</strong>ficer would then actually be<br />
on duty and there would be no reason why he should in these<br />
circumstances be deemed to be on duty. The meaning <strong>of</strong> s 21 was<br />
that a police <strong>of</strong>ficer was deemed to be on duty when circumstances<br />
existed requiring him to exercise the powers he had as a police<br />
<strong>of</strong>ficer. Thus, for example, where he observed a crime being<br />
committed, he ought to take all necessary action. The obligation<br />
on a police <strong>of</strong>ficer was to discharge his duties if he was able to do<br />
so. If he was for any legitimate reason unable to, he would be<br />
excused from doing so;<br />
(5) There was no constitutional impediment to this analysis <strong>of</strong><br />
the construction <strong>of</strong> s 21. Police <strong>of</strong>ficers, by reason <strong>of</strong> their <strong>of</strong>fice<br />
and the crucial duties they discharged to society, must have some<br />
constraints that other people might not have. Section 21 satisfied<br />
the proportionality test.<br />
Result - A1’s application dismissed.<br />
[A2’s application dismissed on other grounds]
23<br />
C. CRIMINAL APPEALS/<br />
AGAINST SENTENCE<br />
刑 事 上 訴 案 件 / 針 對 刑 罰<br />
CA 39/2004<br />
Stuart-Moore VP<br />
Lunn J<br />
(14.5.2004)<br />
*William Tam<br />
#Simon<br />
Westbrook SC<br />
CHAN<br />
Wang-kwok<br />
Conspiracy to make and use false instruments/Production <strong>of</strong><br />
false documents to trick foreign governments to accept<br />
immigrants/Approach to disparate sentences/Clear record<br />
subsumed into customary discount/Detention abroad<br />
串 謀 製 造 和 使 用 虛 假 文 書 – 出 示 虛 假 文 件 欺 騙 外<br />
國 政 府 使 其 接 納 移 民 – 對 判 刑 差 異 的 處 理 方 法 –<br />
無 犯 罪 紀 錄 所 獲 的 刑 期 減 免 已 納 入 慣 常 的 刑 期 減 免<br />
內 – 在 海 外 遭 羈 留<br />
The Applicant pleaded guilty to one <strong>of</strong>fence <strong>of</strong> conspiracy to<br />
make false instruments, contrary to ss 71 and 159A <strong>of</strong> the Crimes<br />
Ordinance, Cap 200, (Charge 1) and two <strong>of</strong>fences <strong>of</strong> conspiracy to<br />
use false instruments, contrary to ss 73 and 159A <strong>of</strong> the Crimes<br />
Ordinance, Cap 200. (Charges 3 and 4), and was sentenced to<br />
14 months’ imprisonment on each charge, all sentences to be<br />
served concurrently.<br />
The three charges arose out <strong>of</strong> the Applicant’s business in<br />
which he provided services to clients, including applications for<br />
emigration. In Charge 1, the Applicant conspired in 1998 with<br />
Tsang Kwok-shing, a District Manager <strong>of</strong> City College, to make<br />
false academic certificates and diplomas purportedly issued with<br />
the intention that others accepted them as genuine. In particular,<br />
the false documents were to be used by the Applicant in support <strong>of</strong><br />
applications made by his clients for emigration to Canada.<br />
Charges 3 and 4 concerned conspiracies in 1997 and 1998<br />
between the Applicant and his clients who sought to emigrate and<br />
whom he assisted by the provision <strong>of</strong> false certificates. In each<br />
case, he prepared and submitted to a Canadian Consulate an<br />
Emigration Application Form, which asserted that the respective<br />
Applicant possessed academic qualifications, which was false.<br />
The Applicant provided each <strong>of</strong> his clients with the original false<br />
documents so that they could present them in person to the<br />
consulate in question, and that they did. In both conspiracies, the<br />
Applicant had been the instigator <strong>of</strong> the conspiracy in consequence<br />
<strong>of</strong> his advice to his clients that their respective academic<br />
background was insufficient for them to succeed in their<br />
applications for emigration to Canada.<br />
On appeal, the Applicant submitted that the starting point for<br />
sentence <strong>of</strong> 2 years’ imprisonment was manifestly excessive<br />
having regard to his criminality and the sentences imposed by<br />
others judges upon co-conspirators in respect <strong>of</strong> related
24<br />
conspiracies. It was also said that the sentencing judge gave<br />
insufficient discount in sentence, having regard to the Applicant’s<br />
clear record with positive character references, the fact that the<br />
Applicant was in custody in Canada for 36 days, and the staleness<br />
<strong>of</strong> the <strong>of</strong>fences and the delay in bringing him to trial.<br />
Held :<br />
(1) This case concerned the production <strong>of</strong> false documents to be<br />
used to trick the consulates <strong>of</strong> foreign governments in relation to<br />
emigration applications with the subsequent ramifications to the<br />
integrity <strong>of</strong> documentation produced in Hong Kong: Attorney<br />
General v Tai Chin-wah [1994] 2 HKCLR 81, HKSAR v Chim<br />
Pui-chung Cr App 402/98 distinguished;<br />
(2) The judge was clearly correct when he stated that<br />
notwithstanding the sentences imposed upon defendants in related<br />
cases, it was his duty to pass the sentence he deemed appropriate<br />
in this case: R v So Hung-lee [1986] HKLR 1049;<br />
(3) In taking a starting point for sentence <strong>of</strong> 2 years’<br />
imprisonment the judge was not in error;<br />
(4) Although the judge had given the Applicant a discount <strong>of</strong><br />
one month for his ‘effectively clear record ’ , this was unwarranted.<br />
This factor <strong>of</strong> mitigation was usually subsumed within the onethird<br />
discount for a timely plea: HKSAR v Yan Wai-ming Cr<br />
App 417/2002;<br />
(5) As regards the complaint that the judge had allowed only<br />
one month’s discount in respect <strong>of</strong> the 36 days the Applicant spent<br />
in detention in Canada pending his return to Hong Kong, there<br />
were no grounds to impugn the exercise <strong>of</strong> what was clearly the<br />
discretion he had;<br />
(6) Of the complaint <strong>of</strong> delay in bringing proceedings and the<br />
consequent staleness <strong>of</strong> the <strong>of</strong>fences, the Applicant left Hong<br />
Kong in 1998 and returned to live in Canada where he was<br />
detained in October 2003. No blame in terms <strong>of</strong> delay or staleness<br />
attached to the Authorities.<br />
Result - Application dismissed.<br />
[See also Sentencing in Hong Kong, 4th ed, at p 543: Ed]
25<br />
CA 126/2002<br />
Stock &<br />
Yeung JJA<br />
Lugar-Mawson J<br />
(30.6.2004)<br />
*K Zervos SC &<br />
Tsang Oi-kei<br />
#Edwin Choy<br />
(1 & 2)<br />
Michael Delaney<br />
(3 & 4)<br />
(1) CHAN<br />
Ngan-ying<br />
(2) CHAN<br />
Yuk-ha<br />
(3) CHEUNG<br />
Wai-chi<br />
(4) LO<br />
Lai-yung<br />
Conspiracy to defraud/Loco-London Gold and Silver frauds/<br />
Jurisdictional limit <strong>of</strong> District Court/Heartless crime <strong>of</strong><br />
deception/Disparity <strong>of</strong> sentences<br />
串 謀 詐 騙 – 本 地 倫 敦 金 銀 的 詐 騙 案 – 區 域 法 院 的<br />
司 法 權 限 – 冷 酷 無 情 的 欺 騙 罪 行 – 判 刑 上 的 差 異<br />
The Applicants were four out <strong>of</strong> twenty defendants who<br />
were charged in various combinations with <strong>of</strong>fences <strong>of</strong> conspiracy<br />
to defraud and theft in relation to the operation <strong>of</strong> four companies<br />
each <strong>of</strong> which purported to be involved in futures trading. The<br />
frauds were <strong>of</strong> the type known as ‘Loco-London Gold or Loco-<br />
London Silver Frauds’ in which persons were induced to work for<br />
a fraudulent investment company where they were swindled out <strong>of</strong><br />
substantial sums <strong>of</strong> money by false representations by the<br />
conspirators that their money had been invested and then lost in<br />
futures trading.<br />
Two <strong>of</strong> the bogus companies purported to be in the business<br />
