The Right to Dignity Rex D. Glensy - Columbia Law School
The Right to Dignity Rex D. Glensy - Columbia Law School
The Right to Dignity Rex D. Glensy - Columbia Law School
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2011] <strong>The</strong> <strong>Right</strong> <strong>to</strong> <strong>Dignity</strong> 137<br />
While it is true that “[a] proclamation of a right is not the fulfillment<br />
of a right . . . [and] may or may not be an initial step <strong>to</strong>ward the<br />
fulfillment of the rights listed,” 326 it is nevertheless an important<br />
signal that will, over the course of time, first affect the reputation of<br />
those that disregard its exhortations, and later operate <strong>to</strong> change<br />
behavior in consonance with its desired goals.<br />
One of the facets of the expressive approach <strong>to</strong> the right <strong>to</strong><br />
dignity is that the horta<strong>to</strong>ry language can be found both in legislative<br />
materials and in judicial opinions that interpret provisions which<br />
themselves might not have a significant expressive element. As <strong>to</strong> the<br />
first category, horta<strong>to</strong>ry clauses are not a novelty in American<br />
jurisprudence; both the Constitution (see the “wellregulated militia”<br />
language of the Second Amendment) and state constitutions (see the<br />
dignity clause of the Illinois Constitution) 327 have them. As <strong>to</strong> the<br />
second category, there are numerous judicial pronouncements<br />
concerning the right <strong>to</strong> dignity that stem from private rights of action<br />
or constitutional clauses that do not have facially expressive content.<br />
Nevertheless, the right <strong>to</strong> dignity is invoked <strong>to</strong> signal the weight <strong>to</strong> be<br />
given the pronouncement. Thus, for example, in the Eighth<br />
Amendment context, the right <strong>to</strong> dignity language appears when the<br />
Court wants <strong>to</strong> make the moorings of its cruel and unusual<br />
punishment jurisprudence abundantly clear. <strong>The</strong> Court emphasized<br />
in Trop v. Dulles—which enunciated, over fifty years ago, the modern<br />
Eighth Amendment standard—that the very purpose of the Eighth<br />
Amendment “is nothing less than the dignity of man.” 328 <strong>The</strong>se<br />
rhe<strong>to</strong>rical flourishes are not only confined <strong>to</strong> the Eighth Amendment<br />
context, but reveal themselves at regular intervals. Justice Murphy’s<br />
exhortation in his dissent in Yamashita bears repeating: “[w]hile<br />
peoples in other lands may not share our beliefs as <strong>to</strong> . . . the dignity<br />
of the individual, we are not free <strong>to</strong> give effect <strong>to</strong> our emotions in<br />
reckless disregard of the rights of others.” 329 To Justice Murphy, the<br />
rhe<strong>to</strong>rical use of “the dignity of the individual” signaled something<br />
326. Henry Shue, Basic <strong>Right</strong>s: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign<br />
Policy 15 (2d ed. 1996).<br />
327. See AIDA v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., 772 N.E.2d 953, 957, 961 (Ill.<br />
App. Ct. 2002) (construing the dignity clause of the Illinois Constitution <strong>to</strong> be<br />
horta<strong>to</strong>ry and thus comprising neither a cause of action nor a curtailment of<br />
government conduct).<br />
328. See e.g. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 587 (O’Connor, J.,<br />
dissenting) (referring <strong>to</strong> “this Nation’s evolving standards of human dignity”<br />
within the context of the Eighth Amendment).<br />
329. See Yamashita v. Styer, 327 U.S. 1, 41 (1946) (Murphy J., dissenting<br />
from the denial of a petition for certiorari).