70-years-chart-illustrates-the-dominance-by-the-cfr-trilaterals-bilderbergers

The piece then reviews a variety of ways in which we've done this in the IMF, in the
non-proliferation regime, both bilaterally and multilaterally, and on the whole gives
the administration, you know, a decent grade in terms of doing this. Now certain
things have handicapped it.
One is the fact that it's easy to paint this administration as unilateralist and belligerent,
and as a result, there are ways in which, even if it's doing things for the right reasons, it
might be accused by some states of doing things for the wrong reasons. So therefore, this
creates a lot of suspicion.
The second problem which was going to be inevitable to this enterprise is that if
you're trying to cut in rising powers, sort of by the nature of power you're
undercutting states that are falling, and the states in this case are the members of
the European Union. And while they see the handwriting on the wall as well, you
know, it's not like France and Great Britain are going to be giving up their U.N. Security
Council seats any time soon.
So as a result, the administration on the one hand faces a thankless task, because trying to
rewrite the rules of global governance are not easy. But at the same time, I'm arguing
that if they don't do it, if China and India aren't made to feel like they are responsible, you
know, great power members of the existing world order, they're going to go out and
create institutions of their own, and the institutions that they create might not necessarily
be ones that the United States would like to see.
ROSE: So let's start back for a second with the idea that the Bush administration
actually sees this new world order and thinks of it in terms of a multilateral,
institutional approach -- that runs counter to most people's view of the Bush
administration, so talk a little bit about that. Is the view that the conventional view
of the Bush administration that's devoted to unilateralism and not caring about
world order and -- or caring only about primacy if it does think of world order, is
that wrong or is this occupying a place alongside it How does this -- how does the
picture you're talking about coexist with the one that other people see
DREZNER: I would not say that that perception is wrong as much as it is
incomplete. Obviously -- you know, particularly if you looked at the first term, you
know, it would be hard to say that the United States, you know, did not act in a
unilateral manner. And certainly the invasion of Iraq has -- you know, is the sort of
apotheosis of this.
The problem is that does obscure a second component of the Bush administration's
grand strategy. And they were clear about this in 2002 as well as in the 2006
reformulation, which is the U.S. sees itself at a moment in time where it actually has
somewhat decent relations with the -- most of the other great powers out there, and
if it can therefore form, you know, what's the great power concert to try to, you
know, sort of regulate world politics, it will do so.