<strong>of</strong> Loco-London Silver. The other two bogus companies<br />
purported to be in the business <strong>of</strong> oil trading. It was the<br />
prosecution case that none <strong>of</strong> the four companies had any<br />
legitimate purpose. They were set up for the sole purpose <strong>of</strong><br />
cheating the public out <strong>of</strong> large sums <strong>of</strong> money. The victims were<br />
recruited through advertisements which <strong>of</strong>fered attractive salaries<br />
for straightforward clerical work in the companies, which were all<br />
registered. Once the victims had been <strong>of</strong>fered employment, they<br />
were set to work doing meaningless <strong>of</strong>fice tasks and then deceived<br />
into paying money to the companies for apparent investment either<br />
into the Loco- London Silver market or trading in oil futures. No<br />
investments were made, the victims’ payments going straight into<br />
the conspirators’ pockets. The victims were told their money had<br />
been lost in trading. They were then sacked for incompetence, or<br />
left voluntarily.<br />
A1 was convicted <strong>of</strong> two charges <strong>of</strong> conspiracy to defraud,<br />
and three charges <strong>of</strong> theft; A2 was convicted <strong>of</strong> three charges <strong>of</strong><br />
conspiracy to defraud and one charge <strong>of</strong> theft. For both A1 and<br />
A2, the judge took a starting point for sentence <strong>of</strong> 7 years’<br />
imprisonment, which was reduced to 6 years to reflect the fact that<br />
the major <strong>of</strong>fenders could only be sentenced to 7 years’<br />
imprisonment because <strong>of</strong> the jurisdictional limit <strong>of</strong> the District<br />
Court.<br />
A3 and A4 were each convicted <strong>of</strong> two charges <strong>of</strong><br />
conspiracy to defraud. They were each sentenced to 4 years’<br />
imprisonment on each charge, with 2 years <strong>of</strong> the sentence on one<br />
charge ordered to run consecutively to the sentence on the other,<br />
resulting in a total term <strong>of</strong> 6 years’ imprisonment.
26<br />
The roles <strong>of</strong> A1 and A2 in the frauds were considerable, and<br />
they played many parts in the scams. The roles <strong>of</strong> A3 and A4<br />
were less significant, and they were ‘special agents ’ whose job<br />
was to pose as new recruits to the company, befriend the victims,<br />
mollify their concerns and then induce them to ‘invest’ their<br />
money in the purported trading activities <strong>of</strong> the company.<br />
Held :<br />
On appeal<br />
(1) As regards A1 and A2, the judge was bound by the<br />
sentencing jurisdictional limit in the District Court <strong>of</strong> 7 years’<br />
imprisonment, and was constrained by law to impose that<br />
maximum sentence on each <strong>of</strong> them. That was in accordance with<br />
established principle. It did not mean, however, that he was as<br />
equally constrained to reduce the sentences for the other<br />
conspirators, whose sentences fell within his sentencing<br />
jurisdiction, by the same ratio. There could be no doubt that by<br />
reducing the sentences <strong>of</strong> A1 and A2 by a year the judge had the<br />
sentences imposed on the three masterminds well in mind;<br />
(2) It was a matter <strong>of</strong> great surprise that a Loco-London<br />
Gold/Silver fraud <strong>of</strong> this magnitude had been prosecuted in the<br />
District Court rather than the Court <strong>of</strong> First Instance especially in<br />
relation to the masterminds;<br />
(3) A3 and A4 had associated themselves with very serious<br />
crimes. Loco-London Gold/Silver frauds were one <strong>of</strong> the most<br />
heartless crimes <strong>of</strong> deception practiced in Hong Kong: HKSAR v<br />
Ching Chun-wai Cr App 11/2001. They targeted ordinary<br />
members <strong>of</strong> the public and not banks or similar commercial<br />
organizations. They required a great deal <strong>of</strong> planning and<br />
considerable skill in execution. If successful, they ran for a long<br />
time before being closed down. They earned their perpetrators a<br />
great deal <strong>of</strong> money - a known $31 million in this case. They<br />
required a sizable number <strong>of</strong> willing conspirators to operate<br />
successfully and they corrupted those who were drawn into the<br />
work for them;<br />
(4) The only roles the prosecution witnesses spoke <strong>of</strong> A3 and<br />
A4 playing with the fraudulent companies was that <strong>of</strong> ‘special<br />
agents ’ or callous befrienders, and their roles were lesser than<br />
those <strong>of</strong> A1 and A2, both <strong>of</strong> whom were accomplished actresses<br />
playing many parts in the scams. It was the case, however, that<br />
Loco-London Gold/Silver frauds could not work without ‘special<br />
agents ’ , who played one <strong>of</strong> the most important roles in these<br />
scams;
27<br />
(5) Ins<strong>of</strong>ar as A3 and A4 complained <strong>of</strong> disparity <strong>of</strong> sentence,<br />
two situations commonly arose where there was such a complaint.<br />
The first was when there was a disparity between sentences passed<br />
on the same occasion by the same judge. In this case the sentence<br />
should only be varied if it could be shown that the judge failed to<br />
apportion blame between the various defendants properly so that it<br />
could be said that, notwithstanding that the appellant’s sentence<br />
was otherwise appropriate, it was so disparate when compared<br />
with the other sentences passed at the same time on his codefendants<br />
as to engender a real sense <strong>of</strong> grievance on his part.<br />
The second was when different sentences were passed on different<br />
accused for the same <strong>of</strong>fence or <strong>of</strong>fences by different judges on<br />
different occasions. In that situation the only consideration was<br />
whether the sentence passed on the accused was proper: R v So<br />
Hung-lee and Another [1986] HKLR 1049 and R v Lam Ho-kwong<br />
Cr App 175/92;<br />
(6) In R v Stroud (1977) 65 Cr App R 150, Roskill LJ said that it<br />
had never been intended that a sentence should be reduced on<br />
account <strong>of</strong> disparity unless there was a glaring disparity which<br />
engendered a grievance. In R v Fawcett (1983) 5 Cr App R (S)<br />
158, Lawton LJ, at 161, put the basis for an appellate court’s<br />
intervention in a disparity argument as follows: ‘Would right<br />
thinking members <strong>of</strong> the public, with full knowledge <strong>of</strong> all the<br />
relevant facts and circumstances, learning <strong>of</strong> this sentence<br />
consider that something had gone wrong with the administration<br />
<strong>of</strong> justice?’ If the answer to that question was in the affirmative an<br />
appellate court would consider interfering, not necessarily because<br />
justice had not been done to a particular person, but because what<br />
had been done <strong>of</strong>fended against the appearance <strong>of</strong> justice: R v<br />
Potter [1977] Crim LR 112;<br />
(7) In this case there were four other defendants, each convicted<br />
<strong>of</strong> a greater number <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fences than A3 and A4, who each<br />
received the same overall sentence <strong>of</strong> 6 years’ imprisonment that<br />
they did. The judge failed to make a clear distinction in respect <strong>of</strong><br />
culpability regarding A3 and A4. This engendered a real and<br />
legitimate sense <strong>of</strong> grievance in their minds and the commonsense<br />
test <strong>of</strong> Lawton LJ in Fawcett (supra) was made out.<br />
Result - Applications <strong>of</strong> A1 and A2 dismissed. Applications <strong>of</strong><br />
A3 and A4 allowed, and sentences on each <strong>of</strong> 4 years<br />
