SAFEX Newsletter No.35 - EU-Excert

SAFEX Newsletter No.35, 4 th Qtr. 2010 1
Chairman’s New Year Message
CONTENTS
Chairman’s Message
This is your Captain Speaking
− Dr David Price, Chemring Group
Incident performance
− Reporting our performance score
Know the Expert Panel
− Dr Michael du Plessis
Boardroom Feedback
Congress Chat
Research notes from CERL
− What is IGUS?
Our Regulatory World
− Update on the 6(d) Test
Explosives Eco-talk
− Recycling military explosives
Inbox
Safety Snippets
− Lone-working with explosives
− Gun powder manufacturer fined
− Hot water geyser explodes
Spectators who had gathered at the finish line were
craning their necks to see which athlete will be entering
the stadium first. For the athletes the finish line will
mark the end of a gruelling 6 hours of pounding the
road in this ultra-marathon. When the runners reach the
finish line they would have covered almost a 100 km
and climbed a 1, 000 m in a series of hills and valleys.
Legs were cramping; lungs were burning and minds
were in turmoil as exhaustion sets in. For some runners
the going was too tough and they fell out. Others carried
on running, almost automatically.
While it is unlikely many of us have run races like this, we can probably picture the
scene. The thing that amazes me is the reaction of the runners in the TV interviews
at the end of the race. Viewers would have seen how some runners literally crawl
over the finish line and collapse from sheer exhaustion. “I guess this is the last ultramarathon
he will run”, we think to ourselves. Yet when interviewed afterwards the
same runner will say: “I’ll be back next year to run it again"
The end of 2010 is almost upon us. The experience of many in our industry during
this year would have been similar to those ultra-marathon athletes. As explosives
companies we are in this race for the long haul and know we have to pace ourselves.
As with the marathon runners, we felt the cramps when we hit the hills and may
have even been obliged to walk from time to time. But we also encountered the
downhills that allowed us to catch our breath and tackle what is left of the course
with new vigour.
The SAFEX way is to think about how we ran the race this year and see what we
can learn from it – the good and the bad. But it does not stop there; we also have to
apply what we learnt to do better in the year to come. Perhaps this is what makes the
athlete who crawled over the finish line say he will be back next year - to record a
better time and run a better race. My wish to all Newsletter readers on behalf of the
SAFEX Board of Governors is that you, too, will be back in 2011 with renewed
determination to improve on your performance. May we as an explosives industry
worldwide experience fewer incidents that cause harm in the year to come. For
those who will be celebrating this Festive Season, may it be a time of reflection but
also of physical and spiritual renewal.
We have every reason to approach 2011 with confidence.
Tony’s Tale-piece
Claude Modoux
Chairman, SAFEX International

SAFEX Newsletter No.35, 4 th Qtr. 2010 2
This is your Captain Speaking
Dr David Price – Chemring Group PLC
Dr David Price CBE took over as
Chief Executive of Chemring
Group PLC on 4 April 2005, and
has overseen its promotion to the
FTSE 250 and an eight-fold
growth in its market capitalisation.
Dr Price was educated at
University College, London and is
a Fellow of the IET and the
Institute of Marine Engineering,
Science & Technology, and a
Companion of the Institute of
Management. He was elected to
Council of A|D|S in 2006 and to
the National Defence Industries
Council in 2008. His career in the
defence industry spans over 25
years; initially in research and
technical roles within companies,
such as EMI Electronics and
Thorn-EMI.
For the last fifteen years, David
has taken on a number of
managerial and strategic roles,
firstly with Thomson-CSF (as
Chief Executive of one of its UK
subsidiaries and later as Managing
Director of all its UK operations)
and more recently as Managing
Director of the Naval Marine
Business for Rolls Royce PLC,
where he had responsibility for
managing a global business with a
turnover in excess of £450 million
per annum.
David was awarded Commander
of the Order of the British Empire
(CBE) in the 2010 New Year
Honours for his services to the
defence industry. David is 55
years old, married with two
daughters.
Chemring Group is a leading
manufacturer of countermeasures,
counter-IED (improvised
explosives devices) and energetic
material products for the global
defence market. We manufacture a
very large range of products, which
include primary and secondary
explosives, pyrotechnic flares, smoke
and illuminating rounds together with
the munitions in which they are
deployed. The Group has operations in
nine countries and employs more than
4,500 people. We develop and
manufacture highly hazardous
materials and products that require
exacting process design and planned
maintenance operations to reduce the
likelihood of an incident. Many of our
products are manufactured in high
volume and we invest heavily in
automation and physical protection for
our employees to reduce the
consequence should an incident occur.
It is impossible to be successful in this
business without a strong safety focus.
It is not just the moral imperative to
protect the well being of our
employees and customers but the
significant economic consequences of
any interruption to high volume
production in a fast growing company.
In 2007, we had a fatality at a newly
acquired facility in Italy and this
redoubled our focus on safety systems
but particularly facility design, process
design and competence. We set a high
standard for our safety staff at all sites
and many have been replaced or
received additional training to ensure
that we maintain the right calibre of
people and the highest levels of
competence. All senior executives and
operations managers have safety
targets built into their remuneration
and are required to complete formal
training to emphasise their personal
responsibilities and duties.
My Director of Safety is a full member
of the Group Executive Committee and
plays a vital role in our due diligence
of acquisition targets. He has direct
access to the Board of Directors and is
responsible for the development and
implementation of programmes across
the Group to address the key safety
risks in a fast changing, high growth
strategy. We have the same goals and
objectives wherever we operate in the
world.
Over the last few years we have seen
our incident rates fall slowly as our
programmes take root but an incident
in 2010 in which three of our
employees were hospitalised reminds
me that this is an area that requires
constant vigilance. Whenever we have
an energetic incident or significant near
miss we launch a thorough
investigation and stop work in related
areas until we are satisfied that the root
cause has been identified, corrective
actions closed, our formal restart
process completed and lessons shared
across the Group. Complacency and
process non-compliance is always the
principal enemy and we must all work
tirelessly to find new ways to avoid
their pitfalls.
My priority is the protection of our
workforce by assuring the competence
of all those that interact with, or whose
decisions affect, highly hazardous
processes whether it be product design,
manufacturing process development,
facilities management or safety
management systems.
At the end of the day, I am
accountable. I want all members of
staff to walk home every day as
healthy as when they came in!

SAFEX Newsletter No.35, 4 th Qtr. 2010 3
Incident Reporting
Monitoring our Reporting Performance
“Every incident that is reported may prevent another from occurring. You can save a
life by reporting an incident - including a near-event.”
SAFEX learns from its members’ experiences through the incident reports we receive. By applying these lessons
we can prevent similar incidents recurring. That is why we track our incident reporting performance as follows:
INCIDENTS BY MONTH
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
ALL INCIDENTS REPORTED: Ytd 2010 vs 2009
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
Month 09 2 0 3 5 3 4 8 2 1 2 2 4
Month 10 1 3 1 3 2 4 3 1 7 2 2 1
Ytd 09 2 2 5 10 13 17 25 27 28 30 32 36
Ytd 10 1 4 5 8 10 14 17 18 25 27 29 30
Member incidents reported. Because they give us
the best learning opportunities, we track member
incidents (MI’s) separately in the chart on the right.
PAR is an estimate of how many MI’s are occurring
based on the severity of the MI’s that occurred in a
particular month. The gap between the number of
MI’s reported and PAR is our Reporting Gap. The
Reporting Gap suggests that only ⅔ of our MI’s are
being reported.
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
INCIDENTS YEAR TO DATE (YTD))
INCIDENTS BY MONTH
All the incidents reported. This chart compares the
sum of non-member and member incidents reported to
SAFEX every month this year to the previous year.
We have reported fewer incidents this year than in
2009. Are we having fewer incidents or are we not
reporting the incidents we are having? Every incident
not reported is a lost learning opportunity. Remember,
it’s never too late to report an incident.
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
MEMBER INCIDENTS REPORTED: Ytd 2010
Reporting
Gap = 14
0
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
Month 10 1 1 1 2 2 4 3 1 6 2 2 1
Ytd 1 2 3 5 7 11 14 15 21 23 25 26
Par 0 10 20 20 20 20 20 30 40 40 40 40
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
MEMBER INCIDENTS REPORTED (Ytd)
CONTRIBUTORS: MEMBER INCIDENTS Ytd 2010
COMPANIES
(18)
SAUDI (2)
GROUPS
(8) Contributors of member incidents. This chart
identifies those members who reported their incidents.
It shows the number of incidents each of these
members have reported relative to the total number of
MI’s received. The chart distinguishes between
Groups and Companies merely to indicate the
performance of the two membership categories. Each
of these categories has about the same number of
operating units. In 2010 Groups reported fewer
incidents than their counterparts in single Companies

SAFEX Newsletter No.35, 4 th Qtr. 2010 4
Know the Expert Panel
The Expert Panel comprises individuals who were nominated by members and approved by the Board. Such an
individual must be associated with the explosives industry and have acquired expertise in specific fields. He must also
be willing to make the same available to SAFEX members on a commercial basis which is agreed between the expert
and the member. SAFEX merely “connects” the Expert and the Member who has a need and does not get involved in
the detail arrangements.
To access the services of a SAFEX Expert, a client Member accurately defines the need it wishes the Expert to address.
This requirement is captured in a Brief which is e-mailed or faxed to the Secretary General. The Member will be
notified of the details of Experts that could meet this need. It is then up to the Member to select an Expert and enter
into an agreement directly with him.
PERSONAL
Position: Owner and
Principal Consultant
Company: Greenice Pty Ltd
Location: Sydney, Australia
Education: BSc (Hons), MSc,
PhD – Cape Town
Affiliations: PDMA (USA)
Languages: English
MICHAEL DU PLESSIS
AEL:
ICI:
AEL:
CAREER OUTLINE
Explosives Research Scientist
Senior Research Scientist
Accessories Research Mgr.
IES (J.V. EBCo & ICI): Technical Mgr.
Orica Australia: Project Mgr Electronic
Blasting Systems
EXPERTISE
• Non electric detonator systems (product and process technology)
• Electronic blasting systems (technologies and field applications)
• Safety review of explosives operations and risk management
• Explosives licensing and regulatory compliance
• Security Sensitive Ammonium Nitrate issues
• R&D and Technology Management
• Carbon footprint calculations for Greenhouse Gas emissions
TYPICAL ASSIGNMENTS
2006: HAZOP and audit of bulk explosives manufacture, Quin Investments, South Australia.
2006 – 2008: Advice on effective technology management processes for major Gold Mining Group,
Australia.
2006– 2008: Licence application for TNT cast melt plant for Applied Explosives Technology Pty Ltd,
Sydney, Australia.
2007 – 2010: Development of Safety Management Plan and negotiation of operating licence for Bevex
Pty Ltd., Darwin Australia.
2010: Review initiating explosives technology in China for investors.

