- Page 1 and 2: INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCE
- Page 3 and 4: Finding of Fact 16, paragraph 1: Co
- Page 5 and 6: This item was resolved in November
- Page 7 and 8: Action: We concur with this recomme
- Page 9 and 10: (MSC) by the Commandant. Accordingl
- Page 11 and 12: Action: We concur with this recomme
- Page 13: c. Catcher - Processor Boat - Secon
- Page 17 and 18: NAVTEX NM NMFS NOAA NOK NPFVOA NVIC
- Page 19 and 20: Registered Depth: Place Constructed
- Page 21 and 22: Name: G.W. Kandris Position: Asst.
- Page 23 and 24: . Hold Level. The hold level contai
- Page 25 and 26: cleaned of all viscera and blood. T
- Page 27 and 28: Figure 5 Main Deck Drawing (Disrega
- Page 29 and 30: The equipment locations were as bel
- Page 31 and 32: facilitated the movement of the cat
- Page 33 and 34: . Departure from St. Paul. The vess
- Page 35 and 36: David Olney. There were no manageme
- Page 37 and 38: d. Same Owner, New Operator. In 199
- Page 39 and 40: Figure 18 Photo of sump pump simila
- Page 41 and 42: 14. INDUSTRY STANDARDS AND GUIDELIN
- Page 43 and 44: time. It is very likely the weather
- Page 45 and 46: Figure 21 Graphic depiction of a Sk
- Page 47 and 48: d. SafetyNET Receivers. There are t
- Page 49 and 50: 18. COMMERCIAL FISHING VESSEL SAFET
- Page 51 and 52: the NPFVOA, which is considered by
- Page 53 and 54: unless the processing space is kept
- Page 55 and 56: The Marine Board received testimony
- Page 57 and 58: Figure 27 Picture from side scannin
- Page 59 and 60: Open door from processor room to tr
- Page 61 and 62: 17. Ten of the fifteen crew began w
- Page 63 and 64: 55. The ARCTIC ROSE is sitting upri
- Page 65 and 66:
ANALYSIS VESSEL STABILITY The Marin
- Page 67 and 68:
Figure 31 Universal plotting sheet
- Page 69 and 70:
CONCLUSIONS 1. The exact cause of t
- Page 71 and 72:
9. The Marine Board identified a so
- Page 73 and 74:
RECOMMENDATIONS Regulatory Changes
- Page 75:
damage control, and training requir
- Page 78 and 79:
MARINE BOARD SUMMARY OF ACTIONS The
- Page 80 and 81:
Appendix 2 HF PROPAGATION REPORT 1
- Page 82 and 83:
REAL TIME T INDICES FOR AUSTRALIAN
- Page 84 and 85:
Appendix 3 STABILITY ANALYSIS 2 2 T
- Page 86 and 87:
SCENARIO 1 PROGRESSIVE FLOODING INT
- Page 88 and 89:
SCENARIOS THAT COULD LEAD TO THE LO
- Page 90 and 91:
lose all positive stability. Even a
- Page 92 and 93:
SCENARIO 3 PROGRESSIVE FLOODING INT
- Page 94 and 95:
SCENARIOS THAT COULD LEAD TO THE LO
- Page 96 and 97:
starboard of only 23°. Based on th
- Page 98 and 99:
SCENARIO 5 THROUGH HULL FITTING FAI
- Page 100 and 101:
SCENARIO 6 THROUGH HULL FITTING FAI
- Page 102 and 103:
SCENARIO 7 THROUGH HULL FITTING FAI
- Page 104 and 105:
SCENARIO 8 STRUCK OBJECT OR COLLISI
- Page 106 and 107:
SCENARIOS THAT COULD LEAD TO THE LO
- Page 108 and 109:
SCENARIOS THAT COULD LEAD TO THE LO
- Page 110 and 111:
SCENARIOS THAT COULD LEAD TO THE LO
- Page 112 and 113:
Conclusion 5. Based on the extremel
- Page 114 and 115:
SCENARIO 12 LOSS OF KEEL BALLAST Me
- Page 116 and 117:
SCENARIO 13 OVERLOADED WITH EXCESS
- Page 118 and 119:
SCENARIO 14 STRUCTURAL FAILURE Meth
- Page 120 and 121:
SCENARIO 15 SYNCHRONOUS ROLL Method
- Page 122 and 123:
SCENARIO 16 SEVERE WIND CAPSIZES VE
- Page 124 and 125:
SCENARIO 17 SWAMPING OF VESSEL DUE
- Page 126 and 127:
SCENARIO 18 TRAWLING NET SNAGS ON B
- Page 128 and 129:
SCENARIO 19 OVERLOADED DUE TO ICING
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The Marine Board faced a daunting t
- Page 132 and 133:
The voyage from Unalaska, Alaska to
- Page 134:
The team arrived on-scene on August