and 6 months’ imprisonment substituted.<br />
[For disparity generally, see Sentencing in Hong Kong,<br />
4th ed, at pp 177 to 183: Ed]<br />
CAs 550 & (1) KWOK Robbery/Victim assaulted in private premises/Theft <strong>of</strong> PIN
28<br />
551/2003<br />
Stuart-Moore VP<br />
Lunn J<br />
(15.6.2004)<br />
*Chan Fung-shan<br />
#CDF Coghlan<br />
Tung<br />
(2) KAN<br />
Chi-keung<br />
number/Effect <strong>of</strong> aggravating factors on sentence<br />
搶 劫 罪 – 受 害 人 在 私 人 地 方 受 襲 – 盜 竊 個 人 密<br />
碼 – 加 重 刑 罰 因 素 對 判 刑 的 影 響<br />
The Applicants pleaded guilty to an <strong>of</strong>fence <strong>of</strong> robbery,<br />
which they were alleged to have committed jointly on 17 January<br />
2003, at Room 1604, on the 16th Floor <strong>of</strong> Honour Industrial<br />
Centre, 6 Sun Yip Street, Chai Wan. The victim was robbed <strong>of</strong><br />
four credit cards, an ATM card, a clinic card and an Octopus card,<br />
as well as her mobile telephone, mini disc walkman and $77.50.<br />
A1 pleaded guilty at committal in the magistracy. He<br />
confirmed that plea before Beeson J. He was sentenced to 6 years’<br />
imprisonment.<br />
A2 pleaded guilty on the first day <strong>of</strong> trial. He was sentenced<br />
to 6½ years’ imprisonment.<br />
The facts were that at about 8 pm on 17 January 2003, the<br />
31-year-old female victim was closing her <strong>of</strong>fice when a man<br />
pushed her back inside. Another man was already inside. One<br />
man snatched her telephone while another pressed her head down<br />
to the ground. One <strong>of</strong> them told the victim to be co-operative and<br />
said they just wanted money. The victim noticed that one <strong>of</strong> the<br />
men held a knife. She was pushed into the storeroom where her<br />
hands were tied with wire. Her head was covered by a T-shirt and<br />
her watch and rucksack were taken away. One <strong>of</strong> the men asked<br />
for the PIN numbers <strong>of</strong> the bank and credit cards in her wallet, and<br />
she was threatened with a stabbing. The victim then provided the<br />
number <strong>of</strong> one <strong>of</strong> her cards, and her eyes and mouth were then<br />
covered with an adhesive tape.<br />
After police arrived, the Applicants were caught. The<br />
property identified in the charge was found on A1, together with a<br />
knife ten inches in length. A1 also had a knife sheath attached to<br />
each <strong>of</strong> his calves. It was accepted that the Applicants were<br />
carrying two knives but the second <strong>of</strong> these had never been<br />
recovered. Under caution, both admitted their involvement in the<br />
<strong>of</strong>fence.<br />
On appeal, it was submitted that the sentences were<br />
manifestly excessive.<br />
Held :<br />
(1) The guideline sentencing tariffs for an <strong>of</strong>fence <strong>of</strong> the present<br />
kind were laid down in Mo Kwong-sang v R [1981] HKLR 610.<br />
Roberts CJ said that if these guidelines had been applied to the<br />
appellant in that case, who was treated as a person <strong>of</strong> previous
29<br />
good character, he would have received a sentence <strong>of</strong> 7 to 8 years.<br />
At 611, he said:<br />
… the appropriate sentence in an ordinary case <strong>of</strong><br />
armed robbery, where the accused was carrying a knife<br />
or other dangerous weapon which he displayed to his<br />
victim, should normally be five years. If such a robbery<br />
also involves an invasion <strong>of</strong> private premises (which<br />
includes domestic and business premises and the<br />
common parts <strong>of</strong> premises such as lifts and staircases)<br />
we suggest that a sentence <strong>of</strong> six years would be<br />
appropriate.<br />
If any physical violence, which includes tying them up,<br />
is used on any <strong>of</strong> the victims, we suggest that a sentence<br />
<strong>of</strong> seven years should be considered. These suggested<br />
sentences should be increased if there are other<br />
aggravating factors. Among these, though the list is not<br />
exhaustive, are invasion <strong>of</strong> domestic premises at night;<br />
the presence <strong>of</strong> more than one person in the group <strong>of</strong><br />
robbers; threats made to victims, ill-treatment <strong>of</strong> elderly<br />
persons and children; and a multiplicity <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fences <strong>of</strong> a<br />
similar kind.<br />
(2) When credit card PIN numbers were extracted from victims<br />
by threats or force, this added to the gravity <strong>of</strong> the <strong>of</strong>fences: R v<br />
Sun Sheung-chung Cr App 152/93, HKSAR v Kwong Chi-ming Cr<br />
App 62/99;<br />
(3) Apart from their guilty pleas, there was little to be said for<br />
either <strong>of</strong> the Applicants, each <strong>of</strong> whom was well versed in the<br />
likely consequences <strong>of</strong> a crime <strong>of</strong> this gravity in the event that they<br />
were caught: HKSAR v Chan Pui-chi [1999] 3 HKC 848;<br />
(4) The sentences received by the Applicants were at the high<br />
end <strong>of</strong> the scale, but were within the permissible range having<br />
regard to all the aggravating circumstances which accompanied<br />
the <strong>of</strong>fence.<br />
Result - Applications dismissed.
30<br />
D. MAGISTRACY APPEALS/<br />
AGAINST CONVICTION<br />
裁 判 法 院 上 訴 案 件 / 針 對 定 罪<br />
MA 111/2004<br />
Gall J<br />
(2.4.2004)<br />
*Cheung Wai-sun<br />
& Chan Man-wai<br />
#G A Mackay<br />
CHEONG<br />
Un-ieng<br />
Inflicting grievous bodily harm/Victim burned with iron/<br />
Whether injury grievous bodily harm/Question <strong>of</strong> fact in each<br />
case<br />
對 他 人 身 體 加 以 嚴 重 傷 害 – 受 害 人 遭 熨 斗 熨 傷 –<br />
所 受 傷 害 是 否 嚴 重 身 體 傷 害 – 屬 每 一 案 件 的 事 實<br />
問 題<br />
The Appellant was convicted <strong>of</strong> an <strong>of</strong>fence <strong>of</strong> inflicting<br />
grievous bodily harm, contrary to s 19 <strong>of</strong> the Offences against the<br />
Person Ordinance, Cap 212.<br />
The prosecution case was that PW1, an Indonesian aged 19<br />
years, was employed with the family <strong>of</strong> the Appellant in 2003 as a<br />
servant. They were not happy with her performance. On<br />
5 September 2003, PW1 testified that she spilt some water while<br />
ironing. As she squatted down to wipe the floor, the Appellant<br />
lifted her shirt and placed the hot iron she had been using on her<br />
back. This caused a wound which consisted <strong>of</strong> a trapezoid<br />
brownish-red burn with ruptured blisters measuring about 10 cm<br />
by 6 cm with ruptured blisters about 11.5 cm by 0.5 cm. Two<br />
smallish burns were also found on examination upon the front <strong>of</strong><br />
the right forearm <strong>of</strong> PW1.<br />
On appeal, it was submitted, inter alia, that the injury to the<br />
victim could not be categorised as grievous bodily harm. Reliance<br />
was placed upon HKSAR v Lo Tak-chi [2001] 3 HKC 385, where it<br />
was held that multiple bruise marks and abrasions, a small cut<br />
wound on the tongue which required suturing and a chipped tooth<br />
without fractures did not satisfy the definition <strong>of</strong> grievous bodily<br />
harm.<br />
Held :<br />
(1) The phrase ‘grievous bodily harm’ was not defined in the<br />
Offences against the Person Ordinance, Cap 212. In HKSAR v Liu<br />
Man-kuen MA 604/2000, Lugar-Mawson J said:<br />
In both Hong Kong and England, following a jury<br />
direction given by Willes J in R v Ashman [1858] 1<br />
F&F 88, it was formerly interpreted to include ‘… any<br />
harm, which seriously interferes with health or<br />
comfort’. But in DPP v Smith [1961] AC 290, the<br />
House <strong>of</strong> Lords said that there was no warrant for<br />
giving the words a meaning other than that which they<br />
convey in their ordinary and natural meaning.
