Rufo v. OJ Simpson - Right Of Publicity

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Simpson contends the trial court erred in admitting evidence of five
instances of Simpson's prior abuse of Nicole. This evidence showed: (1)
outside a veterinary clinic around the spring of 1983, Simpson
approached [*585] Nicole's car, tried to pull off Nicole's fur coat,
and hit Nicole in the face, saying he "didn't buy this fur coat for you
to go fuck somebody else"; (2) in 1984, Simpson lost his temper and
struck Nicole's Mercedes with a baseball bat; (3) at a public beach in
July 1986, Simpson slapped Nicole and she fell to the sand; (4) on New
Years Day 1989, Simpson and Nicole had a violent argument during which
he pulled her hair and struck her on the face or head, for which
Simpson pleaded nolo contendere to spousal abuse; and (5) during a rage
in October 1993, Simpson broke a door of Nicole's residence.
Simpson contends this evidence showed nothing more than bad
character or a propensity for violence, which is inadmissible under
Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (a). n1 But that section
further provides, "Nothing in this section prohibits the admission of
evidence that a person committed a crime, civil wrong, or other act
when relevant to prove some fact (such as motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident
. . .) other than his or her disposition to commit such an act."(Evid.
Code, @ 1101, subd. (b); People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal. 4th 380, 393,
867 P.2d 757.) The trial court denied Simpson's motion in limine to
exclude this evidence. The court ruled the evidence was admissible to
show motive, intent, and identity.
n1 Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (a) provides, "Except as
provided in this section [and certain other sections], evidence of a
person's character or a trait of his or her character (whether in the
form of an opinion, evidence of reputation, or evidence of specific
instances of his or her conduct) is inadmissible when offered to prove
his or her conduct on a specified occasion."
Simpson contends that since he denied being the perpetrator, the
intent with which the killings were committed was not genuinely in
issue. He contends the prior instances of abuse did not tend to
establish a motive for these killings and were not similar to these
killings. He misplaces reliance on cases stating that in order to be
admissible to prove identity, prior acts and charged acts must bear
striking and distinctive similarities so as to support a reasonable
inference that the same person committed both. ( People v. Ewoldt,
supra, 7 Cal. 4th at p. 403; People v. Haston (1968) 69 Cal. 2d 233,
246, 70 Cal. Rptr. 419, 444 P.2d 91.)
The requirement for a distinctive modus operandi does not apply when
the prior and charged acts involve the same perpetrator and the same
victim. The courts have concluded that evidence of prior quarrels
between the same parties is obviously relevant on the issue whether the
accused committed the charged acts. ( People v. Cartier (1960) 54 Cal.
2d 300, 311, 5 Cal. Rptr. 573, 353 P.2d 53; People v. Daniels (1971) 16
Cal. App. 3d 36, 46, 93 Cal. Rptr. 628; People v. Haylock (1980) 113
Cal. App. 3d 146, 150, 169 Cal. Rptr. [*586] 658; People v. Zack
(1986) 184 Cal. App. 3d 409, 413-415, 229 Cal. Rptr. 317; People v.
Linkenauger (1995) 32 Cal. App. 4th 1603, 1609-1614; see People v.
Beamon (1973) 8 Cal. 3d 625, 633, 105 Cal. Rptr. 681, 504 P.2d 905;
People v. Benton (1979) 100 Cal. App. 3d 92, 98, 161 Cal. Rptr. 12;