Rufo v. OJ Simpson - Right Of Publicity

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to keep it if we stay together, as a reminder. There was also that
time before Justin [was born and a few months] after Sydney [was born]
I felt really good about how I got back in shape [and] we were out[,]
you beat the holy hell out of me [and] we lied at the x-ray lab [and]
said I fell off a bike. Remember! And since Justin['s] birth is the
mad New Years Eve beat up. I just don't see how that compares to
infidelity, wife beating, verbal abuse. And if I wanted to hurt you or
had it in me to be anything like the person you are I would have done
so after the New Year incident. But I didn't even do it then. I called
the cops to save my life whether you believe it or not. But I didn't
pursue anything after that. I didn't prosecute, I didn't call the press
[and] didn't make a big charade out of it. I waited for it to die down
and asked for it to. But I've never loved you since or been the same."
The trial court expressly limited the scope of this evidence to
Nicole's state of mind and not the truth of what occurred in the
underlying incidents. [*590] In addition to instructing the jury
generally that evidence admitted for a limited purpose may not be
considered for any other purpose, the court at least twice instructed
the jury specifically regarding the letter that it was admitted into
evidence only "for the limited purpose of demonstrating Nicole Brown
Simpson's state of mind regarding her relationship with defendant
Simpson. You are not to consider any of the statements contained in
that letter as evidence that the events described in the letter
occurred."
Discussion
Spontaneous Statements to Police
As discussed in the previous section, the prior incidents of abuse
were relevant and admissible to show motive, intent, and identity.
Nicole's statements describing those incidents were therefore relevant,
and they were admissible if they came within an exception to the
hearsay rule. Nicole's statements to responding officers on the dates
of the 1984 and 1989 incidents were properly admitted under the
spontaneous statement exception to the hearsay rule. Evidence Code
section 1240 provides, "Evidence of a statement is not made
inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement: [P] (a) Purports to
narrate, describe, or explain an act, condition, or event perceived by
the declarant; and [P] (b) Was made spontaneously while the declarant
was under the stress of excitement caused by such perception." This
codifies a common law exception to hearsay. The requirements for this
exception are: (1) there must be an occurrence startling enough to
produce nervous excitement and render the utterance spontaneous and
unreflecting; (2) the utterance must be made before there has been time
to contrive and misrepresent, while the nervous excitement still
dominates and the reflective powers are still in abeyance; and (3) the
utterance must relate to the circumstance of the occurrence preceding
it. (People v. Poggi (1988) 45 Cal. 3d 306, 318, 246 Cal. Rptr. 886,
753 P.2d 1082.) A statement that satisfies these elements is deemed
sufficiently trustworthy to be received as evidence for the truth of
the matter asserted despite its hearsay nature. (Ibid.; People v.
Hughey (1987) 194 Cal. App. 3d 1383, 1392-1393, 240
Cal. Rptr. 269.)