31<br />
Viscount Kilmuir LC saying at p 334 <strong>of</strong> the report:<br />
‘Bodily harm’ needs no explanation, and<br />
‘grievous’ means no more and no less than<br />
‘really serious’.<br />
(2) In Liu Man-kuen, the court was considering a case with facts<br />
similar to these when a victim was told to place her hands on an<br />
ironing board and a hot iron was pressed down the back <strong>of</strong> both<br />
hands resulting in a secondary degree scaled wound <strong>of</strong> the dorsum<br />
<strong>of</strong> each hand. The court concluded that the injury involved<br />
grievous bodily harm, and said:<br />
It is a question <strong>of</strong> fact in each case. And whereas<br />
common sense tells one that some injuries will always<br />
be considered as amounting to grievous bodily harm<br />
and some, obviously minor ones, will not, in the vast<br />
majority <strong>of</strong> cases it is left to the tribunal, properly<br />
directed, to come to its own conclusion.<br />
(3) The magistrate in the instant appeal came to the same<br />
conclusion as in Liu Man-kuen, and it could not be said that was a<br />
wrong decision.<br />
Result - Appeal dismissed.<br />
MA 202/2004<br />
Fung DJ<br />
(21.5.2004)<br />
*Cheung Wai-sun<br />
& Yam Ho<br />
#A Macrae SC<br />
CHOU<br />
Shih-bin<br />
Possession <strong>of</strong> arms and ammunition/Defence that items<br />
planted in bag/Magistrate disbelieving defendant and drawing<br />
irresistible inference <strong>of</strong> guilt/No basis for appellate court to<br />
intervene on basis <strong>of</strong> lurking doubt/Magistrate overlooking<br />
effect <strong>of</strong> presumption and setting himself a higher standard<br />
管 有 槍 械 及 彈 藥 – 辯 稱 物 品 遭 人 栽 藏 袋 中 – 裁 判<br />
官 不 相 信 被 告 人 並 作 出 被 告 人 有 罪 的 不 可 抗 拒 推<br />
論 – 上 訴 法 庭 沒 理 由 以 潛 在 疑 點 為 基 礎 而 干 預 –<br />
裁 判 官 忽 視 推 定 的 影 響 並 自 行 設 定 較 高 的 標 準<br />
The Appellant was convicted after trial <strong>of</strong> an <strong>of</strong>fence <strong>of</strong><br />
possession <strong>of</strong> arms and ammunition without a licence, contrary to<br />
s 13 <strong>of</strong> the Firearms and Ammunition Ordinance, Cap 238.<br />
The prosecution case was that at about 5.50 pm on 13 June<br />
2003, the Appellant entered Hong Kong from the Mainland at Lok<br />
Ma Chau. At 7.15 pm, at Hong Kong Airport, where he was to fly<br />
to Taiwan, he presented his hand-carry baggage (ex P1) for X-ray<br />
screening. The security guard found an anti-riot gun <strong>of</strong> Chinese<br />
origin (ex P2) and a cartridge with five chambers (ex P3). It was<br />
admitted that ex P2 was a firearm, under Cap 238, and that ex P3<br />
was ammunition. The battery <strong>of</strong> the gun was not functioning and
32<br />
the gun was inoperative. The Appellant told the guard that the gun<br />
was for self-defence.<br />
The Appellant’s case at trial was that he was a Taiwanese<br />
who owned a factory in Dongguan, which employed 3,000<br />
workers and had an annual turnover <strong>of</strong> US$40 million. His family<br />
lived in Taiwan.<br />
The Appellant testified that on the morning <strong>of</strong> 13 June at<br />
about 9 am, he packed his baggage (ex P1). He did not pack<br />
exhibits P2 and P3, and had no knowledge <strong>of</strong> them. He then went<br />
to his <strong>of</strong>fice in the Administration Building, and put his bag next<br />
to the desk in his <strong>of</strong>fice. On that day he left the <strong>of</strong>fice on two<br />
occasions, and it was unattended and unlocked. About 20 people<br />
would have had access to his <strong>of</strong>fice regularly. There were four<br />
entrances to the <strong>of</strong>fice. On 12 June he had told senior staff he<br />
would leave for Taiwan the following day. At 3 pm he asked his<br />
assistant Zhu Zhong (DW2) to place his baggage in the boot <strong>of</strong> his<br />
car. When he crossed the border at 5.50 pm, neither the baggage<br />
nor the car was inspected. He produced his Hong Kong identity<br />
card, which was kept in his car.<br />
The Appellant denied having told PW1 that the gun was for<br />
self-defence. He thought someone might bear a grudge against<br />
him as he had recently fired some staff. In April 2003, 700 to 800<br />
workers had taken part in a strike. His deputy manager had told<br />
him that one staff member had warned the general managers and<br />
managers to be careful as they might get killed. He would pick up<br />
his family personally at the airport because he was concerned<br />
about their safety.<br />
DW2 gave evidence that he had never seen the Appellant<br />
with a gun. On 15 June, the Appellant asked him to investigate<br />
the incident. Two employees were suspected but no report was<br />
made to the Mainland police as the incident did not occur in the<br />
Mainland.<br />
The magistrate rejected the explanation <strong>of</strong> the Appellant. He<br />
was sure he had said something to PW1 at the airport, and that the<br />
Appellant was lying when he denied this. His evidence as to what<br />
occurred at this juncture was vague and he gave different versions.<br />
The Appellant was vague as to the packing <strong>of</strong> the hand baggage in<br />
which the gun was found. The magistrate drew the irresistible<br />
inference that the Appellant was aware that the gun was in his<br />
baggage.<br />
Held :<br />
On appeal
33<br />
(1) The magistrate had taken into account all the circumstances,<br />
including the inherent probabilities <strong>of</strong> the planting <strong>of</strong> the gun in<br />
the Appellant’s baggage. He was entitled to come to a conclusion<br />
on the facts which a court exercising appellate jurisdiction should<br />
not lightly disturb: HKSAR v Cheung Ho-ying [1993] 3 HKLRD<br />
45. There was no occasion to intervene on the basis <strong>of</strong> a lurking<br />
doubt;<br />
(2) The magistrate had not referred to s 24 <strong>of</strong> the Firearms and<br />
Ammunition Ordinance, Cap 238 which provided that:<br />
(1) Any person who is proved to have had in his<br />
physical possession –<br />
(a) anything containing arms or ammunition, or<br />
both;<br />
(b) the keys <strong>of</strong> any baggage, briefcase, box, case,<br />
cupboard, drawer, safe-deposit box, safe or<br />
other similar containers containing arms or<br />
ammunition, or both,<br />
shall, until the contrary is proved, be presumed to<br />
