Rocznik_2014-215

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16 Mladen Karadzoski, Artur Adamczyk to re-establish relations and trade exchange between them. In 1995, they signed an agreement, but the problem of the name remained unsolved. As a result of the turn in Greece’s policy, upon Greece’s motion, FYROM was admitted to the Council of Europe and the OSCE. 20 From the second half of the 1990s, the relations between Greece and Macedonia were considerably improving. Greece became Macedonia’s primary trade partner and the largest foreign investor. Macedonian politicians were also becoming aware that their path to the family of European democracies led through Greece. Macedonia has a very bad geopolitical and demographic situation. With the Albanian minority constituting almost 23 per cent of the population and being still unsatisfied with its status, with borders with Albania and Kosovo, FYROM is permanently in the state of potential threat. 21 This state of insecurity was further highlighted by the 2001 Albanian insurgency in Macedonia. Concerned that the conflict might escalate to neighbouring countries, the EU and US diplomacy quickly intervened and the conflict ended in the conclusion of the Ohrid Agreement. 22 In order to ensure its security, FYROM applied for membership in the NATO and the EU in 2004. The decision of admitting Macedonia to these organisations, however, depends largely on the government in Athens, as it has a veto right on the enlargement of both structures. Greek politicians try to take advantage of the situation and use the membership in the organisations as leverage to force Macedonia to solve the dispute over its name. After Macedonia obtained the status of candidate country for EU accession, the process of integration with the Western European structures was frozen – primarily due to the Greek veto. In April 2008, at the NATO Summit in Bucharest, Greece blocked the invitation to the organisation and threatened that it would do the same with Macedonia’s integration with the EU, if the country fails to solve the problem of its name. 23 In response, Macedonia filed a com- 20 Ch. Tsardanidis, S. Stavridis, The Europeanisation of Greek Foreign Policy: a Critical Appraisal, “European Integration”, 2005, no. 2, p. 229. 21 R. Panagiotou, FYROM’s Transition: on the Road to Europe, “Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans”, 2008, no. 1, p. 50-51. 22 M. Szpala, Macedonia, in: Bałkany Zachodnie a integracja europejska. Perspektywy i implikacje, Warszawa 2008, p. 56-57. 23 A. Adamczyk, Kwestia macedońska w bałkańskiej polityce Grecji, “Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej”, 2009, no. 7, p. 51-67. Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej • Rok 12 (2014) • Zeszyt 3
Macedonia’s Difficult Path to the European Union 17 plaint against Greece with the International Court of Justice claiming that Greece was violating the agreement of 1995 by blocking FYROM’s accession to international organisations. In 2009, when the European Commission issued a recommendation to open accession negotiations between the EU and FYROM, Greece was the only country to block the decision on setting the starting date for these negotiations. In 2011, the ICJ ruled that Greece had had no right to block FY- ROM’s membership in the NATO. 24 This ruling, however, had no effect on Greece’s policy towards Macedonia. Consecutive Greek governments stand by the position that before Macedonia can resume its path to the EU, it first needs to solve the issue of its name. Even though every year the European Commission reconfirms its opinion that FY- ROM is ready to start the accession negotiations, Greece consistently blocks the decision on setting the date for the commencement of these negotiations in the EU. At the summit of the European Council in December 2012, the heads of state and government unanimously decided that the commencement of FYROM’s accession process depended on the implementation of the right reforms, consolidation and respect for good neighbourly values and on the resolution of the name issue in negotiations held under the auspices of the UN. 25 The difficult task to mediate in these negotiations fell to Matthew Nimetz, who made a number of attempts to propose different versions of the country’s possible name. 26 In late 2012 and early 2013, there were proposals to name it the Upper Republic of Macedonia, Northern Republic of Macedonia, Democratic Republic of Macedonia, or Vardar Republic of Macedonia. 27 None of these, however, was accepted by Greece and some were also rejected by Bulgaria. Greek politicians – hostages to the internal political situation, which they 24 International Court of Justice website: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/142/16841.pdf, last acicessed on: 12 September 2014. 25 FYROM Name Issue, Hellenic Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available at: http://www.mfa. gr/en/fyrom-name-issue, last accessed on: 10 August 2014. 26 Nimetz Starts New Push for Macedonia ‘Name’ Deal, “Balkan Insight", 8 January 2013, available at: http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/nimetz-visits-athens-skopje-for-fresh-name-talks, last accessed on: 10 August 2014. 27 Nowa propozycja nazwy dla Macedonii, EuroActiv, 17 April 2013, available at: http://www.eura - ctiv.pl/rozszerzenie/artykul/nowa-propozycja-nazwy-dla-macedonii-004616, last accessed on: 10 August 2014. Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej • Rok 12 (2014) • Zeszyt 3
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About the Authors Artur Adamczyk -
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Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-
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