Rocznik_2014-215

Rocznik 

Instytutu Europy 

Środkowo-Wschodniej 

Rok 12 (2014) 

Zeszyt 3 

Yearbook of the Institute of East-Central Europe 

Volume 12 (2014), Issue 3 

Bosnia and Herzegovina 

and the Western Balkans 

Macedonia’s Difficult Path 

to the European Union 

Uneven and Combined Development 

of the Ethnopolitics in the Balkans 

Is Kosovo a Precedent Legal and International Dilemmas 

of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence 

of the Kosovo Republic 

Bosnian Visions of Europe





Zeszyt 3 

Yearbook 

of the Institute of East-Central Europe 

Volume 12 (2014) 

Issue 3

Rada Naukowa 

„Rocznika Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej” 

Natalia Yakovenko (Kijów), Adolf Juzwenko (Wrocław), Jūratė Kiaupienė (Wilno), 

Andreas Lawaty (Lüneburg), Alexei Miller (Moskwa), Antony Polonsky (Boston), 

Adam Daniel Rotfeld (Warszawa), Henryk Samsonowicz (Warszawa), 

Aleksander Smolar (Warszawa), Oleksiy Tolochko (Kijów), 

Piotr S. Wandycz (New Haven), Jerzy Wyrozumski (Kraków) 

Komitet Redakcyjny 

„Rocznika Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej” 

Mirosław Filipowicz (przewodniczący), 

Andrzej Gil, Jerzy Kłoczowski, Hubert Łaszkiewicz, Tomasz Stępniewski, Agata Stolarz, 

Paweł Jarosz (sekretarz redakcji), Anna Paprocka (sekretarz wydawnictwa)





Zeszyt 3 

Yearbook of the Institute of East-Central Europe 

Volume 12 (2014), Issue 3 


and the Western Balkans 

EDITED BY 

Jakub Olchowski 

Tomasz Stępniewski 

Bartosz Bojarczyk 

Alina Sobol 

Lublin 2014

The Yearbook 

of the Institute of East-Central Europe 

is a peer-reviewed journal 

Language editors and proofreading 

Cover design and typesetting 

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Amadeusz Targoński 

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This publication appears thanks to the support 

of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland 

The opinions expressed in the book are the authors’ own 

and do not necessarily represent the view 

of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland 

© Instytut Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej, Lublin 2014 

All rights reserved 

ISSN 1732-1395 

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Table of contents 

PAPERS 

Mladen Karadzoski, Artur Adamczyk 

Macedonia’s Difficult Path to the European Union 9 

Tomasz Stępniewski, Tomasz Olejarz 

Is Kosovo a Precedent Legal and International Dilemmas 

of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence of the Kosovo Republic 27 

Abit Hoxha, Donika Emini 

Bosnia and Herzegovina in Kosovar Perspective: 

An Agenda for International Cooperation 37 


Radical Islamism – A Threat to Bosniak Identity 

and Security of Bosnia and Herzegovina 53 

Ewa Dominikowska 

Bosnia and Herzegovina – Unquiet region – Implication 

for Neighbouring Countries 73 

Magdalena Rekść 

Bosnian Visions of Europe 93

Jan Muś 


of the Ethnopolitics in the Balkans 107 

Anna Masłoń-Oracz 

Recommendations for Development of Cluster Policy 

in Croatia in the Light of Smart Specialization in Poland 129 

About the Authors 145

Papers


Macedonia’s Difficult Path 

to the European Union 

Abstract: After becoming independent, the Republic of Macedonia consistently 

strived towards obtaining its membership in the European Union. 

The consecutive Macedonian governments implemented reforms aimed at 

meeting the Copenhagen criteria, which were appreciated by the EU. In 2005, 

FYROM was granted the status of a candidate country. Unfortunately, due to 

the unresolved dispute with Greece concerning the country’s name and the 

strained relations with Bulgaria, the starting date of the accession negotiations 

has not been set yet, even despite positive recommendations issued 

by the European Commission. Macedonian politicians are no longer standing 

the test of time and are beginning to abandon European standards. 

Keywords: Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the European Union, accession 

negotiations, foreign policy of Greece, foreign policy of Bulgaria 

Introduction 

After becoming independent in 1991, the Republic of Macedonia started 

the process of political, economic and social transformation. The 

reforms consistently implemented by the government were to bring 

Macedonia closer to Western European standards and gradually include 

it in the processes of European integration. Memberships in the 

European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization have 

been pointed out by all of the country’s political parties as the primary 

strategic goals. As a result, Macedonia has become the leader of 

pro-Western transformations among all the Balkan countries of the 

former Yugoslavia. 1 Successive Macedonian governments conducted 

1 Of course, the first constituent of the former Yugoslavia to join the European Union was Slovenia, 

in 2004, but Slovene politicians do not classify their country as a Balkan state.

10 


reforms suggested by the EU and, as a result, in 2005, the former Yugoslav 

Republic of Macedonia was granted the status of a candidate 

country. Unfortunately, the so far unsolved dispute with Greece concerning 

the country’s name as well as political problems surfacing in 

the relations between Macedonia and Bulgaria have effectively stopped 

Macedonia’s march towards the European Union. 

1. 

The evolution of the relations 

between Macedonia and the European Union 

The relations between Macedonia and the European Communities 

started already in the age when the world was divided into two blocs, 

when trade agreements were signed between the EEC and the Socialist 

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the 1970s and 1980s. 2 After 

Yugoslavia disintegrated and Macedonia declared independence, the 

Macedonian government attempted to re-establish relations with 

Western European structures. Despite the fact that the Communities 

recognised Macedonia’s sovereignty and in 1992 allowed it to appoint 

a representative in Brussels, full diplomatic relations between the EU 

and Macedonia were established only in 1995. 3 This delay was caused 

by the dispute between Macedonia and Greece over the name and 

national symbols of the new country, and the government in Skopje 

was only able to proceed with establishing its international relations 

in 1995, after the signing of the Interim Accord between Macedonia 

and Greece, which stipulated that the young country could apply for 

membership in international organisations under the name ‘Former 

Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’ (FYROM). 4 Consequently, in December 

1995, the European Union decided to establish full relations 

2 Sporazum o Stabilizaciji i Pridruzivanje, Vlada Republike Srbije, Kancelarija za Pridruzivanje Evropskoj 

Uniji, Beograd 2005, available at: www.seio.gov.rs, last accessed on: 9 September 2014, 

p. 1-5. 

3 Македонија во ЕУ-трето дополнето и изменето издание, Секретаријат за европски 

прашања, Скопје: септември 2006 година/Skopje: September 2006, available at: http://www. 

morm.gov.mk, last accessed on: 3 September 2014, p. 10-11. 

4 Interim Accord between the Hellenic Republic and the FYROM, United Nations, New York, 13 September 

1995, available at: http://www.mfa.gr/images/docs/fyrom/interim_accord_1995.pdf, last 

accessed on: 8 September 2014. 

Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej • Rok 12 (2014) • Zeszyt 3

Macedonia’s Difficult Path to the European Union 

11 

with Macedonia and agreed to the opening of a FYROM diplomatic 

mission in Brussels. 5 Following that, the relations between Macedonia 

and the EU gradually developed. In 1996, they started negotiations on 

trade and transport cooperation, which culminated in the signing of 

an agreement that entered into force two years later. 

In 1999, the European Commission presented a new project addressed 

to the Western Balkan states (Macedonia, Albania, Bosnia and 

Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, and Croatia), called the Stabilisation 

and Association Process (SAP). The main objective that the European 

Commission tried to achieve was stabilisation of the political 

and economic situation in the Balkans and encouraging the countries 

covered by the project to further develop the relations among themselves 

in order to establish a strong regional structure. The project was 

meant as a litmus paper, testing the ability of the Western Balkans to 

engage in integration on their path to the European Union. 6 The EU 

Member States were concerned that further conflicts could break out 

in the Balkans, especially with regard to the issue of Kosovo. Therefore, 

they forced the Balkan states to form coalitions among themselves 

and encouraged them to cooperate with each other, emphasising it as 

the best way to further their chances for EU membership. The main 

instruments of the project were bilateral Stabilisation and Association 

Agreements, concluded between the EU and the Balkan countries. 

When this opportunity appeared, the Macedonian government 

immediately started negotiating this agreement with the European 

Commission. 7 A huge incentive for the countries of the West Balkans 

to participate in the project announced by the EC was provided by 

the declaration of the European Council at the summit in Santa Maria 

da Feira in 2000 that all the countries subject to the Stabilisation and 

Association Process were potential candidates for EU membership. 8 

5 The European Commission opened its representation in Skopje in 1998; after: Македонија во 

ЕУ-трето дополнето и изменето издани, op. cit., p. 11. 

6 O. Anastasakis, V. Bijcic-Dzelilović, Balkan Regional Cooperation and European Integration, The 

Hellenic Observatory, London School of Economics and Political Sciences, London 2002, p. 5-14. 

7 Национална стратегија за интеграција на Република Македонија во Европската Унија, 

Влада на Република Македонија, Генерален секретаријат, Сектор за европска интеграција: 

Скопје, септември 2004 година, стр. 34/Skopje, September 2004, p. 34. 

8 Conclusions of The Presidency, European Council, Santa Maria Da Feira 19 And 20 June 2000, available 

at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/fei1_en.htm, last accessed on: 20 September 

2014. 


12 


FYROM’s determination to join the EU was proven by the fact that it 

was the first country to sign the Stabilisation and Association Agreement 

with the European Union (already in 2001). 9 

Despite internal problems suffered by Macedonia in 2001, caused 

by an armed conflict with insurgents from the Albanian minority, the 

government in Skopje managed to convince the European Union of its 

democratic intentions. The signing of the Ohrid Framework Agreement, 

which ended the internal political crisis, showed that Macedonia 

was indeed a democratic and tolerant country that respected the 

rights of national minorities. In the following years, 2003-2005, in order 

to safeguard the still fragile peace in Macedonia, the European Union 

executed the EU Police Mission Proxima. The mission’s main task 

was to support the Macedonian Ministry of internal Affairs in maintaining 

the legal order and reforming the national police force. 10 The 

calming of the internal situation and the implementation of further 

reforms recommended by the European Commission induced the 

FYROM government to apply for full membership in the European 

Union, which it did at the 2004 summit of the European Council in 

Dublin. 11 In response, in November 2005, the European Commission 

issued an opinion that FYROM deserved the status of a candidate 

country, which was officially confirmed by a decision of the European 

Council in Brussels a month later. 12 

The decision of granting FYROM the status of a candidate country 

was a form of reward given to Macedonians for their immense effort 

in fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria and for their achievements 

resulting from the implementation of the legal solutions laid down in 

the Ohrid Agreement. It is worth noting that even Greece, with which 

Macedonia was still conducting negotiations on the country’s name, 

did not block this decision. There is no doubt that this was a political 

9 Македонија во ЕУ-трето дополнето и изменето издани, op. cit., p. 12. 

10 www.europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r18013.htm, last accessed on: 10 August 2014. 

11 Analytical Report for the Opinion on the Application from the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 

for EU Membership, Commission of the European Communities Brussels, 9 November 2005, SEC 

(2005) 1425, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2005/ 

package/sec_1425_final_analytical_report_mk_en.pdf, last accessed on: 10 August 2014. 

12 F. Nelli Feroci, The Future of Enlargement: Candidate and Potential Candidate Countries of the Western 

Balkans, in: F. M. Bindi and I. Angelescu (ed.), A Frontier of Europe: A Transatlantic Problem, 

Brooking Institution Press, Washington D.C.–Rome, p. 27. 



13 

reward given to the government in Skopje for the quick and peaceful 

solution of the Albanian problem, which threatened to spread in the 

region, and thus indirectly threatened security and stability in Greece. 

Pleased with obtaining the candidate country status, the government 

in Skopje consistently implemented further pro-democratic reforms 

towards obtaining a full membership in the EU – with some 

success, particularly in combating corruption and organised crime, 

as well as introducing the principles of the freedom of the press. 13 

Once again, the European Union appreciated Macedonia’s efforts in 

2009, when it decided to abolish the visa requirement for Macedonian 

citizens in the first phase of visa liberalisation for the Western Balkans. 

14 As Macedonia made significant progress and largely fulfilled 

the primary priorities of the accession partnership, in the same year 

the European Commission issued a recommendation on the opening 

of accession negotiations with FYROM. 15 The government in Skopje 

was hoping that after the Commission’s recommendation, the EU 

heads of state and government would soon set the date for launching 

the accession negotiations. Unfortunately, Greece took advantage of 

its right to veto this decision in the European Council and forced the 

arrangement that before the starting date of accession negotiations 

was specified, Macedonia first had to reach an agreement with Greece 

regarding the name of the young country. 

Although in consecutive annual reports on FYROM’s state of preparations 

for EU membership the European Commission maintains that 

the country is ready to start negotiations, the starting date has not 

been set so far. 16 Greece, opposing the commencement of negotiations 

13 T. Żornaczuk, Macedonia: od bałkańskiego prymusa do chorej demokracji, “Biuletyn PISM”, Polski 

Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych, 2014, no. 64, p. 2. 

14 Council Regulation (EC) No 1244/2009 of 30 November 2009 amending Regulation (EC) 

No 539/2001 listing the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when 

crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement, 

available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/uri=CELEX:32009R1244, last ac - 

cessed on: 2 September 2014. 

15 D. Morolov, The Euro-Atlantic aspiration of the Republic of Macedonia, “International Journal of 

Sciences: Basic and Applied Research (IJSBAR)”, vol. 13, 2014, no. 1, p. 271. 

16 Commission Staff Working Document The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 2013 Progress 

Report and Accompanying the Document Communication From The Commission To The European 

Parliament And The Council Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2013-2014, European Commission 

COM(2013) 700 final, Brussels, 16.10.2013. 


14 


due to the unsolved dispute over the name, was joined by Bulgaria, 

which accuses Skopje of conducting an anti-Bulgarian campaign and 

of falsifying history. In line with the EU’s decision-making procedures, 

the European Council decisions on commencing negotiations and on 

Macedonia’s possible accession have to be unanimous, which means 

that as long as FYROM does not normalise its relations with Greece 

and Bulgaria, the accession process is up in the air. 

2. 

Greece’s policy towards the FYROM 

and the Greek veto in the European Union 

The dissolution of Yugoslavia and the establishment of the Republic 

of Macedonia on 19 December 1991 came as a surprise to Greek politicians. 

Initially, the government in Athens perceived it as a threat to 

Greece’s territorial integrity, as during the formation of the new state 

some people had called for incorporating the territories inhabited by 

Macedonians in neighbouring countries. As Macedonian politicians 

mainly strived for international recognition, which would stabilise 

the country’s situation in the international arena, they quickly backed 

out from the aspirations to establish a United Macedonia. The newly 

formed parliament in Skopje passed a declaration on relinquishing all 

claims to territories held by the neighbouring countries and on having 

all international disputes settled by peaceful means. 17 

This, however, did not dissipate all the concerns of Greek politicians 

and the relations between the two countries remained strained. 

The Macedonian issue essentially comes down to a dispute over the 

name and the national symbols of the new country. Greeks negate 

this name claiming that the new country may not be called Republic 

of Macedonia because Macedonia is connected with the historical 

and national heritage of Greece, a region which was part of the ancient 

Hellas. Despite the Macedonian’s reassurances of their peaceful 

intentions, Greeks perceived the adoption of this name as a pretext 

for potential territorial claims to territories held by the Republic of 

17 S. Pięta, Polityka Grecji wobec kwestii macedońskiej w latach 1991-1995, in: M. Waloński (ed.), Wybrane 

problemy współczesnych stosunków międzynarodowych, Wrocław 2008, p. 159 ff. 



15 

Greece. Another element of the dispute was Macedonia’s flag depicting 

the Sun of Vergina – the symbol of Alexander the Great, connected 

with Hellenic history and not with the Slavic peoples that inhabit the 

new country. Yet another controversial issue was the provision in the 

Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia that the state would look 

after the rights of all Macedonians, including those living in neighbouring 

countries (this concerned primarily inhabitants of Greece and 

Bulgaria). According to Athens, this provision interfered with its internal 

affairs and infringed on its sovereignty. In fact, Greece negates 

the existence of a separate Macedonian nation and believes that they 

are just Slavic immigrants. 

Following explicit signals from European countries that any constitutional 

provisions resembling nationalist discourse would hamper 

the process of recognising the new country and admitting it into 

the international community, Macedonia altered its flag and removed 

the controversial passages from the constitution. What still remained, 

however, was the issue of the name, under which the new country was 

to be recognised in the international arena. As a result of negotiations 

conducted since 1992, Athens and Skopje agreed to adopt the technical 

name ‘former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia’ (FYROM), 

under which Macedonia was to be admitted to the UN on 7 April 

1993. 18 The adoption of this technical name, under which Macedonia 

was able to apply for membership in international organisations, was 

only a temporary solution and did not mean that the relations with 

Greece were normalised. 

In February 1994, Greece broke off talks with FYROM on negotiating 

the final name and introduced a trade embargo against it. 19 The 

tensions between Athens and Skopje forced the US diplomacy and 

the European countries to take mitigating actions. Cyrus Vance’s mediations 

ended in a limited success, which allowed the two countries 

18 P. Sioussiouras, The Process of Recognition of the Newly Independent States of Former Yugoslavia by 

The European Community: The Case of Former Socialist Republic of Macedonia, “Journal of Political 

and Military Sociology”, 2004, no. 1, p. 12. 

19 The European Commission referred the decision of the Greek government on introducing the 

embargo against FYROM to the European Court of Justice, but it rejected the claim stating that 

this was a political issue and not a legal one. Even before that, however, the Greek prime minister 

announced that his government would pursue its policy towards Macedonia regardless of 

the Court’s verdict. 


16 


to re-establish relations and trade exchange between them. In 1995, 

they signed an agreement, but the problem of the name remained unsolved. 

As a result of the turn in Greece’s policy, upon Greece’s motion, 

FYROM was admitted to the Council of Europe and the OSCE. 20 

From the second half of the 1990s, the relations between Greece 

and Macedonia were considerably improving. Greece became Macedonia’s 

primary trade partner and the largest foreign investor. Macedonian 

politicians were also becoming aware that their path to the 

family of European democracies led through Greece. Macedonia has 

a very bad geopolitical and demographic situation. With the Albanian 

minority constituting almost 23 per cent of the population and being 

still unsatisfied with its status, with borders with Albania and Kosovo, 

FYROM is permanently in the state of potential threat. 21 This state of 

insecurity was further highlighted by the 2001 Albanian insurgency in 

Macedonia. Concerned that the conflict might escalate to neighbouring 

countries, the EU and US diplomacy quickly intervened and the 

conflict ended in the conclusion of the Ohrid Agreement. 22 In order 

to ensure its security, FYROM applied for membership in the NATO 

and the EU in 2004. The decision of admitting Macedonia to these organisations, 

however, depends largely on the government in Athens, as 

it has a veto right on the enlargement of both structures. Greek politicians 

try to take advantage of the situation and use the membership 

in the organisations as leverage to force Macedonia to solve the dispute 

over its name. After Macedonia obtained the status of candidate 

country for EU accession, the process of integration with the Western 

European structures was frozen – primarily due to the Greek veto. 

In April 2008, at the NATO Summit in Bucharest, Greece blocked 

the invitation to the organisation and threatened that it would do the 

same with Macedonia’s integration with the EU, if the country fails to 

solve the problem of its name. 23 In response, Macedonia filed a com- 

20 Ch. Tsardanidis, S. Stavridis, The Europeanisation of Greek Foreign Policy: a Critical Appraisal, “European 

Integration”, 2005, no. 2, p. 229. 

21 R. Panagiotou, FYROM’s Transition: on the Road to Europe, “Journal of Southern Europe and the 

Balkans”, 2008, no. 1, p. 50-51. 

22 M. Szpala, Macedonia, in: Bałkany Zachodnie a integracja europejska. Perspektywy i implikacje, 

Warszawa 2008, p. 56-57. 

23 A. Adamczyk, Kwestia macedońska w bałkańskiej polityce Grecji, “Rocznik Instytutu Europy 

Środkowo-Wschodniej”, 2009, no. 7, p. 51-67. 



17 

plaint against Greece with the International Court of Justice claiming 

that Greece was violating the agreement of 1995 by blocking FYROM’s 

accession to international organisations. In 2009, when the European 

Commission issued a recommendation to open accession negotiations 

between the EU and FYROM, Greece was the only country to 

block the decision on setting the starting date for these negotiations. 

In 2011, the ICJ ruled that Greece had had no right to block FY- 

ROM’s membership in the NATO. 24 This ruling, however, had no effect 

on Greece’s policy towards Macedonia. Consecutive Greek governments 

stand by the position that before Macedonia can resume its 

path to the EU, it first needs to solve the issue of its name. Even though 

every year the European Commission reconfirms its opinion that FY- 

ROM is ready to start the accession negotiations, Greece consistently 

blocks the decision on setting the date for the commencement of these 

negotiations in the EU. At the summit of the European Council in December 

2012, the heads of state and government unanimously decided 

that the commencement of FYROM’s accession process depended on 

the implementation of the right reforms, consolidation and respect 

for good neighbourly values and on the resolution of the name issue 

in negotiations held under the auspices of the UN. 25 

The difficult task to mediate in these negotiations fell to Matthew 

Nimetz, who made a number of attempts to propose different versions 

of the country’s possible name. 26 In late 2012 and early 2013, 

there were proposals to name it the Upper Republic of Macedonia, 

Northern Republic of Macedonia, Democratic Republic of Macedonia, 

or Vardar Republic of Macedonia. 27 None of these, however, was 

accepted by Greece and some were also rejected by Bulgaria. Greek 

politicians – hostages to the internal political situation, which they 

24 International Court of Justice website: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/142/16841.pdf, last acicessed 

on: 12 September 2014. 

25 FYROM Name Issue, Hellenic Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available at: http://www.mfa. 

gr/en/fyrom-name-issue, last accessed on: 10 August 2014. 

26 Nimetz Starts New Push for Macedonia ‘Name’ Deal, “Balkan Insight", 8 January 2013, available at: 

http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/nimetz-visits-athens-skopje-for-fresh-name-talks, last 

accessed on: 10 August 2014. 

27 Nowa propozycja nazwy dla Macedonii, EuroActiv, 17 April 2013, available at: http://www.eura - 

ctiv.pl/rozszerzenie/artykul/nowa-propozycja-nazwy-dla-macedonii-004616, last accessed on: 

10 August 2014. 


18 


themselves have caused trying to overdo each other in patriotism – 

do not want to accept any name which contains the word Macedonia. 28 

The relations between the two countries became even more strained 

in 2010, when the Macedonian government launched the project 

Skopje 2014 of restructuring the downtown of the capital to emphasise 

its historical ties to the ancient Macedon. Next to classicist buildings 

bearing hallmarks of ancient Greek architecture, huge statues to 

Alexander III of Macedon, Philip II of Macedon and Olympias were 

erected. The Macedonian project offended the Greeks’ patriotic feelings 

and provoked the government in Athens to take further international 

actions against Macedonia. The enlargement policy was not one 

of the priorities of the Greek Presidency in the Council of the European 

Union. This way, at the next summit in June 2014, the problem 

of setting the starting date for accession negotiations with FYROM 

did not arise. Well aware that its recommendation would once again 

be rejected, the European Commission did no longer even try to issue 

it. Štefan Füle, the European Commissioner for Enlargement and 

European Neighbourhood Policy, attempted on several occasions to 

persuade Greece to soften their position so that FYROM would be 

able to commence their accession negotiations, and so that only the 

final outcome would depend on the resolution of the name problem, 

but Greece remained adamant. 29 

It would seem that the relations between Greece and Macedonia 

and, consequently, between the EU and Macedonia have reached 

a stalemate. Greece is waiting for the government in Skopje to come 

up with an initiative. In Macedonia, in turn, the dispute with Greece 

is excellent political fuel for the FYROM’s ruling party which enjoys 

ever greater political support due to its uncompromising stance. As 

a result, there is little hope for a solution to this problem and for resuming 

integration between Macedonia and the European Union. 

28 P. Koktsidis, FYROM’s EU Accession Hopes: A Delicate Balance, “ELIAMEP Briefing Notes”, 2013, 

no. 6, p. 2. 

29 Bulgaria and Greece Block Macedonia’s EU Talks, “Balkan Insight”, 12 December 2012, available at: 

http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/bulgaria-joins-greece-in-blocking-macedonia-s-eubid, 

last accessed on: 10 August 2014. 


3. 


The Bulgarian veto 

against FYROM’s accession to the EU 

The relations between Macedonia and Bulgaria are best described as 

changeable. Initially, after Macedonia’s declaration of independence, 

they were friendly. In 1992, Bulgaria was the first country to recognise 

Macedonia as a sovereign state 30 and, what is even more important, 

it also recognised the name Republic of Macedonia, which caused 

a brief crisis in the relations between Bulgaria and Greece. Bulgaria 

supported Macedonia’s pro-Western efforts and its ambitions to join 

the NATO and the EU. The government in Sofia was deeply interested 

in stabilising the political situation of their western neighbour, well 

aware that with a considerable Albanian minority Macedonia could 

be a source of ethnic conflicts in the entire region. 

Even though the two governments issued official declarations that 

they would maintain friendly relations, numerous problems arose and 

hampered the relations between Skopje and Sofia. Even today Bulgarian 

linguists abide by the thesis that there is no separate Macedonian 

language and that it is just a dialect of Bulgarian, while Bulgarian 

rightist politicians and historians claim that there is also no separate 

Macedonian nation and that the country is in fact inhabited by ethnic 

Bulgarians. 31 Some Macedonian politicians, in turn, criticise the Bulgarian 

government for not recognising the Macedonian minority living 

in Bulgaria. Furthermore, the disputes between the two countries 

concern some historical events, which the two countries interpret as 

their own national heritage. 32 In 1999, in order to eliminate the problems 

causing disputes between them, the two countries signed a Joint 

Declaration, in which they committed to supporting the development 

of cooperation between Macedonia and Bulgaria. The main objective 

behind the declaration was to bring the two societies closer through 

promotion of the development of transportation and communication 

as well as joint participation in regional projects. Moreover, the two 

19 

30 http://www.euractiv.com/sections/enlargement/macedonian-spat-marks-end-greek-presidenncy-303277, 

last accessed on: 8 September 2014. 

31 Ibidem. 

32 In the Middle Ages, the present territory of the Republic of Macedonia was held by the Bulgarian 

Empire and was subsequently conquered by the Ottoman Empire. As an autonomous entity, 

Macedonia was distinguished only after World War II, as a part of Yugoslavia. 


20 


countries promised to abstain from taking any hostile actions against 

each other: ‘Both parties shall undertake effective measures to prevent 

ill-intentioned propaganda of the respective institutions and agencies 

and shall not allow activities of private individuals aimed at instigating 

violence, hatred or other such actions which might harm the relations 

between the Republic of Bulgaria and the Republic of Macedonia’. 33 

Even though the declaration was very general and left many issues 

unaddressed, it contributed to the improvement of the relations 

between the two countries. Taking into account the bad relations between 

Macedonia and Greece, the government in Skopje was aware 

that Bulgaria was their main partner in the region – a partner who 

was advanced on the path to Western European structures and who 

could support Macedonia in the international arena. Good relations 

between the two countries lasted until the NATO summit in Bucharest 

of 2008, when FYROM’s candidacy was rejected after Greece’s 

veto. Furthermore, the spokesperson for the Bulgarian ministry of foreign 

affairs declared that bearing in mind the historical and geographic 

determinants, Sofia would not support the government in Skopje 

unconditionally. It seems that the Bulgarian government decided to 

take advantage of Macedonia’s difficult situation to pursue its own 

interests. Following that, the Macedonian media presented opinions 

that by supporting Athens, Bulgaria was interfering with the dispute 

between Macedonia and Greece, and there were suggestions of there 

being a Greek–Bulgarian conspiracy against Skopje. These speculations 

were denied by the prime minister of Bulgaria, but this did not 

prevent the relations between the two countries from deteriorating. 34 

It should be stressed that the rejection of FYROM as a candidate for 

a NATO member in 2008 was a landmark event for Macedonians, 

whose bitterness and resentment fuelled a surge of nationalistic attitudes. 

In 2010, the Bulgarian government presented to Macedonia 

a proposal of an agreement on good neighbourly and friendly relations. 

The proposal concerned cooperation in the fields of economy, infrastructure, 

energy, and combating organised crime. A special scientific 

33 Macedonia and Bulgaria: So Close, Yet So Distant, “Policy Brief”, Macedonian Centre for European 

Training, February 2012, p. 8, available at: http://mcet.org.mk/ckfinder/files/Bulgarija_Macedonia_So-Close_Yet_So-Distant_MCET_-ENG.pdf, 


34 Ibidem, p. 4. 



21 

committee would also be established to solve the problems with the 

interpretation of history by the two societies. In response, the Macedonian 

government proposed that Bulgaria should sign the Framework 

Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, which would 

force the government in Sofia to recognise the Macedonian minority 

living in Bulgaria. 35 Nationalist rhetoric was becoming an increasingly 

prominent element of statements made by politicians from both 

countries. The culminating point of the relations between Macedonia 

and Bulgaria was 2012, when Bulgaria took an official position in the 

dispute between Greece and Macedonia concerning the name of the 

latter. The government in Sofia announced that they would not agree 

to the name North Macedonia proposed by the mediator, as they believed 

this could mean that Macedonia would make territorial claims 

to the Bulgarian region of Pirin Macedonia. Bulgarian politicians announced 

that they would be blocking any progress in the talks between 

Macedonia and the European Union until such a time when all problems 

between Bulgaria and Macedonia are solved. In the same year, 

the European Commission once again presented its positive opinion 

on commencing accession negotiations between FYROM and the EU. 

The government in Sofia criticised the Commission’s opinion, claiming 

that it did not reflect reality. In the opinion of the Bulgarian government, 

there was an anti-Bulgarian campaign in Macedonia, conducting 

business was made difficult for Bulgarian companies and individuals 

of Bulgarian origins were persecuted. 36 Bulgaria was the second country, 

after Greece, which did not consent to launching accession negotiations 

at the summit of the European Council in December 2012. 

