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Thesis_gd_final_vers.. - Vernimmen

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growth rates, which cannot be explained by the development of new businesses as both the asset<br />

mix and the revenue mix are staying relatively constant overtime. Consequently the growth comes<br />

from existing activities and especially lending. This strongly growing lending activity may be a hint<br />

of the riskier profile of failed banks. Indeed, a very strong growth in loans issuance can conduct to<br />

less careful applicant screening, to lowering credit standards, thus favouring lending volume over<br />

risk and quality. Moreover lending expansion into new geography or previously un-addressed<br />

riskier customer segments in which the bank did not have any informational advantage may have<br />

resulted in the bank attracting marginally riskier borrowers, which then increased the risks on the<br />

balance sheet. The fact that failed banks were holding riskier loans and were having borrowers of<br />

lower credit quality is reflected by the strong rise of the level of non-performing loans when the<br />

crisis starts. As a consequence, failed banks were much more severely hit by the crisis because of<br />

their riskier assets. Losses on their loan portfolios brought them progressively to financial distress<br />

and then to bankruptcy. Concerning the financing, failed banks have been exposed to higher<br />

liquidity risk because they relied more on non-core funding sources such as brokered deposits,<br />

alternative funding and to a lesser extent federal funds. This riskier financing structure may be a<br />

direct consequence of the strong growth of their total assets. Because it is difficult to increase<br />

rapidly core deposits or equity, fast growing banks favour non-core funding.<br />

5) Developing a new bank failure prediction model<br />

a) Methodology<br />

We use a dynamic logistic regression using our data panel to assess the importance of our different<br />

variables in explaining bankruptcy. Shumway (2001) who was among the first to apply a dynamic<br />

model to corporate bankruptcy prediction develops a mathematical demonstration proving that<br />

one-period logit model are giving inconsistent variable coefficients and that they have a poor<br />

prediction ability compared to dynamic logistic regression. To our knowledge, dynamic models<br />

have been only applied to predict bank failures by Cole and Wu (2009), who demonstrate the<br />

superior in-sample as well as out of sample prediction accuracy of a dynamic logistic regression.<br />

Cole and Wu (2009) use data from Call Reports between 1980 and 1992, that they divide into two<br />

intervals 1980-1989 which is their sample period, and 1989-1992 which is used for the out of<br />

sample prediction. They compare the results of the logistic regression with the results of a probit<br />

model using the same variables. They find that a dynamic logistic regression yields much more<br />

accurate results than the one-period probit model. They also develop a second dynamic logistic<br />

regression model adding to the accounting variables from the Call Reports variables which are<br />

linked to economic data such as interest rate and GDP evolution, but they do not find that the<br />

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