marine board report - Off Soundings

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message would have to be viewed prior to deleting it from the queue. The system operator has to program the INMARSAT-C system to receive messages based on the location of the terminal to avoid overloading the system with excessive messages from other broadcast stations. Mr. John Nelson provided testimony to the Marine Board indicating the ALASKAN ROSE did receive countless messages from Russia but did not receive the distress message until several hours after it was sent by D17 RCC. Figure 22 Diagram of SafetyNET Network 31
18. COMMERCIAL FISHING VESSEL SAFETY PROGRAM Congress passed the Commercial Fishing Vessel Safety Act of 1988, which requires certain lifesaving equipment aboard commercial fishing vessels. The voluntary dockside exams were instituted as part of the CFVSA. The purpose of the Coast Guard’s CFVSE program is to ensure that fishing vessels have the proper life saving equipment for the area of operation based on a number of factors such as vessel size, area of operation, etc. The CFVSE does not evaluate the vessel’s structure, hull integrity, critical systems or crew competence. Therefore, the program focuses on emergency response by emphasizing emergency drills and safety equipment that will aid the mariner should a casualty occur. The Coast Guard instituted the voluntary dockside examination program through the promulgation of COMDINST 16711.13B, Implementation of the Commercial Fishing Industry Vessel Regulations, dated November 1, 1996. The instruction provides Coast Guard units with guidance to perform voluntary dockside exams. a. Voluntary Dockside Exam Program. The ARCTIC ROSE had a voluntary dockside examination based on its operation as a H & G vice a fish processor, receiving a valid CFVSE decal (#74701). It was issued in Unalaska on September 9, 1999, by a Petty Officer from the Marine Safety Detachment. The Marine Safety Information System case number for the inspection is MI99030162. Marine Safety Office Anchorage pursues an aggressive prevention approach to the CFVSE program. The unit deploys CFVSE examiners and marine inspectors to fishing ports prior to the King and Opelio crab seasons and other high risk fishery openers. The examiners board the vessels prior to their departure to evaluate vessel stability and safety equipment. Using existing authority, the COTP prohibits a vessel’s departure until noted safety deficiencies are corrected. MSO Anchorage’s proactive enforcement has made a positive contribution to safety, recording no loss of life during these high risk fisheries from 1999 - 2001. MSO Anchorage also works in concert with the state of Alaska and NMFS observers. MSO personnel supplement the NMFS observer safety training course to provide the observers with basic safety skills and an overview of the CFVSE program. This interagency partnership facilitates the communication of safety issues that NMFS and State observers encounter while on board a fishing vessel to the Coast Guard. There has been concern expressed by NMFS personnel that this information is considered proprietary in nature and should not be passed to the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard is currently working with NMFS to address these concerns. b. At Sea Boardings. All vessels, including commercial fishing vessels, are subject to at sea boardings by the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard’s at sea boarding policy is outlined in ALDIST 062/92 and the MLEM Manual COMDTINST M16247.1. The ALDIST message provides guidance for the Coast Guard’s cutters to perform at sea boardings and details the safety equipment the boarding team should focus on. The ARCTIC ROSE was boarded by a team from the USCGC STORIS (WMEC 38) on February 25, 2001, approximately 19.5 nautical miles off Otter Point, Alaska, in position 55°22.8N/163°52.4’W. The boarding team consisted of five members with LTjg Katherine Fox acting as the boarding team leader. The team introduced themselves to the Master, 32
Page 1 and 2: INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCE
Page 3 and 4: Finding of Fact 16, paragraph 1: Co
Page 5 and 6: This item was resolved in November
Page 7 and 8: Action: We concur with this recomme
Page 9 and 10: (MSC) by the Commandant. Accordingl
Page 11 and 12: Action: We concur with this recomme
Page 13 and 14: c. Catcher - Processor Boat - Secon
Page 15 and 16: LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1 Profile dr
Page 17 and 18: NAVTEX NM NMFS NOAA NOK NPFVOA NVIC
Page 19 and 20: Registered Depth: Place Constructed
Page 21 and 22: Name: G.W. Kandris Position: Asst.