Bulgaria decided to take advantage of Macedonia’s difficult situation 

and demanded that the government in Skopje meet three conditions: 

first, that they sign the agreement on good neighbourly practice; second, 

that they create suitable conditions for the development of cooperation 

and establish working groups for improving relations in 

35 Ibidem, p. 2. 

36 Bułgaria nadal przeciwna negocjacjom UE z Macedonią o akcesji, EuroActiv, 6 December 2012, 

available at: http://www.euractiv.pl/rozszerzenie/wywiad/bugaria-nadal-przeciwna-negocjaccjom-ue-z-macedoni-o-akcesji-004269, 



22 


key areas; and third, that a special council be formed to deal with the 

organisation of annual intergovernmental meetings. 37 

Concerned that his country might be facing further international 

isolation, the Macedonian prime minister accepted Bulgaria’s conditions. 

38 But even despite this declaration, the relations between the 

two countries kept deteriorating in 2013. The escalation of tensions 

was caused by repressions against Macedonians of Bulgarian origin 

in the town of Strumica and appropriation by Macedonia of Bulgaria’s 

historical heroes and their achievements. But the greatest consternation 

among Bulgarians was caused by the screening of the movie 

‘Third Half’, which accused Bulgarians of collaboration with the Nazis 

and aiding them in committing the Holocaust against Jews during 

World War II. 39 Nationalist rhetoric surged in the speeches delivered 

by politicians from both countries. It seems that at a certain point it 

got out of control and was used mainly for the purpose of internal political 

games preceding the parliamentary elections in both countries. 

At the moment, Bulgaria’s position remains unchanged. The government 

in Sofia still demands that Macedonia sign the agreement on 

good neighbourly practice and that it cease all attempts to falsify history 

and any other actions contributing to the worsening of the relations 

between the two countries. 40 

Conclusion 

Macedonia’s road to the European Union seems particularly bumpy. 

Despite the implemented reforms and the determination of consecutive 

governments to obtain a membership in Western European struc- 

37 Bulgaria’s Brussels Blockade Leaves Macedonia Bitter, “Balkan Insight”, 14 December 2012, available 

at: http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/bulgaria-s-brussels-blockade-leaves-macedoniabitter, 


38 Macedonia Accepts Bulgaria’s Terms for Support, “Balkan Insight”, 5 December 2012, available at: 

http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/macedonia-accepts-bulgarian-terms-for-support, last 

accessed on: 21 September 2014. 

39 Bulgaria’s Relations with Macedonia: Reset Or Reverse, The Sofia Globe, available at: http://sofialglobe.com/2013/01/10/bulgarias-relations-with-macedonia-reset-or-reverse/, 

last accessed on: 

12 September 2014. 

40 Bulgaria Continues Sting Conditions for Macedonia’s EU, NATO Accession, Focus News Agency, 

23 July 2014, available at: http://www.focus-fen.net/news, last accessed on: 12 September 2014. 



23 

tures, the country still has no tangible prospects for accession. The 

unresolved dispute between Greece and Macedonia concerning the 

name of the country and the strained relations between Skopje and 

Sofia keep preventing Macedonia from participating in the processes 

of European integration. The Macedonian society is already tired and 

feels humiliated by the long wait for the EU’s decision on commencing 

accession negotiations. On the other hand, Macedonia’s leading 

political party, the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization 

– Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO – 

DPMNE), does not exhibit any inclination towards reconciliation with 

the neighbours. On the contrary, it tries to gain political support by 

taking advantage of the Macedonians’ patriotic feelings by promoting 

a sense of threat to their national identity. 41 The lack of tangible 

prospects for joining the EU causes increasing tensions among Macedonia’s 

citizens and leads to a surge of nationalist sentiments. The 

Albanian minority protests against the government’s policy, which 

has a rather liberal attitude to the country’s name. Politicians do not 

stand the test of time and forget about implementing pro-democratic 

reforms. Macedonia is more and more often criticised for lowering 

democratic standards, infringing on the freedom of the media, corruption 

and nepotism. Macedonia’s path to the EU is now blocked not 

only by the unresolved dispute with Greece and Bulgaria, but also by 

failing to observe European values. 

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Is Kosovo a Precedent 

Legal and International Dilemmas 

of the Unilateral Declaration 

of Independence of the Kosovo Republic 

Abstract: On 17 th February 2008, the parliamentary body of the temporary authorities 

of Kosovo adopted a Declaration of Independence and proclaimed 

that Kosovo should be recognized as an “independent and sovereign country”. 

At present, 106 countries recognize Kosovo as an independent country 

(as for 2 nd July, 2014). The political dilemmas of the countries of the international 

community, including the requirement of a legal assessment of the 

consequences of the unilateral Declaration of Independence of the Kosovo 

Republic, referred, in fact, to the need to take a stance towards the meaning of 

and the mutual relations between the basic rules and principles and the institutions 

of modern international law (ius inter gentes), in particular the problem 

of setting a precedent in terms of intrastate and international law, respecting 

the rules of the territorial integrity of states, and issues such as the autonomy 

of nations, the institution of territorial secession and the recognition of states 

by other states. 

Keywords: Kosovo, Western Balkans, international law, independence, precedent. 

1. 

The problem of precedent as exemplified 

by Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence 

On 17 th February 2008, the parliamentary body of the temporary authorities 

of Kosovo adopted a Declaration of Independence and proclaimed 

that Kosovo should be recognized as “an independent and 

sovereign country” 1 . The case above resulted in an actual polarization 

of the standpoints of other countries as to its legal validity. As a result, 

1 More in: P. Hilpold (ed.), Kosovo and International Law, The ICJ Advisory Opinion of 22 July 2010, 

Leiden 2012.

28 


Kosovo was only recognized as a state body by a particular, though 

divided and pluralized, group of countries – so far 106 countries have 

declared this kind of affirmation (as for 2 nd July, 2014). What is significant, 

there is no consensus in this matter among the EU member 

states or the permanent members of the Security Council of the UN 

(the Russian Federation and the Republic of China). 

Russia, a long-time and proven ally of Serbia, is the main opponent 

of the existence of an independent Kosovo 2 . As a member of the 

Security Council of the UN it effectively blocks the accession of the 

new country to that organization. This approach is enhanced, on the 

one hand, by the rivalry between Russia and the USA, and, on the 

other hand, by Russia’s fear of the “precedent” as encouraging local 

separatism in the post-soviet countries. The latter reason, apart from 

solidarity with Serbia, is the premise of the attitude of such countries 

as Spain, Cyprus, Slovakia, Greece or Romania which also refused to 

accept the independence of Kosovo 3 . 

The political dilemmas of the countries, including the requirement 

of a legal assessment of the consequences of a unilateral Declaration 

of Independence of the Kosovo Republic, in fact, referred to the necessity 

of taking stance towards the meaning of and relations between 

the basic rules and principles as well as the institutions of modern international 

law (ius inter gentes), in particular the problem of setting 

a precedent in terms of intrastate and international law, respecting 

the rules of the territorial integrity of states, the autonomy of nations, 

the institution of territorial secession of states, and the recognition of 

states by other states. 

The main dilemma, which seemed to have the greatest influence on 

the reactions of other countries, was the belief and the question if the 

Declaration of Independence of Kosovo and its subsequent recognition 

would be some kind of a precedent which could result in similar 

reactions in spe. In other words, there was a fear that the Declaration 

of Independence of Kosovo would inspire and provide a legal basis 

for analogue attempts at political emancipation of the national mi- 

2 More in: K. Pawłowski, Kosowo: konflikt i interwencja, Lublin 2008, chapter 2 and 3. 

3 Cf. P. Pacuła, Kosowo: problemy teraźniejszości, wyzwania przyszłości, „Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe”, 

nr 22, II – 2012, p. 118. 


Is Kosovo a Precedent Legal and International Dilemmas... 

29 

norities within other countries. Whereas the anxious opponents of 

the recognition of Kosovo persist in pressing the charge of a violation 

of the principles of international law which should safeguard, first of 

all, the territorial integrity of the existing countries, those who accept 

the foundation of Kosovo claim that the act of separation of the province 

from Serbia is unique in international practice and does not set 

a precedent for the future 4 . 

Therefore, it seems that in order to assess the legitimacy of the dilemmas 

rationally, it has to be stated that the problem of a precedent 

is described and analyzed differently in international legal doctrine 

and practice and in the theory of international relations. Political scientists 

usually use the term “precedent” with reference to finite past 

events which are politically convincing and usable in terms of daily 

political and diplomatic practice. In contrast, lawyers, show a more 

principled and stricter understanding of that term and use it when 

a past event confirms the legitimacy of its application in current and 

analogue cases. From a practical, technical point of view, it should be 

stressed that in international law, unlike in intrastate law, a precedent 

is not binding. For example, a previous decision by the International 

Court of Justice in the case between A and B does not define a legal 

rule and, in consequence, the practice of its use later in a similar situation 

occurring between countries C and D. 

However, in defiance of this stipulation, in international legal practice 

attempts are often made to create and use a coherent catalogue of 

rules possible to use in similar or analogical situations. The questions 

is whether Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence and the acceptance 

of its consequences in international practice by means of diplomatic 

recognition signifies that both international lawyers and political 

decision-makers have decided to follow that example and as a result 

use it as a legal principle for other analogical cases, or, if that practice 

is, in fact, incorrect and should rather be perceived as an actual violation 

of international law. 

4 Cf. P. Daranowski, Uznanie niepodległości Kosowa – usankcjonowanie precedensu, [in:] Księga 

pamiątkowa ku czci Profesora Jana Białocerkiewicza, T. Jasudowicz, M. Balcerzak (ed.), Toruń 

2009, p. 1-2. 


30 


It seems that in this particular case, i.e. the international status of 

the Kosovo Republic, the answer should comprise an analysis of the 

content of the UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999), which is 

binding on this matter, as well as an interpretation of the rules and 

provisions of international law and of the theory of international relations 

concerning the problems of sovereignty and secession 5 . 

2. 

The case of Kosovo and the implications 

of the UN Resolution 1244 

It remains significant that the direct parties to the conflict, that is the 

Republic of Serbia and the Republic of Kosovo, are now seeking a legal 

justification to their political standpoints as to the status of Kosovo in 

the UN Resolution 1244 from June 10, 1999. What is more, the Declaration 

of Independence of Kosovo emphasizes expressis verbis the 

will to act according to the rules of international law and the resolutions 

of the Security Council (including the Resolution 1244) and at 

the same time, a contrario, Serbian political authorities are contesting 

the legality of the declaration, quoting its incongruity with the Resolution 

1244 as one of the reasons. In a way it confirms the importance 

and a special political and legal character of the Resolution 1244 and 

its practical significance to Kosovo 6 . In practice, the acceptance of the 

resolution meant that the intervention of NATO countries in Serbia 

and Montenegro in 1999 determined the “entanglement” of further operations 

in Kosovo with some UN mechanisms and subjecting them 

to the order established by the Charter of the United Nations and the 

international community accepted and adopted that solution. 

Most importantly, an analysis of the content of the UN Resolution 

1244 shows that it established an international protectorate in Kosovo 

supervised by the UN (United Nations Interim Administration Mission 

5 Cf. Ch. Borgen, Is Kosovo a Precedent Secession, Self-Determination and Conflict Resolution, Wilson 

Center/Global Europe Program, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/350-kosovo-precedent-secession-self-determination-and-conflict-resolution 

6 Cf. R. Kwiecień, Prawnomiędzynarodowe konsekwencje jednostronnej deklaracji niepodległości Kosowa, 

[in:] Prawo Międzynarodowe i Wspólnotowe wobec wyzwań współczesnego świata, E. Dynia 

(ed.), Rzeszów 2009, p. 115-116. 



31 

in Kosovo – UNMIK). In the prologue, the resolution confirmed the 

duty to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal 

Republic of Yugoslavia and appealed for real autonomy and self-governance 

in Kosovo. In its matter, however, the resolution asserted that 

“actions aimed at establishing real autonomy and self-governance” in 

Kosovo will be taken “the definitive decision pending” with full respect 

to the Rambouillet agreement. The Rambouiliet agreement which was 

de facto an attempt at normalizing the conflict between Serbia and 

Kosovo with the support of the international community and outlined 

a construction of the province’s autonomy which was very demanding 

on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 7 . The content of the resolution 

also stipulated that formally Yugoslavia would have sovereignty over 

Kosovo while, in fact, it granted the power to the Kosovo Force and 

a UN-appointed administrator 8 . 

Nowadays, when referring to the specific character and the interpretation 

of the content of the UN Resolution 1244 and the consequences 

it entailed, governments of states such as the Republic of 

Serbia or the Russian Federation quote the provisions of the preamble: 

“reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty 

and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia” 

and claim that de facto et de iure the Resolution 1244 does not allow 

the secession of Kosovo in any scope or form, and even less so without 

a formal agreement of the Republic of Serbia. On the other hand, the 

European Union in its official stance emphasizes that the Resolution 

1244 is not an obstacle to Kosovo’s independence, sovereignty and political 

subjectivity and that the document does not determine the ultimate 

status of the province. In fact, it should be assumed that from 

a formal point of view the resolution neither promotes nor in any way 

prevents a future secession of Kosovo. What is more, the content of 

paragraph 1 of the resolution states that a future political solution as to 

the status of the province should be based on the principles included 

in the relevant annexes, which, as far as their content is concerned, 

remain “silent” in this matter. They only confirm that until a defini- 

7 More in: P. Daranowski, Uznanie niepodległości Kosowa – usankcjonowanie..., p. 13. 

8 Cf. E. Dynia, Uznanie Kosowa w świetle prawa międzynarodowego, [in:] Prawo Międzynarodowe 

i Wspólnotowe wobec wyzwań współczesnego świata, E. Dynia (ed.), Rzeszów 2009, p. 21. 


32 


tive solution is worked out, Kosovo should have a wide autonomy and 

self-governance while preserving a permanent territorial integrity of 

the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. As for the territorial integrity of 

Serbia, the relevant declarations are limited to the introductory part 

of the preamble and do not occur in the operational part of the document. 

In other words, in its technical part the UN Resolution 1244 is 

also “silent,” which has led to a number of interpretative speculations 

as to the legality and validity of the acknowledgement of the Republic 

of Kosovo as a full-fledged state entity 9 . 

3. 

The principle of sovereignty and the problem 

of the “precedent” of Kosovo 

As Roman Kwiecień notices, the lack of reference to the principle of 

sovereignty in the Declaration of Independence of Kosovo is significant. 

Presumably, it was an intentional act. In fact, the legal justification 

of the secession of Kosovo on the strength of the principle of the 

autonomy of nations seems nowadays to be a risky measure which 

is doomed to failure. There are two reasons for that. Firstly, the process 

of establishing Kosovo was not an inner process and as such it 

was not a self-constitution, but was incited by international involvement, 

especially that of the UN (Resolution 1244). The involvement 

was so significant that the constitution adopted by the Parliament of 

Kosovo is, in fact, a granted constitution, as the legal system which it 

introduced in Kosovo had been stipulated in the so-called Ahtisaari 

Plan 10 (Annex 1, Art.1.3). Secondly, because of the lack of the home 

9 Cf. Ch. Borgen, Is Kosovo a Precedent Secession, Self-Determination and Conflict Resolution... 

10 On the strength of a decision of the UN, its Special Envoy, Martii Ahtisaari, was obliged to prepare 

a comprehensive proposal of solving the status of Kosovo as a basis for further international 

negotiations. His proposal was submitted (respectively on 26 Jan and 02 Feb 2007) to the 

parties of the so-called Contact Group. Russia excluded the possibility of accepting it without 

a Serbian agreement. The Serbian parliament rejected the project. On March 26 th , 2007, the 

UN submitted the final version of the project, stating the final status of Kosovo, to the Security 

Council with the recommendation of accepting it and a Report of the Special Envoy. The plan 

stipulated an extensive self-governance of Kosovo including the right to enter into treaty relations 

and apply for the membership of international organizations as well as the right to decide 

its state symbols, such as the flag, the currency and the army. Although the plan did not use the 

term “independence,” its author formed his opinion saying that “the only credible option is the 



33 

state’s (the Republic of Serbia’s) agreement to a secession of part of its 

territory. It is worth noticing, that the authors of the Declaration of 

Independence of Kosovo were conscious of the legal controversy of 

the act admitting in the preambule that the case of “Kosovo is a special 

case arising from Yugoslavia’s non-consensual breakup and is not 

a precedent for any other situations” 11 . 

In the subject of the so-called Ahtisaari Plan, it should be noticed 

that the Declaration of Independence of Kosovo emphasizes the respect 

for the principle of integrity of the existing countries. It declares 

that “Kosovo will maintain its international borders as determined in 

Annex VIII to the Ahtisaari Plan and will fully respect the autonomy 

and territorial integrity of all its neighbours”. In Annex VIII, we can 

read that “3.2 The territory of Kosovo shall be defined by the frontiers 

of the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo within the Socialist 

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as these frontiers stood on 31 December 

1988 (…)” 12 . 

The Ahtisaari Plan stipulated that Kosovo would obtain the status 

of an entity recognized by international law 13 , controlled by the 

EU and NATO, yet it did not contain any reference to Kosovo’s independence. 

It was only supported by the authorities of Kosovo, most 

EU countries and the USA, while Serbia and Russia were against it. 

The subsequent negotiations between Serbia and the contemporary 

authorities of Kosovo, in cooperation with the representatives of the 

EU, the Russian Federation and the USA, were not successful. On 

17 th February 2008, the National Assembly of Kosovo proclaimed the 

unilateral Declaration of Independence 14 . The act, nota bene of a very 

controversial nature, initiated the real process of the secession of Kosovo 

from the Republic of Serbia. 

independence of Kosovo, initially under the supervision of the international community (…)” 

because “Kosovo is a unique case requiring unique solutions. It does not set a precedent in relation 

to other unsolved conflicts”. Cf. R. Kwiecień, Prawnomiędzynarodowe konsekwencje jednostronnej 

deklaracji..., p. 117. 

11 R. Kwiecień, Prawnomiędzynarodowe konsekwencje jednostronnej.., p. 12. 

12 P. Daranowski, Uznanie niepodległości Kosowa…, p. 12. 

13 E. Dynia, Uznanie Kosowa w świetle prawa międzynarodowego..., p. 20. 

14 Kosovo Declaration of Independence, http://www.assembly-kosova.org/cid=2,100,45 [access: 

01.08. 2010]. 


34 


4. 

The consequences of the recognition of Kosovo 

and its absence in international legal practice 

The problem of the recognition of the new subject aroused controversy 

in the international community. The Serbian government did not agree 

to the independence and secession of a part of Serbia considering it 

a breach of international law. Acting upon the initiative of that country, 

on October 8, 2008, the General Assembly of the UN made the 

decision of examining the international legacy of the unilateral Declaration 

of Independence of Kosovo. Voting 10 to 4 the International 

Court of Justice in the Hague ruled that the Declaration of Independence 

of Kosovo 15 proclaimed in February 2008 violated neither international 

law nor the Resolution 1244 of the Security Council of the UN. 

More importantly, as stated in the opinion of the International Court 

of Justice, the interpretation only concerns Kosovo and takes into account 

the particular historical and political conditions of the process 

and as such should not be used as a precedent in international law. 

In spite of the above, the international community is still divided 

over the question of the legitimacy of the Declaration of Independence 

and the recognition Kosovo by other countries. The split illustrates 

not only the division of the community into countries which 

recognize Kosovo and those which do not, but also the outcome of 

the vote on the resolution of the UN from 2008, concerning the motion 

for an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on 

the compatibility of the declaration with international law (77 countries 

were for, 6 against, 74 abstained from voting or voted against the 

adoption of the resolution) 16 . 

We can try to estimate the influence of the recognition of Kosovo 

as a country by most subjects of international communities for international 

law. It seems that over the lack of common recognition, 

particularly by all the members of the Security Council of the UN the 

recognition does not result erga omnes but only inter partes. That 

means that Kosovo is a country in relation to the countries which recognize 

it. It is not a country for those which do not 17 . 

15 E. Dynia, Uznanie Kosowa w świetle prawa międzynarodowego..., p. 21. 

16 R. Kwiecień, Prawnomiędzynarodowe konsekwencje jednostronnej deklaracji..., p. 118. 

17 Ibidem, p. 119. 



35 

What is more, it should be stated that for the international law the 

case of Kosovo is dangerous for essential reasons. It undermines an 

relativizes its stability and predictability and in this way proves its susceptibility 

to change, either revolutionary or evolutionary. Describing 

Kosovo as a case sui generis we accept that the international law is not 

sufficient or inadequate in this matter and seek solutions outside the 

law. The risk is not reduced by the reservations voiced by some countries 

as well as the very Declaration of Independence of Kosovo, claiming 

that the case should not be considered as a precedent. Moreover, 

this kind of statement is counterproductive as it implies the awareness 

of the resolving entities of the incongruity of the legal status of 

Kosovo with the international law. Secondly, it should be noted that 

the recognition of Kosovo by a numerous group of countries has had, 

despite the controversy of the act and due to its incompatibility with 

the principle of territorial integrity of a country, at least two measurable 

international consequences, i.e., a reduction of the Serbian territory 

and the establishment of a new state – the Republic of Kosovo 18 . 

Bibliography 

Borgen Ch., Is Kosovo a Precedent Secession, Self-Determination and Conflict 

Resolution, Wilson Center/Global Europe Program, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/350-kosovo-precedent-secession-self-determination-and-conflict-resolution 

Daranowski P., Uznanie niepodległości Kosowa – usankcjonowanie precedensu, 

[in:] Księga pamiątkowa ku czci Profesora Jana Białocerkiewicza, T. Jasudowicz, 

M. Balcerzak (ed.), Toruń 2009, p. 1-2 

Hilpold P. (ed.), Kosovo and International Law, The ICJ Advisory Opinion of 

22 July 2010, Leiden 2012 

Kosovo Declaration of Independence, http://www.assembly-kosova. 

org/cid=2,100,45 [access: 01.08. 2010] 

Księga pamiątkowa ku czci Profesora Jana Białocerkiewicza, T. Jasudowicz, M. Balcerzak 

(ed.), Toruń 2009 

Kwiecień R., Prawnomiędzynarodowe konsekwencje jednostronnej deklaracji 

niepodległości Kosowa, [in:] Prawo Międzynarodowe i Wspólnotowe wobec 

wyzwań współczesnego świata, E. Dynia (ed.), Rzeszów 2009, p. 115-116 

18 Ibidem, p. 120; K. Pawłowski, Kosowo…, p. 210. 


36 


Pacuła P., Kosowo: problemy teraźniejszości, wyzwania przyszłości, 

„Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe”, nr 22, II – 2012, p. 118 

Pawłowski K., Kosowo: konflikt i interwencja, Lublin 2008, chapter 2 and 3 

Prawo Międzynarodowe i Wspólnotowe wobec wyzwań współczesnego 

świata, E. Dynia (ed.), Rzeszów 2009 



1. 


in Kosovar Perspective: 

An Agenda for International Cooperation 

Abstract: Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) shared a similar fate in 

former Yugoslav conflicts and international development on the subject of 

nation building, international intervention and international relations. The 

two countries now are making an incremental progress towards the EU integration. 

However, challenges remain in many aspects, including the regional 

cooperation. This paper aims to look at the Kosovo and Bosnia & Herzegovina 

relations in last decade or so with the objective to conduct an analysis 

of the current developments in the region. This paper looks at the political, 

economic and security cooperation as an amalgamation of inter-dependent 

relations in the post-Yugoslav context, with all the ethno-political challenges 

and geo-political burdens. 

Keywords: Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, former Yugoslav conflicts, the 

EU. 

Historical Overview 

1.1. Former Yugoslavia 

The relations between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo are linked 

historically since the Ottoman Empire until the collapse of Yugoslavia. 

However, the history of the Balkans is riddled with historic resources 

allowing for symbolic distinctions to be manipulated for political 

goals 1 . This is particularly evident within former Yugoslavia, where 

ethnic, religious, and nationalist divisions have lasting consequences 

on international relations. Yet, relations since independence of both 

states have been non-existent due to a lack of unanimity in the central 

1 Barth F., Boundaries and connections. Signifying identities: Anthropological perspectives on boundaries 

and contested values, 17-36.

38 


government of Bosnia and Herzegovina. “Bosnia has refrained from 

formal recognition, largely due to the position of its own Serb population 

on the issue”. As the Serbs comprise around 37% of the population 

of the country. Even though “Bosniaks share a similar independence 

trajectory and a common stance against Serbs–as well as having some 

religious and cultural similarities to Kosovo” 2 , constructed ethnic divisions 

within Bosnia have had consequences on international relations. 

For instance, on the 21 st February 2008, the Republika Srpska 

refuses to recognize Kosovo; this stance has been continued until the 

present day 3 , resulting in the lack of formal recognition of Kosovo by 

Bosnia and Herzegovina due to ethno-politics. 

1.2. Diasporas (Kosovars in Bosnia and Bosniaks in Kosovo) 

Ethno-politics have consequences also in Kosovo; for instance, the political 

structure secures non-Serb minorities with ten seats in the Kosovo 

Assembly, three of which are for Bosniaks, enables community 

elites to manipulate “political activity within the community in order 

to prevent the emergence of electoral competitors”. While, for Bosniaks 

(diaspora & non-diaspora) in Kosovo, have struggled to stay politically 

unified, and tend to support larger Albanian parties. This may 

be a result of the 1974 Yugoslav Federation constitution which titled 

all Slavic Muslims as “nationality Muslim” or “Bosniak” 4 . Therefore, 

this may be an indication that those classified as “Bosniaks” are not 

self-prescribed, or the fact that the classification of “national” Muslim 

may also contribute to their integration into other Albanian parties. 

1.3. Relations during the Kosovo war 

The course of wars in Former Yugoslavia brought up a very important 

question “How did such an obvious artificial construct as Yugoslavia 

came into its existence and survived for such a long time” By the end 

2 Stroschein, S. (2013). Discourse in Bosnia and Macedonia on the Independence of Kosovo: When 

and What is a Precedent Europe-Asia Studies, 65:5, 874-888. 

3 Republika Srpska Slams Kosovo Recognition “Pressure”: Balkan Insight. 2014. RepublikaSrpska 

Slams Kosovo Recognition “Pressure”: Balkan Insight. [ONLINE] Available at: http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/dodik-opposes-bosnia-s-recognition-of-kosovo. 

[Accessed 09 July 2014]. 

4 Cocozzeli, F. (2008). Small Minorities in a Divided Polity: Turks, Bosniaks, Muslim Slavs and Roms, 

Ashkalis, Egyptians in Post-Conflict Kosovo. Ethnopolitics: Formerly Global Review of Ethnopolitics, 

7:2-3, 287-306. 


Bosnia and Herzegovina in Kosovar Perspective: An Agenda for International Cooperation 

39 

of the 20 th century, Yugoslavia was a truly multi-national state; The 

Bosniak and Albanian communities comprised 18.6% respectively 8% 

of the total Yugoslav population by 1988 5 . (See table 1.) 

Table 1. Kosovo and Bosnian population within Yugoslavia 6 

Year 

Population in Percentage 

1953 1979 1988 

Kosovo 4.8% 6.9% 8% 

Bosnia and Herzegovina 16.7% 18.6% 18.8% 

The course of wars and the rise of nationalism and economic issues 

within Yugoslavia profoundly influenced the stability of the federation. 

The internal movements within BiH and later on Kosovo 7 raised 

violence to a total new level and agitated the public opinion in Yugoslavia. 

These movements triggered a chain of bloody wars that lasted 

for years bringing the Yugoslav federation towards an end. Needless 

to say, the conflicts brought unity, especially between Bosniaks and 

Kosovo Albanians, having to share a similar experience of war, displacement 

and later on international intervention. 

The political elite in BiH having to deal with coordination and problems 

originated by the Dayton Peace signed in December 1995 8 were 

reluctant to show support for Kosovo explicitly. Nevertheless, by the 

end of April, around 600, 000 residents of Kosovo had become refugees; 

roughly 400,000 were displaced internally within the territory of 

Kosovo. 375,000 Kosovars moved south to the neighbouring Albania, 

and 150,000 had moved to Macedonia. Others moved to Montenegro 

5 Lampe, J. R. (1996). Yugoslavia as history: twice there was a country. Cambridge: Cambridge Uniiversity 

Press, 336-337. 

6 Leätina D. (1992). Regional Development in Communist Yugoslavia: Success, Failure, anti-Consequences, 

Boulder, CO: Westview Press (180-181). 

7 For the purpose of this paper the case of Croatia, Slovenia, Montenegro and FYROM will not be 

elaborated. 

8 Peace agreement reached on November 21, 1995, by the presidents of Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia, 

ending the war in Bosnia and outlining a General Framework of the Bosnian Federation and 

its political system. 


40 


and BiH. According to UNHCR, approximately 10,000 of the Kosovo 

refugees have moved to BiH since January 1988 9 . 

2. 

Economic Cooperation 

Kosovo and BiH are undergoing a long-lasting transition from 

the socialist to liberal open market economy. The trajectory of Kosovo 

and BiH economic development is shifting from the system in which 

the establishment of state ownership and control was the main objective 

of economic policy, to the liberalization of the economy, free 

market, self-management and decentralization 10 . The economies of 

Kosovo and BiH have shown a relatively low development since the 

90s, and the challenging struggles for better, sustainable economy are 

continuing in the post-war years. 

Needless to say, despite its weak economy, Kosovo has showed enthusiasm 

for trade liberalization. Along with internal economic development, 

Kosovo has been struggling to establish commercial and trade 

relations with other countries in the region and worldwide. A small 

emerging economy such as the one of Kosovo does not have a balance 

of exports and imports – meaning that the quantity of imported good 

is larger than the goods exported in other partner countries. 

2.1. CEFTA and Free Trade between Kosovo and BiH 

The CEFTA is a free trade agreement which progressively form an 

integrated area of regional trade and cooperation. The new CEFTA 

– also the so called – CEFTA 2006 was signed by its all parties in 

2007, to only enter into force in the second part of 2008 11 . CEFTA 

represents a trade agreement between non-EU countries in Central 

and South-Eastern Europe. Comprised of fifteen member states, the 

signatory countries are: Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, 

9 Krieger, H. (2001). The Kosovo conflict and international law: an analytical documentation, 1974- 

1999. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 66-68. 

10 Simon, György, An Economic History of Socialist Yugoslavia (2014). Available at SSRN:http://ssrn. 

com/abstract=2094334 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2094334 

11 Introduced by the European Union, CEFTA was firstly established in 1991, and it only became effective 

in 1993 having only Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary as member states. 



