- Page 1: Edited collection E-IR.INFO Ukraine
- Page 5 and 6: ii Abstract The intense and dangero
- Page 7 and 8: 109 The Origins of Peace, Non-Viole
- Page 9 and 10: 1 Introduction Agnieszka Pikulicka-
- Page 11 and 12: 3 The second chapter, by Nicolai Pe
- Page 13 and 14: 5 processes behind the formation of
- Page 15 and 16: 7 European security, the internal c
- Page 17 and 18: 9 Ethnic and Social Composition of
- Page 19 and 20: 11 of the population considered Ukr
- Page 21 and 22: 13 Between these two magnets of the
- Page 23 and 24: 15 it has supported them with weapo
- Page 25 and 26: 17 References Aref’ev, A. L. (201
- Page 27 and 28: 19 Understanding the Other Ukraine:
- Page 29 and 30: 21 The Left Bank, which includes th
- Page 31 and 32: 23 Novorossiya Novorossiya, a name
- Page 33 and 34: 25 proposed by Mikhail Gorbachev. T
- Page 35 and 36: 27 Another specificity of this regi
- Page 37 and 38: 29 language. By contrast, their opp
- Page 39 and 40: 31 its rank within that district, a
- Page 41 and 42: 33 shifting the discourse of Ukrain
- Page 43 and 44: 35 Poluneev, Y. (2014) ‘Desyat’
- Page 45 and 46: 37 Since the fall of the Soviet Uni
- Page 47 and 48: 39 Figure 1: How Ukrainians View Ru
- Page 49 and 50: 41 former president Yanukovych to R
- Page 51 and 52: 43 Figure 3: Russians’ Approval o
- Page 53 and 54:
45 Figure 5: Russians’ and Ukrain
- Page 55 and 56:
47 justified in supporting the guer
- Page 57 and 58:
49 divergence could make the furthe
- Page 59 and 60:
51 Figure 10: Ukrainians’ Externa
- Page 61 and 62:
53 Figure 12: Ukrainians’ Foreign
- Page 63 and 64:
55 conditions (and which types of)
- Page 65 and 66:
57 Mikhanchuk, D. and Volosevych I.
- Page 67 and 68:
59 Roots and Features of Modern Ukr
- Page 69 and 70:
61 movement hesitated to set out th
- Page 71 and 72:
63 Europe after the fall of the Sov
- Page 73 and 74:
65 artificial mass starvation of th
- Page 75 and 76:
67 at least, to allow their childre
- Page 77 and 78:
69 Everyday Life After Annexation:
- Page 79 and 80:
71 The Crimean Tatars consider them
- Page 81 and 82:
73 Crimea as Part of Newly Independ
- Page 83 and 84:
75 A good example of this unevennes
- Page 85 and 86:
77 almost a parody, the government
- Page 87 and 88:
79 The Moscow Times (2014) ‘Medve
- Page 89 and 90:
81 Crimea before Secession and Russ
- Page 91 and 92:
83 allied with nationalist Ukrainia
- Page 93 and 94:
85 Some other Russian leaders - suc
- Page 95 and 96:
87 The Ukrainian government’s off
- Page 97 and 98:
89 Magocsi, P. R. (2014) This Bless
- Page 99 and 100:
91 In the title of the article, I h
- Page 101 and 102:
93 Russia and for the state status
- Page 103 and 104:
95 Language Law (K-K) that elevated
- Page 105 and 106:
97 The 2 May tragedy in Odessa was
- Page 107 and 108:
99 LB.ua (2014) ‘Poroshenko Iklyu
- Page 109 and 110:
101 Ukrainian Politics since Indepe
- Page 111 and 112:
103 and the stick of a legal and ta
- Page 113 and 114:
105 Kuchma was, however, weakened b
- Page 115 and 116:
107 Hromadske TV tapped new audienc
- Page 117 and 118:
109 The Origins of Peace, Non-Viole
- Page 119 and 120:
111 Rise of Authoritarian and Neo-S
- Page 121 and 122:
113 who supported the independence
- Page 123 and 124:
115 was the first of what became ca
- Page 125 and 126:
117 2014). France’s neo-Nazi Fron
- Page 127 and 128:
119 home (not NATO or EU). Spiritua
- Page 129 and 130:
121 Kupchinsky, R. (2009) ‘The St
- Page 131 and 132:
123 The Ukrainian Crisis and its Im
- Page 133 and 134:
125 example of an almost blood-free
- Page 135 and 136:
127 status. The ‘Russian World’
- Page 137 and 138:
129 An Unnecessary War: The Geopoli
- Page 139 and 140:
131 1997, p. 46). Ukraine’s new l
- Page 141 and 142:
133 The US Position In the 1990s, t
- Page 143 and 144:
135 (Bosnia, Macedonia, Montenegro,
- Page 145 and 146:
137 Tymoshenko’s release as a con
- Page 147 and 148:
