The Power of the Pill: Oral Contraceptives and Women's ... - Mail

746 journal of political economy
Fig. 3.—Distribution of career ability, a, and shifts in the “impatience” factor, l, with
the pill.
Women’s attractiveness to men, on the other hand, depends on F j p
max [N j,(Nj aj l 0)].
The marriage market operates at the start of
period 1 by matching men and women by their ranking in terms of Y i
and F j . The highest-ranked male gets matched to the highest-ranked
female, and so on down the distribution. As depicted in figure 3, all
women with aj ≥ l 0 invest in careers and delay marriage until period
2; all others marry in period 1.
The pill reduces l, say from l 0 to l p , and shifts down the cutoff point
in the a distribution for careers. The fraction of women with careers
and the fraction of women delaying marriage increase by the same
amount. Even with no change in matching there will be an increase in
marriage delay and in career investment. But matching will, in general,
change because the pill enhances the relative attractiveness of women
with high career values (high a j ). Thus the F j distribution will shift with
the decline in l.
Three groups of women can be distinguished. Group I women, those
for whom aj 1 l 0,
delay marriage and have a career with or without the
pill. The pill increases the value in marriage of each woman in this
group by DFj p l 0 l p. Group II women, those for whom l 0 1 aj
1
l p,
marry in period 1 in the absence of the pill but delay marriage and
have a career with the pill. The pill increases the marriage value of each