41 

Slovenia, Rumania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Albania, Kosovo, 

BiH, Moldova, Montenegro, and Serbia.Basically, through this treaty 

the member states agree on mutual reduction of customs in their territory. 

Furthermore, it envisages the elimination of state monopolies 

by stimulating competition, and harmonizing the legal framework 

and regulations 12 . 

From 2000 until 2013, Kosovo products have been exported mainly 

on the regional countries, whereas the economic embargo set by 

the authorities in BiH and Serbia had a remarkable implication in this 

manner. Since the declaration of independence by Kosovo institutions, 

both Serbia and BiH have introduced the economic sanctions towards 

Kosovo. Not having recognized the independence of Kosovo and the 

new customs stamps, Serbia and BiH seized both import and transit 

of Kosovo products in and through their territories thus by hampering 

Kosovar economic development 13 . As a reaction towards the Serbian 

and BiH authorities, Kosovo introduced trade reciprocity, meaning 

that an embargo on imports of Serbian products and set a 10% tariff 

on goods produced in BiH 14 . 

Figure 1. Kosovo Foreign Trade with BiH (Source: Kosovo Agency of Statistics) 

12 Handjiski, B. (2010). Enhancing regional trade integration in Southeast Europe. Washington, D.C.: 

World Bank, 56-57. 

13 GAP Insitute (2011). Kosovo in CEFTA: In or Out GAP Institute. Retrieved August 13, 2014, from 

http://www.institutigap.org/documents/72590_CEFTAEng.pdf 

14 Halili, P. (2011). Kosovo on the offensive: Trade reciprocity and rule of law. Washington Times Communities. 

Retrieved August 7, 2014, from http://communities.washingtontimes.com/neighbor/- 

hood/europeanization-monitor/2011/aug/2/kosovo-offensive-trade-reciprocity-and-rule-law/ 


42 


Despite the contract signed and the decision to become part of 

CEFTA and the agreement for a free trade economy within Balkan 

states, the trade reciprocity between Kosovo and BiH breached the 

main points of the CEFTA treaty. As seen in the figure above, precisely 

after signing the CFETA agreement, BiH introduced the economic embargo 

thus by decreasing the percentage of imports from Kosovo from 

3.0% in 2008 to 0.7% in 2009. This trend continues to decrease, while 

the products of BiH, still remain in Kosovo market by roughly 3.0%. 

Economic sanctions as a practice are quite well-known in international 

relations, a practice than in the 20 th century has been used widely 

15 . Despite the fact that the economic sanctions are widely used, the 

traditional scholars believe that this tool is unsuccessful in achieving 

the policy objectives 16 . Although, Robert Pope argues that economic 

sanctions are rather human and definitely have smaller impact than 

the use of military force 17 . Yet, in the case of Kosovo and BiH, the economic 

reciprocity has a great impact, and by default illegal, since it 

does breach the CEFTA (Central European Free Trade Agreement). 

One of the most debatable issues is that the CEFTA treaty does 

not possess any provision on how to act in cases when one member 

state or groups of states applies economic embargo towards another 

CEFTA member. However, Article 43 of the CEFTA treaty on Arbitration, 

clearly states that: 

Disputes between the Parties, arising after this Agreement enters into 

force between the Parties concerned and relating to the interpretation or 

application of rights and obligations under it, which have not been settled 

through direct consultations in the Joint Committee within 90 calendar 

days from the date of the receipt of the request for consultations, 

may be referred to arbitration by any Party to the dispute by means of 

a written notification addressed to the other Party to the dispute 18 . 

15 Tsugui, E. (2011). Regionalization and European Integration in the Framework of Central European 

Free Trade Agreement. Institute for Development and Social Initiatives (IDIS), 2, 1-8. 

16 Delevis, M. (1998). The International Journal of Peace Studies. Economic Sanctions as a Foreign 

Policy Tool: The Case of Yugoslavia. Retrieved September 7, 2014, from http://www.gmu.edu/ 

programs/icar/ijps/vol3_1/Delvic.htm 

17 Pape, R. A. (1997). Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work. International Security, 22(2), 90. 

18 Central European Free Trade Agreement (2006) Consolidated Version of the Central European 

Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA 2006). Retrieved August 8, 2014, fromhttp://www.stabilitypact. 

org/trade/ANN1CEFTA%202006%20Final%20Text.pdf 



43 

Nevertheless, in the case of Kosovo and BiH, the dispute is still ongoing, 

after almost four years by seriously harming the main concept 

of the CEFTA as such the free trade concept. 

As showed in the stats below, in 2013, Kosovo main foreign trade 

partners in exports are Albania with 14.9%, Macedonia 8.9%, 5.9% 

Montenegro, Serbia by 4.9%, while the largest partners of Kosovo imports 

from Balkan countries are Serbia with11.7%, Macedonia with 

7.6%, and 4.5% Albania 19 . 

3. 

Security Cooperation 

Developing and maintaining regional security cooperation in 

the Western Balkan region continues to remain of the most crucial 

interests of the European Union and Western Balkan countries. Indeed, 

security is a vital factor for establishing political stability, peace, 

security and economic prosperity in the region. 

Having in front challenges such as organized crime, international 

terrorism, corruption and border management the Western Balkan 

countries assisted by the EU, has had established many regional security 

initiatives. Despite the fact that cooperation in the field security 

does represent one of the main elements of stabilization in the region, 

it also requires partnership and cooperation between the countries 

which were active in the chain of conflicts occurring in 1990’s or still 

is in ongoing political disputes 20 . Hence, lack of recognition of Kosovo 

independence 21 and statehood from BiH has created a status-quo 

thus lack of bilateral relations among these countries. 

19 Kosovo Agency of Statistics: Kosovo Foreign Trade – 2013 Stats. Kosovo Agency of Statistics. 

Retrieved August 13, 2014, from http://ask.rks-gov.net/publikimet/doc_view/1127-statistikat-etregtisaeuml-saeuml-jashtme-2013tmpl=component&format=raw 

20 Djugumanov, I., Lazić, B., &Tasev, J. (2012). The Balkans and the Future of Euro-Atlantic Integration. 

Atlantic Council, 2(2), 1-12. 

21 Full text: Kosovo declaration. (2008, February 17). BBC News. Retrieved September 8, 2014, from 

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7249677.stm 


44 


4. Police 

Police cooperation between BiH and Kosovo is constantly being 

hampered by the political implications and lack of statehood recognition 

by BiH. Lacking formal and bilateral agreements between Kosovo 

and BiH, the cooperation between the two states has been done by using 

other channels such as informal communication and cooperation 

through regional initiatives in the field of security 22 . 

So far, Kosovo has been communicating with BiH informally 

through ILECU (International Law Enforcement Coordination Unit) 23 . 

This platform of communication did boost cooperation between Kosovo 

and BiH, and it does connect Kosovo to the international platforms 

such as INTERPOL and EUROPOL 24 . 

Needless to say, the development of the regional cooperation in the 

Balkans under the coordination of the Regional Cooperation Council 

(RCC) which represents one of the main initiatives carrying more 

than 40 regional cooperation mechanisms, has begun to show its first 

successes by engaging Kosovo in regional level projects. Police cooperation 

in the Balkans has been also seen as a tool to overcome the 

challenges of the past while facilitating the campaign against organized 

crime and other security threatens 25 . 

4.1. Organized crime, Trafficking and Drugs 

There is lack of cooperation between Kosovo and BiH in the bilateral 

level, however, there has been some communication set up by law enforcement 

agencies led by several EU and Balkan countries. Collaboration 

in several operations has led to the dismantling one of the largest 

and powerful drug network in the Balkans which used to network and 

supplies drugs to the EU countries 26 . Moreover, the cooperation be- 

22 Emini, D. (2014). Kosovo’s Membership and Participation in Regional Security Initiatives. Kosovar 

Center for Security Studies (KCSS), 1(1), 1-32. 

23 ILECU is an EU regional project aiming to establish national coordination units and enforce cooperation 

in the Western Balkan state. 

24 Elshani, Veton. Interview by Donika Emini.Personal interview. Kosovo Police – ILECU, June 26, 

2014. 

25 Paszkiewicz, J. (2013). Faculty of Arts and Sciences Journal of Social Sciences, Regional Cooperation 

In Western Balkans : A View From Inside The European Union, The Premises And Obstacles 

(149-160). 

26 Karadaku, L. (2013, November 4). Police co-operation breaks major drug-trafficking network. 

(SETimes.com). Retrieved September 25, 2014, from http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/ 



45 

tween police and prosecutors Kosovo, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina 

(BiH), Croatia, Slovenia, Austria and Italy after an operation of 

four years with the arrests of seven suspects in Albania and Italy on 

charges of drug trafficking and other related crimes. 

5. Military 

Military cooperation does represent one of the most challenging 

sphere in which Kosovo and BiH have not managed to establish 

cooperation. The logic of linking the security institutions with the 

statehood of Kosovo has made BiH authorities reluctant to establish 

any type of relations with Kosovo. Thus, different from the police sector, 

the defence sector still remains challenging. 

5.1. Defence, Training and Peacekeeping 

Lacking bilateral relations Kosovo and BiH have not yet established 

cooperation in the defence sector, henceforth the newly established 

Kosovo Security Force (KSF) did not benefit from joint trainings with 

BiH or other regional states. 

So far Kosovo has not been able to participate in the Peace Support 

Operations Training Center (PSOTC), an organization created for the 

support of Armed Forces of BiH which of course has a regional component 

and partnership with NATO. Kosovo authorities have been 

constantly showing ambitions to join this organization, but failed to 

establish any type of relations, even non formal 27 . 

Nevertheless, the Western Balkans region is being threatened from 

terrorism, organized crime, cross-border criminal activities, corruption, 

such cases need to be dealt regionally and cooperation in the field 

of security, including the intelligence sharing and other joint effort 

are very much needed in order to fight against powerful global forces. 

xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2013/11/04/feature-01 

27 Emini, D. (2014). Kosovo’s Membership and Representation in Regional Security Initiative. Kosovar 

Center for Security Studies. Retrieved September 22, 2014, from http://www.qkss.org/reposiutory/docs/Kosovo 


46 


6. 

Transnational Justice and Victims of war 

The chain of conflict in the Balkan Region for almost a decade 

has had a huge impact on the former Yugoslav countries and their political 

and economic systems. Besides, this had devastated the social 

fabric leaving thousands of people traumatized, still missing, killed and 

disabled. Social devastation and wars and atrocities in this regional, 

especially towards Muslims in BIH and ethnic Albanians in Kosovo 

reinforced and deepened social fragmentation in post-war society. 

Many scholars have raised the question how do the post-war societies 

and countries manage to come to cope with a history of war 

and violence, oppression and human rights violations The concept 

of transitional justice evolved from the field of international human 

rights movements initially aiming to the judicial process aiming to address 

human rights violations committed by the dictatorial regimes 28 . 

Nowadays, the concept of transitional justice has expanded and plays 

a crucial role in international law and the process of democratisation, 

as well as state and nation building in post-conflict countries. The concept 

does not include the judicial process only; it also includes truth 

commissions aiming to keep track of the “damages”, and reparation 

to the victims 29 . This process is usually led by international organizations/donors 

and foreign experts for the countries and societies in 

transition most likely post-war or authoritarian countries. Generally 

this process is done by reforming the state institutions focusing on 

the security and justice sectors and by proceeding cases towards war 

criminals by national and international courts. In the case of Kosovo 

and BiH, the process of the above mentioned reforms are being initiated 

and implemented by international institutions, the concerns 

about capacities and impartiality led to the creation of a mixed judicial 

system staffed by both international and national judges and prosecutors, 

especially in the high profile cases of war crimes 30 . Nevertheless, 

the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 

28 Fischer, M. (2010). Transitional Justice and Reconciliation: Theory and Practice. Berghof Foundation. 

Retrieved August 9, 2014, from http://www.berghof-handbook.net/documents/publicaetions/fischer 

29 Riffler, V. (2010). International Journal of Rule of Law, Transitional Justice and Human Rights, Transitional 

Justice And Human Rights, Vol. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1736605 p. 13 

30 Zupan, N. (2007). Facing the Past and Transitional Justice in Countries of Former Yugoslavia. Berlin, 

332. 



47 

deals with the cases of high profile war criminals, and so far this tribunal 

has four rather big cases ongoing 31 . 

The number of victims in both Kosovo and BiH is rather difficult to 

be estimated due to an ongoing process of finding the missing people. 

However, the approximate death toll as registered so far shows that 

in Kosovo around 16.000 32 people died, while in BiH the number of 

war victims is rather larger by registering around 104.000 victims 33 . 

Table 2. Missing Persons during the Yugoslav wars: Cases of Kosovo and BiH 34 

Unaccounted/Missing Persons in the former Yugoslavia 

Persons that went missing during the Yugoslav Wars 

Bosnia-Herzegovina 30,000 

Kosovo 4,400 

Persons still missing or unaccounted for today 

Bosnia-Herzegovina 10,000 

Kosovo 1,900 

6.1. Reparations 

Reparations refer to the programs and initiatives sponsored by the 

state aiming to contribute repairing – moral and material – of the 

past abuse experienced by the victims 35 . Until now, no governmentsponsored 

reparation programmes for direct/ indirect victims of war 

have been initiated in Kosovo or BiH. 

31 The case of Ratko Mladic, Vojislav Seselj, Goran Hadzic, he cases are listed on the website of the 

Tribunal: available at: http://www.icty.org/action/cases/4 

32 Human Rights Watch. (2000). The Crisis in Kosovo. Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign. 

Retrieved September 21, 2014, from http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/nato/Natbm200-01.htm 

33 Zwierzchowski, J., & Tabeau, E. (2010). The Global Costs of Conflict.ICTY. Retrieved August 21, 

2014, from http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/OTP/War_Demographics/en/bih_casualty_underucount_conf_paper_1 

34 Der Auweraert, P. V. (2013). Reparations for Wartime Victims in the Former Yugoslavia: In Search 

of the Way Forward. IOM. Retrieved August 22, 2014, from https://www.iom.int/files/live/sites/ 

iom/files/What-We-Do/docs/Reparations-for-Wartime-Victimes-in-the-Former-Yugoslavia-In- 

Search-of-the-Way-Forward.pdf 

35 What is Transitional Justice (2008, August 20). UN. Retrieved September 10, 2014, from http:// 

www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pdf/do 


48 


While, the government of BiH has filed a lawsuit against Former 

Yugoslavia at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for violating 

the Convention on Genocide in 1993, the government of Kosovo has 

created a ministerial working group in 2012 to develop a strategy for 

dealing with the past 36 . 

6.2. Lustration 

The concept of lustration refers to the measures taken by the state 

against all persons associated and linked to the former state authorities 

which functioned during the period of repression. So far, Kosovo 

and BiH have not drafted the Law on Lustration, although the international 

institutions in both countries have introduced the screening 

and vetting process as part of a larger institutional reform 37 . It is only 

Serbia that passed this law in 2003, however due to the high political 

consequences this law did not manage to open the secret files, and no 

case has been preceded so far 38 . 

Conclusion 

To boost cooperation and relations BiH needs to lift its sanctions 

against Kosovo declared after the Independence of Kosovo. Not having 

recognized the independence of Kosovo and the new customs 

stamps, Serbia and BiH seized both import and transit of Kosovo 

products in and through their territories thus by hampering Kosovar 

economic development. 

BiH and Kosovo needs to increase Police cooperation in the technical 

level and policy level. Lacking formal and bilateral agreements 

between Kosovo and BiH, the cooperation between the two states re- 

36 Zupan, N. (2007). Facing the Past and Transitional Justice in Countries of Former Yugoslavia. Berlin, 

332. 

37 Transitional Justice in Post-Yugoslav Countries. (2007). Report for 2006. Retrieved September 15, 

2014, from http://wcjp.unicri.it/proceedings/docs/DOCUMENTA-HLC-RCS_Trans%20justice%20 

in%20ex%20Yu% 

38 Dvořáková, V., & Milardović, A. (2007). Lustration and Consolidation of Democracy and the Rule 

of Law in Central and Eastern Europe. Series of Political Science Research Centre Forum Book 5. Retrieved 

August 9, 2014, from http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_12839-1522-19-30.pdf090702164702 



49 

mains informal and not effective in fighting organized crime and other 

security challenges in the region. 

BiH and Kosovo needs to start cooperation in the field of defence 

sector to address necessary joint efforts for NATO integration and 

regional defence challenges. 

BiH and Kosovo need to cooperate closely in the field of transitional 

justice and exchange experiences in dealing with the past. Issues such 

as reparation, missing persons, and lustration can be accelerating issues 

in cooperation between the two countries. 

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War_Demographics/en/bih_casualty_undercount_conf_paper_1 



Radical Islamism – A threat to 

Bosniak Identity and Security 

of Bosnia and Herzegovina 

Abstract: The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina that broke out in the eve 

of post-Cold War era has brought to the international agenda the issue of Bosniak 

identity, rights and future political and state representation. The security 

of Bosniak identity, built up on religious and cultural aspects, was confronted 

in military terms with nationalistic ethnic approach of Serbs and Croats. 

The aim of this paper is to analyze the roots, history and evolution of Bosniak 

identity as challenged by radical Islamic ideology that emerged with the conflict. 

The role of radical Islamism in shaping the security of post-conflict Bosnia 

will also be described. Foreign assistance or help from various Muslim states, 

non-governmental organizations as well as from radical Islamic militant 

groups put the question of the Bosniak islamization and radicalization into 

discourse. The security and structure of the Bosnia and Herzegovina was also 

challenged by radical Islamic ideologies and their militant representations. After 

the September 11 th the Islamic terrorism was a target of international war 

and that has changed Bosnia and Herzegovina in a great manner. 

Keywords: Bosnia and Herzegovina, identity, security, Islamic, radicalism 

Introduction 

The dissolution of the Soviet Union that started somewhere in the late 

1980-ies but formally occurred in the 1992 has brought fundamental 

changes to European security system. New developments were transforming 

the map of Europe not only in political sense but what’s more 

important in the geopolitical one. Formation of new independent states 

from Baltic states to Central Asia, reintegration of the Germany (or 

rather incorporation of DDR into Federal Republic), division of Czechoslovakia 

into two independent states effected the nations of Yugoslavia, 

which also wanted to implement the idea of self-determination 

and create its own “national” states. The processes of democratization 

of political systems and liberalization of economies has been characterizing 

most of post – Soviet bloc states but in the Balkans the ghost

54 


of violent ethnic conflict was challenging the multinational structure 

of Yugoslavia. That structure designed and preserved by Tito was already 

falling down through the 1980-ies but the end of the Cold War 

speed up processes of disintegration and finally let to outbreak of three 

year long, bloody and very turbulent civil war on the territory of former 

Yugoslavia. 

Between the 1991 and 1992, Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia and 

Bosnia and Herzegovina have proclaimed independence and Federal 

Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia still with Kosovo, Montenegro) was 

created. The initiatives of peaceful and democratic changes were being 

destroyed by each side of conflict and military option was most 

likely chosen for reconstruction of regional affairs. Bosnia and Herzegovina 

was the weakest organism due to the internal division between 

the three ethnic groups (Bosniaks 1 , Serbs and Croats), three religions 

(Islam, Orthodox and Catholic) and the ambitions of newly established 

Serbia and Croatia to divide the Bosnia and Herzegovina and 

incorporate its territories into their states. The Muslim side of the conflict 

had no backing in regional actors and had to defend itself with 

the help of anyone who would like to provide it. Naturally, they turned 

to the Muslim states of the Middle East, as well as to the other nonstate 

Muslim actors for help. The turnout was quite significant and 

the stream of money, weapons and other help was heading to Sarajevo 

from the Muslim states, nongovernmental organizations and terrorist 

groups. As a result of that cooperation the challenge of radical Islamism 

emerged in the Bosnia and Herzegovina mostly due to the direct 

and military involvement of many radical or terrorist organizations 

whose interests were not always parallel with the ones of Bosniak society 

and Bosnian state. 

In many sources the question of Bosnian islamization and its role 

in international terrorist network was stated. The aim of this paper 

is to analyze the roots and evolution of the Bosniak identity and its 

adaptation to radical Islamic concepts promoted by international jihadist 

and Muslim states during and after the conflict. As well as to un- 

1 In this paper the term Bosniacs will refer to the Muslim populations of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 

where Bosnians would mean the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 


Radical Islamism – A threat to Bosniak Identity and Security of Bosnia and Herzegovina 

55 

derstand the role of radical Islamic ideologies and theirs supporters 

in shaping and challenging the security of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 

1. 

Bosniak Islamic identity and history 

Muslim history of Bosnia is mainly connected with the Ottomans 

who established its presence over her territories also by spreading Islam. 

Migration from other Ottoman regions and conversion of locals 

into Islam brought the Muslim community into aliveness. It built up 

its identity in the mixture of Turkish influence and accommodation 

to Balkan ethnic and religious diversity. Long-term administration 

of those territories by the Turks allowed the community to fit into 

regional affairs and secure its dominant position over other Balkans’ 

communities in all aspects. After the Congress of Berlin the Bosnia 

and Herzegovina went under the Austro-Hungarian rule. They untouched 

the Muslim rights on that territory, mainly on the economic 

level. That was the reason that the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina 

supported the Central Powers in the World War I 2 . The legal system 

of Muslim advantages has secured their rights for long period but was 

also a reason of great conflict with the Serbs and Croats. 

Bosnia as a peripheral region quickly became a victim of international 

conflicts through XIX and XX centuries. Ottoman Empire was 

falling down since the mid XIX century and loosing Bosnia and Herzegovina 

was one of early syndromes of final collapse that emerged 

as a result of World War I. The nation-state’s building processes that 

shaped Europe those days have omitted Bosniaks 3 . Turks were not able 

to support Muslim community and they alone were unable to break 

through other Balkans nationalisms. In given period, Bosniaks were 

rather the subjects of regional and international arrangements and 

preserve identity mostly because of religious and linguistic differences 

as well as previous economic dominance. 

2 J. Elsässer, Jak dżihad przybył do Europy. Wojownicy Boga i Tajne Służby na Bałkanach, Warszawskie 

Wydawnictwo Literackie MUZA 2007, p. 29-30. 

3 S. L. Burg, P. S. Shop, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention, 

M. E. Sharpe 2000, p. 18. 


56 


Until the second half of the XX century, described group was perceived 

mostly as a religious minority/community, not as a distinguished 

ethnic category. That was main the main reason why their 

rights of self-determination were not recognized by regional states 

and international system. In addition, between the great wars the geopolitics 

of the Balkans were shaped on the grave of Ottomans and 

the possibility to recognize the interests of “Turks” in Bosnia and Herzegovina 

was unlikely to happen. Nevertheless, most of the Bosniaks 

(Muslims) supported the idea of Yugoslavian state when they were 

placed among the Serbs and Croats. The idea of unite multinational 

state was giving the chance for gaining at least some autonomy especially 

in the religious and educational aspects. For most of those times 

Bosnia and Herzegovina was under the Belgrade’s administration, but 

growing conflict between Serbs and Croats placed them again of both 

sides 4 . Nevertheless, before the World War II the Muslims of Bosnia 

and Herzegovina enjoyed some degree of autonomy and were able 

to build up their political representation, namely Yugoslav Muslim 

Organization (YMO). 

The World War II brought to the Balkans an outbreak of ethnical/ 

religious war between the Muslims, Serbs, and Croats who supported 

different sides of the conflict. On 10 August 1941 the YMO recognized 

the German satellite “state” – the Independent State of Croatia 

and its members took some high positions in government of that entity. 

In 1943, the Muslim volunteers from Bosnia and Herzegovina has 

formed SS Division “Handschar”, which became infamous of the ethnic 

cleansing committed in Central-Eastern Bosnia 5 . However, formally 

the Muslims supported the Nazi Germany and the Croatian satellite 

state, the regular people were present in all of fighting formations. 

The activities of the Bosniaks were not different than others in the region, 

even concerning the genocides or other war crimes. The complicated 

and bloody war in the Balkans during the WWII was just 

a prelude to the conflict that blew up during the 1990s. 

After the war, the victorious side became the communists with 

the leader Josip Tito, who established Federal People’s Republic of Yu- 

4 Ibidem, p. 35-37. 

5 J. Elsässer, op. cit., p. 28, 35. 



57 

goslavia in 1946. The Yugoslavia was built up on the idea of communism, 

which in this case promote multicultural diversity and protection 

of each minority. Although the Serbs were somehow favoured, the system 

was working and the conflicts have been silenced for some decades. 

Under the communist rule, the Bosniaks were adapting to new realities 

and system that secured their rights on basic level. In the 1963, J. Tito 

change the name of the state into Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia, 

amended constitution that established authoritarian system of his 

rule, granted some self-governance rights to the federal republics, but 

what’s more important in this case, recognized the Muslims of Yugoslavia 

as a nation with equal status the other participating nations 6 . 

It was a milestone in building up the Bosniak identity, which not only 

facilitated the presence in the legal system but also was a main source 

of nation building processes. Even the next amendment of constitution 

from 1974, which limited the powers of the federal republics, hasn’t 

stopped the wheel of Bosniak political identity building processes. 

Like it was already described, the Bosniaks identity before the second 

part of the XX century was build up rather on religious and cultural 

aspects and the political awareness is a quite new concept. The ideas 

of sovereign Bosnia and Herzegovina were appearing in the thoughts 

of Young Turks, however it was the Islamic Religious Community that 

was following the caliphate order, trying to preserve the Islam religion 

on these territories, and secure the interests and rights of Muslim people 

7 . It was just in 1939, when the Young Muslims started to operate 

in the Bosnia and Herzegovina. They brought idea of pan-Islamism and 

were trying to shape the Muslim/Bosniak identity in political terms. 

Recognition in national/ethnic category under socialistic rule, gave 

Muslim leaders great opportunity to build up coherence of Bosniaks. 

The openness of the system allowed the Young Muslims to reorganize 

and to conduct some activities. Alija Izetbegovic and many others 

continued to promote the ideas of pan-Islamism and Muslim political 

identity. In 1970 he wrote famous Islamic Declaration. In many terms 

it’s a very fundamentalist document that promote establishment of Is- 

6 S. L. Burg, P. S. Shop, op. cit., p. 41. 

7 The Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina, History, http://www.rijaset.ba/english/index.php/modules-menu/history, 

[20.10.2014]. 


58 


lamic entity/state among the Muslim population of Bosnia and Herzegovina 

and postulate reestablishment of united Islamic state based on 

the conception of Umma (conception of religious and political unity 

of all Muslims). Some postulates of Izetbegovic Declaration, as it was 

stated by J. Elsässer, are potentially dangerous to the civil society concept 

and more important to the basic democratic values 8 . However, 

the document itself looks more like general manifesto rather than coherent 

concept, nonetheless it brought the idea of radical Islamism 

into the modern European security system 9 . It need to be underline 

that the Islamic Declaration was alike other manifestos that were written 

all along the Muslim world. The 1970s were the times of Islamism’s 

awaking due to the practical failure of secular pan-Arabism and arise 

of many political Islamism concepts. 

After the J. Tito’s death in 1980, the fragile multinational system 

of Yugoslavia was already in a deep crisis. The national tendencies were 

breaking the system from inside, where main cluster of it seemed to be 

the cold war realities. On the turn of the 1970-ies and 1980-ies, Young 

Muslims were able to extend their activities, establish strong links with 

the Muslim organizations and promote the idea of sovereign Bosnia. 

With the help of foreign donations, mostly from the Arab world, 

many mosques and Islamic schools were built up or reopened 10 . For 

those reasons the leaders of that organization, with the Izetbegovic at 

the head of it, became accused of anti-systemic activities, tried to create 

national, independent Bosnia. They were judged and sentenced 

for long prison but after a few years (3-5) all of them became free men 

again. Those days were the times when fundaments of Bosniak political 

identity and ideas of coherent state were shaped in the minds 

of future Bosniak political elite members. In the late 1980-ies some 

kind of agreement between the Young Muslims and the Islamic Community 

was made, since those two organizations were backing an idea 

of Bosnia’s autonomy, self-governance and possible achievement of formal 

independence. The year of 1990 was crucial for Bosniak history 

8 J. Elsässer, op. cit., p. 39-41. 

9 For Text of Islamic Declaration look: A. Izetbegovic, Islamic Declaration. A Programme for the Islamization 

of Muslims and the Muslim People, Sarajevo 1990, http://life-info.de/inh1./texte/Islamic%20Declaration_1990%20Izetbegovic.pdf 

[15.09.2014]. 

10 W. Dietl, K. Hirschman, R. Tophoven, Terroryzm, Wydawnicto Naukowe PWN, Warszawa 2009, p. 170. 



59 

because its main political representation and military forces were organized. 

On 26 th May 1990 the Party of Democratic Action (Stranke 

Demokratske Akcije – SDA) was established, with the leadership of Alija 

Izetbegovic. It was not only the first political party organized on collapse 

of Yugoslavian state (among other republics) but it was the first 

such an entity which was established to secure and promote the interests 

of the Muslim population of the Bosnia and Herzegovina 11 

(the Bosniaks). During the same year the military Bosniak formation 

was organized – the Patriotic League, which in 1992 was incorporated 

by Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bosniaks 

were aware of the possibility of armed conflict so they wanted to be 

prepared in some way to defend their interests also on military level. 

2. 

Defending Bosnia and Herzegovina – 

role of radical Islamism 

The founders of the Muslim entity of Bosnia in Herzegovina, mainly 

A. Izetbegovic and the other leaders of the SDA represented very 

Islamic, or even fundamentalist, approach to the idea of future Bosnia 

and Herzegovina state’s structure and model. Many scholars have 

been accusing them of desire to build up the truly Islamic state in Bosnia 

and Herzegovina or to establish a safe base for radical Islamists’ 

operations in Europe 12 . Indisputably, they grew up from the mixture 

of pan-Islamism and newly born Bosniak political identity. They had 

to operate in geographically isolation from the main area of Muslim 

polity, so most of contacts have been established through informal 

nets of cooperation – with today terrorist organizations, those days 

openly accepted as Islamic fighters. Rapid and turbulent process of Yugoslavia’s 

disintegration surprised not only the concern nations but 

mainly international community. Clear signs of upcoming catastrophe 

were turned back on the wave of positive climax in changing Europe. 

