Thesis_gd_final_vers.. - Vernimmen

Table 7: Univariate tests of equality of the means between failed and safe banks (3/6)
Variable
Quarter to
failure
failed
banks
Ratio for
failed banks
Ratio for safe
banks
Difference of
means
(t-statistic)
securities 1 140 11.37% 22.25% 10.88% ( 8.60)***
4 140 12.36% 22.26% 9.90% (7.83)***
6 140 12.71% 22.27% 9.57% (7.57)***
12 134 13.82% 22.30% 8.48% (6.56)***
lo 1 140 72.55% 63.52% -9.04% (-6.22)***
4 140 76.31% 63.50% -12.81% (-8.83)***
6 140 76.85% 63.49% -13.36% (-9.20)***
12 134 73.58% 63.46% -10.12% (-6.82)***
ci_lo 1 140 8.76% 9.60% 0.84% (1.38)
4 140 9.39% 9.60% 0.21% (0.34)
6 140 9.87% 9.60% -0.27% (-0.44)
12 134 8.83% 9.60% 0.77% (1.24)
cc_lo 1 140 1.49% 5.41% 3.92% (8.68)***
4 140 1.50% 5.42% 3.92% (8.67)***
6 140 1.51% 5.42% 3.91% (8.65)***
12 134 1.87% 5.43% 3.56% (7.70)***
agri_lo 1 140 0.95% 4.39% 3.43% (5.33)***
4 140 0.92% 4.39% 3.48% (5.40)***
6 140 0.95% 4.39% 3.44% (5.34)***
12 134 0.97% 4.40% 3.44% (5.21)***
re_lo 1 140 60.33% 42.67% -17.66% (-11.35)***
4 140 63.46% 42.64% -20.82% (-13.39)***
6 140 63.55% 42.62% -20.93% (-13.47)***
12 134 61.08% 42.56% -18.52% (-11.67)***
com_re_lo 1 140 20.24% 14.05% -6.18% (-6.79)***
4 140 19.72% 14.04% -5.67% (-6.23)***
6 140 19.46% 14.04% -5.42% (-5.95)***
12 134 20.65% 14.02% -6.63% (-7.13)***
res_re_lo 1 140 15.71% 18.87% 3.17% (2.89)***
4 140 15.37% 18.88% 3.51% (3.20)***
6 140 15.43% 18.88% 3.45% (3.15)***
12 134 16.86% 18.89% 2.03% (1.82)*
dvpt_re_lo 1 140 20.91% 5.76% -15.16% (-24.18)***
4 140 23.54% 5.73% -17.81% (-28.56)***
6 140 23.78% 5.71% -18.07% (-29.08)***
12 134 19.93% 5.67% -14.27% (-22.69)***
non_perf_lo 1 140 8.05% 1.62% -6.43% (-45.57)***
4 140 5.34% 1.61% -3.73% (-26.59)***
6 140 3.55% 1.61% -1.94% (-13.86)***
12 134 1.38% 1.61% 0.23% (1.58)
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively.
2-sided t-test using different variances for the two sub-samples.
significantly less exposed to agricultural loans relative to total assets compared to safe banks. As
we expected, failed banks have a larger relative exposure to real estate loans, which is logical as the
crisis was the consequence of a housing market and real estate credit bubble. Real estate loans
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