BERGER v. CITY OF SEATTLE - ACLU of Washington
BERGER v. CITY OF SEATTLE - ACLU of Washington
BERGER v. CITY OF SEATTLE - ACLU of Washington
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<strong>BERGER</strong> v. <strong>CITY</strong> <strong>OF</strong> <strong>SEATTLE</strong><br />
229<br />
because it deemed the permit requirement—<strong>of</strong> which the<br />
badge requirement is a part—to be invalid. Because we conclude<br />
that the permit requirement satisfies the three conditions<br />
for a time, place, or manner restriction on speech, we must<br />
ask also whether the badge requirement imposes some additional<br />
burden that tips the balance against the rule.<br />
[12] Berger contends that the badge requirement generates<br />
a further impediment to free expression because “[p]erformers<br />
<strong>of</strong>ten wear costumes, which are a carefully-crafted part <strong>of</strong> the<br />
speech itself,” and “[t]he integrity <strong>of</strong> this part <strong>of</strong> the message<br />
may be damaged by a clip-on identification badge.” Berger<br />
rests this claim upon the Court’s decision in Buckley v. American<br />
Constitutional Law Foundation, 525 U.S. 182 (1999), in<br />
which the Court invalidated a Colorado regulation “requiring<br />
[voter-]initiative-petition circulators to wear identification<br />
badges.” Id. at 198.<br />
[13] At first sight, the Seattle Center’s badge requirement<br />
appears similar to that deemed invalid in Buckley: the Seattle<br />
Center’s interest in enforcing its permit requirement can be<br />
likened to Colorado’s aim <strong>of</strong> “enabl[ing] the public to identify,<br />
and the State to apprehend, petition circulators who<br />
engage in misconduct.” Id. at 199. However, a closer reading<br />
<strong>of</strong> Buckley defeats the analogy. Unlike Seattle Center’s<br />
content-neutral badge requirement, Colorado’s badge requirement<br />
targeted speech based upon its message. See id. at 210<br />
(Thomas, J., concurring) (“[T]he regulation must be evaluated<br />
under strict scrutiny [because] the category <strong>of</strong> burdened<br />
speech is defined by its content—Colorado’s badge requirement<br />
does not apply to those who circulate candidate petitions,<br />
only to those who circulate initiative or referendum<br />
proposals.”). Moreover, Colorado’s interest in avoiding voter<br />
fraud was not clearly furthered by the badge requirement and<br />
provided no “sufficient cause” to limit the traditional right to<br />
anonymous political speech. Id. at 200-01.<br />
[14] The Buckley Court’s protection <strong>of</strong> anonymous political<br />
speech does not require us to discern an inviolable right to