The Bosniaks were left alone in the growing military conflict. Croatia 

11 Offical website of SDA – http://sda.ba/home/o-name/licna-karta-stranke/, [15.09.2014]. 

12 Look into: Ch. Deliso, The Coming Balkan Caliphate: The Threat of Radical Islam to Europe and 

the West, Praeger Security International 2007, p. 3-22; J. Elsässer, op. cit., p. 46-55. 


60 


was quickly backed by some European states, with the Germany on 

the top. Serbia naturally was granted some help from Moscow and 

only the Bosniak side was left without formal protection and backing 

in upcoming military struggle. The fall down of Yugoslavia state started 

the decomposition of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Republic. With 

the creation of independent Croatia (1991), Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 

1992 (reminiscence of the former Yugoslavia with the dominant 

Serb position) and proclamation of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s independence 

on 6 th March 1992 political and military conflict erupted 

on this territories. The Bosniaks had to compete with the Croatia and 

Serbs who wanted to divide the Bosnia and Herzegovina territories and 

incorporate them into their national states. The Republika Srpska and 

the Croatian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Herzeg-Bosnia) were 

formed on the territories of former federal republic and the Bosniak 

(Muslim) interests were omitted in division plans of bigger nations 13 . 

In such realities, the Bosniaks realized that they need to prepare 

themselves for war on two frontlines. It’s why we are not surprised that 

they used religious aspect (the core of their identity) of the conflict 

to internationalize it and gain support from any sources. The Muslims 

cried for help, lacking almost everything were in position to accept 

the help from anyone. As it will be describe later, the help came from 

Muslim states but also from militant Islamic groups 14 . Complacence 

and cruelty of Bosnian war resulted in involvement of all important 

intelligence services, where the interests of ethnic groups were mixed 

with the ones of informal groups, regional states and international 

actors. The international Islamic militant groups’ presence and involvement 

of the Middle East States (mainly Saudi Arabia, Iran and 

Turkey) gave enough help for survival but it was actually the USA 

who secured the position of Bosniaks and the integrity of the Bosnia 

and Herzegovina. 

13 S. L. Burg, P. S. Shop, op. cit., p. 64-69. 

14 J. S. Landay, J. Battersby, Bosnia War Shakes Mulim Word, Christian Science Monitor, 9.05.1995, 

http://www.csmonitor.com/1995/0809/0913.html, [02.10.2014], p. 1. 


3. 


International Islamic Militant groups’ involvement 

The war in Bosnia attracted many of the Mujahedeen, who answered 

the call of the Izetbegovic and the SDA from 1992. They were 

coming in numbers to fight the war in Bosnia on behalf of the Muslim 

community 15 . After the declared victory in Afghanistan, the Mujahedeens 

were taking part in new emerged conflicts on the Caucasus 

and the Central Asia, Somalia, Algeria and many other places. Bosnia 

seemed for them as a good place to conduct international jihad 

and defend Muslims. According to radical jihadist ideology, Serbs 

and other enemies have occupied Muslim territories and it was natural 

right for Islamists to defend them 16 . The Muslim volunteers that 

were coming into fight were mostly previous fighters of Afghanistan 

and the Caucasus but the conflict also attracted new wave of Islamist 

who turned into it because of pro-Bosniak propaganda in the Muslim 

states’ media 17 . No one may argue that the international Islamic 

militant groups, nowadays labelled terrorist, played an important role 

in defending Bosniak security, but its role was partly limited coming 

from internal demands and external pressure. Due to the later terrorist 

activities of the Al-Qaeda, the links between Bin Laden and the heads 

of the war-time Bosniak leaders are well described in literature. 

In 1987, in Vienna the new charity foundation was established – 

the Third World Relief Agency (TWRA). The head of the foundation 

was Sudanese Faith al-Hasan and one of the board members was 

close friend of A. Izetbegovic from Young Muslims – Hasan Cengic. 

After the 9/11 it was proven that TRWA was a company that directly 

linked Osama bin Laden with the leaders of the Bosnian Muslims. 

The international militants Islamists/terrorists backed the Bosniaks 

with the financial help, mostly spent on arms purchases and sending 

the fighters into frontlines. Thousands of millions of dollars were 

transfers through the TWRA (0.5-2.5 bln USD) and many of fighters 

were trafficked into the conflict area (2500-6000). Besides, bin Lad- 

61 

15 P. L. Williams, AL-KAIDA. Międzynarodowy terroryzm, zorganizowana przestępczość i nadciągająca 

apokalipsa, Zysk i S-ka Wydawnictwo, Poznań 2007, p. 82-83. 

16 W. Dietl, K. Hirschman, R. Tophoven, op. cit., p. 172. 

17 Ch. Hedges, Muslims from Afar Joining “Holy War” in Bosnia, The New York Times, 05.12.1992, 

http://www.nytimes.com/1992/12/05/world/muslims-from-afar-joining-holy-war-in-bosnia.html, 

[17.09.2014]. 


62 


en connections the other terrorist groups from Hezbollah to Islamic 

Jihad were very active in the Bosnian war. In 1991, Chief of Egyptian 

Islamic Jihad and current leader of Al-Qaeda – Ayman al-Zawahiri, 

opened in Sofia Mujahideen Coordination Bureau. Its main role was 

to transfer the fighter into the conflict 18 . Close connection of Izetbegovic 

with Iran, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and different Islamic groups 

made Bosnia in some way safe haven for Islamic militants in Europe 

who started to operate from there into other part of the Balkans (Kosovo, 

Macedonia) as well as other part of Europe 19 . As it was proven, 

Bosnia after the conflict was used by terrorist to prepare the operations, 

laundry the money or train fighter but predicted or even described 

radicalization of social affairs has never occurred in the big 

manner. The link between the Bosniak leaders and terrorist organizations 

is more than clear. However, they fight to secure the Bosniaks 

and needed much more than the given international Islamic militant 

groups were able to provide. 

State’s assistance 

The war in Bosnia brought attention all around the Muslim world. 

The pictures of atrocities were shown publicly what turned popular 

support for the Bosniaks, but only few of the states acted in serious 

manner. Most of the relief that was going through the legal channels 

from the Muslim states to Bosniaks had humanitarian or civil use 

character, due to the UN arms embargo placed on all sides of conflict 

(1991/1992). Bosniaks could not count as Croats and Serbs on direct 

deliveries from neighbour Croatia or New Yugoslavia; it’s why the matter 

of arms delivers to Sarajevo was so crucial and only possible with 

the support of friendly states. Between 1992 and 1993 the main, but 

very limited arms deliveries to Bosniaks came from Sudan, Iran, and 

Turkey 20 . The outbreak of war between the Muslims and Croats closed 

the Zagreb connection and Sarajevo was left with no other option than 

relying on terrorist network. 

18 J. Elsässer, op. cit., p. 59-77; P. L. Williams, op. cit., p. 173. 

19 Ch. Deliso, op. cit., p. 5-8. 

20 J. Elsässer, op. cit., p. 113. 



63 

After the end of bilateral military conflict and reestablishment 

of Bosnian Croats and Muslims Federation in 1994, the process of mass 

arms transfers to the Bosniaks was organized in secret and very fragile 

coalition led by the USA. According to report “Intelligence and 

the war in Bosnia, 1992-1995” prepared by Professor Cees Wiebes deliveries 

where made through Croatia who cut 20-50% for themselves 

and organized the transport via controlled territories. The operation 

was organized by various US agencies, Iran and Turkey (with financial 

backup from Saudi Arabia) together with various radical Islamic militant 

groups (Afghan Mujahedeens and Hezbollah members). It was 

proven that Iran Air was delivering weapons do several Croatian airports 

but there were also reports of US direct involvement in those 

lifts, especially since 1995 21 . It is widely believed that the US agencies 

helped some radical Islamists group in their activities in Bosnia who 

later became their fighting enemies in the war against terrorism 22 . 

The US recognition of Bosniak rights and some kind of protection 

of their interest on the international level, with efficient military help, 

was crucial for securing lives of the Muslim Bosniaks but also for establishment 

of independent Bosnia and Herzegovina. It looks like tactical 

alliance with radical Islamist militants in Bosnia, very quickly turned 

to be wrong path in US policies. In the times pre-9/11, the USA was 

not recognizing radical Islamic militant groups as a serious challenge 

to international security or underestimated their potency. Nevertheless, 

as it was described in details in last decade, US intelligence agencies 

were rather blind on Islamic extremism or didn’t want to recognize 

growing threat. Most probably, in old-Afghanistan times model, they 

used them as the proxies in realization of particular international interests 

especially on the Balkans and Caucasus. After 9/11 former allies 

became primary enemies when radical Islamic militant ideology became 

stated as the one of the biggest threats to international security. 

The war in Bosnia created some strange alliances based on support 

given to the fighting sides. The Croats were supported in the military 

sense by Germany and some other Western European countries. 

21 After R. J. Aldrich, America used Islamists to Arm the Bosnian Muslins, The Guardian, 22.04.2002, 

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/apr/22/warcrimes.comment, [02.10.2014]. 

22 Ibidem. 


64 


Bosniak Serbs were supported by Russia but also the secret services 

of Greece, Ukraine and Israel were arming them 23 . The Bosniaks were 

supported by described Muslim states but it was the USA who made 

significant change in building the military potency of the Bosniaks. 

There were also some arms deliveries to Sarajevo made from Germany 

and through Austria but we should rooted them in a strange 

cooperation of the European states and informal terrorist nets, made 

on the supervision of the USA 24 . 

Besides, the fact that almost all of Muslim states supported the Bosniak 

case and even were trying to organize humanitarian help, it were 

Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey who made significant difference. Turkey 

was quite reluctant to the idea of supporting radical Islamist but 

was not able to stand aside of the conflict; it’s why her role was growing 

bigger with the internationalization of the conflict and involvement 

of the USA. It mostly served logistic and financial roles rather 

then coordinating the nations. Turkey during the 1990-ies was preoccupied 

with domestic issues (political and economic ones) and its 

role was limited due to internal limitations. Saudi Arabia became one 

of the main supporters of the Bosniak cause. In 1993, the Saudi High 

Commission for Aid to Bosnia was created. Since the wartimes, the financial 

help that was channelled through different foundations, legal 

institutions and others is counted for about 560 million of dollars 25 . 

Members of Saudi Royal family, as well as other wealth individuals, 

were supporting military struggle of the Bosnian Muslims in the name 

of Islamic brotherhood and help for oppressed. It was a part of realized 

by Saudi Arabia role – supporter and defender off all Muslims 

as a result of growing international ambitions. Unfortunately, as it was 

proven later, some of that money was send through terrorist financial 

net and was spent on spreading the radical Islamic ideologies/models 

(like Wahhabism) among the Bosniak people. And it will be described 

later it didn’t change Bosniak society but rather established 

some radical entities with it. It looked like Islamic Republic of Iran was 

one of the main donors and organizer of illegal trafficking into Bosnia. 

23 Ibidem. 


25 Saudi Arabia ends an almost decade-old $560 million aid program to Bosnia, Al Arabiya News, 

22.12.2011, http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/12/22/183927.html, [03.10.2014]. 



65 

Iran during the 1990-ies was still in some way driven by radicals who 

supported the spread of revolutionary ideologies across the world. 

Bosniaks perfectly fitted into Iranian categories; it’s why Tehran was 

so active in this area. Since 1991, Iran organized the smuggling of weapons 

to Bosnia through Sudan an later on has entered the strange alliance 

with USA. Both states were providing their military assistance 

between 1994 and 1995 to the Bosnian Muslims, in the same time 

they were engaged in the deep political conflict in the Middle East. 

Iran openly supported the Bosniaks and was cooperating with various 

states and even with radical Salafists terrorist organizations. Of 

course, its capabilities were quite limited (longstanding war with Iraq 

and international isolation) but Tehran was able to place in Bosnia and 

Herzegovina very strong intelligence net based on multidimensional 

penetration (from weapons to education). The influence of Iranian intelligence 

agency in the Bosnian security apparatus became so strong 

and obvious till 1997 that it became main aim of Western (US and EU) 

counteractions 26 . One more time the war in Bosnia proved that some 

tactical and very particular in aims alliances may occurred between 

antagonists if the short time interest serves both sides. 

In summary, it can be said that the war in Bosnia of 1992-1995 has 

brought into the Bosniak entity and society some radical elements 

of Islamic radicalism. The need of assistance in the military struggle 

left Bosniak leaders with no other option but to accept help from any 

sources. The radical Islamic militant groups have helped to defend 

the Bosniak interests but in the same time they entered the Balkans 

in huge manner. 

4. 

Building Bosnia and Herzegovina – 

role of radical Islamism 

Bosnia and Herzegovina’s independence was established by direct intervention 

of international powers. From the very beginning its existence 

and internal structure was questioned by the Bosnians, regional 

states and other actors of international system. The radical Islamism 



66 


and its followers, as well as an intelligence services of some rough states 

like Iran were shaping realities in post-Was Bosnia. We may distinguish 

two periods in analyzing the role of radical Islam in Bosnia after 1995. 

First phase after the peace treaty and 9/11 2001 when international 

radical Islamic militant groups were free to operate on the Bosnia and 

Herzegovina territory, enjoying the support from legal Bosniak and 

Bosnian institutions. Iran and Saudi Arabia had a lot of influence over 

the Bosniak decision-makers and security forces. The ideas of radical 

Islamism (i.e. wahhabism) were promoted with the help of the state. 

Many legal and illegal groups were operating on that territory. The activity 

of international jihadist militias in Chechnya, Kosovo and Europe 

were organized and coordinated also through the Bosniak cells. 

The situation during those days created among some scholars (Ch. 

Deliso, J. Elsässer, J. R. Schindler, S, Shay) and for sure within the global 

community the fear: of Bosniak radicalization (in religious terms), unpredictable 

grow in power of radical Islamic groups and of even creation 

of fundamentalist caliphate in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 

The main reason for cementing presence of radical Islamic ideologies 

in Bosnia and Herzegovina after 1995 was that some of the militants 

Islamists, who fought the war, didn’t leave the country. Like 

it was already stated, there is no agreed and proven number of Islamic 

fighters who came from abroad to fight the Bosnian war. From 

few hundreds up to 6500 is a number we may find in the different 

sources. The size of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina was no less 

then 140 000 troops, so the Mujahedeen played more qualitative then 

quantitative roles in the military effort of Bosniaks. On the beginning, 

they formed “al-Mujaheed Battalion” and with the increase in numbers 

they dominated the whole 3rd Corps of the 7 th Brigade. Fighting 

jihad rather conducting military operations, they became infamous 

for the cruelty and ethnic cleansings. They were also very efficient on 

the military level. Determination and skills of Mujahedeen made them 

be perceived by enemies as tough fighters. On the easy from the frontline 

they were forcing locals to accept and follow strict religious model, 

what created a lot of tensions 27 . The foreigners were mostly followers 

27 Ibidem, p. 72-76, 83-94; G. Kepel, Święta woja. Ekspansja i upadek fundamentalizmu muzułmańskiego, 

Wydawnictwo Akademickie DIALOG, Warszawa 2003, p. 251-258. 



67 

of radical Islamic ideology and tried to persuade (also by force) the local 

population into strict code of behaviour and religion. They came 

to Bosnia for achieving two goals: fighting the enemies of Islam and 

secure the Muslim community but also to organize an Islamic fundamentalist 

state (or at least try to do so). Their military role was widely 

accepted by most Bosniak and international powers but the desire 

to radicalize the social relations and create fundamentalist state were 

not supported by majority of Bosniaks and international community. 

Under the Dayton Treaty all foreign forces and fighters supposed 

to leave the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina till 16 th January 1996. 

Most of them left Bosnia in 1996 heading in organized way to Afghanistan, 

Iran, and Turkey. But the group of several hundred Mujahedeens 

stayed in Bosnia. They were granted citizenship or even married Bosniak 

women. Because of their presence, the net of radical Islamic terrorist 

activities was able to operate and coordinate their operations 

in South-Europe. The mobilization and success of UCK in conflict 

over Kosovo was also possible of Islamist net in the Bosnia 28 . In our 

opinion, naturalization of Mujahedeens served two purposes. They 

supposed to secure the Islamic character of Bosniaks and the Bosnian 

state from within – supporting Islamic leader like A. Izetbegovic, and 

promoting radical models of Islam. What’s more important, they were 

active in organizing and conducting terrorist activities in the region 

or world widely in the financial aspect. In this aspect, the Bosniak 

episode in the international Islamic terrorists’ evolution was a huge 

step forward because let them entered the European system on almost 

legal bases. It has been already proved that the Bosnian territory or 

the Bosnian citizens were used/ involved in planning, and sometimes 

conducting most of the terrorist attacks in those days. 

After the war, states like Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Turkey were 

continuing building up their roles in new realities of the Bosnia and 

Herzegovina. New state needed multilevel assistance from economic 

to security matters and the help from the European powers was 

much less then expected. The main donor was a Saudi Arabia who 

was sending billions of dollars into Bosnia. As it was already described, 

some part of that many was transferred through terrorist fi- 

28 J. Elsässer, op. cit., p. 130-138, 161-170. 


68 


nancial nets but part was spent on cultural and economic projects. 

With the Saudi money the promotion of Wahhabi version of Islam 

was continued, which was anathema to most Bosnian Muslims, who 

followed more tolerant, Ottoman version. Saudi sponsored groups 

(also “former” Mujahedeens) were provoking the conflicts with Serbs 

and Croats and were forcing for radicalization of social life. In 1995 by 

Saudi money the Active Islamic Youth was created, which was supposed 

to spread the Islamic values, code and behaviour among young 

Muslims 29 . The main problem for radicals was the fact the Bosniaks 

hadn't radicalized in the social or political manner. The sponsored 

groups functioned in the small groups (enclaves) that were not able 

to change the Bosnian society but presented great threat international 

security due to its involvement in terrorist activities 30 . Saudi money 

was mostly spent on reestablishment of religious infrastructure. Most 

of the mosques, schools and other institutions governed by the Islamic 

Community of the Bosnia and Herzegovina were built, rebuilt and are 

partly financed by the Persian Gulf monarchies. 

During the war times and after, Iran was trying to obtain influence 

among the Bosniaks and within the Bosnian state. Arm deliveries, trafficking 

of fighters, humanitarian aid and some financial assistance grew 

its position a lot. Most probably, Iranian leaders were using the Bosniak 

case as a proxy in increasing its international position and get access 

to European territories. It was never proven, but there were rumours 

that Iranian secret services organized several assassinations and attacks 

in Western Europe from the territory of Bosnia. As it was described, 

Iranian penetration of Bosnian security apparatus and growing influence 

over its polity resulted in harsh US actions aimed at Tehran net. 

After 9/11 we may notice the gradual decrease of Iranian influences. 

Iranians were not able to successfully export its ideas and ideologies 

due to the ethnical and sectarian differences. They were able to penetrate 

the system and get some influence over the Bosnia but with 

the help of international powers Tehran’s role seems to be limited. 

29 B. Whitmore, Saudi “charity” troubles Bosniacs, „Bosnia Report” New Series No: 29-31, June-November 

2002, http://bosnia.org.uk, [14.09.2014]. 

30 T. Bachora, Bośnia i Hercegowina państwem upadłym Kwestia ekstremizmu muzułmańskiego, 

[in:] M. Gniazdowski (ed.), Europejski Protektorat Bośnia i Hercegowina w perspektywie 

środkowoeuropejskiej, PISM, Warszawa 2008, p. 134. 



69 

Turkey was playing in most modest way in its approach to Bosnia 

and Herzegovina. During the war time it restrained from direct military 

involvement (played secondary role) but was constantly calling 

for international intervention. Ankara backed US interference, NATO 

intervention and Dayton Peace Agreement Since than, was taking 

part in the following UN peacekeeping forces in Bosnia and together 

with the USA trained armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina 31 . After 

the war, Turkey became mediating between the Bosnians and Serbs and 

Croats, promoting regional cooperation through South East Europe 

Cooperation Process. Due to the change in Turkish foreign expectation 

with the won of AKP with the leaders Erdogan and Davutoglu 

in 2002, Ankara has increased its presence in the Balkans 32 . Turkey 

plays a positive assistance to Bosnia and Herzegovina in post conflict 

times. It engaged not only politically but mostly on the economic level. 

In 1995 both states have signed Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation 

what finally let to Free Trade Agreement of 2002. The volume 

of bilateral trade in 2012 was about 360 mln USD and Turkey 

was ranked 9 th in direct investments list to Bosnia and Herzegovina 33 . 

Turkey does not pose the threat to Bosniak identity but rather might 

serve as a model of society structure and governance. To some extend 

Bosniaks looked up to Turkish example, and increase in relations may 

strengthen that tendencies. 

After the 9/11 terrorist Islamic net that was operating on the territory 

of Bosnia and Herzegovina became one of the main targets 

in the war on terrorism announced by the USA and quickly picked up 

by main international powers. That subject is well described in the already 

cited books and documents that we will just focus on presenting 

main outcomes of international inquiries. There was evidence 

presented that linked leaders of SDA to the international Islamic terrorism. 

Bosnia served as some kind of operational base for Al-Qaeda 

and other terrorist organizations during the 1990-ies. The unique 

31 S. Sayari, Turkish Foreign Policy In the Post-Cold War Era: The Challenges of Multi-Regionalism, „Journal 

of International Affairs”, Fall 2000, 54, no. 1, p. 177-178. 

32 Ł. Reszczyński, Geopolityczna emancypacja Turcji i jej wpływ na Bałkany Zachodnie, „Biuletyn 

Opinie”, Nr 25/2010, p. 6-7. 

33 Relations Between Turkey and Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic 

of Turkey, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-bosnia-and-herzegovina.en.mfa, 

[17.10.2014]. 


70 


system of financial-charity institution was discovered, where Bosnian 

NGO-s played an very important role (TWRA, Al-Haramain Islamic 

Foundations, Benevolence International Foundation, Global Relief 

Foundations and hundreds more) not only as collectors but mainly 

as laundering chains. Many of terrorist plots and attacks were organized 

in Bosnia or with the participation of its citizens. Through last 

decade in Bosnia and Herzegovina many efforts were made to break 

the Islamist net mainly under the supervision of EU institutions but 

also in the cooperation with the UN and USA 34 . In last years there were 

no data about significant activity of terrorists in Bosnia and Herzegovina 

that may serve as some proof that main sources of radical Islamic 

terrorism were successfully destroyed there. Of course, Bosnia 

is still challenged by those organizations but their power is too weak 

to destabilize the structure of the state or pose serious international 

threat. The main reason that international institutions and the Bosnian 

state got rid off most of terrorist and Islamic radicals is that they lacked 

the popular support among the Bosniaks and Bosnian society. The radical 

ideologies like Wahhabism were rejected by most of the people 

who stuck to their more tolerant version of Islam. The same happen 

to the idea of fundamentalist Islamic state that was overwhelmed by 

mass support for democratic values and standards 35 . 

Conclusions 

The Bosniak identity shaped by Islam, Ottoman culture and the Balkan 

realities is different from other models of Muslim communities. 

The geographical isolation from main centres of Muslim culture and 

polity, together with small population made it very vulnerable in the security 

terms. The collapse of Yugoslavia endangered the physical and 

political existence of the Bosniaks. Lack of wider international protection 

of Bosniak security and interest made them turned into illegal, 

terrorist and other sources for help. The emergence of radical Islamic 

34 The war on terrorism in Bosnia and Herzegovina was described in details by J. Elsässer, Ch. Deliso. 

35 G. Kippel, op. cit., p. 255-258; Ch. Deliso, op. cit., p. 54-58. 



71 

ideologies, together with foreign Islamists who came to Bosnia and 

Herzegovina to fight jihad, stated a recognized threat to Bosniak identity 

and to the security of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Some Muslims 

states, namely Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, were able to get some 

influence over the Bosnia and Herzegovina also by spreading different 

Islamic models, ideologies and Islamic concepts. During the 1990-ies 

Bosnia and Herzegovina became an operational base for radical Islamic 

militant groups, with the Al-Qaeda as a one of most important 

challenger. After the 9/11 the international counterterrorism focused 

on the Balkans and was quite successful in crushing main cells of international 

terrorist network. The radical Islamism that was brought 

to Bosnia and Herzegovina during the war time, was mainly rejected 

by most of the Bosniaks. The fundamentalist Islamic concepts are 

rather strange to most of the Bosniaks; it’s why radical elements have 

created so little support. However, Islamic terrorist network still operates 

on the Bosnian territory and some of the citizens of Bosnia and 

Herzegovina follow jihadist movement. 

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Poznań 2007 




– Unquiet Region – Implication 

for Neighbouring Countries 

Abstract: The article is devoted to the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina 

and its impact on the European security. Particular emphasis has been placed 

on the recent history of the state, including the Balkan wars taking place 

in the end of twenty century, as well as on the resulting from it complex internal 

situation, without any doubts influencing the perception of Bosnia and 

Herzegovina as not fully democratic state, struggling with many problems 

of political, social, as well as religious and ethnic nature. Not without consequence 

for this situation is the attitude of neighboring countries – Serbia and 

Croatia. Policy pursued by the governments of these countries has a huge 

influence on the actions taken by the national minorities living in the regions 

of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which has an impact on the internal situation 

of the country. All these activities contribute to internal stability and external 

position of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 

Keywords: stability, multiethnicity, European security, conflict, disintegration 

Introduction 

The twentieth century has elapsed on the Balkan Peninsula under 

the sign of bloody conflicts. It was a continuation of ongoing (since 

the second half of the nineteenth century) struggle of the Balkan nations 

for freedom and independence, which in the next century took 

the form of domestic fighting during the Balkan and both World Wars. 

The next 50 years were influenced by Josip Broz “Tito” and seeking 

of economic and political “third way”. Even though there existed one 

and independent state of southern Slavs, the internal situation in Yugoslavia 

was far from ideal. Reluctance and ethnic conflicts between 

the various components of the federation to a lesser or greater extent 

manifested throughout the existence of the state. Josip Broz “Tito” tried 

to balance the claims (especially territorial and economic) of the individual 

republics and ethnic groups. However, not only Serbs evinced

74 


a desire to achieve greater power, the Croatian side was also not satisfied 

with the status quo. Josip Broz “Tito” was well aware of existing 

the Serb – Croatian animosity (especially mutual territorial claims), 

because from the beginning he tried to neutralise it. First important 

step was the recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BH) as one 

of the constitutional republics of Yugoslavia 1 . Such a solution, which 

was to bring back not only on maps, but mainly to the internal political 

and ethnic discourse, Bosnia and Herzegovina, was to become 

the guarantor of abandoning all attempts to change the internal borders 

and the balance of power in the federation. From that moment 

republic is functioning not only as a buffer, but above all once again 

became a kind of “safety valve” for all inarticulate conflict and mutual 

resentment among the Yugoslavia’s nations. 

The first post-war years were in these area extremely difficult, on 

one hand, both Serbs and Croats claimed their right to the lands inhabited 

by them in the area of Bosnia and Herzegovina, on the other 

hand, the communist authorities try to incorporate the idea of Yugoslavism 

in the attempt to displace the consciousness of the inhabitants 

of these regions, their faith and sense of separateness from neighbouring 

ethnic groups 2 . In the census, however, very few Muslims declared 

their ethnicity (the biggest part of them underlined anything or chose 

the answer “unspecified”). The situation changed in the 60s, when 

for the first time name Muslim was used to identify a specific ethnic 

group, which were Slavic Muslims living in Bosnia and Herzegovina 3 . 

Although certain reluctance from the part of some communist activists 

was seen, the term “Muslim”, in the ethnic meaning, entered permanently 

into use. Among the Muslims themselves also there was no 

agreement as to whether this name is to be more political and ethnic, 

or should be based on religion identity. Initially, the first view prevailed, 

supported by secular Muslims, members of the Communist 

Party, who actively worked to isolate the Muslim ethnos. The second 

direction came to the fore later, becoming the basis for modern Mus- 

1 N. Malcolm, Bosnia: a short history, Papermac, London 2002, p. 196-197. 

2 N. Malcolm, op. cit., p. 194-198. 

3 Ibidem, p. 198. 


Bosnia and Herzegovina – Unquiet Region – Implication for Neighbouring Countries 

75 

lim nationalism, supported by later president of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 

Alija Izetbegović 4 . 

After the death of Josip Broz “Tito”, Yugoslavia slipped into a growing 

economic and political crisis. Lack of strong leader made the form 

of federation increasingly difficult to maintain. Although the Communists 

of Yugoslavia – SKJ (Savez komunista Jugoslavije – SkJ) tried 

to keep the state’s unity, its decay was only a matter of time. Mutual resentment 

and grievances erupted in the early 90s, initially in the form 

of a civil war, which, after the declaration of independence by Croatia 

and Slovenia (and recognition of their independence, first by Germany 

and Vatican, then by other countries) took on the nature of interstate 

war. Fights intensified, however, only after the declaration of independence 

by Bosnia and Herzegovina (this took place in October 15, 

1991, after the vote by Croatian and Muslim members of parliament 

in favour of declaration of independence) 5 . Officially republic was declared 

March 1, 1992, but the road to true independence was very difficult 

and bloody 6 . 

Ethnical situation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was the most complex. 

Extremely bloody civil war very quickly engulfed the entire republic 

– Bosnian Serbs fought with Bosnian Croats and Muslims, there has 

also been a short Croat-Muslim conflict (May 1993 – February 1994). 

The situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina was so serious that not only did 

they threaten to destabilize the Balkan Peninsula, but also threaten 

the security of the region or even the entire continent. Great influence 

on the further development of the situation had the actions taken by 

neighbors – Serbia and Croatia, as well as by Germany, the United 

States and Islamic countries (including Saudi Arabia, Turkey) 7 . Soon 

it turned out that all mediation and negotiation is not enough to calm 

the conflict, which was sneaking out of control. International community, 

fearing of spilling the fighting on still unstable Central Europe, 

has decided to extend the mandate of the military peacekeeping mis- 

4 Ibidem, p. 200. 

5 M. Kuczyński, Bałkańska pożoga: wojny i konflikty na Bałkanach w latach 1981-1999, Biuro Prasy 

i Informacji Ministerstwa Obrony Narodowej, Warszawa 1999, p. 54. 

6 E. Bujwid-Kurek, Państwa pojugosłowiańskie. Szkice politologiczne, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu 

Krakowskiego, Kraków 2008, p. 136. 

7 More information on this subject: A. Parzymies, Muzułmanie w Europie, Wydawnictwo Akademickie 

DIALOG, Warszawa 2005. 