SAFEX Newsletter No.35, 4 th Qtr. 2010 5
Feedback from the Boardroom
The SAFEX Board of Governors met in Orlando, FL early in February this year. The focus of the Meeting was a
review of the SAFEX Strategy. We have already summarised the Board’s approach to developing strategy and the
process it used. It consisted of establishing the Association’s MISSION, determining its VALUES and then agreeing
a VISION. The outcome will be STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES followed by TARGETS and ACTION PLANS. These
are concepts with which member companies are familiar. In the last Newsletter we discussed how the Strategy
Survey in which members participated influenced the SAFEX Value System. In this edition we want to focus on
one of the important outcomes of the SAFEX Strategy, namely the proposed Explosives Operations Management
Development (XOMD) Course.
Development of
explosives operations
management is a
strategic focus
Development of managers at all
levels in explosives operations is
one of the specific outcomes of the
proposed SAFEX strategy.
The Board feels so strongly about
the issue that it has not waited for
the SAFEX strategy to be finalised
before going ahead with its plans.
To that end a Steering Committee
with Noel Hsu (Orica) as convener
was established. Its task is to look
at the design and implementation
of a training course that focuses on
explosives line management
competencies in the areas of
Leadership, Culture and Systems.
While the target audience will be
line managers in explosives
operations, HS&E professionals
will be equally welcome. At the
end of the Course participants
must be better equipped for their
role and able to contribute directly
to the bottom line through
improved HS&E performance.
It was envisaged that the course
content will be compiled from
member companies’ training
material.
The Steering Committee arranged
a Workshop comprising
representatives from a crosssection
of SAFEX member
companies. SAFEX members such
The Course targets
explosives managers –
at all levels
The fundamental need identified in
the Strategy Survey was the
quality of leadership in explosives
operations. In the past explosives
operations managers grew up in
the industry. They had years of
experience before assuming their
leadership roles. Unfortunately,
few companies have this luxury
today. The problem is
compounded by the fact that
explosives companies are often
obliged to bring managers at all
levels into these roles from outside
the industry.
The question we face is how well
operations managers are equipped
for their role in today’s explosives
industry. The Course is aimed at
all levels of managers involved in
running explosives operations. If
you want a crash course in the
essentials of running an explosives
plant you need to take this Course
seriously. It is not for plant
managers only but for leaders at all
levels involved with explosives
operations regardless of their size.
Managers from small and large
companies will benefit from this
Course.
Course design Workshop held in London
as AEL Mining Services, Austin
Powder Company, Dyno Nobel,
Orica Mining Services and
Poudrerie d’Aubonne were already
represented on the Steering
It’s all in the name
(so they say)
When a child is born, one of the
first things parents have to do is to
give the child a name. It is a
serious responsibility as the child
has to carry that name for the rest
of his or her life. There are many
stories about children who were
saddled with impossible names
that embarrassed them for the rest
of their lives.
In the same way we are looking for
a name for the SAFEX Explosives
Operations Management
Development (XOMD) Course we
are designing. This is a clumsy
name and not that appealing.
Therefore, we ask our readers to
propose something better;
something that will stir the
imagination and help us market the
Course.
Some of the key concepts of the
Course include EXPLOSIVES;
LEADERSHIP; OPERATIONS;
TOOLS; A NEW LEVEL; etc.
As “parents” the Board wants to
do the right thing for this “child” –
the XOMD Course. Please, help us
with a suitable name? The
Secretariat is anxious to hear from
you.
Committee together with Andy
Begg. It was felt the Workshop
should also include military
explosives manufacturers, smaller
member companies and any other

SAFEX Newsletter No.35, 4 th Qtr. 2010 6
member or outside organisation
that may be able to contribute
training material. To that end
SAFEX was delighted when the
Chemring Group, the KEMEK
organisation by way of Ulster
Industrial Explosives, Cranfield
University and the Competence
Centre of Energetic Materials
(KCEM) agreed to participate. .
Representatives from most of these
organisations met outside London
for 3 days towards the end of
October. The Workshop agreed a
preliminary outline for the course
comprising 8 modules to be
presented over 4 or 5 days.
A further Workshop will be held in
San Diego prior to the Board
meeting at the beginning of
February next year.
What will the course cover?
A principle which the Workshop adopted is that the Course is not a general management course; there are enough of
those on the market. This Course must focus on the important things managers must know to be effective in an
explosives operation; those things that are unique to explosives
Based on their collective experience, the results of the Strategy Survey and the origin of many reported explosives
incidents, the Workshop identified the following as key issues that such a Course must cover:
• Explosives regulations – an overview of the general principles involved
• Basis of safety and good explosives practices
• Risk management – the essentials in an explosives context
• Permit to Work – decontamination and understanding the essentials of a good system
• Management of Change – implementing change in processes, plant and procedures responsibly
• Materials management including disposal of explosives – how to handle raw materials, semi-products,
products, contaminated material, out-of-spec materials and waste
• Emergency Response and Crisis Management. – what to do when things go wrong in order to minimise the
consequences (business and other)
• Incident Reporting and Investigation including near-events - why it is important (incident prevention);
investigation tools; use of the SAFEX database
It is proposed to cover each of these aspects in a module and that the 8 modules will be presented over a period of 4
to 5 days.
The Course must provide participants with the knowledge and skills to lead explosives operations under their
control safely and in the best interest of their businesses. Above all, we want participants to return to their jobs as
more effective managers. We need them to say this course was one of the better, if not the best, training/education
experiences of their career.
Congress chat
The XVII SAFEX Congress in 2011 will take place during the week Monday, 23 May to Saturday, 28 May 2011
in Istanbul, Turkey. The planning framework for the Congress was communicated to members in Congress
Bulletin No.1 which we distributed in March. At the end of April we issued Bulletin No.2 in which we called for
Congress Papers and requested prospective authors to submit Abstracts by the end of June. Bulletin No.3 outlined at
the end of August the Congress Programme in order to give members an indication of what to expect if they attend
this Congress. This was followed by Bulletins No.4 and No.5 in which prospective delegates were informed of
accommodation arrangements and how to register. This Newsletter elaborates on those arrangements
.
Please contact the Secretariat for copies of the Bulletins if you are interested in them.
You can help, please!
We have tried to send out the hotel reservations and Congress registration information earlier for this Congress than
previous times. If delegates wait till the last minute before making reservations or registering, it makes planning the
Congress more difficult.
You can help us if you make your hotel Reservation and Register for the Congress sooner rather than later.

SAFEX Newsletter No.35, 4 th Qtr. 2010 7
Our Congress Logo
This logo will appear on all our
Congress material. Mr Haluk Kurt,
our contact in Istanbul, designed it
especially for us. The logo depicts
the bridge across the Bosphorus
which connects Europe and Asia.
It is symbolic of the East meeting
the West and indicative of what we
hope to achieve in our Congress –
the meeting of members from
different parts of the world.
We hope you like it.
Have you made your hotel reservation?
Congress Bulletin No.4 outlines the two accommodation options for
which SAFEX was able to negotiate preferential rates for delegates. They
are:
• Hotel Elite World Istanbul (5-star) is the Congress venue. The rate
we have been given per night per room including breakfast is Euro
195.00 (single) and Euro 215.00 (double). More information about the
hotel is available at http://www.eliteworldhotel.com.tr/en/index.asp
• Hotel Elite World Prestige (4-Star) is situated right next door to the
Congress venue. Its rates per night per room including breakfast are
Euro 155.00 (single) and Euro 185.00 (double). For more information
visit
http://www.eliteworldprestige.com/Elite_World_Prestige_Hotel_Hom
e.html
Reservations must be made directly with Elite World Hotels using the
Reservation Form that was attached to Bulletin No.4. If you need a copy
of the Bulletin or the Form please contact the Secretariat at
secretariat@safex-international.org
We have only reserved a limited number of rooms in these hotels
especially the Elite World Prestige (4 star). Please make your
Reservation as soon as possible.
Overview of Congress
Sessions
The main Congress activities
comprise the following Sessions:
Training Session
Workgroup Sessions
Plenary Sessions
Special Sessions
Social Programme
The Plenary Sessions are divided
into an Open and Closed Day.
Participation in the Closed Day is
restricted to members of the
SAFEX Community. The
following topics will be covered in
the Plenary Sessions:
Open Day:
• Behavioural Safety
• “Green” explosives
manufacture
• Risk management: Tools and
best practices
• Risk management: Hazards
and Regulatory impact
Closed Day:
• Incident investigation and
reporting
• Incidents with initiating
systems and primary
explosives
• Incidents with other
explosives
• Ordinary General Meeting of
Members
A Remediation Workgroup meeting in progress
The Training Session being conducted at Madrid

SAFEX Newsletter No.35, 4 th Qtr. 2010 8
Numbers at Workgroup meetings have
to be restricted
The following Workgroups will meet on Wednesday,
25 May 2011 led by the Workgroup leaders whose
names are shown in parentheses:
• Explosives decontamination and remediation
(Paul Harrison)
• Emulsion explosives safety (Leigh Hart)
• Safe explosives transport (Henry Merrick)
• Good explosives practices (Martin Held)
• Explosives traceability (Noel Hsu)
We will also make provision for the Workgroup that
produced the TGAN Storage Good Practice Guide to
meet. This meeting will be by invitation only.
There will be two Sessions of Workgroup meetings:
one in the morning for three of the Workgroups and
another in the afternoon for the remaining three.
For the Workgroups to function optimally, Workgroup
leaders will have to limit the number of participants in
each Workgroup meeting. To give leaders sufficient
time to organise their meetings, we are obliged to
impose a cut-off date for Workgroup registrations.
Therefore, after 28 February 2011we will not be able
to entertain any registrations for Workgroups.
As the Workgroups have to restrict numbers for each
meeting, leaders cannot guarantee that everyone who
registers in time will be assured of a place. Those who
register first will be given priority. Therefore, if you
are interested in participating in the Workgroups,
please register right away using the Registration
Form sent out with Bulletin No.5.
Register NOW for the Congress
Training Session
The previous Newsletter (No.34) gave details of the
Congress Training Session. It will focus on the
application of Basis of Safety (BOS) and Good
Explosives Practice (GEP) principles in explosives
operations.
The training is relevant to all company personnel
including managers, supervisors, engineering and field
services personnel as well as safety specialists. SAFEX
hopes member companies will try to have at least one
of their personnel exposed to the training. These
individuals can then lead the implementation of BOS
and GEP programmes in their respective companies.”
The training, for which there is no charge to SAFEX
Members, is scheduled to take place on 23 and 24 May
2011. It will be conducted by four experienced
facilitators from companies who have active BOS and
GEP programmes.
To optimise interaction during the training, 30
participants is the maximum that can be accepted.
Registration for the Training Session is going briskly.
To avoid disappointment register NOW if you wish
to participate in the Training Session. Please use the
Registration Form attached to Congress Bulletin
No.5.
Research Notes from CERL
The International Group of Experts on the Explosion Risks of
Unstable Substances (IGUS)
Dr Phil Lightfoot
© Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as represented by the Minister of Natural Resources, 2010.
The contents of this report may be based on work in progress or may contain speculative comments by the authors.
Readers are cautioned to rely on their own judgment in assessing the correctness of the contents. CERL does not
warrant the quality, accuracy or completeness of the contents and is not responsible for any errors or omissions, or
any technical inaccuracies. CERL disclaims liability for any injury, damage, or other loss resulting from any use of
or reliance on the report or its contents

