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Lead Plaintiff's Opposition to CSFB MSJ 11/13/06 - The ENRON Fraud

Lead Plaintiff's Opposition to CSFB MSJ 11/13/06 - The ENRON Fraud

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a result, the analyst reports themselves are actionable as well as predicate acts in furtherance of<br />

the overall scheme.<br />

D. Red Herrings<br />

1. <strong>CSFB</strong>’s Laurence Nath<br />

In response <strong>to</strong> all of the above, <strong>CSFB</strong> sets up a series of red herrings or straw men <strong>to</strong><br />

knock down or divert the Court’s attention from the hard facts demonstrating primary liability.<br />

Specifically, <strong>CSFB</strong> spends an extraordinary amount of time attacking plaintiffs’ allegations<br />

regarding Laurence Nath, asserting there is not a shred of evidence <strong>to</strong> support the Nath<br />

allegations and flat out asserting the allegations are false. Defs’ Mem. at 2. <strong>The</strong> recent<br />

declaration provided by Andrew Fas<strong>to</strong>w puts this repeated attack <strong>to</strong> rest – at least until a jury<br />

decides the level of Nath’s engagement.<br />

In this regard, Fas<strong>to</strong>w viewed certain banks as “problem solvers” – i.e., the banks,<br />

including <strong>CSFB</strong>, “worked <strong>to</strong> solve certain of [Enron’s] financial problems.” Fas<strong>to</strong>w Decl., 6,<br />

8. “In many instances, the banks primarily devised the financial structures, which contributed<br />

<strong>to</strong> Enron achieving its financial reporting objectives.” Id., 6. <strong>13</strong><br />

Fas<strong>to</strong>w and certain of Enron’s<br />

banks “worked <strong>to</strong>gether, intentionally and knowingly, <strong>to</strong> engage in transactions that would<br />

affect Enron’s financial statements” (Fas<strong>to</strong>w Decl., 7):<br />

We <strong>to</strong>ld certain banks of our financial objectives and they, in many instances,<br />

created solutions utilizing complex financial structures, including prepays, FAS<br />

125/140 deals, share trusts, minority interests, and synthetic leases. I believe that<br />

the manner in which some of these deals were reflected in Enron’s financial<br />

statements might make it difficult for an inves<strong>to</strong>r <strong>to</strong> understand Enron’s true<br />

financial condition and was deceptive. I believe that the banks presented these<br />

structured-finance transactions in response <strong>to</strong> the problems we described <strong>to</strong><br />

them. We paid a premium – in the aggregate, hundreds of millions of dollars – in<br />

<strong>13</strong><br />

See also, e.g., 10/23/<strong>06</strong> Fas<strong>to</strong>w Depo. Tr. at 53:24-54:7 (“In many cases, the banks<br />

brought us these structures, and we executed the transactions with the banks.”).<br />

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