Tactical Intercepts.pdf - e-HAF

caution to the winds for the advantages of deception and surprise. The only positive defensive
point that can be made in its favor is the adage "A good offense is the best defense". The fighters
are in a poor defensive posture throughout the intercept.
They are usually too close for good mutual support before the break-away, and the low,
trailing wingman is vulnerable after the split. A well-controlled situation is a prerequisite for this
tactic, since an unexpected attack by enemy fighters before the break-away would probably be
disastrous.
The situations in which the advantages outweigh the risks of this tactic include a
permissive environment in which the enemy's radar system and aircraft performance are decidedly
superior to those of the friendly fighters. When facing a definite mismatch, good execution of
sound tactics may not be enough. In boxing terminology, "A good big man will beat a good little
man most of the time". In this case a good offense may be the only defense, and some exotic
stunts may be justified if they result in enemy confusion and degraded awareness at the pass.
Obviously, however, such tactics require considerable pilot training and a high level of proficiency
before they can be relied on in combat; even then they cannot be expected to work as a steady diet,
since the enemy will soon figure them out.
There are many variations on the break-away tactic, but most begin with an initial close
formation and employ a radical formation change at close range to sow confusion among the
enemy. As with most hook and bracket-type attacks, the break-away is not recommended against
an enemy in a significant trail formation.
Cross-Block
Description
The cross-block, also called the weave, is another stunt tactic that is often successful
against superior fighters that have a propensity for independent attacks. Figure 15 shows this
tactic.
At time "1" the fighters and bogeys detect each other about head-on, and the bogeys
commence a pincer attack in an attempt to bracket the fighters. The fighter pilots detect this move
and continue straight ahead in combat spread until they reach a point at which the bogeys can be
expected to have individual radar locks on the fighters on their respective sides of the formation
for the terminal phase of attack. Once again, this usually occurs by one minute to go in the
intercept, and the fighters' RWR gear may provide further clues.
At this point, time "2", the fighter pilots also take individual locks, but on the bogey on the
opposite side of the enemy formation. This process is known as "cross-locking". The fighters then
turn toward each other, crossing flight paths, in an effort to get outside the bogey each has locked,
time "3". If the bogeys continue their intercepts on their originally intended victims, they too can
be expected to turn inward in response to the fighters' maneuvers. The geometry of the situation
tends to draw the bogeys together as they approach the merge (time "4"), making it easier for each
fighter pilot to tally both bogeys, and dragging each bogey in front of an unseen fighter. Each
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