SAFEX Newsletter No.35, 4 th Qtr. 2010 9
Introduction
IGUS is the International Group of
Experts on the Explosion Risks of
Unstable Substances. Given the
remarkably unwieldy full name,
the group is invariably known by
its acronym. IGUS brings together
from all over the world
independent experts on the risks of
dangerous substances. The aim of
IGUS is to exchange information
on the behaviour of unstable
substances and improve safety in
production, handling, storage and
transport. Full members of IGUS
work for governments and
independent
research
organizations. Experts from
industry can and do attend
meetings by invitation. The
purpose of this short article is to
familiarize SAFEX members with
the activities of IGUS and to
encourage them to participate
where appropriate.
IGUS was set up in 1962 with the
aim of harmonizing test methods
used by different countries to
identify and quantify the explosive
properties of unstable materials.
Since then, its scope has widened
and now broadly covers the
hazardous properties of all kinds of
unstable and reactive substances.
Over the years, IGUS has
continued to offer scientists who
are advisers to their governments,
as well as other interested parties,
a forum to exchange data and
information. This exchange takes
place primarily in support of the
development of harmonized
classification regimes to protect
society from hazards of unstable
substances and to remove barriers
to international trade. One of the
main goals of this exchange has
always been to understand and
quantify the resulting effects from
accidents involving dangerous
goods.
There are relatively few fora where
technical experts can share views
and opinions at a formative stage
and exchange information that
benefits national and international
programs, but IGUS is one such
body. The regular attendance of
policy representatives and
regulators at IGUS meetings, as
well as the extensive participation
of industry, is clear indicators of
the value and influence of IGUS.
The links forged between the
national bodies participating in
IGUS over the years provide a
good basis for continued
discussion and collaborative work
to achieve their common goals.
Much of the information provided
here was taken from the IGUS web
site, which may be found at:
http://www.oecdigus.org/.
A Brief History of IGUS
In 1959, the European Productivity
Agency of Co-operation (OEEC)
initiated an international cooperative
study on unstable
substances. In 1961, the
Organisation for Economic Cooperation
and Development
(OECD) approved the creation of
an expert working group and this
group (now IGUS) first met in
Paris on 8 and 9 May 1962.
The rationalization of test methods
has always been an important area
of interest within IGUS, from the
very first meeting in 1962.
Harmonization has moved forward
substantially since then, with
classification schemes being
developed by the United Nations
and various modal regulations now
being aligned in respect to
transport. Global harmonization
with other classification schemes
for safety in handling of materials
(e.g., the EU notification
procedure) is now a goal.
Since 2005, IGUS no longer
operates under the formal umbrella
of OECD. However, it continues to
operate according to the same
principles as it did before and
offers its members an independent
discussion forum. Over the years
IGUS members have produced a
great deal of work to provide a
scientific basis for safety-related
regulatory regimes around the
world. IGUS meetings are ideal
venues for deliberations and
argument on the fine details of test
methods, which would otherwise
encumber the various international
regulating bodies in the plenary
sessions. Some IGUS members
attend international meetings (UN,
EU, CEN, etc.) as technical
advisers to their national
delegation, and thus have direct
contact with the various
international working groups on
dangerous goods. Consequently,
IGUS has influenced technical
considerations underpinning
international recommendations and
legislation concerning the testing,
classification, packaging and
labelling of dangerous goods. For
example, it has made direct
submissions to the UN Committee
of Experts on the Transport of
Dangerous Goods, which deals
with the “Model Regulations” and
the “Manual of Tests and Criteria”;
these documents are in turn
assimilated into legislation by
various bodies, such as those
controlling international carriage
by sea (IMO) and air (ICAO), the
European road, rail, and inland
waterways regulations, the EU
ammonium nitrate directive and
the EU user directives for
dangerous substances.
IGUS Structure
IGUS is run by a steering
committee that oversees the
general direction and
administration of the organization.
At the IGUS plenary meeting held
every two years, national delegates
elect the IGUS officials for the
following biennium. At the end of
their term, they can be re-elected.
The (co-)chairmen of the working
groups are nominated by their
respective working groups and
their appointment is confirmed by
the plenary meeting. The chairman
and secretary of IGUS are elected
by the plenary meeting.

SAFEX Newsletter No.35, 4 th Qtr. 2010 10
The number and mandate of IGUS
working groups have evolved over
the years. Currently, two working
groups operate under the umbrella
of IGUS: the Energetic and
Oxidizing Substances Working
Group (IGUS-EOS) and the
Explosives, Propellants and
Pyrotechnics Working Group
(IGUS-EPP). The IGUS working
groups meet as required, usually
annually. These meetings are
structured into a 'closed' session,
dealing with topics confidential to
the national bodies present, and an
'open' session to which industry
representatives are invited by
agreement of the chairman. The
vast majority of the meeting time
is 'open'.
The current officers of IGUS are
as follows:
IGUS chairman: Dr. N. Pfeil,
Federal Institute for Materials
Research and Testing (BAM,
Germany)
IGUS secretary: Ing. W.A. Mak,
TNO Defence, Security and
Safety (Netherlands)
IGUS-EOS chairman: Dr. K.D.
Wehrstedt, Federal Institute for
Materials Research and Testing
(BAM, Germany)
IGUS-EOS co-chairman: Ing.
W.A. Mak, TNO Defence,
Security and Safety
(Netherlands)
IGUS-EPP chairman: Mr. E.G. de
Jong, TNO Defence, Security
and Safety (Netherlands)
IGUS-EPP co-chairman: Dr. P.
Lightfoot, Canadian Explosives
Research Laboratory
Full membership of IGUS is
limited to members of government
laboratories and organizations, or
scientists who are involved in
research and are governmental
advisers on a permanent basis.
Independents and industry
representatives are not eligible for
office, but industry representatives
take part extensively and are
welcome at all meetings of the
IGUS working groups. For
example, at the last meeting of
IGUS-EPP, 24 of 51 attendees
were from industry, including
direct representation from SAFEX
in the form of Boet and Bets
Coetzee.
Today, IGUS has members in
around 20 countries, including:
Australia, Belgium, Canada,
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland,
Japan, the Netherlands, Norway,
Korea, Poland, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, the United
Kingdom, and the USA.
IGUS is self-supporting, members’
costs being borne by their home
institutes. Members participate at
IGUS meetings as technical
experts in their own right and
cannot commit their country's
policy department in any way. As
no policy decisions are made at
IGUS meetings, discussions are
quite informal, which greatly
facilitates a frank and open
exchange of views in a positive
environment.
IGUS Working Groups: EOS
and EPP
In broad terms, IGUS-EOS deals
with materials that are energetic,
but not designed to be used as
energetic materials. Subject areas
covered by IGUS-EOS include:
test methods, classification and
safety issues related to organic
peroxides, self-reactive substances,
fertilizers, ammonium nitrate and
other oxidizers. Of particular
interest to the SAFEX community
is the involvement of IGUS-EOS
with ammonium nitrate hazards.
In contrast to IGUS-EOS, IGUS-
EPP deals primarily with energetic
materials and devices that are
designed to be used as such.
Subject areas include: explosive
properties, general test methods,
classification, safety and
regulatory aspects related to
explosives, pyrotechnics and
propellants. There is clearly a
significant overlap between the
interests of IGUS-EPP and those
of SAFEX. In what follows, we
will concentrate on the activities of
the IGUS EPP group.
The work plan of IGUS-EPP group
is wide ranging and includes:
• Accident reports. This subject
is a constant agenda item. The
exchange of information on
accidents is very valuable as it
might help preventing a
similar situation somewhere
else.
• Ammonium nitrate (shared
with IGUS-EOS). Ammonium
nitrate is a very versatile
substance. It is used in the
vast majority of blasting
explosives nowadays, it is also
widely used in fertilizers and
other non-explosive
applications.
• Ammonium nitrate-based
intermediates, or ANEs. There
is still a good deal of
dissatisfaction with the current
UN TDG classification
scheme for ANEs, for
example.
• Combined stimuli (e.g.,
sensitivity at elevated
temperature).
• Co-operation, exchange and
round-robin testing between
laboratories
• Disposal of energetic
materials, which presents
challenges that go beyond
safety.
• Environmental, health and
safety issues. Although the
problem has been around for a
long time, increasing
attention is being given to the
effects of energetic materials
on the environment and
industrial hygiene.
• Fireworks, including theatrical
and film effects, family
fireworks and indoor
fireworks. This is a rich area
for IGUS-EPP, particularly as
the fireworks industry has a
number of safety challenges.
• Process hazards For example,
there has been significant
discussion in recent years

