COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

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[18] To similar effect is Borins J.A.‟s decision in Dawson v. Rexcraft Storage and
Warehouse Inc. (1998), 164 D.L.R. (4th) 257 (Ont. C.A.), at paras. 20 and 28:
However, in my respectful view, in determining this issue [of
the necessity of a trial] it is necessary that motions judges not
lose sight of their narrow role, not assume the role of a trial
judge and, before granting summary judgment, be satisfied
that it is clear that a trial is unnecessary.
...
[A]t the end of the day, it is clear that the courts accord
significant deference to the trial process as the final arbiter of
the dispute which has brought the parties to litigation. If there
is a genuine issue with respect to material facts then, no
matter how weak, or how strong, may appear the claim, or the
defence, which has been attacked by the moving party, the
case must be sent to trial. It is not for the motions judge to
resolve the issue.
[19] In Aronowicz v. Emtwo Properties Inc., 2010 ONCA 96, 98 O.R. (3d) 641, at para.
15, Blair J.A. recently commented on the effect of the Aguonie and Rexcraft Storage
decisions in restricting the analytical approach of judges on a summary judgment motion:
The proper test for summary judgment – as articulated by
Morden A.C.J.O. in Irving Ungerman Ltd. v. Galanis (1991),
4 O.R. (3d) 545, at pp. 550-51 – is whether there is a genuine
issue of material fact that requires a trial for its resolution.
Neither Aguonie v. Galion Solid Waste Material Inc. (1998),
38 O.R. (3d) 161 (C.A.), nor Dawson v. Rexcraft Storage and
Warehouse Inc. (1998), 164 D.L.R. (4th) 257 (Ont. C.A.) –
the two summary judgment authorities most referred to in this
province – alter this test. Indeed, they affirm it. What
Aguonie and Dawson and their jurisprudential progeny have
done is develop a more restricted view of the analytical
approach to be adopted by the summary judgment motion