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Lead Plaintiff's Opposition to CSFB MSJ 11/13/06 - The ENRON Fraud

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To state a claim on conduct that violates Rule 10b-5(a) and (c), plaintiff must<br />

assert that the defendant (1) committed a deceptive or manipulative act, (2) with<br />

scienter, that (3) the act affected the market for securities or was otherwise in<br />

connection with their purchase of sale, and (4) that the defendant’s actions caused<br />

the plaintiff’s injuries.<br />

Enron, 20<strong>06</strong> U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43146, at *88 n.45. And that:<br />

Id. at *87.<br />

To establish a claim under . . . Rule 10b-5(b), a plaintiff must ultimately prove (1)<br />

a material misrepresentation or omission; (2) scienter; (3) a connection between<br />

the purchase or sale of the security and the material misrepresentation or<br />

omission; (4) reliance (or “transaction causation” in fraud-on-the-market cases);<br />

(5) economic loss; and (6) loss causation, i.e., causal connection between the<br />

material misrepresentation or omission and the plaintiff’s actual loss.<br />

As the SEC has emphasized – notably in the context of shareholder lawsuits against third<br />

parties alleged <strong>to</strong> have engaged in fraudulent transactions with the issuer –<br />

Meri<strong>to</strong>rious private actions under the federal securities laws serve an<br />

important role, both because they provide compensation for inves<strong>to</strong>rs who have<br />

been harmed by violations of the securities laws and because, as the Supreme<br />

Court has repeatedly recognized, they “provide ‘a most effective weapon in the<br />

enforcement’ of the securities laws and are ‘a necessary supplement <strong>to</strong><br />

Commission action.’” Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S.<br />

299, 310 (1985) (quoting J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964)). See<br />

also Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug S<strong>to</strong>res, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975).<br />

Congress, in adopting the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub.<br />

L. No. 104-67, reaffirmed that “[p]rivate securities litigation is an indispensable<br />

<strong>to</strong>ol with which defrauded inves<strong>to</strong>rs can recover their losses” and that private<br />

lawsuits “promote public and global confidence in our capital markets and help <strong>to</strong><br />

deter wrongdoing and guarantee that corporate officers, audi<strong>to</strong>rs, direc<strong>to</strong>rs,<br />

lawyers and others properly perform their jobs.” Conference Report on Securities<br />

Litigation Reform, H.R. Rep. No. 369, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1995).<br />

SEC Brief (Ex. 3) at 2.<br />

II.<br />

ARGUMENT<br />

A. <strong>The</strong> Summary Judgment Standard<br />

A motion for summary judgment may only be granted where “there is no genuine issue<br />

as <strong>to</strong> any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled <strong>to</strong> a judgment as a matter of law.”<br />

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). “<strong>The</strong> party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden of<br />

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