SAFEX Newsletter No.35, 4 th Qtr. 2010 11
regarding the pumping of
emulsion explosives.
• Harmonized test methods. The
group has been very active in
carrying out work related to
international test methods,
particularly the UN “Orange
Book”. Examples include the
UN 6(c) and 6(d) tests, and
Test Series 8.
To further illustrate the interests of
IGUS-EPP, the following subjects
were on the agenda at the last
meeting of the working group in
Osaka, Japan, in 2009:
• Development of a small scaletype
8(d) Test for ANEs
• Minimum Burning Pressure
Test - discussion on the
potential for use as a standard
test
• Classification of seat-belt
pretensioners
• .50 Browning Machine Gun
testing video
• Standardization of exothermic
decomposition energy
measurement.
• Nitrocellulose Testing Results
• Global availability of
materials specified in the UN
Manual of Tests and Criteria
• Alternatives to UN
specification boosters for the
Series 1 and 2 Gap tests
• 6(d) Tests In ICAO – With a
Focus on Cartridges, Power
Device
• BAM and fireworks testing
• Time /Pressure test for the
definition of flash
compositions
• Discussion on a test procedure
for the definition of flash
compositions
• Flash powder and fireworks
hazard
• Results of testing fireworks
for the Dutch market
according to draft standard
prEN 15947
• Test reports on the explosivity
of waterfall fireworks
• Consumer Fireworks display
for sale
• Mischief involving fireworks
in Sweden
• Pyrotechnically generated
aerosols for fire extinguishing
• Fire extinguisher cartridges
• OECD project on "Safety
Practices on the storage of
fireworks in the context of
land-use planning"
• Monitoring and reporting of
greenhouse gases coming
from the detonation of
explosives (and fireworks)
and their possible trading
further down the track
• Testing of fireworks in retail
premises
• Thermite-based explosives
• Recent accidents in the
production and usage of
explosives in Japan
• Unplanned synthesis of TATP
in chemical processing plant
• Classification of sporting
ammunition
• Ammonium nitrate fertilizers
(high nitrogen content) in
Finland
• "Draft of Industry Code of
Practice for AN Storage" - a
review and discussion
It will be clear from the list that
the group has a broad range of
subjects that could be of interest
across the spectrum of SAFEX
members, from blasting explosives
to energetic devices for the
automobile industry. In addition to
regular agenda items at the last
meeting, there was also a most
interesting case study of an
accidental explosion at an
emulsion
explosives
manufacturing site in India that
resulted in 27 fatalities in 2007.
The case study took place at the
suggestion of SAFEX and
included IGUS-EPP members,
industry and members of the Chief
Inspectors of Explosives Group.
IGUS EPP Group and the
international Chief Inspectors of
Explosives Group
A group representing international
explosives regulators has met
regularly for many years. Known
as the Chief Inspectors of
Explosives (CIE) group, this
informal organization has many
common interests with IGUS-EPP.
The latter covers explosives safety
science with a strong regulatory
focus, whereas the former deals
with explosives regulation, much
of which needs to demonstrate a
strong scientific underpinning. The
strong, common interest is
demonstrated clearly by the fact
that there is overlap between the
membership of the two groups. As
a result, annual meetings of the
two groups have been held jointly
since 2007. This partnership has
proved to be mutually beneficial
and the next meeting will again be
held jointly in May 2011 (Salt
Lake City, USA).
Conclusions
As new technologies emerge, the
need will continue for technical
discussions and exchange to
underpin international agreements,
as well as to safeguard society
through the sharing of knowledge
about hazards. There are still many
problems to be resolved in the
areas of IGUS expertise and there
is never a shortage of items for the
agenda of working group
meetings.
I hope that this short article has
provided a useful insight into the
workings of IGUS and the benefits
that it provides to both regulators
and industry around the world. If
any reader of the Newsletter is
interested in finding out more
about the IGUS organization,
please do not hesitate to contact
me at plighto@nrcan.gc.ca , or
check out the IGUS web site at:
www.oecdigus.org.

SAFEX Newsletter No.35, 4 th Qtr. 2010 12
Our Explosives Regulatory World
Update on the 6 (d) Test
Ben Barrett
Ben Barrett, an Expert Panel member, is an independent consultant specializing in regulation of explosives. DG
Advisor, Ben’s consultancy, is dedicated to participation in the development and modification of international
dangerous goods regulations and helping clients comply with US and international regulations. Ben also provides
training in the handling of dangerous goods including that required by ICAO.
Background
The 6(d) test was adopted in December 2008 by the
UN for the purpose of removing certain products from
Division 1.4 Compatibility Group S classification to
Division 1.4 other than S. It examines addresses part of
the definition of 1.4S that previously was evaluated
using the 6(a) test:
Substance or article so packed or designed that any
hazardous effects arising from accidental
functioning are confined within the package [Note:
6(d) test] unless the package has been degraded by
fire. [Note: 6(c) test].
The 6(d) test method is based on the existing 6(a)
single package test that determines whether inner
packages or articles propagate one to the next when
confined by surrounding material. The 6(d) is different
in that it does not include surrounding material. The
test measures the effects outside the package which
can’t normally be discerned when confined. It was
implemented by adding a special provision requiring
the test for eight out of the approximately 32 existing
1.4S UN numbers, which include the following:
Cartridges, power device, UN 0323
Charges, bursting, plastics bonded, UN 0460
Charges, explosive, commercial without detonator,
UN 0445
Charges, shaped without detonator, UN 0441
Detonator assemblies, non-electric for blasting, UN
0500
Detonators, electric for blasting, UN 0456
Detonators for ammunition, UN 0366
Detonators, non-electric for blasting, UN 0455
The Issues
The implementation of this test is a problem for all
products in these UN numbers because it is retroactive.
Existing products which would clearly pass still have to
undergo the re-approval process. Products which would
fail the test but obviously fit into Division 1.4 must
undergo approval into 1.4 other than S since selfclassification
is not allowed. Until recently the only
impact of the 6(d) test has been for air shipments.
In Spring 2009, the ICAO Technical Instructions for
the Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air were
amended by adding a new paragraph 1.4.2.1:
“1.4.2.1 Certain Division 1.4S explosives,
identified by Special Provision A165 in Table 3-1,
are subject to Test Series 6 (d) of Part I of the UN
Manual of Tests and Criteria (see
ST/SG/AC.10/36/Add.2) to demonstrate that any
hazardous effects arising from functioning are
confined within the package. Evidence of a
hazardous effect outside the package includes:
a) denting or perforation of the witness plate
beneath the package;
b) a flash or flame capable of igniting such as a
sheet of 80 ± 3 g/m2 paper at a distance of 25
cm from the package;
c) disruption of the package causing projection
of the explosives contents; or
d) a projection which passes completely through
the packaging (a projection or fragment
retained or stuck in the wall of the packaging
is considered as non hazardous).
The appropriate national authority may wish to
take into account the expected effect of the
initiator when assessing the results of the test, if
these are expected to be significant when
compared to the articles being tested. If there are
hazardous effects outside the package, then the
product is excluded from Compatibility Group S.”
A new Special Provision A165 was also added by
ICAO:
“A165 This entry must not be used for transport
on passenger aircraft when testing in accordance
with the UN Manual of Tests and Criteria Test
Series 6 (a), upon which classification was based,
has shown evidence of a hazardous effect outside
the package. This includes denting or perforation
of the witness plate beneath the package. From 1
January 2010, for transport aboard passenger
aircraft, this entry may only be used if the results
of Test Series 6 (d) of Part I of the UN Manual of

SAFEX Newsletter No.35, 4 th Qtr. 2010 13
Tests and Criteria have demonstrated that any
hazardous effects arising from functioning are
confined within the package (see 2;1.4.2.1).
Note.— If the 6 (d) test is successfully completed
before 1 January 2010, this entry may be used for
transport on passenger aircraft.”
Developments in the USA
These provisions only existed in the ICAO regulations
and not in national or regional regulations or rules for
highway, rail or vessel. On August 24th, 2010 the DOT
Pipeline & Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
(PHMSA) issued a notice of proposed rulemaking to
implement their bi-annual harmonization of the US
regulations with the latest versions of regulations of the
UN, IMO and ICAO. This provides the first clear
picture in the US of the impact of the 6(d) test adopted
by the UN in 2008 and expedited into the ICAO
regulations in 2009. The essence of the requirements is
contained in the new US special provision 347,
assigned to the same eight UN numbers:
“347 Effective April 1, 2011, for transportation by
aircraft this entry may only be used if the results
of Test series 6(d) of Part I of the UN Manual of
Tests and Criteria (IBR, see § 171.7 of this
subchapter) have demonstrated that any hazardous
effects from accidental functioning are confined
to within the package. Effective January 1, 2014,
for transportation domestically by highway or rail,
this entry may only be used if the results of Test
series 6(d) of Part I of the UN Manual of Tests
and Criteria (IBR, see § 171.7 of this subchapter)
have demonstrated that any hazardous effects
from accidental functioning are confined to within
the package.”
The impact of this proposed rule on the eight affected
UN numbers carries through all modes of
transportation. Since industry can’t self-classify
explosives, companies may not simply self-classify
these products as Division 1.4 with the correct
compatibility group such as B or D. After these
deadlines the products may not be shipped at all
without a revised EX number from the DOT. It
typically requires 120 days to perform the review and
fitness evaluation, but can take substantially longer.
The resulting PHMSA workload is significant.
Thus, according to the proposed rule, in the US the 6(d)
test must be performed by April 1, 2011 for a product
to be transported by air (cargo too, not just passenger),
whether as 1.4S or 1.4 other than S. PHMSA gives
themselves a much more reasonable time frame of
January 1, 2014 to implement the 6(d) test for
shipments by highway or rail. From a practical
standpoint this would include vessel, as one must use
highway at some point to get to the port. I estimate that
this proposed rule will be finalized by the end of the
year at least with respect to this issue.
Further developments in the UN
As stated above, the 6(d) test was created to move
products from Division 1.4 Compatibility Group S into
Division 1.4 in compatibility groups other than S. The
UN is considering expanding the 6(d) test criteria to
impact “1.4 other than S” classifications. Thus the 6(d)
test could be used to remove products from Division
1.4 and assign them into Divisions 1.1, 1.2 or 1.3. An
informal paper UN/SCETDG/37/INF.40 presented the
issue and discussion ensued at the 37th Session of the
UN Sub-Committee of Experts on the Transport of
Dangerous Goods, as paraphrased below.
It is suggested that the expanded criteria could be based
on 6(c) test criteria, for instance the energy of
projectiles measured by witness screens or the massdistance
table. Some experts note that articles with a
significant content of energetic substances may be
packaged in such a way that a mass explosion of the
whole content will not occur in the 6 (c) bonfire test,
but they would generate significant effects if
accidentally initiated. Examples were presented which
include:
“3. Shaped charges with UN 0440 (Hazard
Division 1.4D) are limited to an NEQ of 25 grams
per unit by some competent authorities, otherwise
are classified with UN 0059 (Hazard Division
1.1D);
4. Explosives welding articles that contain a
significant NEQ (e.g. 500 grams) may be
packaged in such a way that a mass explosion of
the whole package does not occur and end up
being classified with a UN 0444 (1.4D); however
the accidental initiation of a single charge may
result in a significant blast which is not consistent
with the definition for a 1.4 article; the
appropriate classification may be UN 0442 (1.1D)
to better reflect potential
5. articles containing smokeless powder used for
blasting applications may be classified as UN
0323 (Cartridges Power Device, 1.4S) or UN
0276 (Cartridges Power device, 1.4C) based on
series 6 testing including 6(d); note that this
classification may be achieved with a product
design feature that would prevent a potential
deflagration if the article is unconfined rather than
special packaging to contain hazardous effects;
should such an article with a similar quantity of
powder be assembled without an igniter this
would be packaged propellant and classified as
UN 0161 (1.3C);”

