NYS Public Health Legal Manual: A Guide for Judges, Attorneys ...

NEW YORK STATE PUBLIC HEALTH LEGAL MANUAL § 1.30
[1.30] G. Involuntary Isolation and Quarantine:
Constitutional Standards
[1.31] 1. Substantive Due Process
Involuntary confinement, either by isolation or quarantine, directly
affects a fundamental right—the right to liberty—and the requirements
of substantive due process compel the locality to demonstrate that it has a
“substantial government interest” in that confinement. See Joyner v.
Dumpson, 712 F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1983). Cf. Beatie v. City of New York, 123
F.3d 707 (2d Cir. 1997) [using “rational relationship” test for substantive
due process challenge not involving a fundamental right]. In sustaining
the “substantial government interest” in the involuntary confinement of an
individual, the government must show (1) that the specific individual, in
fact, poses a danger to society, see O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563,
575 (1975), and (2) that the same basic purpose—sustaining the “substantial
government interest” cannot be achieved by less drastic means, i.e.,
the “least restrictive alternative.” Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488
(1960); City of New York v. Doe, 205 A.D.2d 469 (1st Dep’t 1994)
[upholding involuntary isolation of TB patient]; City of New York v. Antoinette
R., 165 Misc. 2d 1014 (Sup. Ct., Queens Co., 1995) [same]; Best v.
St. Vincent’s Hospital, 2003 WL 21518829 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), report and
recommendation adopted, 2003 WL 21767656 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), aff’d in
part, vacated in part, dismissed in part sub nom. Best v. Bellevue Hospital,
2004 WL 2166316, 115 Fed. Appx. 459 (2d Cir. 2004) [upholding
City Health Code procedures for involuntary isolation of TB patients and
upholding isolation of plaintiff].
[1.32] 2. Procedural Due Process
Deprivation of a liberty interest also requires procedural due process.
Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127 (1990). In cases challenging involuntary
civil commitment, the courts have followed the standards of the
seminal case of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), in determining
the adequacy of the commitment and retention process—requiring
a weighing of the risk of erroneous deprivation of a person’s liberty
(including the possible value of additional safeguards) against the government’s
interest in the confinement (which can include consideration of fiscal
and administrative burdens). See Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d
960, 975-76 (2d Cir. 1983). In civil commitment cases, procedural due
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