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Bench Bulletin - Issue 12 - Kenya Law Reports

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KENYA LAW REPORTS<br />

BENCH BULLETIN<br />

FROM THE COURTS — HIGH COURT<br />

the magistrate’s court erred by admitting the P3 form without calling the maker and without giving the appellant a<br />

chance to object or admit to it. Finally it was the appellant’s submission that the language used during the trial and<br />

whether or not it was understood by the appellant was not on record.<br />

Counsel for the state in objecting to the appeal, submitted that there was no defect in the charge and that the use of<br />

the words “unlawful carnal knowledge” did not make it defective.<br />

Held:<br />

1. The law on use of language was very clear. The language used at the trial did not have to be the accused person’s<br />

mother tongue, nor the language of his choice. All it needed to be was a language clearly understood by the accused.<br />

2. “Causing penetration with a child” and “carnal knowledge” described the same act. It was just a question of<br />

semantics. Penetration was actually a detail of the act but both terms simply meant having sexual intercourse. The fact<br />

that “carnal knowledge” appeared in the Penal Code (Cap 63) and not in the Sexual Offences Act of 2006, did not outlaw<br />

its use in the particulars of the offence. Therefore the use of the said words was not prejudicial to the appellant at all.<br />

3. A retraction would only have arisen if an accused person raised a defence admitting the facts e.g if an accused’s<br />

answer to a charge of murder was, “It is true, I admit the fact but I did not intend to kill him,” that would have completely<br />

negated a plea in that case. However, in a case of defilement it mattered not whether the child gave its consent or whether<br />

she was agreeable to the sexual intercourse. This was a statutory offence and the issue of consent or agreeability would<br />

not arise. Saying that the girl was agreeable did not therefore negate the plea. It did not make it equivocal.<br />

4. Section 77 of the Evidence Act (Cap 80) provided, that in criminal proceedings any document that purported to<br />

be a report under the hand of a Government analyst, medical practitioner or any ballistics expert, document examiner<br />

or geologist upon any person, matter or thing submitted to him for examination or analysis could be used in evidence.<br />

The court could presume that the signature to any such document was genuine and that the person signing it held the<br />

office and qualifications which he professed to hold at the time when he signed it. When any report was so used the<br />

court could, if it thought fit, summon the maker and examine him as to the subject matter thereof. Therefore the P3<br />

form was admissible and since it was not a hearing where viva voce evidence was being adduced, there could not have<br />

been any cross-examination or need to call the maker of the document.<br />

Appeal dismissed<br />

The Hon. Justice Fred A.<br />

Ochieng<br />

Rights of an Accused Person to be Brought to Court within 14 Days of Arrest<br />

Republic v Desmond Mukhaya Mulusa [2010] eKLR<br />

Criminal Case 86 of 2007<br />

April 20, 2010<br />

Judge: Fred A. Ochieng J.<br />

High Court at Nairobi<br />

Reported by Njeri Githang’a<br />

Constitutional <strong>Law</strong>- fundamental rights and freedoms- rights of an accused person- right<br />

to be brought to court within 14 days after arrest- applicant accused of murder-detention of<br />

applicant in police custody for 6 months - onus on the police to demonstrate that the accused<br />

had been taken to court as soon as was reasonably practicable- delay caused by delay in<br />

conducting the post-mortem examination of the victim’s body as the family could not be traced<br />

to identify the body- victim’s family inability to raise the mortuary fees and the post-mortem<br />

fees causing further delay in having the post mortem report released-whether the prosecution<br />

had explained the delay satisfactorily-Constitution sections 70 (a), 72 (3) (b) and 77<br />

Constitutional law-fundamental rights and freedoms-rights of an accused person- accused<br />

person presumed innocent until proven guilty-prosecution submitting that if there was any<br />

breach of the constitutional rights of the accused the court had to apply the provisions of<br />

the Constitution in a wholesome manner- rights of the accused to be weighed as against the<br />

rights of the victim- whether the court could use section 71 of the Constitution as a counter-weight to the provisions of<br />

section 72(3)- obligation of the court to give effect to the section 70 of the Constitution- restrictions and limitations of<br />

constitutional rights –rights subject to respect for the rights and freedoms of others and for public interest – where public<br />

interest required the court to determine whether or not the accused was guilty-whether the violation of constitutional<br />

rights of an accused resulted to an automatic acquittal- Constitution sections 70, 71 and 72 (3).<br />

Constitutional law-fundamental rights and freedoms-remedy for breach of- right of the applicant to sue for compensation<br />

under section 72(6) of the Constitution- the provision an integral part of the Constitution-duty of the court to invoke that<br />

section where section 72(3) has been breached-whether failure to bring the applicant to court within the prescribed time<br />

only entitled him to compensation for breach of his rights- Constitution section 72 (6).<br />

<strong>Issue</strong> <strong>12</strong>: April-June 2010<br />

61

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