SAFEX Newsletter No.35, 4 th Qtr. 2010 14
Conclusion
While this proposal is being debated careful attention
should be given to the impact of proposed criteria, and
to guard against the introduction of unintended
consequences. Manufacturers may want to assess their
inventory to see how classifications could be affected
by criteria on metal fragments. We may wish to avoid
impacts on 1.4 substances such as propellants. However
if the only criteria added is for metal fragments this may
not be a problem. Finally, we must avoid one thing that
happened with the introduction of the 6(d) test where
ICAO wrote their special provision to require the test
regardless even if a competent authority judged it was
not necessary. Competent authority expertise and
discretion is the foundation of the UN classification
methodology, as stated in the UN Manual of Tests &
Criteria:
“1.1.2 It should be noted that the Manual of Tests
and Criteria is not a concise formulation of testing
procedures that will unerringly lead to a proper
classification of products. It therefore assumes
competence on the part of the testing authority
and leaves responsibility for classification with
them. The competent authority has discretion to
dispense with certain tests, to vary the details of
tests, and to require additional tests when this is
justified to obtain a reliable and realistic
assessment of the hazard of a product. In some
cases, a small scale screening procedure may be
used to decide whether or not it is necessary to
perform larger scale classification tests. Suitable
examples of procedures are given in the
introductions to some test series and in Appendix
6.”
If the 6(d) test is amended for this purpose, the new
requirements would normally appear in the UN Model
Recommendations in 2013 for adoption in regional,
national and modal regulations in 2015.
Explosives Eco-talk
The impact explosives and explosives manufacture has on the Environment fall squarely in the SAFEX domain. We
are as interested in the experiences members of the SAFEX community (Members, Associates and Expert Panel)
have in minimising explosives’ environmental impact as we are in safety and health. While most of our explosives
incidents concern the safety and health impact, we are eager to learn about the environmental side of our activities.
By way of this Feature we want to encourage readers to let us have contributions which create awareness of this
facet of our operations as well as assist our industry to behave with environmental sensitivity and responsibility.
Recycling and Reuse of military explosives for the blasting industry
Hans Wallin, Adviser KCEM www.kcem.se ;
Prof. Bo Janzon, CEO, SECRAB, Sweden, www.secrab.eu
The collapse of the Soviet Union
in 1991 revealed enormous
quantities of military material that
was stored ready for use in
magazines in the Soviet Union,
USA and other countries. The
existing recycling industry could
easily take care of tanks, airplanes,
guns and other non-explosive
materials. Metals have been
recycled for thousands of years but
explosive wastes cannot be
handled like ordinary wastes.
Explosives constitute a very
dangerous type of waste due to
their ability to explode or detonate.
In addition they are often toxic to
both man and the environment. If
not handled appropriately they can
cause severe and fatal accidents.
The purpose of this article is to
give a general introduction to the
challenges we face in disposing of
redundant military explosives.
The use of explosives started with
black powder; an era which lasted
1,500 years and left very minor
environmental problems. The
reason is simply that the
ingredients ─ charcoal, nitrates
and sulphur ─ easily lose their
explosive properties when exposed
to water. About 150 years ago high
explosives (HE) were introduced
starting with nitroglycerine, picric
acid and trinitrotoluene (TNT).
The last two explosive types were
very stable in storage, had low
sensitivity and quickly became
very popular for military purposes.
Modern military explosives are
synthetic, have very stable
properties and are often toxic.
Therefore, they must be recycled,
detonated, burned or chemically
decomposed as they will normally
not lose their explosive properties
with time. Warheads, mines and
other explosive articles when
dispersed remain uncontrolled in
the environment where they
present a serious accident risk to

SAFEX Newsletter No.35, 4 th Qtr. 2010 15
all living beings. The most obvious
threats are mines and unexploded
explosives ordnance (UXO) that
kill and maim many thousands of
people each year. Most of the
victims are children or young
males and in many countries they
will be expelled from society - if
they survive. An estimated 5,751
casualties from mines, explosive
remnants of war (ERW) or victimactivated
improvised explosive
devices (IED’s) were recorded in
2006 (1). The actual number may
be considerably larger since the
quality of the data varies
considerably. By August 2007, it
was estimated there were 473,000
survivors from such explosive
events (1) and the numbers are
increasing. Furthermore, other
types of “lost” explosives, such as
abandoned explosives ordnance
(AXO), turn up as dangerous
pollutants in the environment.
Today’s world must react quicker
to the fact that most post-conflict
environments in the last 100 years
contain a substantial risk of
unexpected detonations from
explosive residues that threaten
public safety. More resources for
remediation are now urgently
required.
The necessity to preserve our
world from such man-made
disasters has resulted in a strong
ecological movement. Significant
efforts are being made to create a
long-term sustainable society
based on renewable energy,
recycling and reuse of resources.
To litter the world with mines,
AXO, UXO and other ERW then
seems to be counterproductive and
stupid. Figure 1 below illustrates
the evolution in the disposal of
explosives in light of increasing
ecological concerns.
Figure 1: Evolution of explosives disposal treatments with increasing ecological concerns
PERIOD Yesterday Today Tomorrow
DISPOSAL
TREATMENT
ENVIRONMENTAL
CONSTRAINTS
Dumping
Destruction /
Recycling
Recycling
None Moderate Severe
On the positive side we know
explosives are fundamental tools
for building a modern society.
They are used for blasting in
construction, mining and oil
exploitation; airbags in cars; in
medicine; in fuels and devices for
space rockets and satellites; for
pyrotechnics such as emergency
rockets/signals and for defence
materiel. Therefore, one strategy is
to recover military explosives and
use it in value-added applications
such as commercial blasting. The
production of boosters is a prime
example. Boosters transfer the
initiation from the blasting cap to
the main charge which typically
consists of low sensitive
ammonium nitrate based pumpable
explosives. The production of
boosters in the world today
exceeds 100 ton per day and the
price for recycled explosives is on
the increase. Recovered
propellants are often added to
commercial explosives in order to
increase the gas volume. New
commercial products based on
recovered military explosives are
ready to be introduced to the
market.
Sweden has recycled military
explosives since 1970 at the
Nammo Vingåkersverken facility.
Recycled TNT was delivered in
flaked form to the iron ore area in
the north of Sweden. Other
explosive materials such as
propellant and composite
explosives were burnt.
Our conclusion is that all new
military explosive products must
be designed so that the explosives
materials can be recycled and used
to replace virgin products.
Recycling and reuse of all
excessive energetic materials is an
important marker on the way to
build a sustainable society on our
planet. Open burning and open
detonation must be reduced to a
minimum. Figure 2 on p.16 gives
examples of products that have
been manufactured from recycling
ammunition.
Let us consider in a little more

SAFEX Newsletter No.35, 4 th Qtr. 2010 16
detail some of the challenges that
face those who are involved with
explosives:
Figure 2: Examples of products made from recycling ammunition
1. Pollution of land
The cleaning of battlefields, even
those from World War I nearly
100 years ago, will continue for
many years to come. Even if all
deployment of UXO and mines are
stopped today, clean-up processes
will need to continue for hundreds
of years.
Boosters
Iron girder
Fawcett Fertilizer Batteries
Electricity
2. Pollution of water
A quick and easy way to get rid of
old ammunition was to dump it at
sea, in lakes, disused quarries or
ore mines. This method was used
by many countries as recently as
15 years ago. Normally such
dumps are not considered serious
sources of pollution if they are left
undisturbed. However, pollutants
may leak out into sea or ground
water and cause serious
contamination. If at that point the
explosives must be removed,
serious problems can arise.
Hundreds of thousands (2) of
abandoned naval mines in many
oceans of the world, mostly laid in
relatively shallow waters, will add
to this problem. Many can remain
effective for a hundred years or
more; others can break loose and
float away while remaining
dangerous. Modern, advanced
mines are very difficult to find and
may in practice be impossible to
clear, unless this can be done by
the laying party knowing their
exact location.
Explosively contaminated process
water must be cleaned before
being returned to nature but that
has not always been the case. It is
essential that groundwater is well
protected from explosive
contamination as it is impossible to
clean with available techniques.
3. Pollution of air
Gases and dust from open burning
or open detonation (OBOD) often
contain minute metal particles.
There are also potentially negative
consequences when explosive dust
and gasses are released into the air.
Detonation or combustion in a
closed vessel Iron with girder exhaust
cleaning Boosters is among the Fawcett best
pollution-friendly methods to
dispose of explosives. It is also
logistically more effective than
OBOD.
4. Factory sites, storages,
dumps
Places where explosives have been
produced and stored often create
very complex environmental
problems, especially if the sites
have been in operation for a long
time. (See Figure 3). Normally no
one would know what has
happened at a factory or
ammunition dump 50 years ago or
more. Therefore, keeping and
preserving accurate records is
vitally important.
5. Civilian use of explosives
Civilian use of explosives affects
Figure 3: A deteriorating open-air
AXO dump.
Since these munitions were
temperature-cycled over long time
they cannot be cleared by moving
but should be detonated in situ.
(Photo courtesy OSSE)
many areas of society. Improperly
controlled explosive materials can
have disastrous consequences
when exposed to an unsuspecting
Fertilizer
or ignorant public. For instance, an
Batteries Electricity
airbag removed from its normal
position in a vehicle will constitute
a serious risk for harming people.
Surplus explosives must be
collected and desensitised in a safe
and controlled manner. This
requires economic resources. In
addition, explosives can be stolen
and used for criminal or terrorist
purposes which necessitates good
control of the materials and secure
storage.
6. Economical consequences
Explosive contamination of terrain
can also cause serious economic
damage to the country where it
exists. Even a few uncleared mines
or UXO may obstruct large areas
from normal use such as
agriculture. Also communications,
such as roads, rivers, harbours and
railways may be non-functional for
long periods of time. It will also
prevent the population from
returning to their former
residential areas and resuming a
normal life. In addition, the cost
and personnel resources required
for clearance may be very high.
The worst affected countries are
normally developing nations which
have difficulty finding the
necessary resources to deal with
the problem. The funding offered
by the International Community is
still much too small and the
attention of developed nations
seems to be distracted very quickly
from such issues.

