1959 NORAD CONAD History Jul-Dec.pdf - US Northern Command

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the possibility of saturation very remote, it was declared.
As for vulnerability, it was pointed out in
the study that many of the Mode III facilities (NCC's,
MDC's) were near metropolitan c.:enters which made them
as vulnerable as the SAGE DC's. Furthermore, in the
era of supersonic speeds and precision control, the
most effective, integrated system possible was necessary
f to profitably employ the weapons. To plan to revert to
manual operations, which actually would be only a partial
system under Mode tIl, for ,,,ffc-ctive employment was
being very optimistic, the stu~. ~aid_
,
Secondly, ADC contended that ~he soli\'.; state computer
in its hardened configuration would eliminate the
requirement for any type of Modv [IT operation. The
requirement for Model '11 woula ile .:mly an interim measure
prier to SCC operation. Ant~ ti:e primary purpose! of
Mode II was a back-up to SA(,E.
Finally, the ADC stud:>' said that ADC clicl not have
the resources to support a Mode I[T back-up and that
if it did provide the resourc~s th€- SAGE system would
be degraded. ADC said it could not provide the manning,
communications. and training neces~ary for Mode III unless
they w~re diverted from SAGE,
Ge:ae;:::-al Partl'idge l'l;:plieo .m 'd: ,July 1959 that the
NORAD rec'J,llirement for a non..SAGEi; \ck-up method of exercising
operat ional control of all '.v,~apons was valid UDtil
the SCC s:·stem was operational and could not be
withdrawn. Iiowever, GE:!neral Partl'idge said that because
of ADC's problem in sUPPo,r!ing Mod:' III, NORAD would
work out a means of reduc ing the C Jrrent "across-theboard"
requireml~!~,t. NORAD woul