BRITISH PROFESSIONS TODAY: THE STATE OF ... - Property Week

2.2 Historical development
The current structures and governance of professional
bodies are largely a result of their historical development
and the impact of statutory regulation. The economic and
technological advances of the Industrial Revolution, and
consequently the rise in living standards and the growth
of governmental and corporate institutions, meant that
professional expertise was required more than ever before
(Perkin 2002). Professions in Great Britain and other countries
developed gradually from an unrestricted right to practise to
professional self-regulation in the public interest. In the early
19th century virtually no controls existed to restrain those
who called themselves a solicitor, a physician, or an
accountant. Experience proved the need to establish certain
standards of expertise, and these, established by selfregulatory
bodies, enhanced the quality of practitioners to the
benefit of their clients, the public (Younger 1976). Even most
critics of the professions agree that it is necessary to limit
admission to the professions by setting certain standards of
character and competence.
Backlash?
The perceived self-interest of the professions is at the root
of its historical and (some might say) current crises. Criticisms
of professional self-interest hinge on: the drive to monopoly,
contempt for the free market, setting of own fees or salaries
and conditions for service, the exclusivity of an “old boy”
network, and a fundamental conservatism that predicates
unwillingness to reform (Perkin 2002; Burrage 2007). The
National Audit Office (NAO) recently identified the public
concern that undeserving managers and shareholders,
particularly in private sector professions, will take advantage
of regulatory structures to enrich themselves to levels
considered obscene by the public. This has been perfectly
illustrated by the intense debate over whether bonuses should
be paid to bankers following the financial crisis in 2008.
In Britain and the United States the public sector professions
have often been seen as parasitic, a cost rather than a
contributor to society. The dichotomy between public and
private sector professions in Anglo-American society has
grown up around the neo-classical economic work of the likes
of F.A. Hayek and Milton Friedman, who argue that industry
creates the wealth that government (especially welfare)
squanders. Attacks have not been confined to the right; from
the left, the professions have been vilified as self-interested
elites who award themselves overly handsome perks (Titmuss
1960), or even create the problems they claim to solve (Illich
1973). The Russian academic Ivan Illich (in)famously made
perhaps the most extreme attack on the professions: “Like
Spanish Inquisitors they hold the mandate to hunt down those
whom they shall save… The new professionals gain legal
endorsement for creating the need that, by law, they alone
will be allowed to serve” (Ibid. 1977). However, the most
significant backlash against the professions in modern times
undoubtedly came from Margaret Thatcher.
Thatcher’s attacks on the professions
The three Thatcher governments are essential to
understanding the modern evolution of the structure of
British professions. Thatcher’s governments were devastating
for the professions – the first two terms for the public sector
professions, eg medicine and teaching, and the third term for
the legal profession in particular (Burrage 2007). The
Thatcher governments challenged the legal monopolies of
the professions, arguing that the professions should be
required to justify any claims for immunity from legislation
dealing with monopolies (whereas before, the onus of proof
was reversed). Where past administrations had avoided
confrontation with the professions, the Thatcher governments
challenged them head on with proposals for ending restrictive
practices and strengthening the public regulation of
professional bodies (Klein and Day 1996).
British Professions Today: The State of the Sector © Spada Limited 2009 11