The Right to Dignity Rex D. Glensy - Columbia Law School

2011] The Right to Dignity 93
erratic within the selfcontained doctrine of a single amendment.
Nevertheless, dignity is routinely invoked to make extremely
foundational points that range from the notion that the right to
dignity is the underlying source of some of the most important rights
in the Bill of Rights and the Reconstruction Amendments, to
statements that dignity is the motivating force behind the whole
Constitution itself: “the essential dignity and worth of every human
being [is] a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered
liberty.” 135 Thus, under the rubric of dignity rights, we have observed
dignity as a barrier to illicit state behavior, dignity as autonomy,
dignity as liberty, dignity as respect, and dignity as basic decency.
From all of these different strands, the right to dignity emerges as an
ideational core that is synonymous with a certain purity of purpose
that breathes life into the constitutional text. Moreover, while it
might sometimes be understated or not stated at all, it is undeniably
present within the judicial interpretation of some of the
Constitution’s most vital provisions.
The federal constitution is not the only impetus behind the
judicial conversation pertaining to the right to dignity. Some state
constitutions, such as those of Illinois, 136 Louisiana, 137 and Montana 138
the premise of individual dignity and choice upon which our political system
rests”); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264–65 (1970) (holding that procedural
due process requires a pretermination hearing for welfare recipients because of
the United States’ “basic commitment . . . to foster the dignity and wellbeing of
all persons within its borders”); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 457, 460 (1966)
(stating that “the constitutional foundation underlying the privilege [against self
incrimination] is the respect a government . . . must accord to the dignity and
integrity of its citizens,” and emotional pressure exerted on a suspect in custody is
“destructive of human dignity”); United States v. Balysis, 524 U.S. 666, 713
(noting that “the privilege [against self incrimination] recognizes the
unseemliness, the insult to human dignity, created when a person must convict
himself out of his own mouth . . . .”) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Cruzan v. Missouri,
497 U.S. 261, 302 (arguing that individuals should have a substantive due process
right “to die with dignity”) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
135. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring); see
also William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary
Ratification, 27 S. Tex. L. Rev. 433, 438 (1986) (stating that the Constitution “is a
sublime oration on the dignity of man, a bold commitment by a people to the ideal
of libertarian dignity protected through law”).
136. See Ill. Const. art. I, § 8.1(a)(1) (“Crime victims . . . shall have the . . .
right to be treated with fairness and respect for their dignity and privacy
throughout the criminal justice process”); Ill. Const. art. I, § 20 (“To promote
individual dignity, communications that portray criminality, depravity or lack of
virtue in, or that incite violence, hatred, abuse or hostility toward, a person or