SAFEX Newsletter No.35, 4 th Qtr. 2010 17
7. Clearance and destruction
of explosives
This is definitely a task for well
trained and equipped
professionals, not for amateurs.
The general population should
only participate in ‘mine risk
education’ (MRE). Essentially this
concerns knowledge about how to
avoid exposure to the hazards of
mines and UXO. MRE is
especially important for children
who will often become victims of
explosive remnants of war when
playing, scavenging for water,
food or valuable materials that can
be sold such as metals.
During de-mining operations it is
often preferred to destroy the
cleared munitions by open-air
detonation, either in situ or
collected close to the area of work.
The reason is that it would be
dangerous to move them, or, if left
over-night, there is a serious risk
they could be stolen and re-used.
If societal conditions permit, the
method of choice should be to
recycle explosives industrially.
Typical military explosives can be
melted or cleaned out. It can then
be used, for instance, to produce
civilian booster charges or add to
bulk explosives for rock blasting in
order to improve their detonation
properties. Recycling plants can be
made mobile and be located close
to the place where they will be
needed.
8. Cleaning of waste soil and
water
The increased interest in a clean
and sustainable environment raises
a demand for remediation of old
mistakes. The problems are often a
mixture of different pollutants that
threaten the environment. We must
learn from the mistakes of earlier
generations in order to avoid
destroying our world. Furthermore,
there is an urgent need for new
technology and techniques which
requires resources for research and
development.
9. International efforts
International legislation,
agreements or instruments that
refer to or require the mandatory
clearance and destruction of
ammunition, explosive articles and
explosives are limited. The Anti-
Personnel Mine Ban Treaty
(Ottawa Convention) of 1997 and
the Cluster Munitions Ban of Oslo
of 2008 are a start. In these
agreements governments from
around the world pledged to
abstain from the use, production,
transfer and stockpiling of antipersonnel
mines and cluster
munitions. The Convention on
Cluster Munitions sets the highest
standard to date in International
Law for assistance to survivors and
their communities. That
convention also obliges nations to
destroy all stockpiles within eight
years and to clear contaminated
land within ten. In many cases the
latter task is not achievable. As
with the treaty banning antipersonnel
land mines, this treaty
will also make it difficult for
countries which have not signed it
ever to use these weapons again.
With time these conventions will
also become customary law that
binds them all. However there will
still be non-state belligerents that
may see themselves above the law
and continue to use them
unhindered.
Some good news for the future is
that the international community is
at last beginning to accept that the
problems arising from the
accumulation of conventional
ammunition stockpiles deserve
greater international interest,
developmental commitment and
political will. This is
demonstrated by the Report of a
UN Group of Government Experts
(GGE) (3) in pursuance of a
Resolution (4) of the UN General
Assembly that recommends;
1. the education and training of
national
stockpile
management staff;
2. the development of a set of
international technical
guidelines in order to assist
States in improving their
national
stockpile
management capacities; and
3. the improvement of
knowledge resource
management on ammunition
technical issues within the
United Nations system to
ensure that States have ready
access to appropriate
technical expertise and
guidance for the safe and
secure storage of ammunition
and the disposal of surplus
stockpiles.
The UN General Assembly (5)
welcomed the report and strongly
encouraged States to implement its
recommendations. The very
welcome diplomatic engagement
of Germany and France on this
issue has at last raised the
international profile of this threat
to an appropriate level and work
on the development of
international ammunition
guidelines (UN ATG) commenced
in 2009.
10. Actions for the future
The explosives community (i.e.
everyone who professionally
handles explosives) must develop
ethical rules which call for
professional workmanship and
prohibit contamination of the
environment with explosives.
There is also an obligation on us to
preserve previous knowledge and
foster new generations of
responsible explosives specialists.
Regrettably this seldom happens.
Additional research in the field is
also required.
The authors of this short
introduction to an existing severe
problem hope that the International
Explosives Community and
SAFEX will contribute with
actions and suggestions aimed at
reducing explosive pollution of our
environment. Therefore, we hope
this article will start a process of
engaging SAFEX members in
actions that will serve to reduce
and minimize the pollution of the
environment with explosive
remnants of war, abandoned
explosive ordnance and surplus
ammunition and explosives.

SAFEX Newsletter No.35, 4 th Qtr. 2010 18
11. References
1: Landmine Monitor, 2009, http://lm.icbl.org/index.php/publications/display?url=lm/2009/
2: http://www.havet.nu/dokument/HM_2006_hela.pdf
3: UNGA Report A/63/182 dated 28 July 2008, http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/441/77/PDF/N0844177.pdf?OpenElement
4: UNGA Resolution 61/72 of 03 January 2007, http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/498/75/PDF/N0649875.pdf?OpenElement
5: Resolution 63/61 of the UN General Assembly (02 December 2008), http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/474/45/PDF/N0847445.pdf?OpenElement
Some other links:
http://lm.icbl.org/index.php/publications/display?url=lm/2009/maps/casualties.html
http://lm.icbl.org/lm/2009/maps/resources/LM_09_Casualties_eng.pdf
Inbox @ SAFEX-International.org
From time to time we receive e-mails from members of the SAFEX community on a variety of issues. It is important
we share such experiences and insights and if necessary debate them. Our quarterly Newsletter may just be the
forum for doing so.
We therefore invite ALL readers to drop us a line at secretariat@safex-international.org if they want to raise an
explosives health, safety or environmental issue or comment on any of the opinions received from our
correspondents.
Obligation on electronic detonator manufacturers
In July SAFEX distributed a Safety Alert from Queensland, Australia (QLD SA41 v.2) concerning the
incompatibility of electric detonators with the firing box of an electronic detonator system. An explosives
incident occurred where a development face was initiated with an instantaneous electric detonator that was
unintentionally tied-in with a production blast using electronic detonators. The development blast with the
electric detonator was then initiated during the test sequence for the electronic detonator system.
Dr Stafford Smithies (Expert Panel) commented as follows: In Europe and South Africa the standards for
approval of electronic blasting equipment make it fairly difficult for such an incident to occur. In one case with
which I am familiar the German BAM insisted that electronic blasting equipment for electronic detonators be shown
to be incapable of firing the most sensitive electric detonators available locally.
I recently conducted tests for the South African Department of Mineral Resources and the South African Bureau of
Standards (SABS). These tests showed that a special shot exploder for a new electronic detonator made in South
Africa was not capable of setting off locally-available electric and electronic detonators from different suppliers.
This certainly shows that some authorities are aware of this problem.
The number of suppliers of electronic detonators in the world is increasing, often in areas without the appropriate
technical or regulatory standards. It is important that any organization involved in the manufacture or supply of
electronic detonator systems be sure that:
a. Regular shot exploders for electric detonators will not set off the electronic detonators they manufacture or
supply.
b. Blasting equipment for electronic detonators they may supply should not set off the most sensitive electric
initiators available in that country.
If these two conditions are not required by authorities and not met by the electronic detonator system, appropriate
warnings and training will be required.

SAFEX Newsletter No.35, 4 th Qtr. 2010 19
Pyro powder transfer
requires special care
An incident was reported to
SAFEX in which the manual
transfer of pyrotechnic
composition used for delay
elements from a brass tray to a
plastic bottle using a stainless
steel scoop resulted in an
ignition. As a consequence the
operator and his assistant were
injured. It was thought the
friction between the stainless
steel scoop and edges of the
brass tray may have ignited the
composition in the tray
Maurice Bourgeois (GD-OTS
Canada) sent us the following
observation: Depending on the
sensitivity of the powder, some rebowling
(putting powders in
service containers) must be done
remotely by pouring from a large
container to a service container.
For some pyro igniting powders
we use a U elbow shaped
volumetric transfer system
remotely.
When we scoop we put the large
container on an incline so that the
material collects on one side of the
container; hence the scoop touches
only the material and does not
scrape the interior wall of the
container.
Yes, the conductive plastic scoop
could have helped but if the
composition was very sensitive to
friction (BAM friction test should
be performed on that powder) we
would know if extra precautions
are required like remote rebowling.
Safety is as simple as
ABC…
Always Be Careful.
Electrostatic discharge as a cause can be difficult
to establish
In a recent incident about 900 g of propellant with experimental
composition was extruded and deflagrated when the operator
wearing all the prescribed personal protective equipment went into
the extruder room to pick up the extruded samples for testing.
This prompted Maurice Bourgeois (GD-OTS Canada) from
commenting: Even though the lab technician was wearing conductive
shoes, the last conductive floor test should be checked. For explosives
sensitive to electrostatic discharge (ESD), we require 500 k-ohms for
floor electrical resistance. Also the operator shoe test must be checked
and the result should not be greater than 500 k-Ohms. Hence the total
electrical resistance (operator-shoe-floor) should not be greater than 1
meg-ohm. We had a number of problems in controlling ESD’s. For
example, the soap used to clean the floor collected on the soles of the
shoes with the result that the operators’ shoes did not meet the electrical
resistance limit. Furthermore, some operators have dry skin which
prevents good conductivity. At our Valleyfield plant some operators walk
outside the buildings and dirt collects on the soles of the shoes if not
properly cleaned. The shoes then become non-conductive or less
conductive.
Also, if solvents were involved at the extrusion machine vapour cloud
may have collected near the propellant. If there was sufficient vapour or if
the propellant is highly sensitive to ESD (e.g. less than 3.6 mJ), then a
brush discharge can ignite the solvent vapours or the very ESD sensitive
propellant. A brush discharge occurs when a charged insulating or
dielectric material discharges on a conductive part or body. I think in this
case many stones have to be turned before discarding the electrostatic
explanation.
To this Yehuda Gai (IMI) responded as follows: Shoes, floor and handto-floor
electrical conductivity tests are done on a regular basis. In
addition, every person must check himself each morning for the correct
electrical conductivity and sign that he has done so before entering the
building and starting work. Shoes and floor was checked again a day after
the event and found to be correct. Levels of electrical resistance are
similar to those Maurice mentions in his comment.
Andy Begg (Individual Associate) also had a question: This was an
experimental composition. It will be interesting to know how they assess
experimental compositions for hazard properties in processing and
handling before they do the actual work. This could have been a
composition that was inherently more sensitive to friction or static to the
point where existing controls were not sufficient.
Yehuda Gai (IMI) again replied as follows: Each experimental
composition must be tested in accordance with TB-700-2 (DoD, Ammo
& Explosives Hazard Classification Procedures). While awaiting the final
results of the sample it is classified 1.1 and production is limited to the
minimum required quantity in order to conduct the above mentioned tests.
In this case we had a developed mother product that was previously
classified as 1.3. The R&D engineers wanted to desensitise the
composition by increasing the percentage of desensitising material.
Notwithstanding, our safety board demanded a full scale safety