Page 23 and 24: . Hold Level. The hold level contai
Page 25 and 26: cleaned of all viscera and blood. T
Page 27 and 28: Figure 5 Main Deck Drawing (Disrega
Page 29 and 30: The equipment locations were as bel
Page 31 and 32: facilitated the movement of the cat
Page 33 and 34: . Departure from St. Paul. The vess
Page 35 and 36: David Olney. There were no manageme
Page 37 and 38: d. Same Owner, New Operator. In 199
Page 39 and 40: Figure 18 Photo of sump pump simila
Page 41 and 42: 14. INDUSTRY STANDARDS AND GUIDELIN
Page 43 and 44: time. It is very likely the weather
Page 45 and 46: Figure 21 Graphic depiction of a Sk
Page 47: d. SafetyNET Receivers. There are t
Page 51 and 52: the NPFVOA, which is considered by
Page 53 and 54: unless the processing space is kept
Page 55 and 56: The Marine Board received testimony
Page 57 and 58: Figure 27 Picture from side scannin
Page 59 and 60: Open door from processor room to tr
Page 61 and 62: 17. Ten of the fifteen crew began w
Page 63 and 64: 55. The ARCTIC ROSE is sitting upri
Page 65 and 66: ANALYSIS VESSEL STABILITY The Marin
Page 67 and 68: Figure 31 Universal plotting sheet
Page 69 and 70: CONCLUSIONS 1. The exact cause of t
Page 71 and 72: 9. The Marine Board identified a so
Page 73 and 74: RECOMMENDATIONS Regulatory Changes
Page 75: damage control, and training requir
Page 78 and 79: MARINE BOARD SUMMARY OF ACTIONS The
Page 80 and 81: Appendix 2 HF PROPAGATION REPORT 1
Page 82 and 83: REAL TIME T INDICES FOR AUSTRALIAN
Page 84 and 85: Appendix 3 STABILITY ANALYSIS 2 2 T
Page 86 and 87: SCENARIO 1 PROGRESSIVE FLOODING INT
Page 88 and 89: SCENARIOS THAT COULD LEAD TO THE LO
Page 90 and 91: lose all positive stability. Even a
Page 92 and 93: SCENARIO 3 PROGRESSIVE FLOODING INT
Page 94 and 95: SCENARIOS THAT COULD LEAD TO THE LO
Page 96 and 97: starboard of only 23°. Based on th
Page 98 and 99:
SCENARIO 5 THROUGH HULL FITTING FAI
Page 100 and 101:
Page 102 and 103:
Page 104 and 105:
SCENARIO 8 STRUCK OBJECT OR COLLISI
Page 106 and 107:
SCENARIOS THAT COULD LEAD TO THE LO
Page 108 and 109:
Page 110 and 111:
Page 112 and 113:
Conclusion 5. Based on the extremel
Page 114 and 115:
SCENARIO 12 LOSS OF KEEL BALLAST Me
Page 116 and 117:
SCENARIO 13 OVERLOADED WITH EXCESS
Page 118 and 119:
SCENARIO 14 STRUCTURAL FAILURE Meth
Page 120 and 121:
SCENARIO 15 SYNCHRONOUS ROLL Method
Page 122 and 123:
SCENARIO 16 SEVERE WIND CAPSIZES VE
Page 124 and 125:
SCENARIO 17 SWAMPING OF VESSEL DUE
Page 126 and 127:
SCENARIO 18 TRAWLING NET SNAGS ON B
Page 128 and 129:
SCENARIO 19 OVERLOADED DUE TO ICING
Page 130 and 131:
The Marine Board faced a daunting t
Page 132 and 133:
The voyage from Unalaska, Alaska to
Page 134:
The team arrived on-scene on August
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marine board report - Off Soundings

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