76 


sion stationed in Croatia – United Nations Protection Forces (UN- 

PROFOR), which task was to monitor fulfilling of peace agreements, 

as well as protection of convoys with help. It was also decided to create 

a safety zone around Sarajevo, Tuzla, Bihać, Zepa, Srebrenica and 

Goražde and introduced a ban on flights over the territory of Bosnia- 

Herzegovina 8 . 

Unfortunately, situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina did not improve. 

The whole world was watching ethnic cleansing and war crimes. 

Images from blockaded Sarajevo or columns of refugees, escorted by 

international troops, trying to reach the designated safety zones, have 

been shown by all TV stations and newspapers. Drama unfolding on 

the continent was the largest since World War II and Europe was unable 

to prevent it. In the early stages of the conflict, most Western 

countries thought that Yugoslavia must enter the path of transformation 

and slowly begin democratization and implementation of market 

reforms. However, they did not support the independence aspirations 

of the individual nations. The threat of disintegration of Yugoslavia 

and the outbreak of a possible war in this peripheral, from the bipolar 

division of the world point of view, region was not treated seriously 

enough by leading European politicians, absorbed on the one 

hand on amalgamation of the two German states and, on the other 

hand, on the slow disintegration of the Soviet Union 9 . Unfortunately, 

this attitude has brought disastrous consequences in the form of war. 

It turned out that continent uniting after nearly 50 years is completely 

unprepared for the new political challenges, and more importantly 

Europeans themselves are not able to ensure peace and security in its 

territory. The role of main negotiator and the donor during the conflict 

in the Balkans took over the United States, which together with Russia 

became the main political force in the region. Also important was 

the fact that the “new issues” in the field of security required the use 

of such military measures that Europe did not have, concentrating 

mainly on the economic and social development. 

8 M. Bjarnason, The War and War-Games in Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1992 to 1995. The main 

events, disagreements and arguments, resulting in a “de facto” divided country, http://www.nato. 

int/acad/fellow/99-01/bjarnason.pdf [15.08.2014], p. 63. 

9 B. Koszel, Konflikt na Bałkanach (1991-1999) a bezpieczeństwo europejskie, „Zeszyty Instytutu Zachodniego”, 

vol. 16, Poznań 2000, p. 3-4. 


1. 


Dayton Agreement 

The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina was extremely destructive 

to all parties of the conflict. This circumstance, however, did not 

transform into any actions aiming parties even for a ceasefire, not 

to mention a long-term peace. Numerous attempts of the international 

community to impose a peace plans did not bring the expected 

results 10 . The breakthrough came after 3.5 years of heavy fighting, 

which so weakened all parties that further continuation of war, on 

such scale as before, was impossible. At the negotiating table alongside 

representatives of the so-called contact group 11 and international 

organizations sat people who had undoubtedly contributed to the outbreak 

of the conflict. 

Since the middle of 1995 first serious signs that could suggest 

the possibility of taking the peace negotiations by the warring parties 

could be observed. After a series of reconnaissance meetings it has 

been decided that from the beginning of October an effective ceasefire 

will be established, and more importantly – a deadline for peace 

talks had been set. Negotiations that took place since November 2, 

1995 at the Dayton airbase (USA), finally were completed on November 

21, initialing of The General Framework Agreement for Peace 

in Bosnia and Herzegovina, ending a bloody war 12 . The official signing 

of the document by the representatives of the warring parties: 

Slobodan Milošević – President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 

called “New Yugoslavia” 13 , Franjo Tuđman – President of Croatia and 

Alija Izetbegović – President of Bosnia and Herzegovina, took place 

in December 14, 1995 in Paris 14 . 

Dayton Agreement with 11 annexes and 102 maps 15 became the basis 

for the functioning of an independent, multiethnic Bosnia and Her- 

77 

10 More information on this subject: M. Tanty, Bałkany w XX wieku. Dzieje polityczne, Książka i Wiedza, 

Warszawa 2003, p. 354. 

11 Contact Group – a group consisting of representatives of the United States, Great Britain, France, 

Germany and Russia, established to negotiate a peaceful solution to the crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 

Source: B. Koszel, op. cit., p. 30. 

12 W. Walkiewicz, Jugosławia. Byt wspólny i rozpad, Wydawnictwo Trio, Warszawa 2000, p. 275. 

13 New Yugoslavia – state that proclaimed its independence on April 27, 1992; consisting of Serbia 

and Montenegro; it survived until 2003, when was transformed into Serbia and Montenegro. 

14 M. Tanty, op. cit., p. 355. 

15 W. Walkiewicz, Jugosławia: państwa sukcesyjne, Wydawnictwo Trio, Warszawa 2009, p. 275. 


78 


zegovina 16 . This document is extremely complicated – on one hand 

it was to serve to maintain the territorial unity of the state, on the other 

hand it had to meet the expectations of all its signatories, to solve 

the conflict. Bosnia and Herzegovina has been defined as a republic 

with the structure of federation, consisting of the Federation of Muslim 

and Croats (51% of the area), divided into 10 cantons, and Republika 

Srpska (49% of the territory) 17 . Sarajevo, located in the Federation 

of Muslim and Croats, was decided to be a capital city. Bosniaks (Muslims), 

Serbs and Croats have been recognized as equivalent constitutional 

nations. The most important annex to the Agreement is Annex 

4, which is imposed by the international community, Constitution 

of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It established that both components – administrative 

units (called entitet) will share president (in accordance 

with Article V of the Constitution – the Presidency is a collegial body 

composed of representatives of all three constitutional nations), central 

government, bicameral parliament, the Constitutional Court and 

the Central Bank (Article III of the Constitution). At the central level 

will be conducted foreign policy, customs, trade and monetary therefore 

in Bosnia and Herzegovina will be applied the common currency 

– Convertible Mark (BAM) 18 . The Constitution and other Annexes 

were extremely accurate guidance of the complex electoral systems 

based on ethnic parity, which were to be used for elections of “common” 

central government. Other institutions and areas of the country 

were in the hands of local authorities at the level of entitets. Both 

Republika Srpska and the Federation of Muslim and Croats have had 

its own president, government and parliament. More importantly, the 

state components could lead their own separate foreign policy (establish 

bilateral relations with special rules), domestic policy (separate 

police, justice) and have its own army (Article III of the Constitution) 19 . 

16 The text of General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina is available on 

the website of the UN High Representative and EU Special Envoy to Bosnia and Herzegovina, 

http://www.ohr.int/dpa/default.aspcontent_id=380 [12.08.2014]. 

17 W. Sąsiadek, Doświadczenia z Bośni i Hercegowiny, [in:] J. Stańczyk, B. Stefańczak (eds.), Wojna czy 

pokój Perspektywy byłej Jugosławii, Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN, Warszawa 1999, p. 29-30. 

18 Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Annex 4 to the General Framework Agreement for 

Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina on 14.12.1995, is available on the website of the UN High Representative 

and EU Special Envoy to Bosnia and Herzegovina, http://www.ohr.int/dpa/content_ 

id=372 [12.08.2014]. 

19 Ibidem. 



79 

It seems that the division of powers in 1995 was an attempt to meet 

the conditions set by all fighting parties, but over time it became one 

of the main problems related to the functioning internally divided state. 

From the European point of view key provisions from the Dayton 

Agreement was the creation of the Office of the High Representative 

in Bosnia and Herzegovina (OHR). The mandate of the OHR is an Annex 

10 to the Dayton Agreement. Actions taken by the Office together 

with the method of appointing the person of the High Representative 

is supervised by the Peace Implementation Council, which consists 

of representatives of 55 countries and international organizations, who 

are interested in the restoration and maintenance of peace in Bosnia 

and Herzegovina 20 . In time, when it turned out that the European vision 

of multiethnic Bosnia-Herzegovina has not been entirely shared by its 

inhabitants, as well as the authorities of that State, mandate has been 

enriched with new powers and responsibilities 21 . New competences 

delegated to the OHR are an important point of dispute between international 

community and the inhabitants and the authorities of Bosnia 

and Herzegovina, who believe that in this way they are deprived 

of the influence on their own country, therefore further democratization 

of the country is not possible. Instead of planned decentralization 

and stimulation of local structures for cooperation, “imposed” by 

the international community “administrator” in the form of the OHR 

decides on major issues concerning the state. This raises a justify concern 

that such attitude of the Europeans would discourage people 

of Bosnia and Herzegovina to take any initiatives, thereby contributing 

to the continued functioning of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a protectorate 

of the European Union (EU) 22 . This situation remains a major 

challenge for the EU diplomacy, since the existence of reliant and unstable 

quasi-state is destabilizing the situation in the whole region, 

and thus, poses a real threat to the security of the entire continent. 

20 W. Stanisławski, M. Szpala, Bośniacki Chaos. Źródła kryzysu politycznego we współczesnej Bośni 

i Hercegowinie, „Prace OSW”, vol. 31, Warszawa, październik 2009, p. 22, available on official website 

of Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich, http://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/PRACE_31.pdf 

[13.08.2014]. 

21 More on new prerogatives on the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina 

official website, http://www.ohr.int/ohr-info/gen-info/default.aspcontent_id=38519 [14.08.2014]. 

22 Ibidem. 


80 


The most important attempt to stabilize the situation in Bosnia and 

Herzegovina, and accordingly on a significant part of the Balkan Peninsula, 

was deployment of 60,000 troops from 27 countries 23 . Under 

the UN Security Council Resolution no 1031 the NATO Implementation 

Forces (IFOR), that took part in the operation “Joint Endeavour”, 

has been established 24 . The mandate of IFOR was provided for 

12 months and was attached to the Dayton Agreement as Annex 1. 

Seeing that the situation in the Balkans is stabilizing, but not at expect 

by international community pace, NATO defense ministers, at 

a meeting held in September 1996 in Bergen (Norway), said that not 

all objectives faced by IFOR have been achieved – the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina 

was still unstable and required further monitoring. 

Confirmation of these concerns was the result of the first parliamentary 

elections monitored by international observers and election commissions. 

In both parts of the Federation definitely won nationalistic 

parties – each of the three ethnic groups voted for the representatives 

of their communities, which clearly indicated the failure of current 

international politics 25 . Furthermore, the lack of progress in attempts 

to create the Bosnian nation consisting of three constitutional nations 

was visible. This indicated that although hostilities ceased, the situation 

is still tense. In order to avoid any possible problems arising from 

the reduction in the number or even the withdrawal of international 

peacekeeping forces, it was decided to appoint another mission. 

UN Resolution no 1088 of December 12, 1996, giving permission for 

the implementation of the military aspects of the Peace Agreement, 

the Stabilization Forces (SFOR) 26 . These forces have become the legal 

successor to IFOR units, acting as its predecessors, on the basis 

of Chapter VII of the UN Charter and signed an agreement regarding 

the use of force (Rules of Engagement). The mandate of SFOR, initially 

also – as in the case of IFOR – provided for 12 months, lasted until 

2004. The stabilization of Bosnia and Herzegovina did not go so fast, 

23 B. Koszel, op. cit., p. 35. 

24 A. Ciupiński, J. Pawłowski, Umiędzynarodowiony konflikt wewnętrzny, Wydział Wydawniczy Akademii 

Obrony Narodowej, Warszawa 2001, p. 69. 

25 L. Hladký, Dwanaście lat po Dayton – rzeczywistość i iluzje, [in:] M. Gniazdowski (ed.), Europejski 

protektorat Bośnia i Hercegowina w perspektywie środkowoeuropejskiej, Polski Instytut Spraw 

Międzynarodowych, Warszawa 2008, p. 28-29. 

26 J. Pawłowski, A. Ciupiński, op. cit., p. 71. 



81 

as international community was expecting, but it was noticeable, 

that’s why the number of SFOR soldiers gradually decreased to reach 

the level of 12,000 in 2002 27 . 

Military mission was not the only international mission established 

by the Dayton Agreement. United Nations Mission in Bosnia and 

Herzegovina was created by the United Nations International Police 

Task Force, whose main task was to “monitor, observe and supervise 

of the introduction of law and justice system, providing all necessary 

help to the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the organization 

and management of local police personnel” 28 . 

Situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina has stabilized enough that a dominant 

role in further promotion of peace and security in the region took 

civilian missions, of course, still supported by the presence of the military 

units, but much less numerous than it has been so far. Since December 

2, 2004, the European Union Forces (EUFOR) in the mission 

Althea took over most of the SFOR duties 29 . The main goal of the establishment 

of EUFOR was to maintain the status quo achieved through 

“deterrence” military presence, control of airspace over the territory 

of Bosnia and Herzegovina and to enable government and nongovernmental 

organizations to implement activities aimed at peace 

maintenance. 

The visible presence of the EU in Bosnia and Herzegovina has also 

a political and economic nature. One of the main objectives of the EU 

is a long-term stabilization of the entire region, and the best motivation 

for the Balkan countries is the prospect of integration. The EU 

hopes that the example of a successful transition of countries from 

Central Europe, crowned with membership in the EU, will be sufficient 

incentive for the elite of Bosnia-Herzegovina for putting their 

efforts to break the political impasse, and thus, allow for the necessary 

reforms and modernize existing institutions, which do not always 

meet the democratic standards 30 . The first clear result of European in- 

27 The Stabilization Force, http://www.nato.int/SFOR/docu/d981116a.htm [14.08.2014]. 

28 The United Nations, www.un.org. [15.08.2014]. 

29 I. Pikner, Zaangażowanie sił wojskowych UE w Bośni i Hercegowinie, [in:] M. Gniazdowski (ed.), Europejski 

protektorat Bośnia i Hercegowina w perspektywie środkowoeuropejskiej, Polski Instytut 

Spraw Międzynarodowych, Warszawa 2008, p. 100. 

30 J. Solana, From Dayton implementation to European integration, „NATO Review”, vol. Winter 2004, 

http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2004/issue4/english/art2.html [15.08.2014]. 


82 


volvement is the signing in 2008, after long and difficult negotiations, 

the Plan for the Stabilization and Association Process of Bosnia and 

Herzegovina with the EU 31 . 

2. 

Ethno-religious mosaic and stabilization 

of the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina 

– implications for neighbouring countries 

Extremely complicated history of the lands incorporated in Bosnia and 

Herzegovina has made the ethnic and religious situation in this young 

country one of the most complex on the continent. Over the centuries, 

various pieces of contemporary Bosnia-Herzegovina were part 

of the various states, which has been reflected in their ethno-religious 

composition. Herzegovina, adjacent to Dalmatia, was partly under 

the influence of the catholic Kingdom of Croatia, forming the Habsburg 

state. In Bosnia, the situation was slightly more complex – bordered 

on north by the Kingdom of Croatia, in the south was surrounded by 

the Orthodox Serbs. Due to the large amount of conversion to Islam 

in the Ottoman era, Bosnia has become one of the main settlement 

areas of the Turkish population and other Slavic Muslims. The situation 

is additionally complicated by the fact that after almost five centuries 

of Ottoman rule in 1878 occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 

was taken over by the Austria-Hungary, in 1908 the Habsburg Empire 

incorporated these lands. In 1918 they became part of the Kraljevina 

Srba, Hrvata and Slovenaca. Throughout all this time ethnic structure 

of these lands was changing, as a result leading to more frequent conflicts 

between different groups, escalation of which could be observed 

during the World War II. Ethno-religious issues have been somewhat 

muted only in the era of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 

when officially has been confirmed the existence of Muslims, who are 

Slavs of Islamic religion, inhabiting mainly the area of Bosnia and Herzegovina 

32 . All this helped to create in this part of Yugoslavia unprec- 

31 W. Stanisławski, M. Szpala, op. cit., p. 55. 

32 M. Waldenberg, Rozbicie Jugosławii; od separacji Słowenii do wojny kosowskiej, Wydawnictwo 

SCHOLAR, Warszawa 2003, p. 155. 



83 

edented in Europe ethno-religious mosaic, which mainly consisted of: 

Muslims, Orthodox Serbs, Catholic Croats, and numerous minorities 

(Jews, Gypsies, and Turks) 33 . 

Slow destabilization of the Federation in the late 80s and 90s 

of the twentieth century has shown, that the coexistence of the southern 

Slavs of different faiths and ethnic characteristics in one country 

is not enough to balance the differences, on the contrary, it led 

to the outbreak of mutual resentment on an unprecedented, in last 

50 years, scale. The biggest drama took place in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 

which turned out to be a miniature version of Yugoslavia, with 

all its problems 34 . Initially, Bosnia-Herzegovina was not going to leave 

the Federation, but when information that the presidents of Serbia 

and Croatia talks on the division of the land of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 

possibly leaving a small Bosnian state, appeared the situation 

has changed. This led to proclamation of the Republic of Bosnia and 

Herzegovina 35 . 

Since the announcement of independence Republic began to fight 

for every piece of land, which was to be incorporated into the new 

state. It soon became clear that the war took the ethno-religious nature, 

and the main way of fighting became resettlement, expulsion and 

ethnic cleansing 36 . Any attempt of international mediation and proposals 

for peace plans did not bring results. Finally, under the Dayton 

Agreement independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina was maintained, 

but it became a federal state. This document provided great freedom 

of operation of Republika Srpska and the Federation of Muslim and 

Croats (now the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina). The most 

important, from the point of view of territorial unity and stability 

of the region, proved to be a part with the possibility of creating by 

entitets, on special rules, bilateral relations with third countries (Arti- 

33 More detailed information about ethnic mosaic in: D. Majstorović, V. Turjačanin, Youth Ethnic 

and National Identity in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Social Science Approaches, Palgrave Macmillan, 

London 2013. 

34 Ibidem, p. 148. 

35 E. Bujwid-Kurek, op. cit., p. 136. 

36 M. Waldenberg, op. cit., p. 168. 


84 


cle III of the Constitution), which was mainly applied to contacts with 

Croatia and Yugoslavia (currently only Serbia) 37 . 

From the very beginning, coexistence of three nations in one country 

proved to be extremely difficult. Distinguishing of two entitets, 

based largely on ethnicity, wasn’t enough. Serbs, mostly living in Republika 

Srpska and Croats, constituting the majority of the cantons 

forming part of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, were interested 

in the largest decentralization of the state, hoping for the implementation 

of the irredentist aspirations of joining areas inhabited 

by them to the neighboring countries – Croatia and the New Yugoslavia 

(now only Serbia). On the contrary Muslims were interested in, 

as soon as possible, centralization of Bosnia and Herzegovina, hoping 

to strengthen the unity of the state and ensure themselves a dominant 

role in it 38 . This difference of opinion was the basis of the political crisis, 

which de facto has continued to this day. It has become clear that 

the European vision of creation in Bosnia-Herzegovina stable multiethnic 

state is incredibly difficult to be put into practice. On one 

hand, thanks to the large, although smaller than originally expected, 

financial support granted by the EU and USA, Bosnia and Herzegovina 

is rebuilding infrastructure (most of the roads, bridges, railways) 

and internal security (free movement of persons, goods, reducing 

the number of international forces); on the other hand, it seems that 

the peaceful existence of all three nations in this extremely complicated 

state organism is rather unrealistic 39 . The reluctance of ethnic 

hatred is so strong that without outside help the existence of Bosnia 

and Herzegovina in the shape given to it in the Dayton Agreement 

is still a question mark 40 . 

However, not only internal disputes threaten the maintenance 

of the unity of the new state. The significant destabilizing factors 

of such fragile peace were the activities taken by closest neighbors 

37 Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Annex 4 to the General Framework Agreement for 

Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina on 14.12.1995, is available on the website of the UN High Representative 

and EU Special Envoy to Bosnia and Herzegovina, http://www.ohr.int/dpa/content_ 

id=372 [12.08.2014] 

38 L. Hladký, op. cit., p. 18-19. 


40 More on internal factors of state-building in: J. Dobbins, Overcoming obstacles to peace: local 

factors in nation-building, RAND, Santa Monica 2013, p. 93-124. 



85 

– Croatia and Yugoslavia (now Serbia). The governments of these 

countries wanted to have the greatest impact on strengthening the position 

of the representatives of their minorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 

hoping that this temporary state in the absence of common 

identity and historical memory quickly cease to exist in the shape 

given to it by the West 41 . On one hand, the regime of Milošević, on 

the other Tuđmana meant that both Serbia and Croatia were not willing 

to comply to sign peace agreements. Willingness of incorporation 

of the areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina inhabited by Serbs and Croats 

to neighboring countries manifested itself mainly in supporting nationalistic 

party and groups, which were fighting for the rights of their 

ethnic groups, even for the right to secede. Zagreb and Belgrade also 

were looking for military and economic dependence of Croats and 

Serbs living in Bosnia-Herzegovina 42 . This situation constituted a real 

threat to the internal security of the country, while increasing the risk 

of the outbreak of another war, outcome of which would affect and 

change the balance of power in the Balkans. 

This situation has changed after 2000, after the death of Tuđman 

Croatia entered the path of democratic reforms. The prospect of membership 

in the European Union and NATO has appeared, which forced 

Zagreb to revise its current policy with respect to the Federation 

of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Croatian minority living there. 

First of all, Zagreb has accepted the territorial independence of Bosnia 

and Herzegovina, and its “interfering” in the internal affairs of that 

State limited mainly to the observance of the rights of national minorities. 

But it cannot be said that the government in Zagreb broke 

completely with the policy of interference, since it supported administrative 

reforms that aimed to create in Bosnia-Herzegovina a third 

Croatian entity 43 . In addition, the strongest Croatian party in Bosnia 

and Herzegovina is the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and 

Herzegovina – HDZ BiH (Hrvatska demokratska zajednica Bosne 

41 W. Satnisławski, Źródła kryzysu politycznego w Bośni i Hercegowinie, [in:] M. Gniazdowski (ed.), 

Europejski protektorat Bośnia i Hercegowina w perspektywie środkowoeuropejskiej, Polski Instytut 

Spraw Międzynarodowych, Warszawa 2008, p. 36-37. 


43 The Croatian authorities supported the idea of changing the territorial division of the Republic 

of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In place of the existing two entitets had formed three territorial 

units, each subordinate to one of the constitutional ethnic groups. 


86 


i Hercegovine), which is a sister party of the Croatian Democratic Union 

– HDZ (Hrvatska demokratska zajednica). Both parties bring out 

ideas that promote ethnic issues, which further affects the destabilization 

of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 44 . 

In the case of Serbia, after the overthrow in 2000 of Milosević’s 

government, also can be observed a shift in policy towards Bosnia-Herzegovina, 

but not as visible as in Croatia. The new centralright 

government formed by the Democratic Party of Serbia – DDS 

(Демократска странка Србије/Demokratska stranka Srbije) under 

the leadership of a new president Vojilslav Koštunica, though did 

not support efforts to create a “Greater Serbia”, but was not willing 

to abandon the influence on its minority in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 

Did not cease to militarily and economically support of Republika Srpska, 

therefore supporting the separatist sentiments among its people 

and weakening the influence of the central government of Bosnia and 

Herzegovina in that area. The situation has vast change in 2008, when 

after the parliamentary elections came to power pro-Western Democratic 

Party – DS (Демократска странка/Demokratska Strank) 

supported by president Boris Tadić. The new government focused 

on improving relations with the EU, what definitely require a change 

in relations with neighboring Bosnia-Herzegovina. Serbia continued 

to support its minority, but avoid direct solidarity with separatist slogans 

45 . A major threat to the unity of Bosnia and Herzegovina proved 

announcement of independence by Kosovo in February 2008. Violent 

reaction of Serbia, which did not agree on disconnection of its southern 

autonomous region, also led to increased tensions in neighboring 

Bosnia and Herzegovina 46 . In Republika Srpska appear voices that since 

Kosovo has detached and received a partial international recognition, 

why Republika Srpska can’t leave the Federation and join Serbia. This 

situation alarmed the international community, especially the European 

states, as they did not present common positions in relation to Ko- 

44 Programs and activities of parties available on the official website Hrvatska demokratska zajednica 

Bosne I Hercegovine, http://www.hdzbih.org/ [15.08.2014]. 


46 V. Stojarová, Problem bośniacki a szerzej rozumiane bezpieczeństwo. Strony i reprezentacja interesów 

w Bośni i Hercegowinie, [in:] M. Gniazdowski (ed.), Europejski protektorat Bośnia i Hercegowina 

w perspektywie środkowoeuropejskiej, Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych, 

Warszawa 2008, p. 63. 



87 

sovo. However, they all agreed that this precedent will adversely affect 

the fragile stability in the Balkans. After a few months the situation 

calmed down and Serbia launched a diplomatic offensive to “recover” 

in Kosovo. Danger of the disintegration of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 

influencing the security of the entire region, thereby receded but not 

disappeared completely 47 . 

Conclusions 

Twenty years after the end of warfare, it appears that Bosnia and 

Herzegovina is still struggling with problems which prevent it from 

complete independent and free functioning. Europe sees many failures 

in the fiasco of creation of one Bosnian nation. No shared tradition, 

religion and common ground strongly contributed to radicalize 

the ideas of individual ethnic groups leading to the fact that Bosnia- 

Herzegovina has become a center for all sorts of groups, even of extremist 

nature. These views, which are shared by many authors writing 

about the Balkans, including particularly the Muslim population, 

in which small groups already in the 70s tended to oscillate in the direction 

of radical fractions of Islam 48 . This problem has again gained 

relevance with the beginning of the war on terror, when it turned out 

that some of the people associated with terrorist organizations also 

participated in fighting during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina 49 . 

Europe was concerned with information seeming to confirm that not 

only during the war to the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina rushed 

47 B. Górka-Winter, Unia Europejska a Bośnia i Hercegowina – w kierunku nowego modelu partnerstwa, 

[in:] M. Gniazdowski (ed.), Europejski protektorat Bośnia i Hercegowina w perspektywie 

środkowoeuropejskiej, Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych, Warszawa 2008, p. 169. 

48 A. Koseski, Bałkańskie konflikty etniczne na przełomie XX i XXI stulecia, [in:] W. Konarski, A. Koseski 

(eds.), Bałkany: etnokulturowe podłoże konfliktów, Wydawnictwo Wyższej Szkoły Humanistycznej 

im. A. Gieysztora, Pułtusk 2006, p. 109. 

49 Emerge and mechanisms of action of organizations and persons linked to terrorist activities are 

described in detail in: J. Elsässer, Jak dżihad przybył do Europy. Wojownicy Boga i tajne służby na 

Bałkanach, Warszawskie Wydawnictwo Literackie Muza, Warszawa 2007. 


88 


a large number of Mujahedeen 50 fighting previously in Afghanistan, 

great amount of which has stayed in the Balkans 51 . 

Consequently, Bosnia and Herzegovina, as the state which is still 

not fully democratic is exposed to the influence of extremist ideologies 

of all types (equally Islamic radicalism as well as Serbian and Croatian), 

that fall on fertile ground which are the ordinary citizens of Bosnia- 

Herzegovina, dissatisfied with the lack of improvement in their living 

conditions 52 . All these factors mean that the EU still considers Bosnia 

and Herzegovina as a potential source of threats to peace in Europe. 

This is reflected in the adopted in 2003 the EU Security Strategy (ESS), 

in which experts have emphasis that main threat to the European security 

in international terrorism and the associated proliferation of weapons 

of mass destruction (seen as the greatest threat to human security 

dimension global). It also emphasized regional conflicts, which, by 

the escalation could lead to the disintegration of the state, and hence 

to global conflict. As a result of incompetent governments and poverty 

of local communities, this can lead to destabilize the situation 

in the region and even continent. As the last risk factor is pointed organized 

crime, which also cannot be handled by state authorities (police 

and army). Unfortunately all above mentioned threats are present 

in Bosnia and Herzegovina 53 . 

With this in mind, Europe should be interested in Bosnia and Herzegovina 

as soon as possible entering the path of reforms, not only 

political and economic but also social, enabling the state to function 

freely without assistance and international supervision. Following 

this requirement, the EU has undertaken a number of actions aimed 

at the inclusion of Bosnia-Herzegovina to the “European community 

of nations” by many aid programs (ECHO, PHARE/CARDS or 

50 Mujahedeen (from Arabic muǧāhid meaning fighter for a just cause) – a member of the religious 

– liberation and social-liberation movement in Muslim countries. Often leads an armed struggle 

against the unaccepted government. Source: A. Markowski, R. Pawelec, Słownik wyrazów obcych 

i trudnych, Wydawnictwo Wilga, Warszawa 2001, p. 593. 

51 A. Parzymies, op. cit., p. 158. 

52 R. Báchora, Bośnia i Hercegowina państwem upadłym Kwestia ekstremizmu muzułmańskiego, 

[in:] M. Gniazdowski (ed.), Europejski protektorat Bośnia i Hercegowina w perspektywie 

środkowoeuropejskiej, Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych, Warszawa 2008, p. 138-140. 

53 Bezpieczna Europa w lepszym świecie – Europejska Strategia Bezpieczeństwa, Urząd Publikacji Unii 

Europejskiej, Belgia, 2009, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/librairie/PDF/QC- 

7809568PLC.pdf [17.08.2014]. 



89 

OBNOVA) as well as the presence of military and political missions. 

Above all, it supports (within the Stabilization and Association Process) 

Bosnia and Herzegovina in their efforts to join the EU. It seems, 

however, that for the situation in the country to stabilize, there are 

needed clear steps aimed to determine the final shape of Bosnia and 

Herzegovina (the answer to the question whether the state should be 

more centralized and unified or decentralized, which may not necessarily 

lead to a transformation of the federation into confederation). 

It is also important to accelerate reforms of the security, both internal 

and external, sector allowing for effective fighting against fundamentalism, 

separatism, organized crime and arms trafficking. In this 

place it should be underlined that without support and cooperation 

of neighboring countries – mainly Serbia and Croatia as well as the EU 

maintaining, a stable and independent country of Bosnia and Herzegovina 

seems to be only an international experiment without chances 

for happy ending. 

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Bosnian Visions of Europe 

Abstract: The aim of this work is to present the Bosnian visions of Europe 

as well as its expectations concerning the membership in the European Union 

which seems to be an important issue as almost half of the Bosnian society 

is Islamic. Bosniak people believe their religion, or rather its non-orthodox 

version, will be accepted easier by the West. They see themselves as mediators 

between two civilisations able to show other Muslims that their faith does 

not stand in contradiction to European values. The citizens of the Bosnia and 

Herzegovina are in great majority in favour of accessing the EU. They treat this 

possibility as a chance to raise the level of life; to strengthen the social guarantees; 

to curb corruption and to improve the judiciary system. Those collective 

hopes come together with a grudge towards Europe for being passive during 

the war but also for lack of power of the international administration. 

