Rocznik_2014-215

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20 Mladen Karadzoski, Artur Adamczyk countries promised to abstain from taking any hostile actions against each other: ‘Both parties shall undertake effective measures to prevent ill-intentioned propaganda of the respective institutions and agencies and shall not allow activities of private individuals aimed at instigating violence, hatred or other such actions which might harm the relations between the Republic of Bulgaria and the Republic of Macedonia’. 33 Even though the declaration was very general and left many issues unaddressed, it contributed to the improvement of the relations between the two countries. Taking into account the bad relations between Macedonia and Greece, the government in Skopje was aware that Bulgaria was their main partner in the region – a partner who was advanced on the path to Western European structures and who could support Macedonia in the international arena. Good relations between the two countries lasted until the NATO summit in Bucharest of 2008, when FYROM’s candidacy was rejected after Greece’s veto. Furthermore, the spokesperson for the Bulgarian ministry of foreign affairs declared that bearing in mind the historical and geographic determinants, Sofia would not support the government in Skopje unconditionally. It seems that the Bulgarian government decided to take advantage of Macedonia’s difficult situation to pursue its own interests. Following that, the Macedonian media presented opinions that by supporting Athens, Bulgaria was interfering with the dispute between Macedonia and Greece, and there were suggestions of there being a Greek–Bulgarian conspiracy against Skopje. These speculations were denied by the prime minister of Bulgaria, but this did not prevent the relations between the two countries from deteriorating. 34 It should be stressed that the rejection of FYROM as a candidate for a NATO member in 2008 was a landmark event for Macedonians, whose bitterness and resentment fuelled a surge of nationalistic attitudes. In 2010, the Bulgarian government presented to Macedonia a proposal of an agreement on good neighbourly and friendly relations. The proposal concerned cooperation in the fields of economy, infrastructure, energy, and combating organised crime. A special scientific 33 Macedonia and Bulgaria: So Close, Yet So Distant, “Policy Brief”, Macedonian Centre for European Training, February 2012, p. 8, available at: http://mcet.org.mk/ckfinder/files/Bulgarija_Macedonia_So-Close_Yet_So-Distant_MCET_-ENG.pdf, last accessed on: 21 September 2014. 34 Ibidem, p. 4. Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej • Rok 12 (2014) • Zeszyt 3
Macedonia’s Difficult Path to the European Union 21 committee would also be established to solve the problems with the interpretation of history by the two societies. In response, the Macedonian government proposed that Bulgaria should sign the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, which would force the government in Sofia to recognise the Macedonian minority living in Bulgaria. 35 Nationalist rhetoric was becoming an increasingly prominent element of statements made by politicians from both countries. The culminating point of the relations between Macedonia and Bulgaria was 2012, when Bulgaria took an official position in the dispute between Greece and Macedonia concerning the name of the latter. The government in Sofia announced that they would not agree to the name North Macedonia proposed by the mediator, as they believed this could mean that Macedonia would make territorial claims to the Bulgarian region of Pirin Macedonia. Bulgarian politicians announced that they would be blocking any progress in the talks between Macedonia and the European Union until such a time when all problems between Bulgaria and Macedonia are solved. In the same year, the European Commission once again presented its positive opinion on commencing accession negotiations between FYROM and the EU. The government in Sofia criticised the Commission’s opinion, claiming that it did not reflect reality. In the opinion of the Bulgarian government, there was an anti-Bulgarian campaign in Macedonia, conducting business was made difficult for Bulgarian companies and individuals of Bulgarian origins were persecuted. 36 Bulgaria was the second country, after Greece, which did not consent to launching accession negotiations at the summit of the European Council in December 2012. Bulgaria decided to take advantage of Macedonia’s difficult situation and demanded that the government in Skopje meet three conditions: first, that they sign the agreement on good neighbourly practice; second, that they create suitable conditions for the development of cooperation and establish working groups for improving relations in 35 Ibidem, p. 2. 36 Bułgaria nadal przeciwna negocjacjom UE z Macedonią o akcesji, EuroActiv, 6 December 2012, available at: http://www.euractiv.pl/rozszerzenie/wywiad/bugaria-nadal-przeciwna-negocjaccjom-ue-z-macedoni-o-akcesji-004269, last accessed on: 21 September 2014. Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej • Rok 12 (2014) • Zeszyt 3
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About the Authors Artur Adamczyk -
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