have had the arms or ammunition, or both, as the case<br />
may be, in his possession.<br />
(2) Any person who is proved or presumed to have<br />
had arms or ammunition, or both, in his possession<br />
shall, until the contrary is proved, be presumed to<br />
have known the nature <strong>of</strong> such arm or arms, or both,<br />
as the case may be.<br />
(3) The Respondent, in reliance upon R v Wu Man-choi [1979]<br />
HKLR 174, submitted that where the facts which gave rise to the<br />
presumption were established, as here, that presumption operated<br />
whether it was mentioned or not. However, the parties agreed in<br />
this case that since the magistrate had set himself the higher<br />
standard and approached the matter by way <strong>of</strong> an inference <strong>of</strong><br />
guilt, and the issue here was the magistrate's rejection <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Appellant's evidence, the presumption was not a relevant factor<br />
upon appeal.<br />
Result - Appeal dismissed.<br />
香 港 特 別 行 政 區 訴 黃 佩 翰
34<br />
HKSAR v WONG Pui-hon<br />
高 等 法 院 原 訟 法 庭 – 高 院 裁 判 法 院 上 訴 2002 年 第 1251 號<br />
* 盧 淑 玲 及<br />
張 潔 宜<br />
Peggy Lo &<br />
Kathie<br />
Cheung<br />
# 車 偉 恆<br />
Allen Che<br />
高 等 法 院 原 訟 法 庭 法 官 彭 鍵 基<br />
耹 訊 日 期 : 二 零 零 三 年 四 月 十 日<br />
宣 判 日 期 : 二 零 零 四 年 四 月 六 日<br />
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF THE HIGH COURT<br />
MAGISTRACY APPEAL NO. 1251 OF 2002<br />
在 法 定 時 間 內 沒 有 向 警 務 人 員 提 供 車 輛 司 機 的 資<br />
料 – 沒 有 責 任 提 供 最 後 駕 駛 車 輛 的 司 機 的 資 料 – 第<br />
63(5) 段 的 辯 護 理 由<br />
上 訴 人 被 票 控 違 反 了 香 港 法 例 第 374 章 《 道 路<br />
交 通 條 例 》 第 63(1)(a) 條 , 即 在 法 定 時 間 內 沒 有 向<br />
警 務 人 員 提 供 一 輛 私 家 車 的 司 機 資 料 。 在 裁 判 法 院<br />
經 審 訊 後 , 上 訴 人 被 裁 定 罪 名 成 立 , 並 被 判 罰 款<br />
1000 元 。<br />
在 2002 年 4 月 29 日 , 警 方 的 一 組 車 輛 監 察 儀 器<br />
拍 下 一 輛 私 家 車 衝 紅 燈 。 警 方 根 據 該 私 家 車 的 登 記<br />
車 主 提 供 的 資 料 在 2002 年 7 月 8 日 , 向 上 訴 人 寄 出<br />
一 份 警 方 表 格 , 要 求 他 提 供 事 發 當 日 駕 駛 該 私 家 車<br />
的 司 機 資 料 。 上 訴 人 在 收 到 該 表 格 後 , 曾 主 動 接 觸<br />
有 關 的 警 方 交 通 部 , 並 在 警 方 安 排 下 到 警 署 查 閱 事<br />
發 當 晚 警 方 拍 下 的 照 片 , 但 因 為 照 片 不 能 清 楚 顯 示<br />
司 機 的 樣 貌 , 因 此 上 訴 人 向 警 方 聲 稱 不 能 再 進 一 步<br />
提 供 當 晚 司 機 的 身 分 。 在 8 月 16 日 上 訴 人 給 警 方 的<br />
信 件 中 , 上 訴 人 稱 因 事 發 經 已 兩 個 多 月 , 他 不 能 記<br />
起 當 晚 他 有 否 駕 駛 該 車 。 再 者 , 他 經 查 詢 有 關 人 仕<br />
後 亦 無 法 肯 定 誰 是 該 車 的 司 機 , 因 此 上 訴 人 在 表 格<br />
中 的 資 料 欄 內 一 律 填 寫 了 ‘unknown’( 不 詳 ) 的 字<br />
眼 。<br />
警 方 認 為 上 訴 人 此 舉 等 同 不 能 在 法 定 時 間 內 提
35<br />
供 事 發 當 時 司 機 的 資 料 , 因 此 便 向 上 訴 人 提 出 檢<br />
控 。<br />
審 訊 時 上 訴 人 選 擇 自 辯 , 他 根 據 法 例 第 63(5)<br />
段 的 辯 護 理 由 向 法 庭 提 出 他 不 知 道 , 並 且 經 合 理 的<br />
努 力 後 仍 未 能 確 定 在 該 被 指 控 罪 行 或 意 外 發 生 時 ,<br />
該 車 輛 的 司 機 姓 名 、 地 址 及 駕 駛 執 照 號 碼 。<br />
上 訴 人 自 辯 時 聲 稱 案 中 的 有 關 車 輛 主 要 是 由 他<br />
本 人 駕 駛 , 其 餘 部 份 時 間 是 由 他 的 妻 子 潘 女 士 駕<br />
駛 。 他 在 接 到 警 方 通 知 書 時 , 已 不 能 記 起 事 發 當 日<br />
誰 是 該 車 的 司 機 。 他 亦 曾 向 可 能 會 駕 駛 該 車 的 其 他<br />
人 仕 包 括 他 的 妻 子 、 司 機 和 女 兒 查 詢 , 但 他 們 都 不<br />
能 提 供 確 實 的 消 息 。 上 訴 人 又 曾 主 動 致 電 警 方 , 並<br />
查 閱 事 發 時 拍 下 的 照 片 , 但 是 照 片 未 能 清 楚 地 拍 下<br />
司 機 的 容 貌 , 因 此 上 訴 人 聲 稱 他 不 能 憑 照 片 而 提 供<br />
司 機 的 資 料 。<br />
裁 判 官 曾 向 上 訴 人 發 問 , 而 發 問 的 重 點 是 指 稱<br />
上 訴 人 有 責 任 在 表 格 內 填 上 最 後 駕 駛 該 車 輛 的 司 機<br />
的 資 料 。 裁 判 官 先 後 三 次 指 出 即 使 上 訴 人 不 能 肯 定<br />
事 發 時 司 機 的 身 分 , 他 是 可 以 或 應 該 填 寫 最 後 駕 駛<br />
該 車 輛 司 機 的 資 料 。<br />
最 後 裁 判 官 裁 定 不 信 納 上 訴 人 聲 稱 在 竭 力 回 想<br />
及 詢 問 下 仍 不 能 確 定 司 機 身 分 , 並 裁 定 上 訴 人 罪 名<br />
成 立 。<br />
裁 決 :<br />
(1) 一 般 來 說 , 審 理 上 訴 的 法 庭 絕 少 干 預 原 審 裁 判<br />
官 就 證 人 可 信 性 的 裁 決 , 理 由 是 裁 判 官 在 審 訊 的 時<br />
候 , 他 曾 有 機 會 直 接 觀 察 證 人 作 供 時 神 態 後 才 下 結<br />
論 ;<br />
(2) 裁 判 官 的 發 問 給 人 的 印 象 是 上 訴 人 有 責 任 填 寫<br />
最 後 駕 駛 該 車 輛 司 機 的 資 料 , 但 第 63(1)(a) 條 並 沒<br />
有 此 規 定 。 裁 判 官 是 錯 誤 理 解 了 法 律 條 文 , 並 極 有
36<br />
可 能 混 淆 了 法 例 第 63(1)(a) 和 63(1)(b) 條 文 對 被 告<br />
人 的 要 求 ;<br />
(3) 代 表 上 訴 人 的 律 師 在 結 案 陳 詞 時 , 曾 向 裁 判 官<br />
指 出 法 例 63(1)(a) 並 無 要 求 上 訴 人 提 供 最 後 駕 駛 車<br />
輛 司 機 的 資 料 , 但 裁 判 官 在 他 的 簡 單 口 述 判 案 理 由<br />
和 稍 後 撰 寫 的 事 實 裁 斷 書 , 都 沒 有 澄 清 他 為 何 曾 數<br />
次 向 上 訴 人 指 出 他 有 責 任 提 供 此 等 資 料 。 由 此 看<br />
來 , 裁 判 官 極 可 能 混 淆 了 控 方 需 要 證 明 的 控 罪 元<br />
素 , 因 而 在 法 律 上 犯 錯 ;<br />
(4) 上 訴 人 定 罪 的 裁 決 並 不 安 全 和 穏 當 。<br />
結 果 .. 上 訴 得 直 , 發 還 已 交 罰 款 。<br />
[English digest<br />
<strong>of</strong> MA 1251/2002,<br />
above]<br />
Pang J<br />
(6.4.2004)<br />
*Peggy Lo &<br />
Kathie Cheung<br />
#Allen Che<br />
WONG<br />
Pui-hon<br />
Failure to give police <strong>of</strong>ficer information on driver <strong>of</strong> vehicle<br />
within statutory period/No obligation to give information on<br />
last driver <strong>of</strong> vehicle/Defence under s 63(5)<br />
A summons was issued on the Appellant for an <strong>of</strong>fence<br />
under section 63(1)(a) <strong>of</strong> the Road Traffic Ordinance, Cap 374,<br />
namely, failing to give to a police <strong>of</strong>ficer information on the driver<br />
<strong>of</strong> a private car within a statutory period. The Appellant was<br />
convicted after trial in the magistrate’s court and was fined $1,000.<br />
On 29 April 2002, a private car was photographed for<br />
jumping red lights by the vehicle monitoring equipment set up by<br />
the police. Based on the information provided by the registered<br />
owner <strong>of</strong> the private car, the police sent a form to the Appellant by<br />
post on 8 July 2002, requiring identification <strong>of</strong> the driver <strong>of</strong> the<br />
private car on the day <strong>of</strong> the incident. Upon receipt <strong>of</strong> the form,<br />
the Appellant contacted the traffic section <strong>of</strong> the police. He was<br />
then asked to attend the police station to examine the photographs<br />
taken by the police on the night <strong>of</strong> the incident. However, the<br />
photographs did not show the physical appearance <strong>of</strong> the driver<br />
clearly, and the Appellant told the police that he could not make<br />
further identification <strong>of</strong> the driver that night. In his letter to the<br />
police dated 16 August, the Appellant stated that as more than two<br />
months had elapsed since the incident, he could not recall whether<br />
he drove the car that night. Furthermore, after making enquiries<br />
with persons concerned, he still could not ascertain who the driver<br />
was. Therefore he filled in the form by putting down the word<br />
‘unknown ’ for all the items requiring the provision <strong>of</strong> information.