Keywords: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Identity, Europe, European Union 

The vision of Europe seen by the inhabitants of Bosnia and Herzegovina 

is indeed a very important issue concerning the aspirations of this 

country to join the European Union. First of all, it has to be noticed 

that in the collective ideas Europe is identified with the European 

Union which should not come as a surprise since the fundamental 

feature of collective imagination is to simplify the reality. That is one 

of the reasons why in numerous discourses, not only in the Balkan 

ones, terms: Europe and EU are used interchangeably. During the process 

of accessing the European Union also Poles spoke about joining 

the Europe, although from the geographical point of view, the border 

of the old continent lies several thousand kilometres from the Vistula 

River. A similar kind of Europhilia among Slovenians was analysed by 

Mitja Velikonja who quoted a broad spectrum of statements dealing 

with the topic of coming back to Europe. 1 

1 M. Velikonja, Evroza. Kritika novog evrocentrizma, Biblioteka XX Vek, Beograd 2007, p. 36-42.

94 


Besides, the European Union itself propagates such associations, 

many examples of which can be easily pointed to. One of them is the official 

portal of the European Union which is called Europe. 2 Serbian 

scholar, Tanja Petrović talks about the metaphors of home (in some 

cases a stronghold), family and road functioning in the Western discourse. 

3 From the perspective of the countries applying for accession 

to the EU, the last metaphor, suggesting that the membership has 

to come after an arduous process of adjusting to the EU standards, 

seems to be the most important one. However, in the case of Bosnia 

and Herzegovina this route appears to be much more complicated and 

bumpy because of the almost bizarre character of the country. And 

it is trivial to say that the Dayton Agreement created a weak country 

unable to perform its functions. 4 

While this paper is being written the results of the first census (2013) 

from the times of the Breakup of Yugoslavia remain unknown, thus we 

are forced to base on the unofficial estimates according to which 48% 

of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s inhabitants are Bosniaks, 37% – Serbs and 

14% – Croats. This shows that almost half of the Bosnia and Herzegovina’s 

inhabitants are Muslim and in such a context the attitude towards 

the European integration takes on new meaning, thus the specificity 

of Bosniak autoidentification has to receive as much attention as the issue 

of how Europe is seen in Bosnia. Regarding the limit of this text’s 

length, the author of this work is forced to restrain herself from writing 

about this one nation only. 

Having no place for a broaden description of the historic past: 

the pre-Osmanian times; the dependence on Turkey resulting in orientalization 

of the country; the Hapsburg epoch when the western 

tradition started to be more widely recognized the author of this work 

will limit herself to use the communistic Yugoslavia as the point of reference 

for the present times. Under the rules of Josip Broz Tito Bosnia 

underwent a rapid transformation as the backward, agricultural 

2 http://europa.eu/index_pl.htm [2.08.2014]. 

3 T. Petrović, Yuropa. Jugoslovensko nasleđe i politike budućnosti u postjugoslovenskim društvima, 

Fabrika knjiga, Beograd 2012, p. 38-52. 

4 M. Babić, Węzeł gordyjski: piętnaście lat daytonowskiej Bośni i Hercegowiny, [in:] P. Chmielewski, 

S. L. Szczesio (ed.), Bośnia i Hercegowina 15 lat po Dayton. Przeszłość – teraźniejszość – perspektywy, 

Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, Łódź 2011, p. 271-273. 



95 

territory was to be modernized by developing the industry, mainly 

the defence industry. 5 And although, as it is nowadays often underlined, 

such politics did not bring any of the expected results, as Bosnia 

was left far behind Croatia and Slovenia, the investments also the foreign 

ones (e.g. Volkswagen) resulting in the transformations of people's 

awareness, are an indisputable fact. One has to remember about 

the westernisation of SFRY indicating the inflow of the Western trends 

and lifestyle. Radina Vučetić in a book devoted to Americanisation 

of the Yugoslavian culture, notices that although the level of existence 

in Yugoslavia could not be seen as equal with the one from the United 

States, the process itself revealed that there actually is a different way 

of living and triggered the willing of its achievement. 6 To this fact, one 

should also add the labour-related migration to Western countries, 

mostly to Germany and Austria, which also meant transferring many 

ideas. Returning home for their holiday, Gastarbeiters brought with 

themselves not only souvenirs but also their own observations and experiences 

that they shared with others. Yugoslavian passport allowed 

its owner to travel freely around Europe and opened many doors not 

only to visit members of the family but also for tourist or shopping 

purposes (e.g. to Trieste). 

Also in the times of the communist Yugoslavia the city of Sarajevo 

had been constantly developing and finally became the symbol 

of multiculturalism. A milestone event in the collective consciousness 

of the inhabitants of Sarajevo was the Olympic Games from 1984 called 

by Vojislav Perica “Yugoslavia’s Swan Song.” The authorities tried to put 

much effort in adding propaganda value to the whole event to use 

it as a representation of the successes of the Yugoslavian version of socialism 

and as a symbol of the effectiveness of brotherhood and unity 

politics. It was also underlined in the interior discourse that entrusting 

SFRY with this kind of event is a proof of its recognition in its activities 

for building the stability in the international relationships. 7 

5 N. Anđelić, Bosna i Hercegovina. Između Tita i rata, Samizdat B92, Beograd 2005, p. 51-52. 

6 R. Vučetić, Koka-kola socijalizam. Amerikanizacija jugoslovenske popularne kulture šezdesetih godina 

XX veka, Službeni glasnik, Beograd 2012, p. 409. 

7 V. Perica, Balkanski Idoli, Religija i nacionalizam u jugoslovenskim državama, Vol. 1, Biblioteka XX 

Vek, Beograd 2006, p. 218-222. 


96 


All of this made the inhabitants of Bosnia feel as Europeans; perhaps 

they even regretted that they did not belong to the “true” West. An 

American Journalist, Barbara Demick in her documentary form the besieged 

Sarajevo writes: “Everybody was anxious to explain that they 

hadn’t always lived like barbarians. Usually within minutes of meeting 

us, they pulled out their fading snapshots of holidays spent skiing 

in Switzerland or sunning on the Mediterranean. They showed 

off the fashionable clothes they once wore – usually imported from 

Italy. Saraievians were sophisticated travellers and many had worked 

abroad.” 8 

It can be said that the European identity survived the war and is still 

present, especially in the discourse of Bosniak elite. For example, philosopher 

Muhamed Filipović underlines that the term South-Eastern 

Europe has not only got geographical connotations as it symbolises 

the ancient roots of the entire continent. 9 Abdulgafar Velić adds that 

because in the ancient and medieval times South-East was the centre 

of contemporary civilisation it was there were, among many others, 

the cultural, philosophical political and educational currents were 

born. 10 

Besides, such theses are propagated not only in Bosnia. Božidar 

Jezernik underlines that in antiquity the term Europe meant exclusively 

the territory which nowadays is called the Balkans. 11 In 1994, 

thus when the war raged in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia and 

when Balkans became the synonym of bestiality and brutality, which 

was the theme of Maria Todorova’s writings, a famous Serbian historicist, 

constantly living abroad, creating in the trends of Annales 

School – Trajan Stojanović published a book titled Balkan Worlds: 

The First and Last Europe. According to one of the theses that can be 

found in this book the first Europe lies in the South (thus Greece and 

Balkans), the new Europe on the other hand is the West part of the Old 

Continent. As Stojanović notices, Balkans were excluded from both 

8 B. Demick, W oblężeniu. Życie pod ostrzałem na sarajewskiej ulicy, Czarne, Wołowiec 2014, p. 24-25. 

9 M. Filipović, Deset predavanja o ideji Europe, Pravni centar Fond otvoreno društvo BiH, Sarajevo 

2000, p. 46-47. 

10 A. Velić, Bošnjaci i Evropa, Bošnjacko razumijevanje Evrope i zapadnoevropske kulture u periodu austrougarske 

uprave nad Bosnom i Hercegovinom 1878-1918, Dobra knjiga, Sarajevo 2013, p. 25-26. 

11 B. Jezernik, Dzika Europa. Bałkany w oczach zachodnich podróżników, Universitas, Kraków 2007, p. X. 



97 

visions of Europe and the purpose of his book is to prove that the Balkan 

territory is the indispensable part of the first Europe. 12 Following 

Stojanović’s thought, who also in other cases pointed that Balkans are 

one of the prime parts of Europe, 13 it is natural to start wondering why 

while talking about the necessity of accessing Bosnia and Herzegovina 

and also other Balkan countries to the EU, the strategic and political 

aspects are often mentioned, but the ideological aspect is left 

aside. Somehow Greek Europeanism had never been undermined. 

It seemed unquestionable (at least until the break out of the crisis 

when the mechanisms of Greek economy were exposed) whereas 

Balkans are still treated as a worse part of Europe. Possible, an average 

inhabitant of the West would be more than surprised to hear that 

those “continental outskirts” are actually the cradle of Europe. Such 

a picture of Balkans, which is propagated by their elite, is something 

that collective imagination of Europeans cannot grasp. For example, 

German chancellor, Angela Merkel, during a meeting with Serbian 

prime minister Aleksandar Vučić while discussing the perspectives 

of the Western part of Balkans concerning the EU, stated that European 

history cannot be separated from the Balkan history, which one 

of numerous proofs are the circumstances in which the First World 

War started. 14 It is hard not to get an impression that for the Westerners 

Balkans remain in the margin which presence is marked only 

during the subsequent explosions of the powder keg. 

It seems that the catchphrase: Balkans – The First and the Last Europe 

can be interpreted in one more way by connecting it with the process 

of integration with the EU. Being the cradle of the European 

civilisation, Balkans will join the European Union as the last bridgehead 

of the old continent. As a result, the last of the borders will disappear. 

Writers: Miljenko Jergović and Marko Vidojković in a 2010 documentary 

Dugo putovanje kroz istoriju, historiju i povijest (The Long 

Road Through Balkan History) state that the ghetto begins just behind 

the Slovenian border. Following this idea it can be said that after 

the Croatia’s accession to the EU the ghetto shrank a bit. Nevertheless, 

12 T. Stojanović, Balkan Worlds: The First and Last Europe, M.E. Sharpe, New York 1994, p. 2-3. 

13 Vide ex.: T. Stojanović, Balkanska civilizacija, Geopoetika, Beograd 1995, p. 13-14. 

14 Merkel: Zapadni Balkan čeka dug put do EU-a, http://balkans.aljazeera.net/vijesti/merkel-zapadnibalkan-ceka-dug-put-do-eu 

[3.08.2014]. 


98 


further reductions are possible. Much is being said about Serbia’s and 

Montenegro’s accession; Albany received the status of the official candidate. 

Bosnian situation is exceptionally hard due to the lack of understanding 

between entities. It is enough to mention that because 

of this lack of internal compromise the association agreement with 

the EU has not been reached so far. 15 Serbs and Croats can count on 

Belgrade and Zagreb. 16 The EU’s Croatian passports guarantee full 

freedom in Europe. Serbian passports, on the other hand, guarantee 

the possibility to travel without visa to the Schengen Area. For now, 

Bosniaks remain closed in the ghetto. 

Not only do the Bosniak elite underline that the European integration 

is a necessity and that their motherland is the cradle of the old continent, 

but they go in their suggestions ever further by trying to secure 

for their country a special mission. It has to be noticed that the need 

to play the main role in a historical mission is felt not only by the nation 

but also by every collectivity. However, as Maria Dąbrowska- 

‐Partyka notices, the borderline situation helps such attitudes to arise 

since the division of the world to a familiar and foreign space results 

in the willingness to undertake a civilisation and spiritual mission. 17 

While there is no doubt in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s transitory character 

it would be wise to spare a moment and discuss what kind of task 

Bosniaks want to undertake. 

First of all, Bosniaks see themselves as the bridge between Europe 

and the Muslim world. It is often underlined that the so called autochton, 

European version of Islam, which Bosniaks believe in, will be more 

acceptable for the Western societies and that it will not awake deep 

collective fear as Islam of Arabs do, whose appearance and clothes 

are quite distinctive. By becoming familiar witch such “gentle” version 

of Islam, Europeans will get accustomed and stop or at least significantly 

limit the ritualization of the negative stereotypes. This on 

15 C. Kowanda, Kto następny do Unii, „Polityka”, 16.04.2014, http://www.polityka.pl/ 

tygodnikpolityka/1577213,2,kto-nastepny-do-unii.read [3.08.2014]. 

16 E. Sarajlić, Razmatranje režima državljanstva u postdejtonskoj Bosni i Hercegovini, [in:] Dž. Šo, I. Štiks 

(ed.), Državljani i državljanstvo posle Jugoslavije, Clio, Beograd 2012, p. 156-157. 

17 M. Dąbrowska-Partyka, Literatura pogranicza, pogranicza literatury, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu 

Jagiellońskiego, Kraków 2004, p. 10. 



99 

the other hand would prepare the mental ground for the Turkey’s accession 

to the EU. 

It is also said that about 15 million Muslims live in the European 

Union without any common identity. Such views correspond with 

the suggestions, sprouting in the West, that not only is there an urgent 

need to create the European civil religion but also that for Muslims, 

which number rises, there should also be a place in the European home. 

Xavier Bougarel adds that in Europe one can speak of many Islams, 

as a universal, European version of this religion has not been founded 

so far. 18 The way of making Muslims “fellow countrymen” and not 

“strangers” could be achieved through developing such a form of Islam 

that would be suitable for the European realities. 19 These kinds of ideas 

were eagerly picked up by the Bosniak elite who saw in them the historical 

chance to engage a cultural-civilisation dialogue. 20 It is often 

underlined that Bosniaks will become European patriots 21 setting an 

example for other Muslim societies. 

Secondly, according to Bosniak elite, Bosnia can be a model 

of a peacefully coexisting society for contemporary Europe, which 

is struggling with the challenges of the inflow of the culturally alien 

immigrants. Such slogans can be seen as a surprise in the outer world, 

in which there has been appearing a big number of publications, not 

only scientific ones, dealing with the mad conflicts of neighbours 

turning against each other. The entire world would probably be more 

eager to learn from Bosnia how not to repeat its mistakes rather than 

copy the Balkan solutions. Nevertheless, Bosniak internal discourse 

is abundant in statements about the exceptional tolerance, which 

could be witnessed on their territory in the times when the religious 

minorities were subjected to repression in Europe. Thus one can easily 

come across M. Filipović’s statement that convinces that being 

18 X. Bougarel, Bosnian Islam as “European islam”: Limits and Shifts of a Concept, [in:] A. Al-Azmeh, E. Fokas 

(ed.), Islam in Europe: Diversity, Identity and Influence, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 

2007, p. 121. 

19 A. Karić, Položaj muslimana u Evropskoj Uniji. Velika Britanija, Njemačka i Švedska, Dobra knjiga, 

Sarajevo 2012, p. 180. 

20 S. Abedpour, O definiranju evropskog identiteta Bošnjaka, „Bošnjačka pismohrana”, no. 34- 

35/2012, p. 61. 

21 E. Rathfelder, Raskrsnica Sarajevo. Bosna i Hercegovina deset godina poslije Daytona: muslimani, 

pravoslavci, katolici i jevreji grade zajedničku državu, Bosanska Riječ, Tuzla 2007, p. 135. 


100 


the only province of the West Roman Empire, isolated from the outer 

world, Bosnia and Herzegovina managed to preserve the contemporary 

system of values based on multiculturalism and respect towards 

foreigners. Meanwhile, Europe accepted Christianity as the only possible 

paradigm. Thus, as the philosopher concludes, Bosnia remains 

as a memory after the first Europe. It appears to be the picture of paradise 

lost. To some extent it still can be seen as the living past of Europe. 

22 It seems that such views are in fact a consequence of a popular 

in the Islam world thesis claiming that Islam is actually the most tolerant 

of all monotheistic religions. The proof of that is supposed to be 

found in the centuries-old presence of Jewish and Christian minorities 

in the Muslim world. 23 

So far this work was mainly devoted to the attitude of Bosniak 

elite towards Europe, but it would be also wise to discuss the views 

of the society which, apparently, does not declare itself being explicitly 

European. The European identity is declared by 1/3 of the respondents, 

however, depending on the poll, 70-90% of respondents believe 

that Bosnia and Herzegovina should join the European Union. Such 

pro-EU attitude can be observed among all three Bosnian nations, but 

it is a bit less strong among Serbs and Croats than among Bosniaks. 24 

However, public knowledge about the EU is still limited. 25 On the other 

hand, analysts underline the fact that Bosnia does little to adapt 

to the requirements posed by Brussels and that together with Kosovo, 

which still is not recognized by many countries, occupies the end 

part of the queue to the EU gates. 26 

The disappointment with Europe, which will be discussed later 

in this text, does not transfer to the negative attitude towards EU 

as the inhabitants of Bosnia see in Brussels the only chance to improve 

the economic situation, ensure social guarantees and last but not least 

22 M. Filipović, op. cit., p. 65. 

23 D. Moïsi, Geopolityka emocji, PWN, Warszawa 2012, p. 122. 

24 Vide ex.: Vijeće ministara: Čak 85 posto građana BiH podržava ulazak u EU, http://www.avaz.ba/ 

vijesti/iz-minute-u-minutu/vijece-ministara-cak-85-posto-gradjana-bih-podrzava-ulazak-u-eu 


25 Građani u BiH znaju malo o procesu evropskih integracija, http://cps.ba/gradani-u-bih-znaju-maloo-procesu-evropskih-integracija/ 

[6.08.204]. 

26 Praštalo: Građani BiH nepovratno izgubili još jednu godinu života, http://www.visokoin.com/prastsalo-gradani-bih-nepovratno-izgubili-jos-jednu-godinu-zivota/ 




101 

to force Sarajevo to accept the broadly defined Union standards. 27 

What is more, as it has been pointed out by many, the accession will 

be connected with the necessity of normalization of the state apparatus 

and replacing the labyrinth of ethnic parity with more efficient solutions. 

One of the journalists in the neighbourhood Croatia said that 

the Union “forces us to have courts in which nobody inquires whether 

you are a Croat, Serb, Romani or Hungarian. Courts are blind to origin 

but they act quicker, they are more efficient and more just. Union 

forces us to have equal possibility in being employed and also to have 

economy in which it is possible to get a job.” 28 Bosnia has similar expectations. 

One can risk a supposition that they are even bigger while 

taking into consideration the post-dayton paralyses of the country. 

Analysts, however, point to yet another aspect of membership 

in the EU that is the chance to build a common all-Bosnian European 

identity over the ethnic divisions. And although it appears to be a utopian 

vision, numerous scholars remind that the identity is not something 

that was given once and for all and that it was in Bosnia where 

the Yugoslavian identification caught on the strongest in all the SFRY. 

Džemal Sokolović believes that “on the Balkan peninsula everybody 

was changing their religious and ethic identities.” 29 Thus it is possible 

to foresee that in the future more permutations may occur. The disappointment 

of Bosnian state can paradoxically strengthen the process 

of identifying with Europe. Danijela Majstorović and Vladimir 

Turjačanin prove that in their country Serbs and Croats identify more 

willingly with entities and with Europe than with Bosnia and Herzegovina. 

30 

It is worth to notice that the attitude towards West and thus towards 

Europe will vary in the case of people declaring themselves 

as Bosniaks and Muslims. Here, it has to be mentioned that the decision 

of the Second Bosniak Congress from 1993 to adopt a new name 

27 D. Bajraktarević, Bosna i Hercegovina i proces evropskih integracija, [in:] D. Banović, S. Gavrić (ed.), 

Država, polityka i društvo u Bosni i Hercegovini. Analiza postdejtonskog političkog sistema, IKD University 

Press – Magistrat izdanja, Sarajevo 2011, p. 540-541. 

28 As cited in A. Puszczewicz, Proces integracji Chorwacji z Unią Europejską, Grado, Toruń 2013, p. 242. 

29 Dž. Sokolović, Nacija protiv naroda. Bosna je samo jedan slučaj, Biblioteka XX Vek, Beograd 

2006, p. 126. 

30 D. Majstorović, V. Turjačanin, Youth Ethnic and National Identity in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Social 

Science Approaches, Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2013, p. 161. 


102 


for the nation – Bosniaks, did not put an end to arguments and disputes. 

Many opinions are heard, especially from the units supported 

form the external pan-Islamic environments, to consider the earlier 

name – Muslims, more accurately, because of its inclusive character. 

Islamic missioners often express their conviction that cooperation 

of all Balkan Allah’s followers in necessary. Pan-Muslim circles say 

that nationalism became the real enemy of Islam followers as it has 

forced men to choose between loyalty towards the religious community 

and towards the national state. 31 This in the Balkan conditions 

often happens to be a hard choice. Moreover, until now non-Slavic 

Islamic minorities such as Albanians and Romani people live in Bosnia. 

The result of this is the fact that some choose to define themselves 

as Muslims and not as Bosniaks. Sarajevian sociologist Dino Abazović 

underlines that Bosniaks present their pro-Western attitudes more often 

than Muslims. 32 However, the Muslim identity is declared by relatively 

small number of people and they are often placed in statistics 

under the “other” category. 

There is no doubt that the society of Bosnia and Herzegovina bears 

a grudge to the international society, European Union included, as they 

were left all alone while the war was treated as a marginal conflict. 

The biggest disappointment is probably felt by Bosniaks among whom 

one can come across views stating that the Western world turned 

a blind eye towards ethnic cleansing, concentration camps and also 

towards Srebrenica while recognizing Muslim people as worse, not 

worthy of any sacrifices. 33 Such views appear to suggest that the West 

treats Bosniaks in the way it was described by Edward Said in Orientalism. 

34 Rasim Muratović notices that Europe’s involvement in Bosnia 

was a moral fiasco since instead of effective actions to stop the genocide, 

disputes about the end of history, the triumph of the West were 

31 A. al-Ahsan, Ummet ili nacija. Kriza identiteta u savremenom muslimanskom društvu, Libris, Sarajevo 

2004, p. 45. 

32 D. Abazović, Bosanskohercegovački muslimani na početku novog milenija: sociološki pogledi, 

[in:] H. Kamberović (ed.), Rasprave o nacionalnom identitetu Bošnjaka, Institut za istoriju, Sarajewo 

2009, p. 232. 

33 E. Rathfelder, op. cit., p. 119. 

34 E. W. Said, Orientalizm, Zysk i S-ka, Poznań 2005, p. 82. 



103 

more occupying. The war nightmare was used as an attempt to verify 

the hypothesis of the unity of the post-cold-war-world. 35 

Meanwhile, Europe, which allowed for the Bosnian tragedy and 

which attempts to manage the country resulted in more defeats than 

successes, wants now to make demands as its idea of playing a historical 

mission assumes passing the experience to others. 36 As Croatian 

political scientist Boris Buden, notices, the West has full control over 

the Mid-European transformations. By creating some kind of ideal, 

the West defines the direction towards which young democracies 

should be going, de facto interfering in the internal policy of the postcommunistic 

countries. 37 That kind of bitterness seems natural, as no 

one likes being subjected to demands and receiving in return only 

vague promises of membership in an undefined time. There was a time 

when also in Poland complains arouse about Europe daring to impose 

conditions on Warsaw when some time ago in Yalta it allowed Poland 

to stay in the Soviet block. A certain illogicality is striking here; as it was 

mentioned, Bosnians see in the EU a chance to sort out the country 

affairs, create the social guarantees, curb corruption, etc. Thus why 

does the society that expects the introduction of European norms at 

the same time oppose them being imposed by Brussels The answer 

to this question seems simple since the collective ideas, hopes and 

fears are not internally cohesive. They are led rather by the wishful 

thinking that by rationale. 

Europe keeps disappointing Bosnia as the control over country 

lead by international administration is far from being effective which 

is aptly captured in Nenad Veličković’s book Sahib: Impressions from 

Depression. What is more, the society seeing the consent of the foreign 

officials for the ubiquitous mess and corruption does not understand 

their indifference. In a poor society troubled with high unemployment 

rate it is difficult to understand that for years armies of foreigners receive 

high salaries for actions that are supposed to lead to normalize 

the reality but actually bring no spectacular effects. 

35 R. Muratović, Holokaust nad Jevrejima i genocid nad Bošnjacima, Institut za istraživanje zločina 

protiv čovječnosti i međunarodnog prava, Sarajevo 2011, p. 140. 

36 M. F. Gawrycki, A. Szeptycki, Podporządkowanie – niedorozwój – wyobcowanie. Postkolonializm 

a stosunki międzynarodowe, PWN, Warszawa 2011, p. 110. 

37 B. Buden, Zona prelaska. O kraju postkomunizma, Fabrika knjiga, Beograd 2012, p. 90. 


104 


Here, it has to be mentioned that in the Bosniak society it is possible 

to differentiate between two opposing each other attitudes towards 

religion. The European version of Islam, about which elites speak, 

can be juxtaposed with deep religiousness brought during the war by 

Wahhabis. The strict version of religion, although very much conspicuous 

is still a margin but the West cannot forget that Muslim countries 

invest a lot of capital in Bosnia. Mosque-by schools where free 

after class lessons are conducted are very popular. 38 The EU should 

thus deeply consider the possibility of redefining its politics as so far 

tightly wrapped women are humorously called ninja and the majority 

of Bosniak people desire the European style of living. At the same time 

negative emotions can be easily channelled in the opposite direction 

the signals of which are the ideas of basing Bosnia on Muslim instead 

on EU countries. 39 It is worth to remember that Turkey or Saudi Arabia 

for lending a helping hand do not make any demands concerning 

the respect of human rights or corruption and, as it has been already 

noticed, such demands made by Brussels awake bitterness in Bosniaks. 

The already mentioned Dino Abazović underlines that although 

Bosniaks see their future in the European Union, they tend to believe 

that the West does not understand Islam, that it does not have sufficient 

knowledge about Bosniaks, that it considers their nation as delayed 

in terms of civilisation and that it prefers other Bosnian nations 

(Serbs and Croats). 40 Nevertheless, the membership in the European 

Union is treated as a chance to improve the broadly defined quality 

of life and as a possibility to escape from the Daytonian labyrinth. 41 

But Bosnian political elite show not enough engagement in reforming 

the country. One can only suppose that cleaning the Bosnian mess 

is not suitable for the elite. However this issue goes beyond the topic 

of this text. 

38 M. Kowalik, Boszniackie projekcje Europy, [in:] P. Chmielewski, S. L. Szczesio (ed.), Bałkany Zachodnie 

między przeszłością a przyszłością, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, Łódź 2013, p. 539. 

39 Ibidem. 

40 D. Abazović, Bosanskohercegovački muslimani između sekularizacije i desekularizacije, Synopsis, 

Zagreb – Sarajevo 2012, p. 163-164. 

41 E. Islamović, Europska nelagoda i bosanski labirint, „Bošnjačka pismohrana”, no. 34-35/2012, p. 85. 



105 

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Jan Muś 


of the Ethnopolitics in the Balkans 

Abstract: This article proposes an approach to ethnopolitics in the Balkans 

based on the law of uneven and combined development. It assumes a significant 

role of economy (and control over economy) in social and political 

development of a society across the ages. Subsequently, the ethnopolitics of 

the Balkans should be perceived through the prism of historic development 

of the political solutions to arising economic questions. In effect, we recognize 

several models of cultural division of labour. These models provide varying 

levels of economic (in)dependence of minorities from state-authorities. 

Our claims, however, are based on the conviction that these institutions and 

models are focused mostly on meeting demands of the minorities’ leaders, 

not necessarily of the minorities themselves. Consequently, political and economic 

interests took precedence over human rights and democratic values. 

Keywords: ethnopolitics, ethnicity, combined and uneven development, Balkans, 

ethnic minorities 

Introduction 

Contemporary research approaches to ethnicity and ethnic groups 

tend to perceive them through the prisms of either political and institutional 

frameworks 1 , widely understood protection or abuses of hu- 

1 J. Erin, A Bargaining Theory of Minority Demands: Explaining the Dog that Did not Bite in 1990s Yugoslavia, 

International Studies Quarterly 48:729-754 or, by the same author, Ethnic Bargaining: 

The Paradox of Minority Empowerment, Cornell University Press, 2007 ; T. Kuran Private Truths and 

Public Lies, Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1996; J. C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday 

Forms of Peasant Resistance, New Haven: Yale University Press 1985; J. Zielinski Translating Social 

Cleavages into Party Systems: The Significance of the New Democracies, World Politics 54:184-211, 

2002. Important are the works of Arend Lijphart devoted to plural societies: Constitutional Design 

for Divided Societies, Journal of Democracy 15 (2): 96-109, 2004; Patterns of Democracy: Government 

Forms & Performance in Thirty-six Countries, Second Edition, New Haven: Yale University 

Press, 2012.

108 

Jan Muś 

man (and minority) rights 2 , or cultural and anthropological issues 3 . 

This article seeks to address the question of inter-ethnic political relations 

through the prism of combined and uneven development law. 

The idea of combined and uneven development assumes that social 

development is directly linked to control over production process. 

In other words, economic development is a key determinant of social 

relations. Some social groups develop quicker than others, depending 

on geopolitical conditions and historical circumstances. History witnesses 

various paths and speeds of development and progress of different 

segments of society, economy, culture and politics around the 

globe. The development remains uneven. A combination of domestic 

and international interactions between various social groups, branches 

of economy, as well as cultural and intellectual exchange lead to further 

changes in human development. Therefore, this development 

can be described as combined. The main assumption of this work is 

that the process of inter-ethnic relations has been shaped by uneven 

economic development, providing particular groups with distinctive 

position in the cultural division of labour. 

So far, the historical materialistic approach to social-sciences has 

ignored the question of inter-ethnic relations. Later on, based on the 

modernist approach to the concept of nation and nationalism, it as- 

2 R. Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany, Cambridge: Harvard University 

Press 1992; S. Smooha, Minority Status in an Ethnic Democracy: The Status of the Arab Minority in 

Israel, Ethnic and Racial Studies 13: 389-413, 1990; S. Castles, H. Booth, T. Wallace, Here for Good: 

Western Europe’s New Ethnic Minorities, London, England, Pluto Press 1984; A. Adeno Individualism, 

Communitarianism, and the Rights of Ethnic Minorities, 7 Notre Dame L. Rev. 615 (1991-1992); 

works of Will Kymlicka: Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, Oxford: Oxford 

University Press 1995; Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism, Citizenship, Oxford: 

Oxford University Press 2001; and Immigration, Multiculturalism, and the Welfare State, Ethics & 

International Affairs, Volume 20.3 Fall 2006. 

