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Thesis_gd_final_vers.. - Vernimmen

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monitoring costs incurred in the framework of lending relationship can be spread on more<br />

products. Moreover information can also be re-used across the different product lines in order to<br />

better assess client-specific risks and improve the risk-return profile of the bank’s activities. The<br />

existence of scope economies based on relationship increased the competition for gaining new<br />

customers. It thus has become widespread to offer underpriced corporate loans in order to attract<br />

new customers (Calomiris (2000)). The measure of profitability is consequently no more assessed<br />

on an individual transaction basis, but on a relationship basis by evaluating the resources devoted<br />

to a client against the revenues that the same client generates in the form of interest payments and<br />

fees for the bank.<br />

The best illustration of the existence of scope economies based on information-sharing and<br />

informational advantage comes from the entry of commercial banks into the security underwriting<br />

business though section 20 subsidiaries in the 1990s. Pappaioannou (2008) shows that commercial<br />

banks entered the underwriting business successfully. Their performance is particularly strong in<br />

debt underwriting and Yankee underwriting where they captured on average 58% and 60%<br />

respectively of the market over 2001-2004 <strong>vers</strong>us only 19% and 15% respectively over 1990-1996.<br />

Their market share in equity and in municipal bonds underwriting also surged from 5% and 12%<br />

respectively over 1990-1996 to 40% and 36% respectively over 2001-2004. This gain in market<br />

share was mostly at the expense of independent investment banks. The top-6 bulge bracket<br />

investment banks also experienced a decline in market share over the 1990s and early 2000s except<br />

for equity offerings where they reinforced their positions overtime. Even though commercial<br />

banks had an information advantage due to their lending relationships with securities issuers this<br />

did not translate into significantly higher market share gain for high information content securities,<br />

for which the price discovery process is more complex. However, they were able to charge lower<br />

gross spread on debt underwritings according to Rotten and Mullineaux (2002), and the<br />

underpricing was reduced even more for non-investment grade bonds, which accredits the<br />

informational advantage of commercial banks resulting from scope economies. Concerning the<br />

equity underwriting market, Pappaioannou (2008) findings also suggest that small-sized first-time<br />

issuers for whom information asymmetry is greater tend to favour commercial banks with which<br />

they have lending relationships, rather than investment banks. More generally a bank with a<br />

lending relationship with an issuer is more likely to underwrite debt or equity issues (Barath et al.<br />

(2007).<br />

The product di<strong>vers</strong>ification had a dramatic impact on the banking industry as a whole, even<br />

though banks from different sizes have been impacted to different degrees. Berger and Mester<br />

(2003) found that a larger product scope of commercial banks translated into both a worsening of<br />

cost productivity and an improvement of profit productivity from 191 to 1997. This means that<br />

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