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BERGER v. CITY OF SEATTLE - ACLU of Washington

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<strong>BERGER</strong> v. <strong>CITY</strong> <strong>OF</strong> <strong>SEATTLE</strong><br />

rights <strong>of</strong> the State to limit expressive activity are<br />

sharply circumscribed. At one end <strong>of</strong> the spectrum<br />

are streets and parks . . . . In these quintessential<br />

public forums, the government may not prohibit all<br />

communicative activity.<br />

213<br />

Perry, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983). However, “[t]he principles <strong>of</strong><br />

First Amendment are not to be treated as a promise that<br />

everyone with opinions or beliefs to express may gather<br />

around him at any public place and at any time a group for<br />

discussion or instruction.” Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345<br />

U.S. 395, 406 (1953); see also Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S.<br />

697, 716 (1931) (“[P]rotection even as to previous restraint is<br />

not absolutely unlimited.”).<br />

[2] “Expression, whether oral or written or symbolized by<br />

conduct, is subject to reasonable time, place, or manner<br />

restrictions.” Clark v. Comty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468<br />

U.S. 288, 293 (1984). Such restrictions must satisfy three conditions<br />

to be enforceable: (1) they must be “justified without<br />

reference to the content <strong>of</strong> the regulated speech,” 8<br />

(2) they<br />

must be “narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental<br />

interest,” and (3) they must “leave open ample alternative<br />

channels for communication <strong>of</strong> the information.” Id. In applying<br />

this three-pronged test to the five rules challenged at bar,<br />

we review the district court’s grounds for summary judgment<br />

de novo. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000)<br />

(en banc).<br />

8 A rule failing the content-neutrality threshold must withstand strict<br />

scrutiny: “For the State to enforce a content-based exclusion it must show<br />

that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that<br />

it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.” Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 (emphasis<br />

added).

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