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Lead Plaintiff's Opposition to CSFB MSJ 11/13/06 - The ENRON Fraud

Lead Plaintiff's Opposition to CSFB MSJ 11/13/06 - The ENRON Fraud

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illegitimate deals and the like, which deprive the transactions of economic substance or risk or<br />

cause them <strong>to</strong> be non-GAAP compliant. Each ac<strong>to</strong>r, no matter how manipulative, deceptive or<br />

contrived its conduct may be, will be shielded because it always will be the issuer that later<br />

formally misaccounts for the bogus deal. Thus, the rule cannot be that the issuer who ultimately<br />

misaccounts for a transaction provides immunity <strong>to</strong> sophisticated banks who engage in the fraud<br />

with scienter, using manipulation, deception or contrivances with the primary purpose and effect<br />

of deceiving inves<strong>to</strong>rs under Rule 10b-5(a) or (c).<br />

In the 7/20/<strong>06</strong> Order, the Court relied extensively on the scheme liability analysis<br />

employed by Judge Kaplan in Parmalat I. See, e.g., Enron, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 721-24. At the<br />

same time, though, this Court made clear its understanding that the SEC’s position “appears <strong>to</strong><br />

be in accord with Judge Kaplan’s analysis in Parmalat.” Id. at 715.<br />

In Parmalat I, the plaintiffs alleged that defendant Citigroup violated Rule 10b-5(a) and<br />

(c) when it securitized certain of Parmalat’s invoices that were known <strong>to</strong> the bank <strong>to</strong> be<br />

worthless. 376 F. Supp. 2d at 481-82. <strong>The</strong> plaintiffs also claimed that defendant Banca<br />

Nazionale del Lavoro (“BNL”) violated Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) by fac<strong>to</strong>ring Parmalat’s invoices<br />

which BNL knew <strong>to</strong> be without value. In the scheme, BNL paid Parmalat cash for the<br />

assignment of the bad invoices. But unlike a legitimate fac<strong>to</strong>ring, where “one party purchases at<br />

a discount, receivables from the party that issued them and then attempts <strong>to</strong> collect the face<br />

amount of the invoices” (id. at 488), “Parmalat had guaranteed <strong>to</strong> BNL . . . and the other banks,<br />

payment of the full face value of the invoices” (id.). As such, the so-called “fac<strong>to</strong>ring” and<br />

“securitization” arrangements were simply loans <strong>to</strong> Parmalat; the invoices “played no economic<br />

role in the transaction; they were simply a device or excuse that permitted Parmalat <strong>to</strong> record<br />

the revenue and <strong>to</strong> conceal the liability on the guarantees.” Id.<br />

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