Jan and Apr 1991 - Navy League of Australia

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Who Tells Who To Do What?
Following the government's decision to despatch a small naval force to join the ships of other
nations in the Middle East several months ago, the question of who was to direct the activities of
the RAN ships when they reached the operational zone arose; the matter received limited
attention by the media and intense attention in the responsible departments of governments.
eciding the command arrangements for combined armed
forces has as often as not been a cause of friction over the
years, not so much between Service leaders as between
governments.
The legitimate desire of national governments to determine if,
when and how their armed forces are to be used is the mam
stumbling block in assembling a viable multi-national force under
unified command; language and communication differences, varying
operational procedures and logistical requirements etc. arc lesser
problems that can usually be overcome given time and opportunity
for combined exercises.
Extraordinary technological developments, not least in
communications, appear to have increased rather ihan reduced the
difficulties associated with the -.ommand of multi-national forces. In
an award-winning essay titled "Controlling C" (C is the acronym for
command, control and communications) published in the July 1990
edition of the United States Naval Institute's journal
PROCEEDINGS. Lieutenant Christopher Abel of the liS Coast
Guard writes of communication developments that enable the
President C-in-C of the Armed Forces as well as the political leader,
to communicate almost instantly with commanders and individual
units thousands of miles away. After making the point that
communications play a pivotal role in the exercise of military
command. Lieutenant Abel expresses the belief that instant
communications together with increasingly centralized command
arrangements can have some disturbing consequences:
• A temptation for the Head-of-State to depart from his traditional
role of making strategic and policy decisions and entrusting
implementation to his subordinates: instead becoming involved in
the detail of operations and on occasion directing the way they are
to be earned out.
• The adverse effect on subordinates in the chain-of-command
when over-ridden or by-passed by directions from on high — on
their autonomy, ability to make decisions quickly and act
decisively, and on their self-confidence.
• In practical terms, the vulnerability of electronic communications
to disruption by an opponent, causing the central command to lose
contact with the operational zone.
It is impracticable in the space available to Viewpoint to refer to
all the possible consequences of instant communication and
centralized command that causes the author of C concern, nor the
examples he quotes of political leaders intervening in military matters
at an operational level. In summary, he believes present-day,
communication capability must be brought under intelligent control
and used with restraint to avoid weakening the chain-of-command
including the aurhority of the commander on the spot.
Although Lieutenant Abel's essay concerns the United States in
particular, it is relevant to Australia and other countries wherein the
Armed Forces are subordinate to civilian authority; it also has a
bearing on the situation in the Middle East today.
The decision by the Australian government (and other
governments) to deploy a naval force was quite properly a political
2 Th«N«vy, J»nu«ryM»rch. 1991
one but subsequently the way the ships were to be used in the
operational zone (the high risk area plus its approaches) produced
reports that indicated political direction was extending too far and
impinging with military expertise and authority. This potential
problem now seems to have been resolved and the ships operate
under rules-of-engagement which take into account both political and
military considerations.
At the time Viewpoint goes to print the problem of establishing a
unified command in the Middle East has not been solved. At sea, the
movements of the ships of the several nations involved have been coordinatcd
while remaining answerable to their respective
governments; this should enable an effective sea blockade to be
maintained. However in the event of war it would appear essential for
the governments concerned to appoint an overall commander for the
large sea, land and air forces gathered in the Middle East; not to do so
would surely be a recipe for disaster. Any attempt by individual
governments to restrict the way their contingents were used would
also invite trouble-
The problems outlined in the foregoing must be addressed — one
likes to think they are — and solved if the United Nations
Organisation is to become an effective instrument in the preservation
of world peace.
GEOFFERY EVANS
Federal President.