37<br />
The police regarded the Appellant’s act as tantamount to<br />
failing to give information on the driver at the time <strong>of</strong> the incident<br />
within the statutory period and so brought a prosecution against<br />
him.<br />
At trial, the Appellant elected to give evidence for himself.<br />
He relied on the defence under s 63(5) and submitted that he did<br />
not know, and could not with reasonable diligence have<br />
ascertained, the name or address or driving licence number <strong>of</strong> the<br />
driver <strong>of</strong> the vehicle at the time <strong>of</strong> the alleged <strong>of</strong>fence or accident.<br />
The Appellant in his own defence submitted that the vehicle<br />
concerned was driven by him most <strong>of</strong> the time and by his wife Ms<br />
Poon at other times. When he received a notice from the police,<br />
he could not recall who drove the vehicle on the day <strong>of</strong> the<br />
incident. He had made enquiries with other persons who might<br />
have driven the vehicle, including his wife, his driver and his<br />
daughter, but none <strong>of</strong> them was able to provide a positive answer.<br />
The Appellant also took the initiative to call the police and<br />
examine the photographs taken at the time <strong>of</strong> the incident. But<br />
since the photographs did not show the facial appearance <strong>of</strong> the<br />
driver clearly, the Appellant claimed that he could not identify the<br />
driver merely by the photographs.<br />
The magistrate asked the Appellant a number <strong>of</strong> questions.<br />
They were focused on the Appellant’s obligation to complete the<br />
form by giving information on the last driver. The magistrate had<br />
altogether pointed out three times that even if the Appellant could<br />
not have ascertained the identity <strong>of</strong> the driver at the time <strong>of</strong> the<br />
incident, he could have or should have given information on the<br />
last driver <strong>of</strong> the vehicle.<br />
Finally, the magistrate ruled that he would not accept the<br />
Appellant’s submission that the driver’s identity could not be<br />
ascertained despite the Appellant’s efforts to recall and to make<br />
enquiries, and he convicted the Appellant accordingly.<br />
Held :<br />
(1) Generally, it was rare for an appellate court to interfere with<br />
a trial magistrate’s ruling on the credibility <strong>of</strong> a witness. The<br />
reason was that a trial magistrate, before arriving at a conclusion,<br />
had the opportunity to observe directly the demeanour <strong>of</strong> a witness<br />
when he testified;<br />
(2) The questions put forward by the magistrate gave the<br />
impression that the Appellant had the obligation to give
38<br />
information on the last driver in the form. However, this was not<br />
required by s 63(1)(a). The magistrate misunderstood the statutory<br />
provisions and had very likely confused the different requirements<br />
on a defendant under s 63(1)(a) and s 63(1)(b);<br />
(3) In his closing speech, counsel representing the Appellant<br />
submitted to the magistrate that the Appellant was not required by<br />
s 63(1)(a) to give information on the last driver. However, the<br />
magistrate had not, both in his brief oral Reasons for Verdict and<br />
in his subsequent written Statement <strong>of</strong> Findings, clarified why he<br />
repeatedly pointed out that there was an obligation on the<br />
Appellant to give such information. It was very likely that the<br />
magistrate had confused the elements <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fence which the<br />
prosecution had to prove and therefore had erred in law;<br />
(4) The conviction was unsafe and unsatisfactory.<br />
Result - Appeal allowed. Fine refunded.
39<br />
E. MAGISTRACY APPEALS/<br />
AGAINST SENTENCE<br />
裁 判 法 院 上 訴 案 件 / 針 對 刑 罰<br />
MA 110/2004<br />
Beeson J<br />
(21.5.2004)<br />
*Leung Sun-yee<br />
#Joseph Tse<br />
NGAI<br />
Wing-keung<br />
Possession <strong>of</strong> obscene articles for publication/Imprisonment<br />
and fine imposed/Imprisonment in default <strong>of</strong> payment <strong>of</strong> fine/<br />
Enquiry as to source <strong>of</strong> bail money different from enquiry as<br />
to means to pay fine/Inquiries as to capacity essential/<br />
Defendant wrongly punished for refusing to use bail money to<br />
pay fine<br />
管 有 淫 褻 物 品 以 供 發 布 之 用 – 處 以 監 禁 及 罰 款 – 因<br />
欠 繳 罰 款 而 判 處 監 禁 – 對 保 釋 金 來 源 的 查 問 與 對<br />
支 付 罰 款 的 經 濟 能 力 的 查 問 不 同 – 查 問 支 付 罰 款<br />
的 能 力 屬 必 須 – 被 告 人 因 拒 絕 以 保 釋 金 支 付 罰 款<br />
而 遭 錯 誤 處 罰<br />
The Appellant pleaded guilty to an <strong>of</strong>fence <strong>of</strong> possession <strong>of</strong><br />
obscene articles for the purpose <strong>of</strong> publication, contrary to<br />
s 21(1)(b) <strong>of</strong> the Control <strong>of</strong> Obscene and Indecent Articles<br />
Ordinance, Cap 390. He was sentenced to 10 months’<br />
imprisonment, and fined $20,000, and ordered to serve 3 months’<br />
imprisonment, consecutive, in default <strong>of</strong> payment <strong>of</strong> the fine.<br />
In his Reasons for Sentence, the magistrate noted that the<br />
Appellant has been in possession <strong>of</strong> 4,267 obscene discs, at what<br />
was described as a ‘notorious location’ for this type <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fence.<br />
The Appellant, aged 51, had 31 previous convictions, including 4<br />
for similar <strong>of</strong>fences, and was in breach <strong>of</strong> a suspended sentence<br />
imposed four months earlier for a similar <strong>of</strong>fence. The magistrate<br />
considered a higher starting point for sentence was appropriate<br />
because <strong>of</strong> the Appellant’s disregard for the law and took 15<br />
months as the starting point. He then stated:<br />
I was also satisfied that an additional penalty should<br />
be imposed. I heard evidence regarding the<br />
defendant’s ability to pay a fine and was satisfied<br />
beyond reasonable doubt that the bail money was<br />
available to the defendant to dispose <strong>of</strong>.<br />
The magistrate noted that the Appellant had been convicted<br />
repeatedly in the past three years. In September 2003, he had been<br />
fined a total <strong>of</strong> $5,000, and given a sentence <strong>of</strong> 6 months<br />
suspended for 12 months for two similar <strong>of</strong>fences. He considered<br />
imprisonment was appropriate, and that on this occasion a larger<br />
fine was also appropriate.