3 R. Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe, New 

York: Cambridge University Press 1996; E. Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, Ithaca: Cornell University 

Press 1983. E. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1789: Programme, Myth, Reality, 

New York: Cambridge University Press 1992; A. Marx, Faith in Nation: Exclusionary Origins of Nationalism, 

New York: Oxford University Press 2004; Ch. Tilly, The Formation of National States in 

Western Europe, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1975; of the same author: Coercion, Capital, 

and European States: AD 990-1990, New York: Basil Blackwell Press 1990; A. D. Smith, Ethnic Origins 

of Nations, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1986; and published 3 years earlier in 1983; Theories 

of Nationalism, New York: Holmes and Meier, B. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on 

the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, 1983, and more recent Under Three Flags: Anarchism and the 

Anti-Colonial Imagination, 2005. 


Uneven and Combined Development of the Ethnopolitics in the Balkans 

109 

sumed a state-centred, top-bottom orientation. In this sense, we endeavour 

to create a new perspective within the modernist branch. In 

other words, we will highlight the economic origins of ethnopolitics. 

We claim that control over production processes and economic development 

requires a respective representation in the political system. 

Therefore, depending on the relatively large size of non-majoritarian 

groups, their economic development and (favourable) international 

circumstances, the political system of a particular country was likely 

to change if another institutional set up provided more beneficial (for 

the minority groups) division of labour. On the other hand, a dominating 

ethnic group will want to preserve its privileged position by 

a respective set of institutions. In both cases an idea of separate ethnic/national 

identity will be a primary tool of mobilisation. Intellectual 

and ideological developments (i.e. liberalism, nation state, self 

determination of peoples, etc.) provided explanation for such an evolution, 

while international and domestic circumstances (i.e. shifts of 

international alliances, armed conflicts, invasions, changes of rulers 

in the capital city, economic crisis, etc.) generated favourable momentum 

when changes could be applied or prevented. 

In the first part of the text the major historical events leading to 

establishment of national states and capitalism have been shown. The 

specificity of inter-ethnic relations in the Balkans through the prism 

of combined and uneven development will be highlighted in the second 

part. 

1. 

Combined development of the Great Revolutions4 

1.1. Concentration of capital 

At the end of 18 th century two revolutions took place in the Western 

Europe. They shook the entire world and opened a path to the creation 

of national states and politicization of ethnicity. The first of them had 

an industrial character and was possible thanks to a conjunction of 

specific international circumstances and socio-economic institutions 

4 See: E. Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolution: Europe 1789-1848, New York: Vintage Books 1996. 


110 

Jan Muś 

of the country, where it all began – the Great Britain. Industrialization, 

which followed, led to the creation of a whole new international system 

divided between developed centres and underdeveloped peripheries. 

Although this sort of international division of labour had existed since 

the beginning of human societies, the industrial revolution contributed 

to it new dynamics that forced markets to accelerate trade, buy 

and sell more and quicker – processes that privilege economic development 

and concentration of capital. While the first group (centres) 

was at the time (i.e. 18 th and 19 th century) composed of the western 

powers (the United Kingdom, France, the United States, Germany, 

and to a much lesser degree also Russia, Italy, Belgium and non-European 

Japan), the second covered the rest of the world with a net of 

colognes and more or less dependent states and state-like territories, 

which are called by some contemporary scholars as peripheries, and 

the third world by others. In effect, the globe has been dominated by 

those who produce, create and sell, and subsequently develop quicker, 

gaining economic advantage over subordinated economies of natural 

resources, cheap labour and political dependency. 

1.2. Capital and coercion 

Economic changes happened to be followed by a set of rapid developments 

later named as the French Revolution. These events led to the 

creation of a new political pattern that resulted in the establishment 

of nation states representing the capital, which arose during and after 

the industrial revolution. Balance between those accumulating capital 

and those accumulating coercion has been achieved 5 . These political 

and institutional evolutions, initially of the western European states, 

resulted in the establishment of some new political forms that revolutionized 

political scenes and enable relatively wider groups of society, 

namely those accumulating capital, participation in state governance. 

The pillars for modern nation-state have been created. 

5 Ch. Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1992, Blackwell, Cambridge 

1992 za: A. Gałganek, Historia Stosunków Międzynarodowych. Nierówny i połączony rozwój. 

Tom I. Idee, Dom Wydawniczy Elipsa, Warszawa 2013, p. 462. 



111 

1.3. Nation-states 

Creation of the states functioning in 19 th century required some particular 

and far-reaching changes concerning the vast majority of the 

population; namely, the creation of a nation. For this goal a cultural 

standardization had to be introduced via public education and imposition 

of a single common language. These two features were necessary 

to organize administration and to manage working class growing 

in the industrialized towns. This led to establishment of an ideological 

(one nation – one state principle), cultural (homogeneous public 

education, dominant state religion), and linguistic (single official state 

language) framework with which the state’s population should correspond 

6 . The maintenance of political stability and economic development, 

combined with redistribution of public goods, has been the 

main goal of ethnopolitics. 

A homogeneous society was required and subsequently designed 

for 1. economic development of the industrial states, and 2. relatively 

stable state politics in the new institutional set-up. It has not been done 

according to the French model, where a person is linked with the state 

by ties of citizenship and social agreement, nor by multicultural Swiss 

model, where ethno-confessional divisions are ignored. Centuries of 

authoritarian Ottoman rules and geographic proximity led to adoption 

of the German model, where a citizen is linked with the state by 

ethnic ties, which and creates most culturally homogeneous society 

of the three possible options 7 . 

2. 1st 

phase of ethnopolitics – nationalization 

2.1. Fall of the empire and rise of the nations 

While the western world was undergoing fundamental social, political 

and economic changes, the East was left far behind. The 19 th century 

was characterized by the final stage of the Ottoman Empire’s 

6 E. Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, Cornell University Press, Ithaca New York 2006. 

7 We shall leave aside the question “what would happened” with the Balkans if the French or Swiss 

models prevailed – surely history of Balkan states would take very different course. 


112 

Jan Muś 

fall 8 . The Sublime Porte finds itself on the very periphery of the ongoing 

developments. The centre of the world that had already moved 

to the western world, along with corrupted administrative system of 

the Empire, demoralized armed forces as well as impoverished peasantry 

and lack of industry separated Ottoman lands from the rapidly 

developing countries and, in effect, led it to dissolution at the beginning 

of the 19 th century. All attempts of reforms were either abolished, 

incomplete or came too late to safe the country which used to encompass 

lands stretching over three continents and populated by three 

religious denominations 9 . 

The transitions that were imported from, or imposed by, the West 

have found not only a weak state structure and semi-feudal economy 

but also a very specific social system that stratified population along 

religious lines. That was a consequence of the Ottoman idea of society, 

where state elites were Muslims and particular confessional groups 

were governed by their respective leaders. Common cultural or linguistic 

denominators had rather secondary meaning. Unlike general 

acceptance for multi-confessional idea of nations in other parts of 

Europe (Poles, Ukrainians, Czechs, Slovaks, Hungarians, Germans, 

French) 10 , the religious differences served in the Balkans as primary 

indication of nationality. Bosniaks, Croats, Serbs or Bulgarians became 

separated by religion rather than united by common (south Slavic) 

language and culture or heritage. 

2.2. New men, new states, old problems 

National awakening and the creation of the nation states began in 

Greece and in Serbia, mostly because of the influence of Western ideas 

of the time and favourable international and domestic circumstances. 

Bulgarians and Albanians began much later, i.e. in the second half of 

the 19 th century, mostly due to geographical conditions. Romanians 

on the other hand suffered from a sharp social stratification 11 . The 

8 In 1811 the Empire lost Egypt, in 1812 Bessarabia, 1817 Serbia, 1828 Greece, 1829 Abkhazia and 

Megrelia, 1856 Moldova and Wallachia, 1878 Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Kars and 

Ardahan, 1912 Cyrenaica, Tripolitania, Albania and Macedonia. 

9 Muslims, Christians (Orthodox, Catholic, and others) and Jews. 

10 … even if under the banner of a single or dominating religion. 

11 L. S. Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, Hurst&Company, London 2000, p. 222. 



113 

development of the national ideas concerning a particular group was 

therefore uneven and led to a situation in which some states began 

the race earlier than the others. And yet, by influencing each other, 

especially at the turn of the 19 th and 20 th century, that development 

was combined by ideas, experiences, external influence and domestic 

socio-economic and political circumstances. 

Establishment of the nation-state did not have, however, the dimension 

of national struggle for liberation from the Turkish/Ottoman/Muslim 

rule. It was rather an expression of resistance to an old, 

feudal system of redistribution of goods and financial assets that left 

a vast majority of the population out of its already scarce benefits. The 

homines novi or new men, as Traian Stoianovich refers to them, were 

composed of almost all religious, and most probably also all ethnic, 

groups of the Ottoman empire. Local lords, military officers, merchants, 

chiefs of brigands, lower clergy, teachers and civil servants and 

all those who were either deprived of political power and economic 

privileges or whose high status was never legitimized by the Porte were 

ambitious, energetic people with a lot of ideas about how to improve 

their situation 12 . The enlightenment ideas of liberalization and of creation 

of a nation-state were the most influential among them. Self-determination 

of people was a logical consequence of the liberal path. 

3. 2nd 

phase of ethnopolitics – legitimization, 

assimilation, expulsion 

The western ideas were difficult to implement in the Balkan realities. 

Most of the newly created or recreated states suffered the same dysfunctionality, 

such was the view of the statesmen on multi-ethnicity 

at the time. The creation of nation-states required also some further 

corrections in the spheres of political system, economic development 

and the idea of nationality. 

12 T. Stoianovich, Social Foundations of the Balkan Politics, [in:] Ch. And B. Jelavich (eds.), The Balkans 

in Transition. Essays on the Development of Balkan Life and Politics since the Eighteenth Century, 

Archon Books 1974, p. 297-345. 


114 

Jan Muś 

The main difference between the West and the East was the lack of 

strong economies in the latter. In effect, rapid industrialization of the 

capitalist centres led to economic subordination of the peripheries. 

The newly established states lacked strong and developed class of merchants, 

bankers, industrialists, etc., which would be able to compete in 

international trade and constitute a solid political and economic base 

for the states elites. In effect, economy has been linked to the state 

authorities by personal ties. The state has been the most important 

economic actor 13 . This, in turn, strengthened not only Balkan rulers 

(in Serbia and Montenegro 14 ) or led to permanent disorder (Greece) 

but also pushed for the introduction of authoritarian regimes. Such 

a form of government did not encourage building of multi-confessional, 

multi-cultural, multi-ethnic nor multi-national states. 

Secondly, independently from their rather poor deliberative-parliamentarian 

experience, international circumstances forced the newlyborn 

states to territorial expansion. Nation states in the Balkans were 

liable to the Western economic influence and, consequently, their domestic 

development has been often hampered by foreign interest 15 . 

Instead, these poor countries developed by expanding and overtaking 

lands of the falling Ottoman Empire. This had two consequences: 

they needed to compete with each other, and they had to absorb large 

areas inhabited by populations whose national identity, which would 

attach a population to the state, was still to be moulded. 

Thirdly, as already mentioned above, a strong cultural influence 

from Germany and central Europe led to the establishment of ethnic 

ties with the state rather than citizenship-based relations or a concept 

a multi-ethnic society. This in turn resulted in the implementation 

of a one state – one nation principle. Non-state related identities 

threatened young political structures. There was simply no space for 

double loyalty. 

13 A trend that is well visible today among the ruling elites. 

14 Ruling Belgarde Pashalik Obrenović family quickly became one of most riches in Europe. 

15 See: L. S. Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, Hurst&Company, London 2000, subjects devoted to 

economic development, or B. McGowan, Era of Ayans, 1699-1812 and D. Quataert, Era of Reforms, 

1812-1914, [in:] H. Inalcik and D. Quataert (eds.), An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman 

Empire 1300-1914. 



115 

Serbian, Greek, Bulgarian and, to a limited degree, Croatian nationalisms 

have been fuelled by the necessity to control possibly large 

territories, which would eventually overlap with the ethnic map of the 

region. These concerned, first of all, Macedonia, Southern Serbia, Kosovo, 

Thrace, Aegean, Illyrian and Dalmatian coasts as well as Bosnia 

and Herzegovina. For this goal, ethnopolitics were employed. Along 

military and diplomatic campaigns, they encompassed three principal 

strategies: legitimization of one’s rights to the land in question; 

assimilation of local population, and the expulsion of this part of the 

population that, for various reasons, would not or could not be assimilated. 

As a result, various contradictory ideas were employed and 

often implemented. This was particularly true of Kosovo, Macedonia 

and Bosnia and Herzegovina, which are exactly these lands which, to 

this day, have constituted a major stability challenge to the region and 

the international community. 

Why Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia The geopolitical 

position of theses states made them attractive targets. Inhabited 

by ethnically/religiously mixed population made claims of particular 

states legitimized (Serbian, Montenegrin and Croatian towards Bosnia 

and Herzegovina; Bulgarian, Greek, Serbian and Albanian towards 

Macedonia; Serbian, Montenegrin and Albanian towards Kosovo and 

Sandjak). Various economic reasons made these targets valuable, either 

for expected increase of population, access to natural resources, 

fertile lands or to important trade routes, and often a combination of 

these. The historically justified claims remained however well rooted 

in the society and ethnopolitics became permanent feature of political 

discourse in the Balkans. 

How the great powers referred to ethnopolitics Underestimating 

capabilities of the small Balkan states they allowed for articulation of 

the territorial and ethnic claims, intervening however when the lands 

carved up threaten the balance of power in the region. These happened 

in 1878 after the treaty of San Stefano, in 1885 after unification of the 

two Bulgarian provinces, and after each of the following conflicts 

in the region (including both Balkan Wars in 1912 and 1913 and the 

Serb-Bulgarian conflict of 1886). This in turn result in situation, where 

ambitions of particular Balkan states (Serbia and Bulgaria) (and capabilities) 

were not fulfilled, while (Montenegro and Greece) the appetite 

of others arose, and still others (Croats and Albanians) matured im- 


116 

Jan Muś 

patiently, while observing claims and expansions of their neighbours. 

The leaders of the Balkan nations realized that they would need solid 

arguments for convincing both public opinion of necessity of further 

casualties and the great powers of their rights to the lands in question. 

3.1. Legitimization 

All the Balkan states implemented various forms of legitimization 

of particular claims, vast majority of which were backed with ethnic 

and/or historical arguments. The nation would claim ether historical 

rights to particular land and/or would provide ethnically based arguments. 

For example, references to the medieval or ancient statehoods 

or other legacies have constituted the basis for further claims of Serbs, 

Greeks, and Bulgarians towards Macedonia. Other arguments, such as 

ethnic ties, concerned Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example. Interestingly, 

while Serbian leaders invoked historical legacy to claim Kosovo, 

Albanians referred to the ethnic factor. None of the sides mentioned 

natural resources, in which these lands are rich, and a railway connecting 

the city with the strategically important harbour in Thessaloniki. 

These claims quickly came into conflict with each other. The Macedonian 

Question, but also the claims over Bosnia and Herzegovina, 

Kosovo, Dobruja, Epirus and many other smaller regions, became 

a subject of fiery discussions between historians, politicians and journalists 

(not necessarily in this order), thus creating public image of 

national character of a given territory. However, since the claims were 

balancing each other out, i.e. each part of the conflict possessed some 

historically justified rights to the disputed lands, states and their leaders 

required another tool – assimilation. 

3.2. Assimilation 

Assimilation forbids a non-majoritarian, and therefore non-assimilated, 

(ethnic) group any participation in state governance and in the 

redistribution of public assets. In effect, such a group (or groups) is 

considerably disadvantaged in cultural division of labour and forced 

either to adopt the majoritarian culture, language, values, etc, or to remain 

in an unprivileged position. Assimilation of the population was 

a process that lasted, with some short breaks, from the second half of 

the 19 th century until the middle of the 20 th century. It concerned not 

only the disputed lands, and hence disputed population, but also those 



117 

lands that indisputably belonged to a given state but were inhabited by 

a population whose ethnic identity did not necessarily matched that 

preferred by the state. In other words, the state authorities strove to 

convince a particular population of their national identity. At the time, 

this was executed through a combination of educational and religious 

policy, as well as terror spread by militias. In result, in peripheries (for 

example Macedonia or Bosnia) where more national centres (for example 

Bulgaria and Greece) were involved, local population changed 

its identity, often according to the circumstances and situation “on the 

ground” 16 . Therefore, the results of a public poll conducted by various 

states reflected very different ideas of the national identity of a given 

population. These differences have been presented in the table below: 

Nationality/Source and 

year of poll 

Serbian 1889 Bulgarian 1900 Greek 1904 

Turks 231.400 499.204 603.017 

Bulgarians 57.600 1.181.336 332.162 

Serbs 2.048.320 700 Bd 

Greek 201.140 228.702 652.795 

Albanians 165.620 128.711 Bd 

Aromanians/Vlachs 69.665 80.767 25.101 

Gypsies 28.730 54.557 8.911 

Jews 64.645 67.840 53.147 

Source: M. Dymarski, Konflikty narodowe na Bałkanach w okresie kształtowania się państw narodowych w XIX i na początku XX 

wieku, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, Wrocław 2010, p. 202. 

In practice, assimilation often meant the creation of a new, common 

identity, since the members of the dominant ethnic group would 

not identify themselves with the new idea, although they usually accepted 

it rather quickly. A most vivid example was an attempt to create 

a common Yugoslav identity, after a failure of cooperation of various 

national fractions within one, common state organism. That concept 

was based on the Serbian political and cultural heritage, leaving other 

16 See: M. Glenny, The Balkans 1804-1999. Nationalism, War and the Great Powers, Granta Books, London 

1999 and M. Mazower, The Balkans. A short History, The Modern Library, New York 2001. 


118 

Jan Muś 

nations of the Kingdom the role of petitioners. Imposition of certain 

cultural norms was more or less the case in Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, 

Romania and in Turkey during the inter bellum period and in some 

cases also during the Cold War and thereafter. In general, we can claim 

that today’s result of those policies is a clear confusion and identity 

problem in the contested areas. The process of ethnic and national 

identification has not reached its end in the Balkans. 

3.3. Expulsion 

Combining ethnic and state borders was, as Gellner put it, a “sociological 

necessity”. There was a certain level of assimilation rate that 

could be achieved. The rest of the population, especially in towns and 

inhabiting rural areas with fertile lands, was threatened to be expelled 

peacefully or by force. Ottoman authorities, and at the beginning of the 

19 th century also the rulers of the young Balkan states, did not need to 

impose a cultural homogeneity upon rural societies, which were governed 

by different principles. The second half of the century, however, 

brought prospects of industrialization and a necessity to strengthen 

and organize the state structure, which required impersonal, contextfree 

communication and a high degree of cultural standardization 17 . 

Multi-ethnic society, especially when the minorities’ kin states were 

dangerously close, was not a preferable solution. Both the Balkan wars 

and the World Wars, as well as the after-war settlements, involved, formally 

or not, expulsion or exchange of populations. Mostly members 

of such ethnic groups that could hardly be assimilated due to cultural 

differences were subject of these arrangements. 

Greece and Turkey exchanged populations in 1920s and similar 

arrangements were followed by Greek and Bulgarian governments. 

Albanians were prosecuted in Serbian state and Serbs in the Albanian-controlled 

Kosovo. In both cases, a massive change in the landowing 

structure could be noted. Trade, and therefore also markets, 

have been turned upside-down, and very often new state elites were 

the benefiting group. There were however exceptions: Bosnian Muslims 

and Macedonian Slavs in Yugoslavia were permitted to stay on 

17 E. Gellner, op. cit. 



119 

the condition of recognition of a new national model, within which 

they could actually fit in. 

4. 3rd 

phase of ethnopolitics – empowerment 

The events and the casualties of the Second World War disillusioned 

the elites of a rapid, and often drastic, solutions of the minorities 

issue. Neither the Albanians nor the Serbs succeeded in the 

creation of a purely ethnic Kosovo. Croatian Pavelić’s regime, despite 

its cruelty and devilish methods, did not get rid of Serbs in the Croatian 

heartland. Also Bosnia had remained ethnically mixed rather 

than divided. Most of the borderlands dividing the Balkan states still 

contained a significant share of minorities. The new world order has 

been based on the ideas of protection of human rights and promotion 

of democracy, as opposed to the past era of authoritarian and totalitarian 

regimes that governed most of the world before 1945 18 . That required 

addressing the question of ethnic minorities by enabling them 

to participate in state governance. 

Secondly, new institutional models adopted in the region were 

driven by the necessity to stabilize inter-ethnic relations for the sake 

of the state’s stability and security. This was especially important after 

an internal split between the Balkan states. Bulgaria remained within 

the Eastern block, Greece joined NATO, Tito chose the third path of 

“non-aligned movement” and Albania fell in Enver Hodxa psychosis 

of autarky. Preserving peace within one’s state became the priority, 

since any destabilization of the system led to consequences all too 

well known from Hitler’s claims toward Czechoslovakia, Poland and 

Austria, as well as more recent ones from East Germany in 1953 or 

from Hungary three years later. Unrests, which could quickly lead to 

rebellions, would be immediately used by other states and domestic 

opposition to discredit the ruling elites. In result, the Balkan authorities 

adopted several various solutions, sometimes complimentary to- 

18 Real character of people’s democratic regimes in central and eastern Europe was clearly authoritarian. 

Nevertheless the idea was based on right of self-determination of peoples and basic 

democratic principles. This was well visible in the constitutional arrangements of these states. 

Arrangements that became dead letters. 


120 

Jan Muś 

wards each other. These arrangements enabled various ethnic groups 

to participate in a redistribution of the public financial assets. Ethnicity 

and multi-cultural character of the society provided a pattern along 

which a certain part of the public funds was to be allocated. Ethnicity 

has become a valuable asset for minorities themselves. 

5. 4th 

Phase – Further Divisions 

The fall of Eastern Bloc and general victory in the Cold War 

of the liberal democracies of the West shifted a large share of public 

attention to the protection of human rights, and especially to the 

minorities. Developments and human casualties related to the dissolution 

of Yugoslavia and the USSR drew media and so also political 

attention. It also brought back the question of minorities’ rights – the 

issue almost forgotten after 1945 and Hitler’s claims. Since 1945 those 

minorities gained political experience and ambitions. Until the beginning 

of 1990s, the members of minorities enjoyed their rights either 

as individual members of a particular group or as all other citizens of 

the given state. The fall of the Eastern Bloc and the related conflicts, 

surprisingly often of ethnic character or background, led to the adoption 

of a convention on minorities rights that provided certain political 

rights and freedoms to whole groups, rather than individuals. 

Politicization of ethnicity received a new dynamic that resulted in 

(re)creation and/or adoption of a number of tools and solutions, such 

as federalism or power-sharing mechanisms, territorial autonomy, cultural 

autonomy and national minority councils, or specific central-, 

state-level institutions, quotas system for parliamentary elections and 

specific party politics. Each of them constituted a different model of relocation 

of financial assets and eventually of cultural division of labour. 

5.1. Federalism and power-sharing mechanisms 

Various forms of federalism and power-sharing 19 mechanisms have 

been introduced in the communist Yugoslavia and in the post-Yugo- 

19 Power sharing regime is a wider concept putting emphasis on participation in state governance, 

while federalism has territorial character, where power and sovereignty are divided between 



121 

slav republics. Those forms are applied in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 

Kosovo and Macedonia today. Federalism means shared sovereignty, 

limitation of the state-power by empowering federal units in stategovernance 

and economic and fiscal autonomy. In case of the Balkan 

states which were federalised – Bosnia and Herzegovina and former 

Yugoslavia, significant decentralisation has been applied. In practice, 

this meant not only that the federal units enjoyed wide autonomy, but 

also that certain decisions on the state level could not be taken without 

their consent. Federalisation, if overlapping with ethnic division 

of the country, provides in effect not only the widest possible degree 

of self-government of respective minorities, but also the ability to influence, 

create and direct the state policy. 

Except for Bosnia and Herzegovina and former Yugoslavia, powersharing 

mechanisms have been applied in Kosovo and in Macedonia. 

They seek the inclusion of the representatives of major segments of 

a divided society into the state governance and providing them with 

tools of inter-segmental or inter-ethnic cooperation, but without the 

provision of shared sovereignty and divided territory. There are two 

main approaches to the question of mechanisms and institutions 

which can be used. The first of them, developed by Arend Lijphart, 

and known as a type of consociational democracy includes: building 

a grand coalition by including all major groups in the ruling coalition, 

proportional representation of these groups in state institutions, inclusion 

of all major groups in the government, veto rights and a high 

degree of autonomy. Another one, advocated by Donald Horowitz, 

has centripetal character and five features: dispersion of power, devolution 

of power, fostering cooperation, promoting cross-cutting 

cleavages and reducing disparities 20 . Both of them aim at preserving 

political stability in plural societies. 

Both federalism and the power-sharing system have been applied 

in states where non-majoritarian groups constitute a significant part 

of the society. Federal units usually enjoy various degrees of fiscal and 

various entities. Territorial and social division (and institutional solutions) can overlap, just as in 

the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 

20 F. Bieber, Power-Sharing and the Implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement, [in:] Power 

Sharing and the Implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung – Office 

Macedonia, Skopje 2008, p. 10-13. 


122 

Jan Muś 

economic independence from the state centre – in such cases economic 

and coercive powers overlap. Power-sharing regimes guarantee 

participation in decision making processes regarding economic development, 

the direction of investments and public funds and managing 

state enterprises. What happens if the ethnic composition of a society 

is less balanced, when a non-majoritarian community is concentrated 

in a specific part of the country but its political ambitions do 

not reach the capital city 

5.2. Territorial autonomy 

Territorial autonomy has been applied in several cases. Most prominent 

are Kosovo within the former Yugoslavia and today’s Voivodina 

and Istria. Though, a federal division of the state has to be recognized 

also as a form of autonomy. This form of solution of inter-ethnic problems 

requires high and historically legitimized concentration of a distinguishable 

group on a given territory, constituting at the same time 

rather an exception on the ethnic map of the country. Autonomy is 

also available to communities that do not represent secessionist aims. 

This was sealed after Kosovo secession in 1990s and 2000s. Therefore, 

Albanians of Macedonia enjoy a high level of decentralisation, while 

stopping short from gaining autonomy that would unite the Albanian 

municipalities in the north-western corner of Macedonia. 

Autonomy provides group leaders with a high level of economic 

and political independence from the state authorities, for example by 

granting grants conditionally or unconditionally, or by allowing the 

collection of particular taxes. In such a case, however, the impact of 

the autonomy’s leaders upon the state authorities is not guaranteed 

by any institutional solutions. Therefore, they are more vulnerable to 

influence from the capital than in the case of power-sharing or federal 

models of state-governance. 

5.3. Cultural autonomy and national minority councils 

Minorities that are spread around vast territory and still do not constitute 

the majority in a particular region cannot expect territorial autonomy. 

Instead, another form of self-government has been adopted. 

Cultural autonomy, a concept developed by Austrian Marxist at the 

turn of the 19 th and the 20 th century accepts multi-confessional or multi-ethnic 

character of particular society. Instead of carving out signifi- 



123 

cant parts of the state’s territory, which in such cases would create more 

minorities, it provides dispersed minorities with a high level of selfgovernment 

in limited areas that remain crucial for the preservation 

of the group’s identity – culture, language, religion, education, etc 21 . 

The state provides institutions representing particular minorities 

with financial means, enabling them to maintain respective institutions. 

These are known as National Minority Councils, or NMCs. Croatia and 

Serbia, where NMCs exit, adopted solutions that provide the councils 

with competences in areas of culture and the use of the minorities’ 

languages, making them, however, financially dependant on the state. 

This type of minorities empowerment enables the authorities to create 

a dense network of financial dependencies that rely upon the good will 

of the state, yet it tends to satisfy a relatively large group of local leaders. 

5.4. State-level institutions 

Albania and Croatia adopted yet another solution 22 , i.e. central-level institutions 

representing minorities directly in the government. At a first 

glance, such a solution provides the minorities’ representatives with 

a tool enabling them to react immediately, or at least quicker than in 

case of local authorities, at the level of the highest decisive bodies in 

a particular country, influencing legislative processes, whistle-blowing 

in cases of misuse or discriminatory behaviour of the public organs. 

The state-perspective purpose of this solution, however, is to bring 

the minorities’ leaders closer to the state-elites, while separating them 

from the minorities. Lucrative and prestigious positions, life in the 

capital city, close to the power source, must influence the perspective 

of any provincial leader. Lack of any work-related effects of these 

institutions confirms this statement. 

5.5. Quotas system for parliamentary elections 

There is a whole range of various forms of political parties and electoral 

systems adopted in the Balkans, and except for Greece, minorities are 

21 On the cultural autonomy see: E. Nimni (ed.), National Cultural Autonomy and its Contemporary 

Critics, Routledge, Oxon New York 2005. 

22 Author’s own article (together with Mirella Korzeniewska-Wiszniewska), Divide et impera principle. 

Minority Oriented State Policy in the Balkans, New Balkan Politics peer-reviewed journal, no. 

13/2013. 


124 

Jan Muś 

represented in each one of them. Sometimes, due to their ethnicity 

which is different from the main-stream parties (Croatia), and sometimes, 

thanks to their actual strength (Bulgaria), minorities can play 

an important role in party politics 23 . 

The introduction of parliamentarian systems across the Balkans 

resulted in a gradual introduction of quotas for minorities that either 

would not be able to pass the electoral threshold or require a stronger 

representation in the parliament. Minorities’ quotas were introduced 

in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. This usually means 

that regardless of election results and the participation of minorities 

in it, representatives of particular communities will have their seat 

in the parliamentarian assemblies. In effect, however, they are more 

likely to have an impact on the state policy and access to lucrative 

contacts and positions. 