SAFEX Newsletter No.35, 4 th Qtr. 2010 20
classification testing procedure be
conducted in order to classify the
new composition. Before doing
any work a risk assessment was
conducted as a part of work and
safety procedure. The incident
occurred during the production of
the testing sample. No violation of
safety and work procedures was
found.
The current position is that we are
preparing a fully automatic sample
line in order to conduct the hazard
classification procedures. We will
also try to reproduce an
ignition/deflagration/explosion in
order to understand the mechanism
of this particular event.
I appreciate and respect both
Maurice and Andy’s comments
and thank them for their interest.
Safety Snippets
Lone-working: Feedback on Members’ comments
In October we approached SAFEX members on behalf of Maurice Bourgeois (GD-OTS Canada) for information
about various countries’ regulations regarding lone-working with explosives. Typical questions asked include the
explosives handling operations in which lone workers are permitted or not permitted. As with the similar request on
the use of a “lone worker alarm” in a production facility we posed previously (see SAFEX Newsletter No.30, 3 rd
Quarter 2009 ), we had a gratifying response from the following members of the SAFEX community:
Frank Barker (Expert Panel);
Massimo Berti (Simmel Difesa);
Jorge Carbajal (Austin Bacis);
Ashley Haslett (Ulster Industrial Explosives);
Ernest Hodgson (Rheinmetall Denel Munition);
Claude Modoux (Poudrerie d’Aubonne);
Helen Muller (Dyno Nobel);
Erik Nilsson (KCEM);
Takaaki Torikai (Kayaku Japan);
Mervyn Traut (Expert Panel);
John Bennett (Orica MEA);
Jean-Yves Canihac (Groupe EPC);
Susan Flanagan (IME);
Martin Held (Austin International);
Gunter Kleinrath (Schaffler);
Lisa Molochkova, (Novosibirsk Iskra);
Dawie Mynhardt (BME);
Lon Santis (IME);
Stuart Tough (NIXT);
Dave White (EPC-UK)
Maurice found the responses very helpful and asked me to convey his appreciation to all those who responded. He
kindly put together this summary using the responses he received:
It is clear regulators in many countries have not
addressed this issue. The reason may be that a list of
explosives related tasks which can be done in “workalone
mode could be never-ending. In my view
working with primary explosives and exposed
pyrotechnic powders is similar to certain situations in
the electrical industry. An electrician working on live
circuits or on equipment and processes requiring two or
more workers in emergency situations may by law not
work alone. Someone needs to be around to intervene if
the electrician needs help. This is similar to working at
heights or in enclosed spaces where workers are also
prohibited from working alone.
To make a judgment about permitting lone-working,
companies typically rely on risk assessment and
rightfully so. However, unless the assessment focuses
on the implications of lone-working, a superficial
conclusion may be: “if the risk is acceptable in normal
operations it should be acceptable for lone-working”.
Perhaps lone-working should be the subject of a
SAFEX Good Practice Guide. The importance of such
a Guide is highlighted by the competitive nature of
today’s business environment. In this climate
companies, including those in the explosives industry,
are obliged to reduce “unnecessary” personnel in an
attempt to cut costs.
Perhaps we should start by defining what Loneworking
is. The Dyno Nobel standard which Helen
Muller kindly shared with me serves as a useful starting
point. I have taken the liberty to modify it to read as
follows: A worker works alone when he cannot be:
• seen; or
• heard without an electric sound device; or
• visited frequently during the course of his work by
co-workers or supervisor; and/or
• helped immediately (within 15 seconds) in an
emergency. This may entail someone nearby
having to pull him out of harm’s way or assist him
with an emergency task which requires two or
more workers.

SAFEX Newsletter No.35, 4 th Qtr. 2010 21
In an attempt to stimulate further debate, I highlight
some of the issues that are apparent from the inputs
received:
a. As mentioned by Lon Santis of IME, loneworking
mode should be avoided when explosives
are involved and be used as a last resort when it
can’t be avoided. Sometimes more effort is put
into trying to justify lone-working than finding an
alternative solution.
b. Risk analysis should be reviewed with a focus on
lone-working (especially in dealing with unusual
situations)
c. Lone working should be prohibited for tasks
which represent higher inherent risks (these are
high risk tasks which may have become lower risk
tasks with mitigating measures) . Such tasks
included destruction of explosives and working
with exposed sensitive primary explosives or
pyrotechnic powders. In these circumstances there
are many possible causes of mishap and a second
operator located at a safe distance is necessary to
lend a helping hand, administer first aid or initiate
an emergency.
d. Lone working should not be permitted in
processes where
• a lone operator cannot cope with emergency
situations that can degenerate into a
catastrophe or expose the operator to injury; or
• unusual situations identified after HAZOP
studies; or
• unforeseen incidents not identified in HAZOP
studies and indicative of equipment or process
hazards that are not fully understood.
Such processes should not be operated in work
alone mode.
e. Lone work mode should be analyzed on a
personal basis: Health background check of the
lone worker, safety record, training on the job,
experience in that particular task, etc.
f. Lone work mode should be analyzed for past
incidents for the task or equipment, for unusual
events, how they are recognized and dealt with.
g. As per an INRS document on this topic, studies
indicate that the accident frequency is higher in a
lone working environment. Reasons cited include
boredom (nobody around to talk to); temerity and
a tendency to take shortcuts because there is
nobody around to see what is going on. In these
situations more frequent visits by the supervisor
are necessary. For these reasons personal
background checks on the trustworthiness of the
individual are so important.
h. Obviously man-down devices with GPS is
available and should be considered
i. A proper communication system with contact at
least every half hour (and reporting of any
travelling to other areas or the whereabouts on
real time basis) should be established and a log
kept by the person to whom the worker reports. If
no call is received that person must try to contact
the worker at the given time indicated in the log.
j. For some workstations, instructions can prohibit
certain operations to be performed alone in which
case a second operator or a helping hand is called
in.
k. Sometimes a process has to commence 1 hour
before the normal shift. Such start-ups usually
require more operator interventions and hence
more human errors can occur. Management
should ask itself whether work alone mode is
worth it in this situation.
These are some thoughts on the subject and I look
forward to any comments from Newsletter readers
Gun Powder Manufacturer Fined $1.2 Million Following Deadly Explosion
This article appeared on 27 October 2010 in the OH&S Magazine which is an online publication of Occupational
Health & Safety, an 1105 Media Inc. magazine, www.ohsonline.com. It is reproduced in its entirety with the kind
permission of the Editor, Jerry Laws. We thank Jerry for allowing us to publish his article in this Newsletter. You
can view the original article at http://ohsonline.com/articles/2010/10/27/gun-powder-manufacturer-fined-12-millionfollowing-deadly-explosion.aspx?admgarea=ht.FireSafety
OSHA has issued 54 workplace
safety and health citations with
penalties totalling $1.2 million to
gun powder substitute
manufacturer Black Mag LLC,
following an investigation into the
causes of a deadly explosion in
May at the company's worksite in
Colebrook, N.H. The explosion
took the lives of two workers who
had been on the job for only a
month.
"The fines levied here pale in
comparison to the value of the two
lives lost," said Secretary of Labor
Hilda L. Solis. "Nonetheless, this
was a tragedy that easily could
have been prevented had the
employer valued the health and
safety of its employees. Employers
should not sacrifice their workers'
lives for a profit, and no one
should be injured or killed for a
pay check."
On May 14, two workers and a

SAFEX Newsletter No.35, 4 th Qtr. 2010 22
plant supervisor were
manufacturing a gun powder
substitute known as Black Mag
powder when the explosion
occurred. The workers had been
required to hand feed powder into
operating equipment due to the
employer's failure to implement
essential protective controls. The
employer also chose not to
implement remote starting
procedures, isolate operating
stations, establish safe distancing,
and erect barriers or shielding—all
of which are necessary for the safe
manufacture of explosive powder.
Additionally, the employer chose
not to provide the personal
protective equipment and other
safety measures its employees
needed to work safely with such
hazardous material. OSHA cited
the company with four egregious
willful, 12 willful, 36 serious and
two other-than-serious violations
with total penalties of $1,232,500.
"Even after a prior incident in
which a worker was seriously
injured, and multiple warnings
from its business partners and a
former employee, this employer
still decided against implementing
safety measures," said Assistant
Secretary of Labor for OSHA Dr.
David Michaels. "Unfortunately,
we see this kind of disregard time
and time again across industries.
All employers must find and fix
workplace hazards so these types
of avoidable tragedies don't
happen, and workers can return
home safely at the end of the day."
The four egregious willful
citations were issued for the failure
to train each of the four workers
involved in the manufacture of the
gun powder substitute. In addition
to the two workers killed and their
supervisor, there was an additional
employee who left the job nine
days before the explosion. Willful
citations are considered egregious
(Ed – outstandingly bad; shocking)
when more than one worker is
exposed to a single hazard. The
citation issued for that hazard is
then multiplied by the number of
workers exposed.
Other willful citations were issued
for the failure to locate operators at
safe locations while equipment
was operating; separate
workstations by distance or
barriers and ensure that each
worker was properly trained;
provide adequate personal
protective equipment, such as fire
resistant clothing, face shields and
gloves; safely store gun powder;
and identify explosion hazards in
the company's operating
procedures. A willful violation is
one committed with intentional
knowing or voluntary disregard for
the law's requirements, or with
plain indifference to worker safety
and health.
Hot water geyser explodes
Some of the 36 serious citations
were issued for the failure to
separate small arms ammunition
from flammable liquids, solids,
and oxidizing materials by a fireresistive
wall or by a distance of
25 feet; establish and implement
an emergency action plan and
provide written procedures to
manage changes; provide personal
protective equipment including
clothing, respiratory devices,
protective shields, and barriers for
workers exposed to lead; train
workers on appropriate protective
equipment; train workers in
electrical safety-related work;
address hazards associated with
exit routes; and address hazards
associated with handling, storing
and transporting explosives. A
serious citation is issued when
there is substantial probability that
death or serious physical harm
could result from a hazard about
which the employer knew or
should have known.
The two other-than-serious
violations are for a failure to
perform respirator fit tests and to
ensure that facial hair does not
interfere with a respirator seal. An
other-than-serious violation is one
that has a direct relationship to job
safety and health, but probably
would not cause death or serious
physical harm.
Piet Halliday (AEL Mining Services) kindly sent us this information which was made available to industry by
Natref refinery. Natref (National Petroleum Refiners of South Africa) is a joint venture between SASOL Mining
(Pty) Ltd and TOTAL South Africa (Pty) Ltd. The refinery was commissioned in 1971 and is located near the
industrial heartland at Sasolburg, South Africa. We thank Sasol and Total for sharing this information with us.
While on the face of it this incident has nothing to do with explosives, it has off-the-job safety value. It also contains
important lessons to remind us that old installations must keep pace with changing regulations and good practices. It
also illustrates the result of control instrumentation failure in a simple application.
Description of the Incident
On Sunday 22 August 2010 at
about 02h00 the hot water geyser
at the Natref mechanical workshop
exploded and caused severe
damage to the building and
equipment inside the building.
Repair cost of the damage
estimated at R600 000 Fortunately
no-one was in the affected area
and therefore no injuries resulted.