40<br />
When the magistrate asked defence counsel if he had any<br />
instructions as to whether a fine could be paid from the bail<br />
money, he replied that the Appellant could not pay the fine from<br />
the bail money as it had been borrowed from a relative and the<br />
Appellant wanted the bail money returned to his younger brother.<br />
The magistrate, however, was not prepared to accept that<br />
information, so the Appellant gave evidence. He said that he had<br />
obtained $25,000 from his younger brother to meet the bail. The<br />
arrangement was that he would repay the money to his brother<br />
once the case was finished. The younger brother also testified,<br />
and he confirmed that he had borrowed $25,000 from a friend in<br />
order to provide the Appellant with the bail money he required.<br />
He told the magistrate he had not told his friend why he wanted<br />
the money, but just that it was needed urgently and he would<br />
return the money within several days.<br />
The magistrate did not accept that the money was borrowed<br />
on a promise that it would be repaid. He also did not believe<br />
either the Appellant or his brother and opined that anyone who<br />
was willing to put up $25,000 would certainly want to know what<br />
was being done with the money, particularly if the person<br />
borrowing the money had no great means himself. He was<br />
satisfied that the money was given to the Appellant for his bail<br />
without any strings attached. On that basis, he was satisfied<br />
beyond reasonable doubt that the bail money was available to the<br />
Appellant to dispose <strong>of</strong> as he wished. The magistrate then told the<br />
Appellant:<br />
You are now sentenced to 10 months’ imprisonment<br />
and a fine <strong>of</strong> $20,000. The fine is payable forthwith if<br />
you do not pay that forthwith, you will serve an<br />
additional 3 months’ imprisonment - 3 months<br />
consecutive to the 10 months.<br />
The Appellant told the magistrate he would not pay the fine<br />
from the bail money, but would give it to his younger brother. The<br />
3 months’ sentence in default <strong>of</strong> payment was activated. The<br />
magistrate also activated the suspended sentence, but keeping<br />
totality in mind made 2 months’ <strong>of</strong> that 6 months’ sentence<br />
concurrent with the present sentence, making 17 months in total.<br />
On appeal, complaint was made <strong>of</strong> the fine and <strong>of</strong> the<br />
imprisonment in default <strong>of</strong> payment. It was submitted, first, that<br />
the magistrate erred in imposing a default order <strong>of</strong> 3 months’<br />
imprisonment for non-payment <strong>of</strong> the fine <strong>of</strong> $20,000, as the<br />
magistrate’s enquiry as to the means <strong>of</strong> the Appellant to pay a fine<br />
was not supported by evidence adduced in the enquiry. Further,<br />
there was no evidence adduced in the enquiry by the prosecution<br />
to prove the means <strong>of</strong> the Appellant, or to contradict evidence
41<br />
adduced by the Appellant as to his means. Second, it was said that<br />
in all the circumstances the fine and the default order <strong>of</strong><br />
imprisonment were manifestly excessive and wrong in principle.<br />
Held :<br />
(1) An examination by the magistrate <strong>of</strong> the circumstances<br />
under which the bail money was obtained and whether he was able<br />
to, or wished to, use it to pay a fine was not necessarily the same<br />
as an enquiry as to a defendant’s ability to pay a fine;<br />
(2) No information was given by the defence counsel in<br />
mitigation as to the Appellant’s ability to pay the fine. The<br />
magistrate did not ask any questions as to means, but immediately<br />
seized on the bail money as a possible way <strong>of</strong> paying the fine. The<br />
Appellant said he borrowed the money from his brother and did<br />
not want to use that money for paying the fine;<br />
(3) The magistrate should have made enquiries as to the<br />
financial circumstances <strong>of</strong> the Appellant generally and considered<br />
(a) whether or not a fine <strong>of</strong> $20,000 was appropriate; (b) whether<br />
or not the Appellant was able to pay it, and (c) if so, how long it<br />
would take him to pay it. Although the Appellant was a repeat<br />
<strong>of</strong>fender, there was no evidence before the court to show he had<br />
pr<strong>of</strong>ited in any way, except as an employee from the venture for<br />
which he was arrested;<br />
(4) A magistrate should decide whether a fine was appropriate<br />
in the circumstances <strong>of</strong> the case and, if so, what the amount should<br />
be. That might involve some enquiries <strong>of</strong> a defendant in person,<br />
or submissions from counsel if represented, as to a defendant’s<br />
means and ability to pay a fine. If a defendant agreed, money for<br />
the whole or part <strong>of</strong> a fine could be taken from the bail money;<br />
(5) If a defendant declined to use bail money because, as in this<br />
case, it was borrowed, or was to be used for some other purposes,<br />
enquiries should be made as to whether or not time was needed, or<br />
should be given, for payment. The magistrate’s enquiry focused<br />
solely on whether or not the bail money was the Appellant’s to<br />
dispose <strong>of</strong> as he wished, rather than his ability to meet a fine;<br />
(6) Having decided that the bail money was the Appellant’s to<br />
dispose <strong>of</strong>, it appeared that the magistrate was annoyed by his<br />
continued refusal to use the bail money to pay the fine. This<br />
resulted in the additional, immediate 3 months’ imprisonment in<br />
default <strong>of</strong> payment. That was wrong in principle, because it must<br />
have appeared to the Appellant that he was being punished with 3<br />
months’ imprisonment for refusing to use his bail money to pay<br />
the fine, rather than being fined as a deterrent linked to his
42<br />
<strong>of</strong>fence;<br />
(7) In the circumstances <strong>of</strong> the case it was not appropriate for<br />
the magistrate to impose a fine in addition to a sentence <strong>of</strong><br />
imprisonment.<br />
Result - Appeal allowed. Fine <strong>of</strong> $20,000 revoked, and sentence<br />
<strong>of</strong> 3 months’ imprisonment in default <strong>of</strong> payment<br />
quashed.<br />
MA 169/2004<br />
Gall J<br />
(17.3.2004)<br />
*Sin Pui-ha<br />
#I/P<br />
CHOW<br />
Yuk-leung<br />
Smuggling/Goods hidden in lorry/Lorry rented by owner to<br />
third party/Owner alert to possible misuse <strong>of</strong> lorry/Forfeiture<br />
order appropriate<br />
走 私 – 貨 品 藏 在 貨 車 上 – 貨 車 由 車 主 租 予 第 三<br />
者 – 車 主 對 不 當 使 用 貨 車 的 可 能 性 有 警 覺 – 沒 收<br />
令 恰 當<br />
On 29 July 2003, a lorry, reg. no. EZ 5135, arrived at Sha<br />
Tau Kok control point for customs clearance. The driver, Mr<br />
Chan Kok-ming, tendered a manifest that declared the vehicle<br />
empty. The vehicle underwent an examination. During the search<br />
<strong>of</strong> the vehicle a secret compartment was discovered in the ro<strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong><br />
the cargo compartment <strong>of</strong> the vehicle and a total <strong>of</strong> 550 computer<br />
hard disks in custom-made trays was found. The defendant was<br />
convicted <strong>of</strong> a customs <strong>of</strong>fence, and the Customs and Excise<br />
<strong>Department</strong> applied for forfeiture <strong>of</strong> the vehicle and keys.<br />
The application for forfeiture was contested before the<br />
magistrate by the Appellant. He was the owner <strong>of</strong> the vehicle and<br />
had driven it to the Mainland himself. He wished to buy another<br />
vehicle and borrowed money to buy one. He could not sell<br />
EZ 5135 so he decided to lease it to a Mr Lam in early June, for<br />
$5,000 per month. The magistrate heard the evidence <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Appellant, and said:<br />
The leasing arrangement was very informal. There<br />
was no documentation produced. The claimant clearly<br />
retained all rights and responsibilities <strong>of</strong> the owner,<br />
one <strong>of</strong> which is to ensure the vehicle is not used<br />
illicitly …<br />
The magistrate ordered the forfeiture <strong>of</strong> the lorry, and its<br />
ignition key.<br />
On appeal
43<br />
Held :<br />
(1) The law was as set out in R v CEC Finance Ltd [1993] 1<br />
HKC 127, 131. Bokhary JA said:<br />
The discretion to order forfeiture being unfettered, the<br />
question whether or not to so order is to be approached<br />
from a neutral starting point, with both parties on a<br />
level playing field, so to speak, and each with the onus<br />
<strong>of</strong> proving on a balance <strong>of</strong> probabilities any fact which<br />
he or it asserts if that fact is not admitted by the<br />
opposite party. That is how the question is to be<br />
approached. And it is to be answered by reference to<br />
what is just in all the circumstances as the magistrate<br />
finds such circumstances proved or admitted.<br />
(2) The magistrate found that, as claimant, the Appellant<br />
retained all rights and responsibilities <strong>of</strong> the owner, that he knew<br />
cross-border trade and that the illicit use <strong>of</strong> the vehicle was a real<br />
possibility. He found that the Appellant introduced the driver to<br />
Mr Lam and that he had at no time since renting the vehicle<br />
checked or inspected it;<br />
(3) The approach <strong>of</strong> the magistrate could not be faulted.<br />
Result - Appeal dismissed.