Conclusions 

The process of politicisation of ethnicity began already at the turn of the 

18 th and the 19 th century and it evolved across the following centuries 

and decades. It provided ethnie with a certain political values. Values 

that were supposed to enable at first majority and later also minority 

groups their participation in state governance and thus provide an acceptable 

cultural division of labour. Contemporary Ethnopolitics of the 

Balkan peninsula involve various forms which place representatives of 

minorities in high-rank and/or well-paid positions where they became 

involved in the division of public funds and assets. Larger, territorially 

concentrated groups tend to claim autonomy, power-sharing or 

federalisation of the country which provide them with economic and 

fiscal independence from the state authorities and/or include the ability 

to govern the state themselves. Smaller minorities, often dispersed 

across the country or squeezed within an area of a few municipalities, 

23 On party politics see for example: V. Stojarova and P. Emerson, Party Politics in the Western Balkans, 

Routledge, Oxon New York 2010; Political Parties and Minority Participation, Friedrich Ebert 

Stiftung, Skopje 2008; B. Reilly, and P. Nordlund (eds.), Political Parties in Conflict-Prone Societies: 

Regulation, Engineering and Democratic Development, United Nations University Press, Tokyo 

2008. 



125 

too small for an economically independent region, can expect other 

forms of solution that would meet their expectations as a minority. 

The cultural autonomy is provided by the state. The state controls it 

and it is financially dependant from the state. In order to satisfy international 

standards and domestic public opinion, sometimes the state 

creates state-level bodies representing minorities in the capital-city, 

directly in the government and other highest political institutions. 

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Recommendations for Development 

of Cluster Policy in Croatia in the Light 

of Smart Specialization in Poland 

Abstract: Special interest is paid to the economic performance of regional 

clusters in the Polish economy. The main research questions are: what characterizes 

the regional clusters in Poland and what are the main tendencies 

in cluster development The purpose of this research is to analyse the importance 

of clusters and their influence on employment growth. The analysis 

is based on the theoretical framework of the cluster development and experiences 

in some old and new EU Member States. The research shows that clusters 

in EU 27 and Poland differ in many dimensions: the point at which they 

arise, the type of products and services they offer, their stage of development, 

and the business environment that surrounds them. 

Keywords: clusters, smart specialisation, European Union Economic Strategies 

Introduction 

Before Poland accessed the European Union, the concepts of supporting 

clusters and cluster policy had not been fully developed yet. 

In this respect, Poland was still behind other East-Central Europe 

countries 1 . Meanwhile, the concept of cluster was gaining more supporters 

in different Member States. A particular interest towards this 

issue appeared after the publication of M. Porter’s The Competitive 

Advantage of Nations 2 . According to M. Porter, “A cluster is a geographical 

proximate group of interconnected companies and asso- 

1 For instance, in relation to Hungary or Slovenia. 

2 M. Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations, Macmillan, London 1990.

130 


ciated institutions in a particular field, linked by commonalities and 

externalities in particular: enterprises, research institutions, business 

institutions and public authorities” 3 . 

1. 

Clusters’ characteristics 

Apart from this well-known definition by M. Porter, other resources 

provide more descriptions of a cluster, which indicates huge 

dynamism in the field of the creation of industrial circles. In their 

analysis, C.Brasisli and R.Fanfani 4 , enumerate the following characteristics 

of the term: 

• tight socio-economic correlation between companies and family 

relationships, which develop jointly in the process of adaptation 

to the new surroundings; 

• geographical concentration of companies of special production; 

• concentration of small and medium enterprises around companies 

specializing in one stage of the production process; 

• cooperation as a part of network of enterprises. 

Because clusters are a global phenomenon of localized production 

and innovation systems, they are not limited only to the highlydeveloped 

countries. The operations of cluster schemes are recorded 

in many regions of the world, including the developing countries. That 

is why clusters do not occur solely in the sectors of high technologies 

as they are also identified in processing industry, services and even 

in traditional sectors. Clusters’ individual structures are characterized 

by various levels of innovation and advancement of technology 

and by different perspectives and development strategies. The synergetic 

effect of industrial clusters is mainly identified by absorption 

of know-how, personnel changes and increase of productivity within 

the structure of a cluster. These processes have their source in concentration 

and attraction of resources and new companies, openness 

to the innovation and possibility of its diffusion. 

3 Ibidem. 

4 C. Brasili, R. Fanfani, Agri-food Districts: Theory and Evidence, 10 th Congress of EAAE, Zaragoza 

(Spain) 28-31 August 2002, p. 61-80. 


Recommendations for Development of Cluster Policy in Croatia... 

131 

Reference literature presents a dominant view indicating that innovative 

clusters are characterized by huge effectiveness of absorption 

of knowledge within the range of the cluster. This results from the fact 

that the knowledge developed in a given cluster is forwarded faster 

and more efficiently within the scope of its structure and slower outside 

of it. The advantage of localization and specialization supports 

the increase and establishment of new enterprisers when urbanization 

advantages guarantee cluster’s ability to adapt and to survive 5 .The foregoing 

perception of the complexity of the notion of cluster implies that 

cluster policy, understood as a policy stimulating clusters’ development, 

focuses mainly on stimulation of economic development and 

innovation, where clusters are identified as factors encouraging foreign 

investors and constitute a lifeblood of export increase. At the national 

level, the development of clusters can speed up the process of internationalization 

of the economy, as well as of the growth of export, 

investments and GDP. Analogously, at the regional level, clusters can 

contribute to the education of professional human resources, development 

of resourcefulness in a particular area and the formation 

of new entities on the local market. By these operations, clusters provide 

new work places and stimulate the growth of effectiveness of enterprises 

from the MSP sector. Simultaneously, clusters make regions 

more attractive for foreign entrepreneurs willing to commence direct 

investments 6 . 

The policy based on clusters makes use of similar tools and has similar 

impact on problematic fields in the same way as economic, innovative 

and scientific policies do 7 . In the broader view, a cluster-based 

policy (CBP) covers various tools and policies implemented in a coordinated 

way by authorities of different ranks, supporting development 

of particular centres (clusters) 8 on the regional level. The main 

objective of CBP is to increase the level of competitiveness of the eco- 

5 R. Boschma, Franco Angeli (ed.), Constructing Regional Advantage and Smart Specialisation: Comparison 

of Two European Policy Concepts, “Scienze Regionali”, vol. 2014(1), p. 51-68. 

6 C. Pilarska, Klastry, Doświadczenia Polski i Innych Krajów Unii Europejskiej, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu 

Ekonomicznego w Krakowie, Kraków 2013, p. 45. 

7 Rola Klastrów w Budowaniu Gospodarki Opartej na Wiedzy, Instytut Badań nad Gospodarką 

Rynkową, Gdańsk, Szczecin, 2011, p. 9. 

8 Kierunki i Założenia Polityki Klastrowej w Polsce do 2020 Roku, Polska Agencja Rozwoju 

Przedsiębiorczości 2012, p. 16. 


132 


nomic system of a particular country. In order to do this, one shall 

take into account country’s specific conditioning on which depends 

the way in which these objectives are accomplished. For this reason, 

there are two models of CBP 9 . 

1.1. Models of cluster-based policy 

In the narrower point of view, the cluster policy chooses diversified 

objectives, makes use of different tools and finds various solutions. 

For these reasons one can indicate two models of the said policy 10 . 

The first model consists of a support of clusters coordinators providing 

information, networking, promotion on the foreign markets and 

bringing profits to the members of the particular cluster. What is more, 

the coordination consists of stimulating cooperation between entities 

of the clusters pursuant to the triple helix concept developed by H. Etzkowitz 

and L. Levdesdorff 11 . This strategy establishes an interaction 

between universities, industry and authorities. The triple helix concept 

focuses particularly on the role of universities in the knowledge-based 

economy as well as on mutual merge of different institutions from 

three spheres including industry, competent authorities and science. 

The second model supports cluster’s internal operations (irrespectively 

of co-financing of the cluster coordinator) within the scope 

of common research, development projects, usage of common R+D 

infrastructure or co-financed educational programs. The network 

of cluster’s interconnections includes, apart from companies, any other 

institutions or organizations such as scientific units, research and 

development units and private organizations. 

This model brings innovative potential and synergy of actions 

as the numerous interconnections between cluster’s entities proceed 

by the same path of development 12 . 

The policy of supporting clusters does not generate profits resulting 

solely from effectiveness of cluster’s entities but it primarily puts 

9 Polityka Wspierania Klastrów. Najlepsze Praktyki dla Polski, Instytut Badań nad Gospodarką 

Rynkową, Gdańsk, 2004, p. 17. 

10 Trend Chart Report, European Commission, 2003. 

11 H. Etzkowitz, L. Leydesdorff, The Triple Helix as a Model for Innovation Studies, “Scene and Public 

Policy”, 1988, no. 25(3), p. 195-203. 

12 A. Rodrígez-Pose, R. Ceescenzi, Research and Development, Spillovers, Innovation Systems, and 

the Genesis of Regional Growth in Europe, “Regional studies”, vol. 42, 2008, p. 51-67. 



133 

emphasis on the positive influence of external environment, i.e. a region 

in which a particular cluster operates. 

Developed cluster policy for particular regions accomplishes 

the following objectives: 

• stimulation of the development of existing clusters 

• testing of potential of existing clusters 

• development of business environment, expansion of entrepreneurs 

• strengthening of confidence 13 . 

2. 

Clusters and Smart Specialisation 

The above mentioned cluster policy is connected with the concept 

of Smart Specialization (SS) 14 which constitutes a framework for 

regional policy for innovation powered by economic growth. Many 

of the fundamental assumptions of Smart Specialization are not identified 

as new ideas – they are part of a wider discussion concerning innovation, 

industrial policy and economic development of a particular 

region in a given time. SS is the most essential element for obtaining 

factual effectiveness of research and innovative investment. The European 

Commission’s draft resolution on cohesion policy for the years 

of 2014-2020 assumes that the development of SS 15 strategy for a particular 

country or region shall constitute grounds for obtaining funds 

from European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) in the years 2014- 

2020 on the basis of supporting SS investments 16 . 

From the analysis conducted by the European Commission 

in 2006 it is clear that the biggest success is reached by regions of re- 

13 The Role of Cluster in Smart Specialisation Strategies, European Commission, 2013, p. 30-40. 

14 Smart Specialisation is connected with identification of unique characteristics and assets of every 

country and region. It emphasizes the regional competition advantage and concentrates on 

resources and local partners aiming to realize their achievement-oriented vision of future. Ibidem, 

p. 12. 

15 For more information, see: The draft regulation of European Parliament and European Council 

establishes common provisions concerning European Regional Development Fund, European 

Social Fund, Cohesion Fund, European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development, European Maritime 

and Fisheries Fund included in the common strategic frameworks and establishes general 

provisions concerning European Regional Development Fund, European Social Fund, Cohesion 

Fund and revokes the regulation (WE) nr 1083/2006. 

16 Przewodnik Strategii Badań i Innowacyjności Na Rzecz Inteligentnej Specjalizacji (S3), Komisja Europejska, 

2013, p. 12. 


134 


lated variety. This concept refers to the regions which have diversified 

specializations and common competences, for instance, specialist 

knowledge and technologies. Therefore, this variety constitutes a base 

for innovation which is a result of interaction between particular regions 

17 . 

According to Dominique Forey, this phenomenon creates favourable 

conditions for: 

• the creation of new domains which have their basis in already 

existing technologies 

• transformation of already existing sectors 

• diversification of local economy 18 . 

The concept of SS establishes the adjustments of the strategies 

of regional development to the level of development of clusters. This 

phase of clusters’ development depends on clusters’ position in their 

life cycle. The SS strategy particularly focuses on an emerging cluster. 

It is essential for emerging clusters to identify a new sector or a new 

domain in which they will specialize. That is why one should support 

entrepreneurs who by establishing new contact networks support 

the exchange of experience, technology and good practices. Table 1 illustrates 

the so called entrepreneurial discovery being one of the stages 

of smart specializations. 

Tab. 1: Enabling Entrepreneurial Discovery for emerging clusters 

Emerging cluster 

Specific challenges for emerging clusters 

Framework High • Acceptance of risk 

• Risk Management 

Capital 

Low 

• Project, not institution 

• Exploration of market opportunities 

Knowledge Medium 

• Crossing geographical and industrial boundaries 

Source: drawn up on the basis of The role of cluster in smart specialization strategies, European Commission 2013, p. 30-40. 

17 J. Del Castillo, B. Barroeta, J. Paton, Converting Smart Specialisation into a Regional Strategy, “Infyde”, 

Working Paper, vol. 2, 2014, no. 1, p. 3. 

18 D. Foray, P. A. David, B. Hall, Smart Specialisation: the Concept in Potocnik’s, “Expert Group Knowledge 

for Growth Report”, 2009, p. 34. 



135 

Tab. 2: Adjusting cluster policies to the stage of Cluster Development. Enabling Entrepreneurial 

Discovery for emerging clusters. [original table] 

Source: The role of cluster in smart specialization strategies, European Commission 2013, p. 33. 

Both concepts of clusters and Smart Specialisation are similar, but 

they put stress on different aspects. Although Clusters are very important 

elements of developing Sustainable Regional Development Strategy, 

they should not be identified with Smart Specialization. Smart 

Specialization is a broader concept aiming at transformation of local 

economy. Clusters may come closer to Smart Specialization only when 

they are stimulating development of a new sector and new knowledge. 

However, one should remember that the position of a cluster depends 

on its phase of life cycle. 

Summarizing, one can state that clusters constitute the most important 

element of the implementation of SS strategy. However, one 

should bear in mind that the full potential of clusters will be applied 

under the following conditions: 

Smart specialization integrates policy based on clusters. SS transforms 

whole regional economy and contributes to the development 

of technology and communication between particular sectors. 


136 


Developed programs of regional support contribute to the local 

environment (in this case, the emerging clusters will fulfil the conditions 

of good practice) 19 . 

Tab 2. Similarities and differences between smart specialisation and clusters 

Smart Specialisation 

Clusters 

Similarities 

Productivity and innovation are critical for sustained growth 

Multiple factors influence productivity and innovation 

Importance of proximity and local spillovers and a critical role of locational context 

Differences 

Exploring emerging market opportunities 

Facilitating knowledge about spillovers between 

sectors and knowledge domains 

Exploit related variety between knowledge domains 

Derive structural social and economic changes 

Critical mass 

The source of knowledge: shared infrastructure and 

common experience 

Entrepreneurs derive their knowledge from each 

other and other entities of local economic community 

Enhancing performance of a set of linked companies 

Source: The role of cluster of smart specialisation strategies, European Commission 2013, p. 9-17. 

3. 

Development of cluster policy in Poland and 

the synthesis of cluster – conclusions for Croatia. 

In reference to The Cluster Initiative Green Book the attempt to elaborate 

cluster policy in the countries undergoing economic transformation 

is burdened by the following problems: 

• Limited confidence of the entrepreneurs to the government 

initiatives 

• Lack of experience in cooperation 

• Lack of sufficient knowledge about clusters 

• Barriers connected with development of resourcefulness 20 . 

19 D. Foray, P. A. David, B. Hall, Smart Specialisation – The Concept, Knowledge, “Economists Policy 

Brief”, 2009, no. 9 and Smart Specialisation Platform “Guide to Research and Innovation Strategies 

for Smart Specialisation (RIS 3)”, 2012 on: http://s3platform.jrc.ec.europa.eu/home [March 2012]. 

20 Polityka Wspierania Klastrów. Najlepsze Praktyki dla Polski, op. cit. 



137 

Basic barriers restraining the development of cluster policy in Poland 

before accession to EU were mainly identified with: lack of cooperation 

between entrepreneurs, institutions and organizations, lack 

of confidence to business partners, cultural barriers, lack of confidence 

to potential cluster’s entities, no willingness to cooperate. The abovementioned 

constraints resulted from underdevelopment of business 

cooperation. It is worth stressing that also underdevelopment of transportation, 

telecommunication and information technology infrastructure 

put many constraints on establishing clusters in particular 

regions 21 . When Poland became a member of the European Union, its 

activity on the international market became more dynamic. Therefore, 

Poland joined different organizations and also acquired access to external 

funds which in natural way stimulated the creation of clusters. 

3.1. Clusters’ support policy in Poland 

The analysis entitled Benchmarking klastrów w Polsce – 2010 22 carried 

out in 2009 on a group of 47 Polish clusters, created between 1997- 

2009, indicates that only one cluster of this group was created before 

2000. Most of the examined clusters were created between 2007 and 

2008. 13 of the analyzed initiatives were created until 2007. 

Graph 1: Examined years of clusters creation 

Source: Benchmarking klastrów w Polsce – 2010, Polska Agencja Rozwoju Przedsiębiorczości, Warszawa 2010, p. 27. 

21 C. Pilarska, op. cit., p. 74-79. 

22 Raport “Benchmarking klastrów w Polsce – 2010”, Polska Agencja Rozwoju Przedsiębiorczości, 

Warszawa 2010, p. 27. 


138 


In the financial perspective for the years 2004-2006, the Ministry 

of Economy together with the Polish Agency for Enterprise Development 

and self-government authorities undertook promotion activities 

aiming at popularization of knowledge about clusters. Through 

a system of trainings and workshops clusters were presented as innovative 

concept leading to the growth of competitiveness of enterprises 

united within cluster’s structure 23 . 

The support of the cluster policy in Poland is associated with sectorial 

operational program Improvement of the Competitiveness of Enterprises 

for the years 2004-2006, action 1.1.2. Strengthening of Institutions 

Supporting Operations of Enterprises and Networks of Institutions 

Supporting Operations of Enterprises and Sectorial Operational Program 

Human Resources Development 2004-2006, action 2.3 Development 

of Human Resources for Modern Economy, schema b: Promotion 

of Systematic Solutions for Adaptive Potential and Knowledge-based 

Economy. In the scope of action 2.2, the Polish Agency for Enterprise 

Development accomplished a program entitled Training Program for 

Promotion of Clusters. Its main objective was the presentation of opportunities 

of cooperation in the form of clusters for enterprisers 

as well as for territorial self-governing bodies 24 . 

In 2007, the Polish Agency for Enterprise Development realized 

pilotage program entitled Strengthening Cluster Development in scope 

of which one could obtain funds for cluster initiatives from Integrated 

Regional Operational Program (IROP), action 2.6. Regional Innovation 

Strategies and Transfer of Knowledge. 

In the financial perspective for the years 2007-2013, the strategy 

of cluster policy is partially framed in the strategic document entitled 

Directions of Expanding Innovativeness of Economy 2007-2013 which 

indicates national and regional operational programs as instruments 

for strengthening and developing clusters. The Operational Program 

Innovative Economy, action 5.1. Strengthening of Supra-Regional Cooperation 

Links, which was one of the most important programs for 

strengthening development of clusters at the national level for the fi- 

23 W. Duczmal, W. Potwora (eds.), Klastry i Inicjatywy Klastrowe w Województwie Opolskim, Wyższa 

Szkoła Zarządzania i Administracji w Opolu, Opole 2010, p. 31. 

24 Kierunki i polityka rozwoju klastrów w Polsce, Ministerstwo Gospodarki Departament Rozwoju 

Gospodarki, Warszawa 2009, p. 18. 



139 

nancial perspective 2007-2013, aimed to increase competitiveness 

of companies by strengthening links between companies, research 

and development units. 

Additionally, within the scope of IROP one could obtain support for 

the initiatives strengthening operations of clusters in a given region: 

• support for technology parks and business incubators 

• support for business institutions aiming at development of innovations 

• elaboration of alternative forms of external financing of development 

of resourcefulness 

• elaboration of alternative forms of external financing for the purpose 

of development of resourcefulness 

• support for promulgation and popularization of knowledge related 

to intellectual property. 

3.2. Detailed analysis of existing clusters in Poland 

Among other actions realized by PAED one can enumerate an operational 

program entitled Development of Eastern Poland dealing with 

promotion of cooperation. 

Within the scope of 16 operational programs at the regional levels, 

there are several actions supporting the creation and development 

of cluster initiative. 

Separate actions were performed for the following voivodeships 

(pursuant to the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics level 

2) Mazowieckie, Lubuskie, Śląskie, Opolskie, Pomorskie, Podlaskie, 

Wielkopolskie, Zachodniopomorskie, Warmińsko-mazurskie, Lubuskie, 

Małopolskie and Świętokrzyskie. Whereas in the remaining 

voivodeships, there was a possibility to obtain support for the cluster 

initiatives within the scope of activities executing more than one projects. 

Most of the project funds are dedicated to development of innovation 

and technology, stimulation of resourcefulness and promotional 

activity. Additionally, most subsidiaries were granted for investments, 

development of clusters and personnel trainings. Implemented programs 

concerned primarily cooperation between companies and R+D 

units and transfer of technology. Some of the said programs were 

dedicated directly towards entrepreneurs, granting them funds for 

personnel training. In each voivodeship one could find programs 

granting funds for development of local and regional business links. 


140 


In regional operational programs, there was also possibility of co-financing 

transfer of new technologies, development of technological 

parks and scientific units 25 . 

Operational programs in Łódzkie, Mazowieckie, Opolskie, Podlaskie, 

Świętokrzyskie and Warmińsko-mazurskie Voivodeships focused 

mainly on the creation and expansion of clusters. An improvement 

in the cooperation between clusters and R+D units was noticeable 

in Kujawsko-pomorskie, Mazowieckie and Śląskie Voivodeships. Activities 

putting into effect new technologies were included in the operational 

programs for Lubuskie and Podlaskie Voivodeships. Promotion 

of cluster initiatives as well as technology parks and business incubators 

was included in the activities of Mazowieckie and Podlaskie 

Voivodeships 26 . 

The examined clusters operate in various lines of business, but 

most of them are connected with technological information, aviation 

and construction sectors. The fewest clusters operate in transportation, 

automotive and medical sectors. 

More than half of the examined clusters were created from 

the so called grass-root initiatives. This means that, they were created 

intrinsically from the cooperation of companies. 17% of the examined 

clusters were created from top-down initiative, and 30% of them 

represent mixed initiative, i.e. they were created from the cooperation 

of companies, non-profit organizations and the public sector. 

An association is the most popular organizational and legal form 

of clusters – 16 from 35 of the examined clusters operate on the basis 

of this legal form (4,5 of examined clusters operate as spółka z.o.o. 

(limited liability company)). Only one cluster operates as a foundation, 

whereas 6 operate on the basis of other deeds 27 . 

25 Instytut Badań nad Gospodarką Rynkową „Wykorzystanie Koncepcji Klastrów dla kształtowania 

polityki innowacyjnej i technologicznej państwa. Rekomendacje dla polityki stymulowania rozwoju 

klastrów w Polsce”, 2009, http://www.ewaluacja.gov.pl/wyniki/documents/2_030.pdf 

26 UniaEuropejska.org „Klastry”, 2001, http://www.uniaeuropejska.org/klaster-czyli-w-grupie-raniej 

27 J. Hałub-Iwan (ed.), Benchmarking klastrów w Polsce – 2012, Warszawa 2012, p. 25. 



141 

Graph 2: Clusters’ organizational and legal forms 

Source: Benchmarking klastrów w Polsce – 2010, Polska Agencja Rozwoju Przedsiębiorczości, Warszawa 2010, p. 24-26. 

According to the data by the European Cluster Observatory of 2014, 

Poland has about 264 clusters. Most of them were established after 

2006 when Poland joined the EU, obtaining access to funds from financial 

programs realized in years 2007-2013. Most of the existing clusters 

are associated with information technology, aviation, eco-energetics, 

hotel industry, tourism services as well as with construction, printing, 

wood and furniture industry sectors. After the accession of Poland 

to the UE, common programs funds became the main source of financing 

of cluster initiatives. Through their operations, benchmarked 

clusters obtained 65.5 million zlotys, from which 32.2 million was received 

from an operational program Innovative Economy 28 . 

By 2012, 212 cluster initiatives appeared in Poland. 26 of them are 

identified in Mazowieckie Voivodeship, 18 in Warmińsko-mazurskie 

Voivodeship and 17 in Śląskie Voivodeship. The dominant business 

line connected with cluster initiative is ICT, represented by 

28 clusters, including 6 cluster initiatives in Mazowieckie Voivodeship, 

5 in Małopolskie Voivodeship and 4 in Śląskie Voivodeship. 

28 M. Dzierżanowski (ed.), Kierunki i założenia polityki klastrowej w Polsce do 2020 roku, Polska Agencja 

Rozwoju Przedsiębiorczości, Warszawa 2012, p. 17. 


142 


The tourist sector includes 27 initiatives, 4 of which are located in Lubuskie 

Voivodeship. Food industry locates initiatives on the territory 

of 12 Voivodeships, 3 of which operate in Lubuskie, Łódzkie, Podlaskie 

and Warmińsko-mazurskie Voivodeships. Łódzkie Voivodeship dominates 

in the textile and clothing industry, with 5 cluster initiatives operating 

there. In Warmińsko-mazurskie Voivodeship, wood industry 

is the dominant branch; one can enumerate about 4 initiatives of this 

type. Mazurskie Voivodeship has 4 initiatives from automotive sector 

29 operating there. 

3.3. Development of clusters in Croatia and other European countries. 

Majority of clusters in Croatia function in the manufacturing and agriculture 

sectors, having more than 500 employees (40% of the total), 

these clusters are mainly financed by membership (68%), and they are 

mainly producing for Croatian market (72%). The development of regional 

clusters in Croatia commenced after 2005. The innovative activity 

of European clusters is relatively concentrated in a few areas 

in Europe (West Germany and most regions of Austria, the north and 

east of France, the south-eastern part of the United Kingdom, the Netherlands 

and in some Scandinavian countries, mostly in Sweden) 30 . 

Conclusions 

To summarise, one can state that a part of clusters’ initiatives in particular 

regions has been created, and is being created, thanks to the accessibility 

to funds designated for development of clusters – at the regional 

and at national level. Unfortunately, this procedure causes some kind 

of inflation of cluster initiatives 31 , some which do not influence the re- 

29 Klastry w Polsce, Polska Agencja Rozwoju Przedsiębiorczości, Warszawa 2012, p. 8-9. 

30 A. Obadićthe, Analysis Of Regional Cluster Development In Europe And Croatia, 2009, p. 17. 

31 On the basis of benchmarking research carried out in 2012 on a group of 35 clusters with attributed 

phase of their development, 80% of them were described as emerging clusters. The youngest 

clusters, created in years 2010-2011 and older clusters, created in years 2006-2007, were identified 

in incubation phase. However, one of the youngest clusters, created in 2011, has been defined 

as an emerging cluster. These data indicate that the number of years is not the sole factor determining 

cluster’s development. Without appropriate activity, clusters which function on the market 

for several years do not advance to the next stage of development. However, clusters which 

take opportunities arising from cooperation can advance to the next phase in a short time. 



143 

gional level and by the same they do no speed up the development 

processes. The foregoing analysis of the types of clusters’ business 

lines indicates that Polish policy aiming at stimulating the development 

of clusters, in relation to the growth of their competitive position, 

shall take into account the specificity and smart specialization 

of a given region. 

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About the Authors 

Artur Adamczyk – Ph.D., Assistant Professor, Centre for Europe, University 

of Warsaw 

e-mail: a.m.adamczyk@uw.edu.pl 

Bartosz Bojarczyk – Ph.D., University of Maria Curie-Sklodowska in Lublin 

Ewa Dominikowska – Ph.D. student, University of Warsaw 

Donika Emini – a fellow of Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS Foundation) at the 

Kosovan Center for Security Studies in Prishtina, Kosovo 

Abit Hoxha – doctoral researcher at the Ludwig Maximilian University (LMU) 

in the INFOCORE project in January 2014 

Mladen Kardzoski – Ph.D., Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University of 

“St. Kliment Ohridski” – Bitola. Author disagrees with the reference FY- 

ROM used in part of the text 

e-mail: mladenkaradzoski1983@gmail.com 

Anna Masłoń-Oracz – Ph.D. student at Warsaw School of Economics, a political 

scientist, economist, the CEO of Maroney Group, Vice-Chairperson 

of Polish European Community Study Association, a member of the International 

Women Forum

146 

About the Authors 

Jan Muś – Ph.D., LLM, Assistant Professor at the Institute of Political Sciences 

and International Affairs, Catholic University of Lublin 

Tomasz Olejarz – Vice-Director and a lecturer at the Institute of Political Science 

and Regional Policy at the East European State Higher School in Przemyśl 

(PWSW); Ph.D. candidate at the Political Science Faculty at Maria 

Curie-Sklodowska University in Lublin 

Magdalena Rekść – Ph.D., University of Lodz 

Tomasz Stępniewski – Doctor Habilitatus, Associate Professor at the Institute 

of Political Sciences and International Affairs, The John Paul II Catholic 

University of Lublin and an associate fellow at the Institute of East-Central 

Europe in Lublin 

e-mail: tomasz.stepniewski5@gmail.com 






Zeszyt 3 


Is Kosovo a precedent Legal and international dilemmas of the unilateral Declaration of Independence 

of the Kosovo Republic. 

On 17 th February 2008, the parliamentary body of the temporary authorities of Kosovo adopted a Declaration 

of Independence and proclaimed that Kosovo should be recognized as an “independent and sovereign country”. 

At present, 106 countries recognize Kosovo as an independent country (as for 2 nd July, 2014). The political dilemmas 

of the countries of the international community, including the requirement of a legal assessment of the consequences 

of the unilateral Declaration of Independence of the Kosovo Republic, referred, in fact, to the need to take 

a stance towards the meaning of and the mutual relations between the basic rules and principles and the institutions 

of modern international law (ius inter gentes). 



Macedonia’s road to the European Union seems particularly bumpy. Despite the implemented reforms and the 

determination of consecutive governments to obtain a membership in Western European structures, the country 

still has no tangible prospects for accession. The unresolved dispute between Greece and Macedonia concerning the 

name of the country and the strained relations between Skopje and Sofia keep preventing Macedonia from participating 

in the processes of European integration. The Macedonian society is already tired and feels humiliated by 

the long wait for the EU’s decision on commencing accession negotiations. On the other hand, Macedonia’s leading 

political party, the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party for Macedonian National 

Unity (VMRO – DPMNE), does not exhibit any inclination towards reconciliation with the neighbours. On the 

contrary, it tries to gain political support by taking advantage of the Macedonians’ patriotic feelings by promoting 

a sense of threat to their national identity. 

Jan Muś 


Contemporary research approaches to ethnicity and ethnic groups tend to perceive them through the prisms of either 

political and institutional frameworks, widely understood protection or abuses of human (and minority) rights, 

or cultural and anthropological issues. This article seeks to address the question of inter-ethnic political relations 

through the prism of combined and uneven development law. The idea of combined and uneven development assumes 

that social development is directly linked to control over production process. In other words, economic development 

is a key determinant of social relations.

Rocznik_2014-215

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