Tactical Intercepts.pdf - e-HAF

Pincer
Description
The pincer is a two-pronged, bracketing attack, also sometimes called a "heart-attack,"
which is analogous to the visual bracket attack. Figure 8 illustrates the pincer.
At time "1" the fighters, initially positioned with near-zero aspect, begin displacement
turns in opposite directions for independent stern conversions or FQ attacks. Approaching time
"2" the enemy fighters detect the attack and turn toward the northern fighter. As soon as such a
bogey turn is noticed, the southern fighter must immediately turn to collision course to avoid
being left out of the action. The northern fighter pilot continues his attempt to get outside the
enemy section without giving away an angular advantage. At time "3" the northern fighter passes
the bogeys nearly head-on, while the southern fighter has gained an offensive advantage.
Had the bogeys continued straight ahead, both fighters might have achieved offensive
positions from opposite sides. Once again, the chance of escaping visual or radar detection is
enhanced when the fighters split high and low to bracket the enemy in altitude during the attack.
Advantages and Disadvantages
The pincer is an extremely effective offensive tactic, but pilots must have considerable
training in its use for it to be consistently effective. The fighters are likely to be separated by
several miles at time "2" and can provide little mutual support, so these are truly autonomous
intercepts. When the pincer is performed at very high speeds and is limited to FQ attacks with allaspect
weapons, this temporary loss of mutual support may be justified, even in the hostile
environment, to gain greater offensive potential. The fighter pilots should generally plan to rejoin
after the attack, however, for better defense, and stern conversions should be avoided except in
well-controlled situations. Again, the pincer is not recommended against bogeys in a significant
trail formation.
A further complication with the pincer is the requirement that each fighter have radar
contact with the bogeys, or at least have dual GCI close control, prior to the split. All the other
tactics described to this point could be performed reasonably with only one operable radar in the
section, or with close control only for the leader.
Another limitation for this tactic is the ability of the individual fighters either to defeat the
bogeys one-on-one or to escape from a bogey after meeting from neutral positions. This is because
the pincer invites the bogeys to split up also, which can easily result in two one-versus-one
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