Ukraine-and-Russia-E-IR

Recommendations

Info

230 rapidly in recent years. In 2000, the northeast Asian trio of China, South Korea, and Japan accounted for just 5.5 per cent of total Russian imports (UN Comtrade, 2014). By 2012, this figure had grown to 25 per cent. Russian exports to the region also grew, albeit at a slower rate. In 2000, the three Asian countries accounted for 7.5 per cent of total Russian exports; by 2012, this had grown to 12.5 per cent. On the other hand, the paltry level of Asian investment in Russia also reveals serious gaps in economic integration. Even after a number of high profile energy and infrastructure deals, China, South Korea, and Japan collectively account for just over one per cent of foreign direct investment in Russia. So while Russia may be importing a growing volume of goods from Asia, it still turns overwhelmingly to Europe for capital. Second, Russia needs to invest in costly infrastructure in its Far East (roads, railways, pipelines, and so on) if it is to fully engage with Asia’s growing economy. Any such spending will require massive private and public investment, and it is far from clear whether such spending will materialise. If it does, it is likely that resources will come from the Russian state, adding yet more substance to the reassertion of the state in the Russian economy. Third, the growing asymmetry between Russia and China may be even more important. Quite simply, the Russian economy is dwarfed by China’s and the gap between them is growing. While the prospect of closer ties with its largest neighbour offers a tantalising prospect – an economic and political counterbalance to the West at a time when relations with the US and Western Europe are at a 20 year low – the Chinese are not under any such pressure. Russia is a relatively minor trade partner, accounting for just over 2 per cent of China’s total trade. With Russia’s relations with the West deteriorating, it is more likely China will exploit Russia’s relative isolation and secure more favourable terms in any deals. Overall, while pivoting to Asia might be desirable in principle to Russia’s ruling elite, the reality of the situation is that Europe will continue to be Russia’s main source of trade and capital, as well as technology and know-how, for the foreseeable future. Moreover, should the Russian state intensify efforts to accelerate the strengthening of economic ties with Asian economies, it is likely that centralised economic development of Russia’s Far East will be the order of the day, rather than any natural, market-based switch. As a result, expansion of trade with Asia is likely to be built on state-to-state relations with China and India in the areas of energy and defence. Ukraine and Russia: People, Politics, Propaganda and Perspectives
231 Conclusion As should now be clear, Western economic sanctions are moving Russia away from a model of economic development approximating the Western model, i.e. based on the primacy of the market and openness to the global economy, or at least the Westerndominated parts of the global economy. In its place, policy-makers are slowly constructing a system that eschews market-based solutions to economic development problems, and which favours selective integration with the global economy, with a preference for other state-driven political economies. The leadership in Russia is, in line with many previous Russian governments throughout history, using the presence of an external threat to justify centralisation of the model of political economy at home. This model is beginning to take shape, and involves the suppression of economic competition, state control over the ‘commanding heights’ of the economy, especially finance, energy, and defence, and the deterioration of the business environment for the market-based portions of the Russian economy. In short, such a model threatens to roll back many of the more positive elements of Russian economic transformation that have taken place since 1991. References Baldwin, D. A. (1985) Economic Statecraft. Princeton University Press. Brooks, R. (2002) ‘Sanctions and Regime Type: What Works, and When?’ Security Studies, 11(4), pp. 1-50. Central Bank of Russia (2014) Monetary Policy Report December 2014. Moscow: Bank of Russia. Connolly, R. and Hanson, P. (2012) ‘Russia’s Accession to the World Trade Organisation: Commitments, Processes,’ Eurasian Geography and Economics. Connolly, R. (2015, forthcoming) ‘Troubled Times: Stagnation, Sanctions and the Prospects for Economic Reform in Russia,’ Chatham House Russia and Eurasia Programme Research Paper, London: Chatham House. Hanson, P. (1988) Western Economic Statecraft in East-West Relations. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs/Routledge. Ukraine and Russia: People, Politics, Propaganda and Perspectives
Page 1 and 2:
Edited collection E-IR.INFO Ukraine
Page 3 and 4:
Ukraine and Russia: People, Politic
Page 5 and 6:
ii Abstract The intense and dangero
Page 7 and 8:
109 The Origins of Peace, Non-Viole
Page 9 and 10:
1 Introduction Agnieszka Pikulicka-
Page 11 and 12:
3 The second chapter, by Nicolai Pe
Page 13 and 14:
5 processes behind the formation of
Page 15 and 16:
7 European security, the internal c
Page 17 and 18:
9 Ethnic and Social Composition of
Page 19 and 20:
11 of the population considered Ukr
Page 21 and 22:
13 Between these two magnets of the
Page 23 and 24:
15 it has supported them with weapo
Page 25 and 26:
17 References Aref’ev, A. L. (201
Page 27 and 28:
19 Understanding the Other Ukraine:
Page 29 and 30:
21 The Left Bank, which includes th
Page 31 and 32:
23 Novorossiya Novorossiya, a name
Page 33 and 34:
25 proposed by Mikhail Gorbachev. T
Page 35 and 36:
27 Another specificity of this regi
Page 37 and 38:
29 language. By contrast, their opp
Page 39 and 40:
31 its rank within that district, a
Page 41 and 42:
33 shifting the discourse of Ukrain
Page 43 and 44:
35 Poluneev, Y. (2014) ‘Desyat’
Page 45 and 46:
37 Since the fall of the Soviet Uni
Page 47 and 48:
39 Figure 1: How Ukrainians View Ru
Page 49 and 50:
41 former president Yanukovych to R
Page 51 and 52:
43 Figure 3: Russians’ Approval o
Page 53 and 54:
45 Figure 5: Russians’ and Ukrain
Page 55 and 56:
47 justified in supporting the guer
Page 57 and 58:
49 divergence could make the furthe
Page 59 and 60:
51 Figure 10: Ukrainians’ Externa
Page 61 and 62:
53 Figure 12: Ukrainians’ Foreign
Page 63 and 64:
55 conditions (and which types of)
Page 65 and 66:
57 Mikhanchuk, D. and Volosevych I.
Page 67 and 68:
59 Roots and Features of Modern Ukr
Page 69 and 70:
61 movement hesitated to set out th
Page 71 and 72:
63 Europe after the fall of the Sov
Page 73 and 74:
65 artificial mass starvation of th
Page 75 and 76:
67 at least, to allow their childre
Page 77 and 78:
69 Everyday Life After Annexation:
Page 79 and 80:
71 The Crimean Tatars consider them
Page 81 and 82:
73 Crimea as Part of Newly Independ
Page 83 and 84:
75 A good example of this unevennes
Page 85 and 86:
77 almost a parody, the government
Page 87 and 88:
79 The Moscow Times (2014) ‘Medve
Page 89 and 90:
81 Crimea before Secession and Russ
Page 91 and 92:
83 allied with nationalist Ukrainia
Page 93 and 94:
85 Some other Russian leaders - suc
Page 95 and 96:
87 The Ukrainian government’s off
Page 97 and 98:
89 Magocsi, P. R. (2014) This Bless
Page 99 and 100:
91 In the title of the article, I h
Page 101 and 102:
93 Russia and for the state status
Page 103 and 104:
95 Language Law (K-K) that elevated
Page 105 and 106:
97 The 2 May tragedy in Odessa was
Page 107 and 108:
99 LB.ua (2014) ‘Poroshenko Iklyu
Page 109 and 110:
101 Ukrainian Politics since Indepe
Page 111 and 112:
103 and the stick of a legal and ta
Page 113 and 114:
105 Kuchma was, however, weakened b
Page 115 and 116:
107 Hromadske TV tapped new audienc
Page 117 and 118:
109 The Origins of Peace, Non-Viole
Page 119 and 120:
111 Rise of Authoritarian and Neo-S
Page 121 and 122:
113 who supported the independence
Page 123 and 124:
115 was the first of what became ca
Page 125 and 126:
117 2014). France’s neo-Nazi Fron
Page 127 and 128:
119 home (not NATO or EU). Spiritua
Page 129 and 130:
121 Kupchinsky, R. (2009) ‘The St
Page 131 and 132:
123 The Ukrainian Crisis and its Im
Page 133 and 134:
125 example of an almost blood-free
Page 135 and 136:
127 status. The ‘Russian World’
Page 137 and 138:
129 An Unnecessary War: The Geopoli
Page 139 and 140:
131 1997, p. 46). Ukraine’s new l
Page 141 and 142:
133 The US Position In the 1990s, t
Page 143 and 144:
135 (Bosnia, Macedonia, Montenegro,
Page 145 and 146:
137 Tymoshenko’s release as a con
Page 147 and 148:
139 The chances for miscommunicatio
Page 149 and 150:
141 Between East and West: NATO Enl
Page 151 and 152:
143 That was more or less where mat
Page 153 and 154:
145 some point, his government woul
Page 155 and 156:
147 replaced by the ‘realist’ a
Page 157 and 158:
149 become members of NATO… There
Page 159 and 160:
151 Central to this project - not o
Page 161 and 162:
153 Editorial Board of The New York
Page 163 and 164:
155 section Three PROPAGANDA Ukrain
Page 165 and 166:
157 When Russian special forces sei
Page 167 and 168:
159 Service (SVR), the Main Intelli
Page 169 and 170:
161 government would make suitable
Page 171 and 172:
163 and political pressure represen
Page 173 and 174:
165 Putin’s Nationalism Problem P
Page 175 and 176:
167 nationalist support for the ele
Page 177 and 178:
169 main metropolitan centres of Mo
Page 179 and 180:
171 development (Bunin, 2014). For
Page 181 and 182:
173 Vladimir Putin: Making of the N
Page 183 and 184:
175 and socio-cultural structures o
Page 185 and 186:
177 To reflect these theoretical st
Page 187 and 188: 179 personnel, thus creating an ava
Page 189 and 190: 181 Gray, J. (2000) Two Faces of Li
Page 191 and 192: 183 Dominant Narratives in Russian
Page 193 and 194: 185 These narratives attribute vari
Page 195 and 196: 187 European states, on the other h
Page 197 and 198: 189 that Russia is still a vast, mu
Page 199 and 200: 191 Russia doesn’t abandon its ow
Page 201 and 202: 193 it has come under scrutiny in t
Page 203 and 204: 195 Putin V. (2014) radio interview
Page 205 and 206: 197 The Ukraine Story in Western Me
Page 207 and 208: 199 The Wall Street Journal, The Da
Page 209 and 210: 201 parliament called an emergency
Page 211 and 212: 203 Many reports presented the conf
Page 213 and 214: 205 BBC World Report (2014) ‘Ukra
Page 215 and 216: 207 Russia’s annexation of the Cr
Page 217 and 218: 209 version of the agreement on the
Page 219 and 220: 211 Myth-Making as Geopolitics Ukra
Page 221 and 222: 213 the Creator of a great civilisa
Page 223 and 224: 215 Kolomoisky is back, and ready t
Page 225 and 226: 217 Boiko, D. (2014) ‘Koalitsiia
Page 227 and 228: 219 Motyl, A. (2014) ‘Putin, just
Page 229 and 230: 221 UNA-UNSO (n.d.) ‘Zaiava UNA-U
Page 231 and 232: 223 Western Economic Sanctions and
Page 233 and 234: 225 on imports of fruit, vegetables
Page 235 and 236: 227 To sum up so far, the economic
Page 237: 229 self-sufficient, quasi-autarkic
Page 241 and 242: 233 Democracy and Geopolitics: Unde
Page 243 and 244: 235 The defensive view sees Russia,
Page 245 and 246: 237 word ‘sovereign’ in this fo
Page 247 and 248: 239 If we focus primarily on territ
Page 249 and 250: 241 Putin, V. (2014a) ‘Address by
Page 251 and 252: 243 Any observer looking at Russian
Page 253 and 254: 245 us - Russia ‘found itself in
Page 255 and 256: 247 insists on referring to Western
Page 257 and 258: 249 regime, particularly given that
Page 259 and 260: 251 Diversity Policy in Ukraine and
Page 261 and 262: 253 In brief, the main features of
Page 263 and 264: 255 political parties. This phenome
Page 265 and 266: 257 preferential treatment of the
Page 267 and 268: 259 Prina, F. (2011) ‘Homogenisat
Page 269 and 270: 261 The focus of this collection ha
Page 271 and 272: 263 July 1989. He outlined a vision
Page 273 and 274: 265 rich variety of other peoples,
Page 275 and 276: 267 Russia, Ukraine, and the Breakd
Page 277 and 278: 269 Yushchenko was torn by factiona
Page 279 and 280: 271 Contributors Edwin Bacon is Rea
Page 281 and 282: 273 aspects of contemporary Russian
Page 283 and 284: 275 Press, 2008), and The Lukashenk
Page 285 and 286: 277 http://nationalismwatch.wordpre
Page 287: 279 The intense and dangerous turmo
show all

Ukraine-and-Russia-E-IR

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?