Rufo v. OJ Simpson - Right Of Publicity

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Cal. 3d 573, 584-587, 209 Cal. Rptr. 664, 693 P.2d 243 [victim's
statement, 17 months before the killing, indicating fear of the
defendant was not admissible to show victim's state of mind on the
night of the murder, where the defense identified a third person as the
killer and raised no issue about the victim's attitude toward defendant
or any issue that the killing was accidental or justifiable]; People v.
Ruiz (1988) 44 Cal. 3d 589, 607-610, 244 Cal. Rptr. 200, 749 P.2d 854
[victims' statements of fear of defendant were not admissible to show
their states of mind; victims 1 and 2 were murdered in their sleep and
there was no issue as to their conduct prior to the killings; victim
3's statement did not support prosecution theory of faltering marriage
as motive for killing; but error harmless in light of limiting
instruction]; and People v. Noguera (1992) 4 Cal. 4th 599, 621-622, 842
P.2d 1160 [victim's statement of fear and hatred of defendant was not
admissible to show victim's state [**35] of mind, where her conduct
and state of mind were not relevant to any part of the People's case
nor did the defense raise any issue of her state of mind or behavior
before she was murdered, the entire defense being alibi; but error
harmless in light of limiting instruction].)
[*596] Here, plaintiffs presented specific theories why Nicole's
state of mind about her relationship to Simpson was relevant to
Simpson's reasons for killing her.
Other Points
Simpson raises several other points about the admission of this
evidence, all without merit. Simpson points out that the state of mind
exception to the hearsay rule "does not make admissible evidence of a
statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or
believed." (Evid. Code, @ 1250, subd. (b).) This point is irrelevant
because the evidence was admitted solely for the limited purpose of
showing Nicole's state of mind, not "to prove the fact remembered or
believed." Simpson contends the statements in the call to the battered
women's shelter which tended to identify the caller as Nicole (the
caller stated her name was Nicole, she was Caucasian, she was in her
30's, she had been married 8 years but was divorced, she had two
children under 10, she was living in West Los Angeles, and her exhusband
was famous) were themselves inadmissible hearsay. They were
not. They were not admitted "to prove the truth of the matter stated,"
because there was no material disputed issue in the case concerning
Nicole's biographical history. These statements were introduced only as
circumstantial evidence tending to identify the caller. They were
properly admissible for this nonhearsay circumstantial evidence
purpose. ( People v. Herman (1920) 49 Cal. App. 592, 595-596, 193 P.
868; People v. McGaughran (1961) 197 Cal. App. 2d 6, 16, 17 Cal. Rptr.
121; People v. Hess (1970) 10 Cal. App. 3d 1071, 1078-1079, 90 Cal.
Rptr. 268; Dege v. United States (9th Cir. 1962) 308 F.2d 534, 535-
536.)
Simpson contends that even if his hearsay and relevance objections
lacked merit, the trial court nevertheless should have excluded this
relevant evidence as unduly prejudicial, pursuant to Evidence Code
section 352. (Fn. 2, ante.) It is for the trial court, in its
discretion, to determine whether the probative value of relevant
evidence is outweighed by a substantial danger of undue prejudice. The
appellate court may not interfere with the trial court's determination