44<br />
F. COSTS IN CRIMINAL CASES<br />
刑 事 案 件 的 訟 費<br />
MA 922/2003<br />
Gall J<br />
(16.3.2004)<br />
*Lynda Shine<br />
#K Oderberg<br />
HAU<br />
Kai-hung<br />
Defendant charged with criminal <strong>of</strong>fence/Charge withdrawn/<br />
Defendant not bringing suspicion upon herself/Costs wrongly<br />
refused<br />
被 告 人 被 控 以 刑 事 罪 行 – 控 罪 撤 回 – 被 告 人 並 非<br />
自 招 懷 疑 – 錯 誤 拒 絕 判 給 訟 費<br />
The Appellant was charged on 14 April 2003 with an<br />
<strong>of</strong>fence <strong>of</strong> possession <strong>of</strong> equipment for making a false instrument.<br />
The charge related to premises in Hunghom, where police found a<br />
number <strong>of</strong> machines, encoding machines, rolls <strong>of</strong> tin foil and<br />
pieces <strong>of</strong> white plastic cards from which cards could be made and<br />
two note books containing credit card data information. The<br />
charge related to the intention to use that equipment to create false<br />
credit cards, using the data from real credit cards so as to pass <strong>of</strong>f<br />
the false cards as genuine.<br />
The Appellant testified that the premises in question had<br />
been rented to her, and sub-let to her co-accused, Lo. The<br />
Appellant, after arrest, made a post-record <strong>of</strong> a statement to the<br />
police in which she said ‘That unit is rented by me. I let my friend<br />
live there ’. Her first reaction to the police was that she had no<br />
connection with the premises. When further questioned, the<br />
Appellant failed to reveal who the sub-tenant was or any details<br />
about him.<br />
The Appellant was charged on the basis that she was the<br />
tenant <strong>of</strong> the premises, that she was known to her co-accused, and<br />
her admission that she had let the premises to Lo.<br />
On 28 July 2003, the prosecution amended the charge by<br />
deleting the name <strong>of</strong> the Appellant and withdrawing the charge<br />
against her. She then made an application to the magistrate for an<br />
award <strong>of</strong> costs.<br />
Section 3 <strong>of</strong> the Costs in Criminal Cases Ordinance,<br />
Cap 492, read:<br />
3. Defence costs in summary proceedings<br />
(1) Where-<br />
(a) an information or complaint laid before a<br />
magistrate is proceeded with;<br />
(b) the magistrate may order that costs be<br />
awarded to the defendant.
45<br />
The magistrate refused to award costs. He recognised that<br />
costs should follow the event unless the defendant was in some<br />
way at fault in one <strong>of</strong> the following situations: (1) the defendant<br />
brought suspicion upon himself, (2) the defendant misled the<br />
prosecution into thinking the case was stronger than it was, or<br />
(3) the defendant was acquitted on a technicality despite ample<br />
evidence to support a conviction. In refusing costs, the magistrate<br />
said:<br />
Held :<br />
In my view, a person who has lent her name to rent a<br />
flat and then subsequently let others occupy it on a<br />
causal basis has acted in her own peril: even giving<br />
credence to the most innocent explanation, Ms Hau<br />
has acted in a careless or even reckless manner and<br />
had brought suspicion upon herself. On this basis I<br />
rejected her application for costs.<br />
On appeal<br />
(1) It could not be true that a person who allowed someone else<br />
to occupy premises to which they had a right was inevitably<br />
bringing suspicion upon themselves;<br />
(2) The difficult issue was that the Appellant had a right to<br />
silence. On the one hand, according to the Respondent’s<br />
submission, she had an obligation, if she was to avoid being<br />
refused costs, to be as helpful as possible on matters not going<br />
directly to her own position, but, on the other hand, she had a right<br />
to preserve her position by not answering the police questions.<br />
Although the Appellant did not co-operate as fully with the police<br />
as they would have liked, nothing she did or said, and none <strong>of</strong> her<br />
actions, brought suspicion upon herself;<br />
(3) The magistrate was in error in finding that the Appellant had<br />
brought suspicion upon herself.<br />
Result - Appeal allowed. Costs awarded.
46<br />
G. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE<br />
常 規 與 程 序<br />
CA 542/2002<br />
Stock JA<br />
Gall &<br />
Beeson JJ<br />
(21.6.2004)<br />
*D G Saw SC &<br />
Peggy Lo<br />
#J Haynes<br />
LI<br />
Suet-ping<br />
Prosecuting counsel/Improper expression to jury <strong>of</strong> personal<br />
opinion/Counsel’s role that <strong>of</strong> an advocate for a case/Judge to<br />
correct improper comment<br />
控 方 律 師 – 向 陪 審 團 發 表 個 人 意 見 屬 不 當 – 律 師<br />
的 職 責 是 作 為 案 件 的 代 訟 人 – 法 官 應 更 正 不 恰 當<br />
的 評 論<br />
Having dismissed the application for leave to appeal against<br />
a conviction for murder, the court commented upon an aspect <strong>of</strong><br />
prosecuting counsel’s address to the jury.<br />
In the course <strong>of</strong> the address to the jury, and after rehearsing<br />
the Applicant’s account about how her husband chased her into the<br />
kitchen after he had been burnt with oil and a discussion they were<br />
meant to have had, according to the Applicant, <strong>of</strong> meeting in the<br />
after-life, counsel said ‘To me, members <strong>of</strong> the jury, and I’m sure<br />
it is to you, it’s just total nonsense ’.<br />
The Court observed:<br />
This was an improper remark. Counsel should never<br />
express a personal opinion <strong>of</strong> this kind. This is not his<br />
or her job. Counsel’s job is that <strong>of</strong> an advocate for a<br />
case, and not as a proponent <strong>of</strong> his or her own views;<br />
most particularly not before a jury. Nor should a<br />
judge permit such advocacy to pass without comment.