Lead Plaintiff's Opposition to CSFB MSJ 11/13/06 - The ENRON Fraud
Lead Plaintiff's Opposition to CSFB MSJ 11/13/06 - The ENRON Fraud
Lead Plaintiff's Opposition to CSFB MSJ 11/13/06 - The ENRON Fraud
You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles
YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.
including debt/equity ratios and coverage ratios, were all manipulated in Enron’s favor. Through<br />
use of the transactions, Enron’s financials understated its debt, overstated cash flow from<br />
operations, understated financing cash flow and overstated equity and income. In addition, the<br />
majority of the transactions <strong>CSFB</strong> engaged in were executed at or near the end of Enron’s<br />
reporting periods – positively, but falsely, impacting Enron’s financials as publicly reported.<br />
Specifically, <strong>CSFB</strong> deceptively structured, designed, funded and/or otherwise engaged in the<br />
following transactions:<br />
A. <strong>CSFB</strong> Transactions<br />
• Related-Party Transactions: <strong>CSFB</strong>, as one of only two limited partners,<br />
structured and capitalized through a sham entity, <strong>CSFB</strong>’s Enron Rhythms<br />
Netconnections Bet (“ENRB”), the now no<strong>to</strong>rious LJM1 partnership, designing it<br />
specifically <strong>to</strong> falsify Enron’s financial statements by allowing the Company <strong>to</strong><br />
establish a fake hedge against a position in a volatile Internet s<strong>to</strong>ck – Rhythms<br />
Netconnections. 2 This fake hedge alone was used by Enron <strong>to</strong> avoid a $<strong>13</strong>5.5<br />
million writedown in FY99. Even <strong>CSFB</strong>’s supposed status as an “inves<strong>to</strong>r” in<br />
LJM1 was itself a fiction – as the Bank’s purported “investment” in LJM1 was in<br />
reality not “at risk,” but only appeared <strong>to</strong> be. 3 <strong>CSFB</strong> also provided a bridge loan<br />
<strong>to</strong> LJM LP <strong>to</strong> complete the sham Cuiaba purchase and fund Osprey, which <strong>CSFB</strong><br />
internally identified as a vehicle <strong>to</strong> “raise disguised debt for Enron” and “an off<br />
balance sheet parking lot for certain assets.”<br />
2<br />
<strong>CSFB</strong>’s involvement in LJM2, as defendants have argued, was vastly different than<br />
LJM1. <strong>CSFB</strong> committed funds <strong>to</strong> LJM2 and extended additional credit <strong>to</strong> allow LJM2 <strong>to</strong> engage<br />
in sham asset “sales.” While these activities help establish scienter, plaintiffs are not asserting a<br />
stand-alone primary violation for <strong>CSFB</strong>’s involvement in LJM2.<br />
3<br />
As <strong>CSFB</strong>’s Ivers testified, the “[p]rimary objective was the hedging of a long position<br />
that Enron owned in a then public company called Rhythms Netconnections” and “<strong>CSFB</strong> over<br />
time negotiated certain changes in structure, documentation and so forth.” 12/1/04 Deposition<br />
Transcript of Richard Ivers (“12/1/04 Ivers Depo. Tr.”) at 56:5-8, 87:8-10. All deposition<br />
transcripts, deposition exhibits, and other exhibits <strong>to</strong> this opposition are attached <strong>to</strong> <strong>Lead</strong><br />
Plaintiff’s Appendix in Support <strong>Lead</strong> Plaintiff’s <strong>Opposition</strong> <strong>to</strong> the <strong>CSFB</strong> Defendants’ Motion for<br />
Summary Judgment and Memorandum of Law in Support of <strong>CSFB</strong> Defendants’ Motion for<br />
Summary Judgment (Docket Nos. 4824 and 4825) filed concurrently herewith. Enron’s Fas<strong>to</strong>w<br />
explained <strong>to</strong> the <strong>CSFB</strong> and Royal Bank of Scotland (“RBS”) bankers that their investment did<br />
not have equity risk. Rather, it had credit risk analogous <strong>to</strong> that of a Reg-U loan. Declaration of<br />
Andrew S. Fas<strong>to</strong>w (“Fas<strong>to</strong>w Decl.”) (Docket No. 5048), 51.<br />
- 2 -