motion to compel - White Collar Fraud

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Office of
DISTRICT ATTOHffjY
Alamedi County J v
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norms, for trivial invasions afford no cause of action." Pioneer, supra, 40 Cal. 4th at 370-71 (emphasis
added) (quoting Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 CaUth 1, 36-37)).
Assuming a claimant satisfies the three-part test, the Court in Pioneer went on to hold that "that
[the privacy] interest must be measured against other competing or countervailing interests in a
'balancing test."1 Pioneer, supra, 40 Cal. 4th at 371 (quoting Hill, supra, 1 Cal.4th at 37). Discovery
r>
that is alleged to result in an invasion of privacy must '"be evaluated based on the extent to which it
furthers legitimate and important competing interests.' .... Protective measures, safeguards and other
alternatives may minimize the privacy intrusion. 'For example, if intrusion is limited and confidential
information is carefully shielded from disclosure except to those who have a legitimate need to know,
privacy concerns are assuaged.1" Pioneer, supra, 40 Cal. 4th at 371 (citations omitted) (quoting Hill,
supra, 7Cal.4that38).4
2. Disclosure of Contact Information on Potential Witnesses Who Have Already
Been Named In Discovery Does Not Implicate Privacy Rights.
The legal flaws in Defendant's apparent position are evident upon application of the Pioneer
framework. Assuming arguendo that Defendant has standing to assert the privacy interests of former
employees, it cannot satisfy the remaining two elements of the Pioneer test.
First, although contact information such as addresses and telephone numbers are generally
regarded as private, it is far from certain that Defendant's former employees would harbor a
"reasonable expectation of privacy under the particular circumstances" of this case. Pioneer, supra,
40 Cal. 4th at 371. This is not a dispute between private litigants; it is a law enforcement action brought
by public officials on behalf of the People of California. Under these circumstances, there is no reason
to assume that the former employees -who are no longer in an employment relationship with
Overstock — would object to disclosure of their contact information. Cf. Puerto, supra, 158 Cal. App.
4th at 1252-53 (the generally private nature of "residential telephone and address information ... does
not mean that the individuals would not want it disclosed under these circumstances").
4 Although Pioneer accepted the use of an "opt-out" letter under the facts of its case, it did not impose an optout
requirement. And for the reasons discussed in Part H.B., infra, no such letter is warranted here.
-7- CaseNo.RGlO-546833
MPA IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER INTERROGATORY RESPONSES