139 The chances for miscommunicatio
- Page 149 and 150:
141 Between East and West: NATO Enl
- Page 151 and 152:
143 That was more or less where mat
- Page 153 and 154:
145 some point, his government woul
- Page 155 and 156:
147 replaced by the ‘realist’ a
- Page 157 and 158:
149 become members of NATO… There
- Page 159 and 160:
151 Central to this project - not o
- Page 161 and 162:
153 Editorial Board of The New York
- Page 163 and 164:
155 section Three PROPAGANDA Ukrain
- Page 165 and 166:
157 When Russian special forces sei
- Page 167 and 168:
159 Service (SVR), the Main Intelli
- Page 169 and 170:
161 government would make suitable
- Page 171 and 172:
163 and political pressure represen
- Page 173 and 174:
165 Putin’s Nationalism Problem P
- Page 175 and 176:
167 nationalist support for the ele
- Page 177 and 178:
169 main metropolitan centres of Mo
- Page 179 and 180:
171 development (Bunin, 2014). For
- Page 181 and 182:
173 Vladimir Putin: Making of the N
- Page 183 and 184:
175 and socio-cultural structures o
- Page 185 and 186:
177 To reflect these theoretical st
- Page 187 and 188:
179 personnel, thus creating an ava
- Page 189 and 190:
181 Gray, J. (2000) Two Faces of Li
- Page 191 and 192:
183 Dominant Narratives in Russian
- Page 193 and 194:
185 These narratives attribute vari
- Page 195 and 196:
187 European states, on the other h
- Page 197 and 198:
189 that Russia is still a vast, mu
- Page 199 and 200:
191 Russia doesn’t abandon its ow
- Page 201 and 202:
193 it has come under scrutiny in t
- Page 203 and 204:
195 Putin V. (2014) radio interview
- Page 205 and 206:
197 The Ukraine Story in Western Me
- Page 207 and 208:
199 The Wall Street Journal, The Da
- Page 209 and 210:
201 parliament called an emergency
- Page 211 and 212:
203 Many reports presented the conf
- Page 213 and 214:
205 BBC World Report (2014) ‘Ukra
- Page 215 and 216:
207 Russia’s annexation of the Cr
- Page 217 and 218:
209 version of the agreement on the
- Page 219 and 220:
211 Myth-Making as Geopolitics Ukra
- Page 221 and 222:
213 the Creator of a great civilisa
- Page 223 and 224:
215 Kolomoisky is back, and ready t
- Page 225 and 226:
217 Boiko, D. (2014) ‘Koalitsiia
- Page 227 and 228:
219 Motyl, A. (2014) ‘Putin, just
- Page 229 and 230:
221 UNA-UNSO (n.d.) ‘Zaiava UNA-U
- Page 231 and 232:
223 Western Economic Sanctions and
- Page 233 and 234:
225 on imports of fruit, vegetables
- Page 235 and 236:
227 To sum up so far, the economic
- Page 237 and 238:
229 self-sufficient, quasi-autarkic
- Page 239 and 240:
231 Conclusion As should now be cle
- Page 241 and 242:
233 Democracy and Geopolitics: Unde
- Page 243 and 244:
235 The defensive view sees Russia,
- Page 245 and 246:
237 word ‘sovereign’ in this fo
- Page 247 and 248:
239 If we focus primarily on territ
- Page 249 and 250:
241 Putin, V. (2014a) ‘Address by
- Page 251 and 252:
243 Any observer looking at Russian
- Page 253 and 254:
245 us - Russia ‘found itself in
- Page 255 and 256:
247 insists on referring to Western
- Page 257 and 258:
249 regime, particularly given that
- Page 259 and 260:
251 Diversity Policy in Ukraine and
- Page 261 and 262:
253 In brief, the main features of
- Page 263 and 264:
255 political parties. This phenome
- Page 265 and 266:
257 preferential treatment of the
- Page 267 and 268:
259 Prina, F. (2011) ‘Homogenisat
- Page 269 and 270:
261 The focus of this collection ha
- Page 271 and 272:
263 July 1989. He outlined a vision
- Page 273 and 274:
265 rich variety of other peoples,
- Page 275 and 276:
267 Russia, Ukraine, and the Breakd
- Page 277 and 278:
269 Yushchenko was torn by factiona
- Page 279 and 280:
271 Contributors Edwin Bacon is Rea
- Page 281 and 282:
273 aspects of contemporary Russian
- Page 283 and 284:
275 Press, 2008), and The Lukashenk
- Page 285 and 286:
277 http://nationalismwatch.wordpre
- Page 287:
279 The intense and dangerous turmo