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Setting the Scene The history of CERN and its accelerators dates ...

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as <strong>the</strong> Secretary General. Four Study Groups were established: <strong>The</strong>ory under N. Bohr,<br />

Laboratory services under L. Kowarski, Synchrocyclotron under C. Bakker, <strong>and</strong> Proton<br />

Synchrotron under O. Dahl with F. Goward as deputy. Fur<strong>the</strong>r members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> PS Group<br />

were H. Alfvén, J. Fry, W. Gentner, K. Johnsen, E. Regenstreif, Chr. Schmelzer <strong>and</strong> R.<br />

Wideröe. From here on we shall follow in some detail <strong>the</strong> activities <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> latter group.<br />

At end June 1952 <strong>the</strong> PS Group presented a first proposal for <strong>the</strong> construction <strong>of</strong> a 10 to<br />

15 GeV proton synchrotron, intended to be an up-scaled version <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 3 GeV Cosmotron<br />

at Brookhaven, which just had accelerated protons to more than 1 GeV in May <strong>of</strong> that<br />

year. Council asked that a detailed design <strong>and</strong> planning for a 10 GeV machine be<br />

presented by November 1953.<br />

Three members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> group, Dahl, Goward <strong>and</strong> Wideröe, visited Brookhaven during <strong>the</strong><br />

first two weeks <strong>of</strong> August 1952 so as to learn about details <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Cosmotron. <strong>The</strong><br />

Cosmotron team discussed, in anticipation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> visit, possible improvements to <strong>the</strong>ir<br />

machine design, <strong>and</strong> discovered during <strong>the</strong>se reflections a new way <strong>of</strong> beam focusing (5).<br />

<strong>The</strong> visitors were thus introduced, to <strong>the</strong>ir great surprise, to a br<strong>and</strong>-new idea, alternatinggradient<br />

or ‘strong’ focusing <strong>of</strong> particle beams, which would reduce by a large factor <strong>the</strong><br />

size <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> vacuum chamber containing <strong>the</strong> beam <strong>and</strong> hence <strong>the</strong> magnet providing <strong>the</strong><br />

guide field. An accelerator <strong>of</strong> higher energy could thus be built within a given budget.<br />

Upon returning home <strong>the</strong> PS Group was faced with a very difficult decision: going ahead<br />

on <strong>the</strong> proven trail (which anyway was new territory for most <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>m) or changing<br />

course <strong>and</strong> proceed with <strong>the</strong> new <strong>and</strong> untried idea. It might have been a deadly blow to<br />

<strong>the</strong> young team if <strong>the</strong>y found <strong>the</strong>mselves in a dead alley. But one could also hope that a<br />

machine <strong>of</strong> classical design might in this case‘ only’ be delayed by a year or so. O. Dahl<br />

strongly advocated an intense study <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> strong focusing system <strong>and</strong> obtained Council<br />

approval at <strong>its</strong> third session in October 1952 at Amsterdam, which also saw <strong>the</strong> decision<br />

for Geneva as <strong>the</strong> location <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> future laboratory.<br />

O. Dahl in his presentation to Council gave due warning <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> risks involved in that<br />

choice but pointed out that a project based on <strong>the</strong> ‘classical’ design could not now be<br />

defended in view <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> possible advantages inherent in <strong>the</strong> new invention. In fact, it was<br />

expected that a synchrotron <strong>of</strong> 30 GeV might be built at <strong>the</strong> same cost as a Cosmotrontype<br />

machine <strong>of</strong> 10 GeV (for which however no reliable cost estimate existed at that<br />

moment).<br />

<strong>The</strong> successful development <strong>of</strong> <strong>CERN</strong> during more than 5 decades was largely due to <strong>the</strong><br />

surprising flexibility <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> alternating-gradient PS. <strong>CERN</strong> would surely have developed<br />

in a very different way, had this courageous decision not been taken.<br />

In fact, as <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>ory <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> alternating gradient synchrotron was developed, two serious<br />

problems were soon discovered: first, <strong>the</strong> stronger <strong>the</strong> focusing, <strong>the</strong> higher a precision <strong>of</strong><br />

<strong>the</strong> magnet field <strong>and</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> alignment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> magnets is required. If <strong>the</strong> tight tolerances<br />

were not met, <strong>the</strong> beam would be lost due to resonance blow-up <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ‘betatron’<br />

oscillations <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> protons about <strong>the</strong> equilibrium orbit (6). Secondly, <strong>the</strong> beam looses

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