Non Strategic Nuclear Weapons - Federation of American Scientists

More documents

Recommendations

Info

Increasing Transparency U.S. Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons Mindful of the difficulty of trading Russian reductions of its non-strategic weapons (which are justified to compensate for inferior conventional forces) for reductions in U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe (which are no longer essential), some officials in Europe and Washington are now focusing more on increasing transparency as a useful first step in the process. Opponents of reductions support this approach as a way to prevent, or at least delay, a withdrawal of non-strategic nuclear weapons from Europe. The Strategic Concept states – echoing Secretary Clinton’s speech in Tallinn – that in “any future reductions, our aim should be to seek Russian agreement to increase transparency on its nuclear weapons in Europe and relocate these weapons away from the territory of NATO members.” 99 In line with this policy, four NATO countries – Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and Poland – in April 2011 circulated a “non-paper” inside NATO that correctly pointed out that lack of transparency is a source of insecurity. The paper, which was also supported by Belgium, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Luxembourg and Slovenia, proposed a series of steps to increase transparency and confidence to “paving the way for concrete reductions.” 100 Specifically, the 4+6 paper recommended that NATO and Russia consider: exchanging information on tactical nuclear weapons. Starting with declaring numbers, the exchange should successively also include locations, operational status and command arrangements, as well as level of warhead storage security; a standard reporting formula for the tactical nuclear weapons inventories; notifying, on a voluntary basis and in good faith, within the NATO-Russia Council, of any plans to move tactical nuclear weapons; an exchange of visits by military officials; starting initial exchanges of conditions and requirements for gradual reductions of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, beginning with clarification of the number of weapons that have already been eliminated and/or put into storage by the U.S. and Russia as a result of the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991-1992; and holding a seminar in the first quarter of 2012 on nuclear doctrines, with special emphasis on the role of tactical nuclear weapons. 101 99 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Active Engagement, Modern Defense, Strategic Concept for the Defense and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, adopted by the Heads of States and Government in Lisbon, November 19, 2010, pp. 7-8, http://www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf 100 Non-Paper Submitted by Poland, Norway, Germany and the Netherlands on increasing transparency and confidence with regard to tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, April 14, 2011. A copy of the paper is available online at http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2011/04/natoproposal.php 101 For complementary and additional transparency and confidence-building measures relating to non-strategic nuclear weapons, see: Addressing Non-Strategic Nuclear Forces, Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, February 2012, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/WGP_AddressingNSNW_FINAL.pdf Federation of American Scientists www.FAS.org 42
Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons May 2012 Yet the paper also endorsed the disparity focus and bluntly rejected further unilateral reductions. Despite the U.S. NPR decision to unilaterally retire the nuclear Tomahawk cruise missile and following two decades of unilateral reductions in Europe, the paper concluded that further reductions “should not be pursued unilaterally,” and the process should be based on “the assumption of reciprocity between NATO and the Russian Federation.” 102 The Importance of Unilateral The rejection of unilateral reductions and the new focus on disparity and bilateral negotiations with Russia to reduce non-strategic nuclear weapons is curious because it is unilateral initiatives – not negotiations – that have produced all the changes in nonstrategic nuclear forces for the past two decades. The unilateral reductions by presidents George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, George W. Bush and Barack Obama have resulted in unprecedented withdrawals and destructions of non-strategic nuclear weapons without negotiations - without undermining U.S. or NATO security. The so-called Montebello decision in 1988 unilaterally withdrew 1,400 warheads from Europe (in addition to the 1,000 withdrawn during the previous decade), leaving nearly 4,000 U.S. warheads in Europe by 1990. George H.W. Bush’s Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs) further reduced the number to approximately 600 by 1993. The Clinton administration’s Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) in 1994 decided to retain 480 bombs in Europe and remove nuclear capability from surface ships, including the ability to launch nuclear weapons from aircraft carriers. In the mid-1990s, non-strategic nuclear weapons were withdrawn and consolidated from bases in Germany and Turkey, and in 2001 nuclear weapons were withdrawn from Greece. During the George W. Bush administration non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe were unilaterally reduced by more than 50 percent, including the complete withdrawal of nuclear weapons from the United Kingdom – a historic decision that was never even announced or used to get Russian reciprocal reductions. Likewise, dual-capable fighter wings in the United States intended to provide back-up to NATO and extended nuclear deterrence in the Pacific were unilaterally cut or lost their nuclear certification, leaving nuclear fighter wings in Europe as the only remaining nonstrategic fighters with an active nuclear mission. 103 102 Non-Paper Submitted by Poland, Norway, Germany and the Netherlands on increasing transparency and confidence with regard to tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, April 14, 2011. A copy of the paper is available online at http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2011/04/natoproposal.php 103 Although it is not as active a posture as the one in Europe, “a small number of nuclear weapons [are] stored in the United States for possible overseas deployment in support of extended deterrence to allies and partners worldwide.” U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report, April 6, 2011, pp. xiii, 27, http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20Nuclear%20Posture%20Review%20Report.pdf 43 Federation of American Scientists www.FAS.org
Page 1 and 2: Federation of American Scientists S
Page 3 and 4: Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons May 2
Page 41: Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons May 2
Page 79 and 80: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Con

Non Strategic Nuclear Weapons - Federation of American Scientists

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?