SAFEX Newsletter No.35, 4 th Qtr. 2010 23
Background Information
It was a large (540L) 3 phase
electrically heated geyser installed
more than 30 years ago. Work was
done on the water supply to the
geyser in the week. The geyser
was switched off to do this work.
After completion of the work, the
geyser was switched on again but
it tripped electrically and was reset
by the electrician who checked for
a fault but found nothing wrong.
The evening before the incident it
was noted that the hot water was
very hot.
Why Did It Happen?
The geyser was installed as a nonvented
system operating higher
than atmospheric pressure
(100kPa). The geyser was not
fitted with a temperature and
pressure safety valve since the
installation of such a device was
not required by regulations at the
time of installation. The heating
system (thermostat) malfunctioned
and failed to shut off the electricity
when the water reached normal
working temperature (65 degrees
C). The water was superheated to
above its atmospheric boiling
point. A sudden drop in operating
pressure was experienced either
because of the geyser rupturing
under pressure or more likely due
to the relieve valve breaking off
due to vibration caused by letting
off steam instead of water. The
water in the geyser turned into
steam at 1600 times the original
volume instantaneously and that
caused the explosion.
How to Prevent It
Unvented geysers inherently pose
the risk of explosion if the water
temperature is allowed to exceed
the atmospheric boiling point. In a
geyser protected against
overheating by the thermostat
only, a single failure (of the
thermostat) can lead to overheating
of the water. New geysers when
properly installed are fitted with a
3 tier safety system to prevent
overheating:
- The thermostat
- The high temperature cut-out
in the thermostat
- The temperature and pressure
safety valve (TP Valve)
It is essential that a unvented
geyser installation adhere to the
latest regulations. Especially the
TP valve must be present. Make
use of a qualified plumber to
install a geyser. Inspect existing
installations or have it inspected
for proper installation
Installation Diagram
Item 6 was not installed in the Natref geyser that exploded when the heat input regulation system failed. If it was in
place, it would have prevented the incident

SAFEX Newsletter No.35, 4 th Qtr. 2010 24
Corrective Actions
All geysers at Natref were
inspected and those not in
compliance with latest regulations
were electrically isolated. Noncompliant
geysers still required
will be upgraded to comply others
will be dismantled. A maintenance
strategy for geysers will be
developed and implemented to
ensure continued integrity. The
learnings from the incident will be
shared to warn others
Lessons Learned
Hot water geysers can explode
with devastating force if not
installed and maintained properly.
When regulations regarding safety
requirements of a system change
the implications for and risk
associated with the installed base
must be assessed and appropriate
action taken
Impact from the explosion of the hot water geyser
What was left of the geyser after the explosion
STOP PRESS
IMESAFR Course: Venue and Dates Confirmed
By now you know the Institute of Makers of Explosives (IME) offered to run an IMESAFR course to coincide with
the SAFEX Congress in Istanbul next year. In this way company delegates to the Congress can combine IMESAFR
training with their Congress participation to save on travel costs. Earlier we distributed information about the Course
to members of the SAFEX community and asked them to indicate their interest. This will help to determine whether
the course is viable. The course will be arranged and presented by APT Research on behalf of the IME and Ashley
Bedwell is the point of contact.
There has been a delay in finalizing the actual dates and venue as we attempted to accommodate those members
who expressed interest. While the interest from SAFEX members has been limited, IME is trying to bolster the
number by looking further afield. If the Course proceeds, it will be held in the Hotel Elite World Prestige (the 4-
star hotel) on 23, 24 and 25 May 2011. The Elite World Prestige is right next door to the Congress Hotel (the 5-
star hotel) and therefore very convenient for delegates regardless of where they elect to stay.
It is not too late to enroll for this Course. If you are interested please contact Ashley Bedwell at
abedwell@apt-research.com or the Secretariat who will then pass your messages onto Ashley.
If you are interested in IMESAFR don’t miss this opportunity.

SAFEX Newsletter No.35, 4 th Qtr. 2010 25
Tony’s Tale-piece
A tailpiece is something that appears at the end of a publication. I guess it is derived from the tail of an animal
which is (normally) fixed to “the end” of it. However, we refer to this feature as a “Tale-piece”. It is not a spelling
mistake but a different tale. This “tale” is about telling stories. While it appears at the end of our Newsletter, it is
also meant to tell a story hence the play on words. Let me tell you what “Tony’s Tale-piece” is about.
Tony Rowe from AEL Mining Services has kindly agreed to provide a regular feature based on truths he has
discovered over many years in his work with explosives. He has a unique style of writing (perhaps “telling stories”
may be a better way to describe it) which we hope gets a well-known message across in a new way. This Feature is
there to remind readers of some explosive(s) truths in a different way!
Detonators are terrifying!
Bleak, but generally quiet, these
dismal places are found all over
the world. The walls of such rooms
are usually painted either white or
cream and may even be lined with
shelves. Nobody lives in the
rooms. They have no personality,
no sense of life or of the living.
There is little to delight the eye or
tickle a fancy. The rooms are
neutral even boring - Spartan to
the extreme.
Such are the places where the hand
removers are stored. The hand
removers wait there, sometimes for
weeks, often for months and
occasionally even years. They wait
patiently, their brief moment of
fame, their ultimate glory
preordained by their purpose. Most
of them will contribute mightily to
human existence while others will
bring only grief and remorse.
The hand removers not only
remove hands, they can also blind,
maim and kill. If more than one is
involved, outcomes worsen almost
exponentially. They will do it to
the young. They will do it to the
old. Given half a chance, they will
even do it to you. Young girls and
old women will mostly fail to
recognize them. But boys,
especially boys of a certain age,
just know. The boys can’t explain
how they know, but like a lock
with a matching key, it’s an ability
that’s built in. Maybe it’s part of
their genetic code. Recognition
Tony Rowe (AEL Mining Services)
though is not understanding. In
fact it’s about as far from
understanding as a live chicken is
from the wreck of the Titanic. So,
year after year, in every country of
the world, the hand removers
continue to do their deadly work.
What are these hand removers of
which I speak? Generally they are
small, silver or copper coloured
tubes closed at one end. Wires, a
plastic tube or a length of fibrous
material will often protrude from
one end. They’re called blasting
caps. The name though is all
wrong. A cap is a name from my
boyhood when a cap was a fairly
harmless noisemaker used in toy
guns. A better name is
Commercial Mining Detonators or
“DETONATOR” for short!
Detonators are truly terrifying.
Their small size belies their
awesome power. Believe me, to
compare one to bottled lightning
would be an understatement! To
demonstrate the output from a
detonator is easy-peasy, but before
we do that let’s spend a minute or
so discussing the little brutes a bit.
Detonators consist of an increment
(usually less than 1 g) of a single
molecule explosive pressed into a
metal or even a paper shell. The
explosive, perhaps PETN
detonates at about 6000 metres per
second. Sugar! That’ll make your
eyes water (for comparison
purposes a bullet leaves the barrel
of a handgun at around 400 metres
per second and we all know what
one of those can do to human flesh
and bone). Shortly after the
explosive (PETN) column
detonates, the surrounding metal
tube breaks up into the thousands
of tiny pieces we call shrapnel.
They are light and very sharp, but
not particularly aerodynamic. It’s a
bit like throwing a feather. The
feather leaves the throwers hand at
a good lick, but rapidly slows
down and usually doesn’t travel
very far. It’s the same with most
detonator shrapnel. But if you are
in the high speed zone, it’s like
you trashed Freddy Kruger’s old
lady. You’ll be cut to bits:
penetrating wounds, lacerations,
blood, pain and trauma - the whole
shooting match. Distance is

SAFEX Newsletter No.35, 4 th Qtr. 2010 26
everything. That’s why the further
you are away, the better.
Sometimes, a “leetle bit of
shicken” is good for you.
As to the power output test
mentioned earlier, well here goes.
Not far from my office there
stands a cylindrical vessel made
from thick steel plate. It is almost
as tall as I am, though I’m pleased
to say a little wider. If you fill it
with water the total mass of both
water and cylinder is around 1000
kilograms. It’s heavier than me
too. Brimful and with a single 8
strength instantaneous electric
detonator (IED) placed in the
water it will cause damage. Don’t
place the detonator close to the
steel walls; rather place it centrally
with the tube just submerged and
positioned vertically closed end
pointing down. Pop the shot and
you will observe the cylinder, (a
whole 1000 kg remember) lift
some 50 mm or so from the
ground. It falls back quickly so
don’t get your fingers in there.
Many scientists claim it is magic,
but I think it is just the shock wave
reflecting. Don’t try this at home!
Demonstrations of any explosive
product(s) should only be
undertaken by trained personnel,
skilled in the art and carried out
under conditions of absolute
control.
Carelessly stored or forgotten
explosives are a magnet to
children so safe storage is vital.
Keep ‘em under lock and key
guys. Don’t ever, ever hide them
away. Children always find
them. Be safe. The children you
protect by your positive actions
might be your own.
SAFEX International thanks the following for their contributions to this Newsletter:
• Claude Modoux, Chairman of SAFEX
• Dr David Price, CEO Chemring Group PLC
• Dr Michael du Plessis, SAFEX Expert Panel member and Owner, Greenice Pty Ltd
• Dr Phil Lightfoot, Manager, Canadian Explosives Research Laboratory
• Ben Barrett, SAFEX Expert Panel member and President, DG Advisor
• Hans Wallin, Adviser to KCEM, Sweden
• Prof Bo Janzon, CEO of SECRAB, Sweden
• Dr. Stafford Smithies, SAFEX Expert Panel member and Consultant, Victor Solomon & Associates
• Maurice Bourgeois, GD-OTS, Canada
• Yehuda Gai, Israel Military Industries (IMI)
• Andy Begg, Individual Associate and Director, EXSAR Consulting
• Jerry Laws, Occupational Health & Safety, an 1105 Media Inc. magazine, www.ohsonline.com
• Dr Piet Halliday, Governor of SAFEX and Director, AEL Mining Services
• Tony Rowe, AEL Mining Services
SAFEX thanks all Newsletter readers for their support
and encouragement during 2010. We wish you all an incident
free Festive Season and a safe and satisfying 2011.
Boet Coetzee
Secretary General, SAFEX International
BOARD OF GOVERNORS
Claude Modoux (Poudrerie d’Aubonne);
Enrique Barraincua (MAXAM);
Andy Begg (Individual Associate);
Jean-Yves Canihac (Groupe EPC);
Stephen Connolly (Orica);
Steven Dawson (Dyno Nobel Asia Pacific);
David Gleason (Austin Powder Company);
Rahul Guha (Solar);
Dr. Piet Halliday (AEL Mining Services);
Karl Maslo (EXSA)
REGISTERED OFFICE
SAFEX International
c/o Modoux Services Sárl
Route du Village 13
CH – 1807 BLONAY. Switzerland
Web: www.safex-international.org
CONTACT US
Secretary General
Tel: + 1 919 342 5848
Tel/Fax: + 27 21 854 4962
e-mail: secretariat@safex-international.org