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2009 SMS Pilot Project (SMSPP) Analysis - FAA

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Figure 3-4 shows the levels of the criticality of products produced by PAHs and their effects on<br />

safety. If the <strong>FAA</strong> proceeds in a direction where scaling is necessary, these categories could be<br />

considered when deciding how to allocate resources.<br />

Figure 3-4: Criticality of Products Produced by Production Approval Holders<br />

Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5<br />

A product or part(s)<br />

A product or part(s)<br />

A product or part(s)<br />

thereof whose failure<br />

thereof, whose failure<br />

thereof whose failure<br />

would not prevent<br />

COULD, IF OTHER<br />

would not prevent<br />

continued safe flight<br />

CONDITIONS<br />

continued safe flight<br />

and landing; resulting<br />

EXISTED, prevent<br />

and landing; resulting<br />

consequences<br />

continued safe flight<br />

consequences<br />

COULD reduce the<br />

and landing; resulting<br />

WOULD reduce the<br />

capability of the<br />

consequences could<br />

capability of the<br />

aircraft or the ability<br />

reduce safety margins,<br />

aircraft or the ability<br />

of the crew to cope<br />

degrade performance,<br />

of the crew to cope<br />

with adverse operating<br />

or cause loss of<br />

with adverse operating<br />

conditions or<br />

capability to conduct<br />

conditions or<br />

subsequent failures.<br />

certain flight<br />

subsequent failures.<br />

A product or part(s)<br />

thereof whose failure<br />

would have LITTLE<br />

TO NO effect on<br />

continued safe flight<br />

and landing of the<br />

aircraft.<br />

A product or part(s)<br />

thereof whose failure<br />

COULD DIRECTLY<br />

prevent continued safe<br />

flight and landing;<br />

resulting<br />

consequences could<br />

reduce safety margins,<br />

degrade performance,<br />

or cause loss of<br />

capability to conduct<br />

certain flight<br />

operations.<br />

operations.<br />

CPL CAT III CPL CAT II CPL CAT I<br />

Figure 3-5 shows the number and percentage of PAHs in 2011 that were producing the various<br />

levels of products depicted in Figure 3-5. Only 15% of PAHs produce critical (level 5) products<br />

versus 62% producing non-critical (level 1) products. This data provides a quantitative<br />

perspective that needs to be further examined regarding the potential safety benefits should the<br />

<strong>FAA</strong> proceed with rulemaking using a very broad approach (consideration 3).<br />

Figure 3-5: Number of PAHs by Production Approval Type 2011<br />

RBRT Criticality UC<br />

Level 5, 275, 15%<br />

Level 4 , 53, 3%<br />

Level 3, 335, 18%<br />

Level 2, 42, 2%<br />

Level 1, 1121,<br />

62%<br />

Level 1<br />

Level 2<br />

Level 3<br />

Level 4<br />

Level 5<br />

17

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